BASIC provides expert analysis and commentary on selective contemporary debates in strategic affairs. To do this, we engage diverse perspectives, encourage empathy across states, and broaden the context of debate. We have an established reputation for non-partisan, non-judgmental, cross-cultural engagement and for seeking common ground.
We aim to make our writing readable and interesting to both experts and the general public, cutting through jargon and democratising debate.
To browse our analysis thematically, visit our Programmes.
Read the latest analysis from BASIC staff and consultants:
In this article, originally published in The Diplomat, Dr Chiara Cervasio and Professor Nicholas J. Wheeler analyse the Pahalgam crisis from a historical perspective, tracing how India and Pakistan have navigated past moments of acute nuclear danger.
Retired Indian army Brigadier Dr Arun Sahgal and PhD Candidate Ambuj Sahu argue that its response to tensions with Pakistan was a unique use of technology-driven kinetic activity using missiles and drones in the subcontinent’s first non-contact war.
Dr Zahir Kazmi, Arms Control Advisor at Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division argues that recent tensions between Islamabad and Delhi have tested the resilience of nuclear deterrence in South Asia to the limit.
Megan Dee explores a third nuclear age in which distrust, deadlock and disorder impinge multilateral mechanisms for dialogue and deliberation. Ahead of the 2025 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee in New York (27 April-10 May), this piece considers how minilateralism can sustain dialogue and revive multilateralism in this space.
Six years ago this month, India and Pakistan were emerging out of a deep crisis…
Syed Ali Zia Jaffery, Deputy Director at CSSPR, writes on Applying the Nuclear Responsibilities Approach to Sino-US Arms Control Dialogues.
In this article, originally published in The Diplomat, Dr Chiara Cervasio and Professor Nicholas J. Wheeler analyse the Pahalgam crisis from a historical perspective, tracing how India and Pakistan have navigated past moments of acute nuclear danger.
Retired Indian army Brigadier Dr Arun Sahgal and PhD Candidate Ambuj Sahu argue that its response to tensions with Pakistan was a unique use of technology-driven kinetic activity using missiles and drones in the subcontinent’s first non-contact war.
Dr Zahir Kazmi, Arms Control Advisor at Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division argues that recent tensions between Islamabad and Delhi have tested the resilience of nuclear deterrence in South Asia to the limit.
Megan Dee explores a third nuclear age in which distrust, deadlock and disorder impinge multilateral mechanisms for dialogue and deliberation. Ahead of the 2025 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee in New York (27 April-10 May), this piece considers how minilateralism can sustain dialogue and revive multilateralism in this space.
Six years ago this month, India and Pakistan were emerging out of a deep crisis…
Syed Ali Zia Jaffery, Deputy Director at CSSPR, writes on Applying the Nuclear Responsibilities Approach to Sino-US Arms Control Dialogues.
Daniel Allen discusses the representation of nuclear weapons in popular media and their role in providing the impetus for robust, long-overdue, public discourse.
In her article published by International Relations Journal, Dr Chiara Cervasio, Policy Fellow and Programme Manager of the Nuclear responsibilities Programme, argues that the exercise of what she calls status recognition sensibility is critical to explaining whether dangerous competitions for status can be mitigated in world politics.
Mubashar Rizvi reflects on the Nuclear Responsibilities Approach through an exploration of two domestic legislative instruments through which Pakistan derives some of its nuclear responsibilities.
Ali Mustafa discusses how the Nuclear Responsibilities framework is a welcome addition to the nuclear discourse in Pakistan – however, meaningful future engagement on responsibilities requires understanding Pakistani sensibilities.
In this piece, Muhammad Shareh Qazi discusses how Nuclear Responsibilities can help strengthening global nuclear risk reduction.
Shaza Arif discusses how BASIC-ICCS Responsibilities Framework opens a new way to consider nuclear responsibilities, and is a relevant contribution to the literature in broadening the debate about nuclear responsibilities or any related subject (ie, cyber, AI) that needs in-depth discussion, collaboration and even conflict management.
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The UK’s continued possession of Trident is not assured. The programme faces running over far budget with knock-on effects to other areas of the budget, multiple emerging technological threats such as cyber weapons, and political risks including Scottish devolution. Each of these factors underlines the need for reasoned, respectful and open-minded debate on the future of the UK’s possession of nuclear weapons, and a willingness to explore alternative pathways to maintain British national security.
Trident patrols are now regularly five months long, up from just two months during the Cold War. What might the implications be for those serving aboard?
Clare Duncanson and Catherine Eschle provide a feminist critique of the UK’s Integrated Review.
The Integrated Review
In just 76 words highlighted below across three statements in the nuclear deterrent section of the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR), the UK government reversed its policy of gradual reduction of the variety, number and salience of its nuclear weapons in place through successive governments since the end of the Cold War.
British diplomats now will be in the dog house, and have a tough time ahead of them.
This report draws upon a mixture of publicly available data and estimates in order to outline both the current operating costs of the Trident nuclear weapon system, as well as the estimated costs of the current plans to renew the UK’s nuclear arsenal.
Despite strong rhetorical support on part of the government for Continuous At-Sea Deterrence (CASD), a real risk exists that CASD could be interrupted in the early 2030s.
BASIC’s new report illustrates in clear detail the cost risk of Trident renewal to the UK’s Defence budget; Dreadnought’s through life costs are likely to be between £110-114bn.
This paper reviews the growing potential for cyber-attack on the UK’s operational fleet of Vanguard-class submarines armed with nuclear-tipped Trident II D-5 ballistic missiles, and some of the implications for strategic stability.
BASIC believes in making progress on nuclear disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation through multiple complementary approaches. We continuously develop our programmes – streams of research – through sustained engagement with a wide range of stakeholders, collectively searching for the art of the possible.
Our current programmes are listed below. Browse our current programmes page by clicking here.
BASIC believes in making progress on nuclear disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation through multiple complementary approaches. We continuously develop our programmes – streams of research – through sustained engagement with a wide range of stakeholders, collectively searching for the art of the possible.
Our archive programmes are listed below. Browse our archive programmes page by clicking here.
