Emily Enright and Eva-Nour Repussard argue that rather competing against one another, the Stepping Stones Approach and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons are mutually reinforcing in advancing disarmament.

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Read the latest analysis from BASIC staff and consultants:
Emily Enright and Eva-Nour Repussard argue that rather competing against one another, the Stepping Stones Approach and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons are mutually reinforcing in advancing disarmament.
In her latest piece for BASIC, Emily Enright discusses the relevance of the Stepping Stones Approach to Asia-Pacific states in their disarmament work.
In their latest paper for BASIC, Eva-Nour Repussard discusses the importance of the Stepping Stones Approach to achieve Nuclear Disarmament.
Polish threat perceptions and risk assessments are heavily influenced by Poland’s proximity to Russia – and the author suggests solutions to contain them.
Lithuania’s current nuclear and conventional risk assessments, and possible policy responses.
The New Atlantic Charter provides the first time that the specific language of ‘responsible state behaviour’ has been used publicly in an official capacity in relation to nuclear weapons.
Emily Enright and Eva-Nour Repussard argue that rather competing against one another, the Stepping Stones Approach and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons are mutually reinforcing in advancing disarmament.
In her latest piece for BASIC, Emily Enright discusses the relevance of the Stepping Stones Approach to Asia-Pacific states in their disarmament work.
In their latest paper for BASIC, Eva-Nour Repussard discusses the importance of the Stepping Stones Approach to achieve Nuclear Disarmament.
Polish threat perceptions and risk assessments are heavily influenced by Poland’s proximity to Russia – and the author suggests solutions to contain them.
Lithuania’s current nuclear and conventional risk assessments, and possible policy responses.
The New Atlantic Charter provides the first time that the specific language of ‘responsible state behaviour’ has been used publicly in an official capacity in relation to nuclear weapons.
Clare Duncanson and Catherine Eschle provide a feminist critique of the UK’s Integrated Review.
Rabia Akhtar reviews the Nuclear Responsibilities Approach from a Pakistani perspective.
Guest author, Peter Rautenbach, explores the challenges of Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) weapons, and looks to arms control to mitigate the ensuing risks.
BASIC Policy Fellow, Emily Enright, explores President Biden’s security model, making the case for a Person-Centered approach to security moving forward.
This piece, by Mr Zhou Chang forms of a number of reflective pieces written by experts to respond to the Nuclear Responsibilities Approach and is co-published between BASIC, the ICCS and the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA).
Recent deadly military incidents and an ongoing border conflict between China and India has led…
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The UK’s continued possession of Trident is not assured. The programme faces running over far budget with knock-on effects to other areas of the budget, multiple emerging technological threats such as cyber weapons, and political risks including Scottish devolution. Each of these factors underlines the need for reasoned, respectful and open-minded debate on the future of the UK’s possession of nuclear weapons, and a willingness to explore alternative pathways to maintain British national security.
Clare Duncanson and Catherine Eschle provide a feminist critique of the UK’s Integrated Review.
The Integrated Review
In just 76 words highlighted below across three statements in the nuclear deterrent section of the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR), the UK government reversed its policy of gradual reduction of the variety, number and salience of its nuclear weapons in place through successive governments since the end of the Cold War.
British diplomats now will be in the dog house, and have a tough time ahead of them.
This report draws upon a mixture of publicly available data and estimates in order to outline both the current operating costs of the Trident nuclear weapon system, as well as the estimated costs of the current plans to renew the UK’s nuclear arsenal.
Despite strong rhetorical support on part of the government for Continuous At-Sea Deterrence (CASD), a real risk exists that CASD could be interrupted in the early 2030s.
BASIC’s new report illustrates in clear detail the cost risk of Trident renewal to the UK’s Defence budget; Dreadnought’s through life costs are likely to be between £110-114bn.
This paper reviews the growing potential for cyber-attack on the UK’s operational fleet of Vanguard-class submarines armed with nuclear-tipped Trident II D-5 ballistic missiles, and some of the implications for strategic stability.
The UK Government has inhibited the International Court of Justice (ICJ) from ruling on cases about nuclear weapons or nuclear disarmament, including if it uses Trident against another country.
BASIC believes in making progress on nuclear disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation through multiple complementary approaches. We continuously develop our programmes – streams of research – through sustained engagement with a wide range of stakeholders, collectively searching for the art of the possible.
Our current programmes are listed below. Browse our current programmes page by clicking here.
BASIC believes in making progress on nuclear disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation through multiple complementary approaches. We continuously develop our programmes – streams of research – through sustained engagement with a wide range of stakeholders, collectively searching for the art of the possible.
Our archive programmes are listed below. Browse our archive programmes page by clicking here.