BASIC provides expert analysis and commentary on selective contemporary debates in strategic affairs. To do this, we engage diverse perspectives, encourage empathy across states, and broaden the context of debate. We have an established reputation for non-partisan, non-judgmental, cross-cultural engagement and for seeking common ground.
We aim to make our writing readable and interesting to both experts and the general public, cutting through jargon and democratising debate. If you’d like to write for us, contact us here.
To browse our analysis thematically, visit our Programmes.
Read the latest analysis from BASIC staff and consultants:
In the last of our series on nuclear responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific, Ruhee Neog highlights the centrality of making the linguistic move from claims to be acting as a ‘responsible nuclear state’ to the responsibilities in practice that follow from possessing nuclear weapons.
Putin’s apparent willingness to introduce nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear war is a watershed moment with implications beyond Europe and the West. In this article, Rishi Paul looks to Russia’s recent behaviour as a lens to understand what the future might hold in store, and draw out the potential implications for international security.
Chris Spedding argues that developing and testing autonomous nuclear-propulsion reactors for aerial or subsea munitions will lead to a real risk of radiological exposure and contamination, with lethal consequences.
In the fourth of our series on the nuclear responsibilities approach in the Asia-Pacific, Kanica Rakhra explores what makes states act responsibly in nuclear crises and how this has to be balanced against the need to ensure credible deterrence.
In this article published in International Affairs (98:4) Laura Rose Brown and Dr Laura Considine examine what ‘gender sensitivity’ means in the nuclear policy context.
In the third of our special pieces on the potential of reframing the nuclear debate in the Asia-Pacific by focusing on the nuclear responsibilities of states, Nidaa Shahid highlights the importance of developing better lines of communication between India and Pakistan, especially in times of crisis.
In the last of our series on nuclear responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific, Ruhee Neog highlights the centrality of making the linguistic move from claims to be acting as a ‘responsible nuclear state’ to the responsibilities in practice that follow from possessing nuclear weapons.
Putin’s apparent willingness to introduce nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear war is a watershed moment with implications beyond Europe and the West. In this article, Rishi Paul looks to Russia’s recent behaviour as a lens to understand what the future might hold in store, and draw out the potential implications for international security.
Chris Spedding argues that developing and testing autonomous nuclear-propulsion reactors for aerial or subsea munitions will lead to a real risk of radiological exposure and contamination, with lethal consequences.
In the fourth of our series on the nuclear responsibilities approach in the Asia-Pacific, Kanica Rakhra explores what makes states act responsibly in nuclear crises and how this has to be balanced against the need to ensure credible deterrence.
In this article published in International Affairs (98:4) Laura Rose Brown and Dr Laura Considine examine what ‘gender sensitivity’ means in the nuclear policy context.
In the third of our special pieces on the potential of reframing the nuclear debate in the Asia-Pacific by focusing on the nuclear responsibilities of states, Nidaa Shahid highlights the importance of developing better lines of communication between India and Pakistan, especially in times of crisis.
In the second of our series reflecting on the value of thinking about risk reduction and security in the Asia-Pacific in terms of nuclear responsibilities, Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto examines the response of ASEAN governments to AUKUS.
Rabia Akhtar shows how a focus on nuclear responsibilities in South Asia opens up new possibilities for a dialogue that can contribute to developing a new shared framework for reducing risks, especially during times of crisis.
Flávia Salazar Sousa discusses the ruling from the ICJ in the case Ukraine v. Russian Federation on allegations of genocide under the Genocide Convention of 1948.
In this blog piece, Professor Andrew Futter and Dr Olamide Samuel discuss the lack of focus on civilian nuclear energy and the Global South in analyses of the Ban Treaty.
Dr Simone Papale and Dr Chiara Cervasio discuss how Western remote interventionism to counter Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine validates the stability-instability paradox.
The world appears to be looking to the United States to solve the current crisis…
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The UK’s continued possession of Trident is not assured. The programme faces running over far budget with knock-on effects to other areas of the budget, multiple emerging technological threats such as cyber weapons, and political risks including Scottish devolution. Each of these factors underlines the need for reasoned, respectful and open-minded debate on the future of the UK’s possession of nuclear weapons, and a willingness to explore alternative pathways to maintain British national security.
Clare Duncanson and Catherine Eschle provide a feminist critique of the UK’s Integrated Review.
The Integrated Review
In just 76 words highlighted below across three statements in the nuclear deterrent section of the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR), the UK government reversed its policy of gradual reduction of the variety, number and salience of its nuclear weapons in place through successive governments since the end of the Cold War.
British diplomats now will be in the dog house, and have a tough time ahead of them.
This report draws upon a mixture of publicly available data and estimates in order to outline both the current operating costs of the Trident nuclear weapon system, as well as the estimated costs of the current plans to renew the UK’s nuclear arsenal.
Despite strong rhetorical support on part of the government for Continuous At-Sea Deterrence (CASD), a real risk exists that CASD could be interrupted in the early 2030s.
BASIC’s new report illustrates in clear detail the cost risk of Trident renewal to the UK’s Defence budget; Dreadnought’s through life costs are likely to be between £110-114bn.
This paper reviews the growing potential for cyber-attack on the UK’s operational fleet of Vanguard-class submarines armed with nuclear-tipped Trident II D-5 ballistic missiles, and some of the implications for strategic stability.
The UK Government has inhibited the International Court of Justice (ICJ) from ruling on cases about nuclear weapons or nuclear disarmament, including if it uses Trident against another country.
BASIC believes in making progress on nuclear disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation through multiple complementary approaches. We continuously develop our programmes – streams of research – through sustained engagement with a wide range of stakeholders, collectively searching for the art of the possible.
Our current programmes are listed below. Browse our current programmes page by clicking here.
BASIC believes in making progress on nuclear disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation through multiple complementary approaches. We continuously develop our programmes – streams of research – through sustained engagement with a wide range of stakeholders, collectively searching for the art of the possible.
Our archive programmes are listed below. Browse our archive programmes page by clicking here.
