Last year, while direct arms control talks between Washington and Beijing were dubbed a positive development by nuclear experts, there was a fear that both countries’ divergent views on the matter would hinder substantive progress. Such an apprehension was certainly not misplaced, as evidenced by China’s recent refusal to continue arms control talks with the United States, which had resumed in 2023. Although Washington’s arms sales to Taiwan were termed as the main reason for this suspension, the overall and ever-increasing distrust had already made the environment unfavourable for arms control. The two countries, it must be stressed, have different positions on arms control. For the United States, it is critical to managing nuclear competition with China and enhancing strategic stability. As for China, the US arms control gambit is seen as an effort to contain it and its power. These diametrically opposite readings do not augur well for the prospect of arms control between the United States and China. However, given that nuclear risks are increasing, there is an urgent need to institute arms control mechanisms. Although bilateral arms control between Washington and Moscow must be revived, the inclusion of Beijing in the global arms control architecture is also of utmost importance. That China’s participation is key is reason enough to identify ways to reduce an ever-growing distrust between China and the United States. While nuclear watchers have recommended a number of excellent, viable proposals to make arms control work, they cannot be implemented if the growing distrust is not addressed and reduced . Also, given that no significant changes are expected in the immediate future, newer approaches should be explored. The Nuclear Responsibilities Approach, developed by BASIC and the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security (ICCS) at the University of Birmingham, could be used to reduce distrust between Washington and Beijing apropos of arms control. There are a number of reasons as to why the Approach could prove to be effective.
An Uncanny Similarity
Centred on stakeholders’ responsibilities in relation to nuclear weapons, the Approach not only seeks to reframe the ways nuclear weapons are discussed but also advocates for reassessing the policies and practices that govern them. The Approach aims at ‘shifting the focal question away from how certain policies and practices might meet certain national interests or fulfil a particular actor’s rights in relation to nuclear weapons, towards asking what an actor’s responsibilities in relation to nuclear weapons are, how they are being fulfilled, and how they interact with the responsibilities of others.’ Notably, focused on exploring shared responsibilities and understandings, the Approach discourages attaching labels like responsible and irresponsible to nuclear weapon states. Therefore, applying these principles that undergird the Approach to Sino-US dialogues could not only facilitate behavioural arms control but also pave the way for its traditional version, which is centred on limiting and regulating capabilities. In its broader sense, arms control refers to military cooperation between current and potential adversaries intended to enhance mutual security. It is seen as a powerful approach to managing strategic risks because it apportions equal responsibilities on the parties involved, leaving them relatively satisfied with the final outcomes. Moreover, arms control can only work if and when adversaries understand that becoming embroiled in a strategic arms race is incompatible with overall stability. However, without thinking through one’s own gamut of responsibilities and comparing it with those of adversaries, a state might think that buttressing strategic capabilities, including in the nuclear realm, is always in its national interests and not at odds with a menu of other interests. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say arms control is a responsible practice in line with the Approach. The corollary is that if Sino-US arms control dialogue, at any level, is centred on the Approach, it will be focused on key areas and the shared responsibilities that they could contribute to fulfilling.
One Step at a Time
That being said, ensuring that dyads like the one in question do not resort to recrimination is a gargantuan task. Chinese and US interlocutors, regardless of their dialogue’s track, will bicker over histories, definitions, and proposals. However, the Approach has been developed to navigate these situations. In other words, this is precisely why the Approach is being pitched as an all-important tool. This is primarily because it contains a number of elements that can help participants look at outstanding issues through different lenses. For example, it will encourage the participating Chinese and US stakeholders in tracks 1, 1.5, and 2 dialogues to develop what Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler call Security Dilemma Sensibility. Lying at the heart of the Approach, this concept refers to an actor’s capacity to not only understand an adversary’s motives but also acknowledge that its own fear-inducing actions may have shaped these. The realisation that your opponent’s behaviour might be the result of your actions can go a long way in reframing the agendas of future dialogues. Furthermore, with Sino-US arms control being marred by fear, using this Approach will help stakeholders fully identify and isolate aspects that create distrust, mistrust, and trust. In the process, this will, to a degree, help obviate the negative impacts of enemy images, which refer to the tendency to attribute malign actions to those who have the capacity to take them. In the Sino-US context, for instance, enemy images play a subversive role. China’s nuclear modernisation or US arms control pleas are considered malicious because both see each other as enemies, not potential upholders of strategic stability.
Thus, engaging with the Approach can be an important step in righting this wrong. The Approach asks stakeholders to explore responsibilities, their sources, the extent to which they are being fulfilled, and how they could be perceived by the other. Using this Approach in arms control-centred dialogues between Washington and Beijing could contribute to finding newer, hitherto unexplored pathways. This is because the Approach is designed in a manner that will push actors to look at the entire range of end-users, potential conflicts, and policy options in relation to, in this case, arms control and strategic stability.
Given that the Approach will be new to participants, phase one, known as Familiarisation, will be critical. Once Chinese and US participants have a fair understanding of the Approach, they would be encouraged to engage as separate groups to explore their own state’s nuclear responsibilities. That both groups will comprise people from diverse backgrounds means that consensus-building will be difficult, but useful. It will make their views more cogent and broad-based. This sets the stage for the Bilateral Dialogue phase, which brings both groups – now more familiar and comfortable with the Approach – together under one roof. Once participants compare their nuclear responsibilities to those of the other party, they can collectively pinpoint anomalies, helping refocus and recalibrate their approaches to arms control. Also, because stakeholders would have thought through many possible angles and interpretation in assessing their own nuclear responsibilities, chances of finding the previously unidentified common grounds will increase precipitously. If this could happen, even in unofficial and semi-official tracks, avenues of exploiting those could open.
While inflexibility at the official level is an important obstacle, using the Nuclear Responsibilities Approach could help give decision-makers on both sides more nuanced perspectives about each other’s policy actions and the intentions behind those. Although this may not bring about a sea change, it can certainly add some more talking points on arms control. At this stage, a somewhat different, balanced discourse will be a step in the right direction, not least because the cost of strained nuclear relations between Washington and Beijing is far too prohibitive.
Syed Ali Zia Jaffery is Deputy Director, Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research (CSSPR), University of Lahore.
Views expressed belong solely to the original author of the article and do not necessarily represent the views and opinions of BASIC.