The following talking points are provided to assist discussion of theatre* nuclear weapons (TNW) and the challenges they pose to European security writ large, not simply to NATO.
NATO Incapable of Change on Nuclear Sharing
The following talking points are provided to assist discussion of theatre* nuclear weapons (TNW) and the challenges they pose to European security writ large, not simply to NATO.
NATO Incapable of Change on Nuclear Sharing
The annual month-long meeting of the General Assembly’s First Committee, responsible for issues of international peace and security, begins today in New York. Two issues have been on the media’s agenda: disarming Syria of its chemical weapons and the next round of nuclear talks between Iran and the E3+3. Both involve a degree of optimism, perhaps even an excitement around the possibilities, rarely seen in the U.N. corridors in recent years. Perhaps it is because these openings for progress have been so unexpected.
The annual month-long meeting of the General Assembly’s First Committee, responsible for issues of international peace and security, begins today in New York. Two issues have been on the media’s agenda: disarming Syria of its chemical weapons and the next round of nuclear talks between Iran and the E3+3. Both involve a degree of optimism, perhaps even an excitement around the possibilities, rarely seen in the U.N. corridors in recent years. Perhaps it is because these openings for progress have been so unexpected.
BASIC has had a lot to say over the years about U.S. theater nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe. (I will repeat here, ad nauseam for some, that it is a grave mistake to call such weapons ‘tactical’; any deliberate nuclear explosion must have strategic consequences. ‘Theater’, meanwhile, simply denotes their basing posture and connotes their intended use, from within a military theater of operations.)
The threat of military intervention in Syria in response to alleged chemical weapons use by Bashar Al-Assad’s government was put on hold this past week as U.S. and Russian Foreign Ministers, John Kerry and Sergei Lavrov, negotiated a deal that would see Syria sign up to the U.N. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and hand their chemical weapons stockpile over to the international community. As we edge towards a decision, it may be valuable to reflect on the core arguments that have been driving the debate.
As the 2015 general election and the decision on whether to replace Trident approaches, it is important to consider the implications of the continued possession of nuclear weapons for British democracy. Historically, Britain’s bomb has been dependent on US support, a relationship notable for its opacity and lack of democratic accountability.
On Wednesday, Britain's Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Danny Alexander, will be in Washington, D.C. discussing the UK government's study on alternatives to the Trident nuclear weapon system, released in mid-July.
The mid-August publication of the National Institute for Public Policy’s Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence has re-invigorated the debate on America’s nuclear policy and on the concept of nuclear deterrence in general: Does it make sense in the 21st century? Can a ‘Deterrence Lite’ policy, hereafter called ‘Minimum Deterrence’ (MD), really work?