As a follow on to the Next Generation project, we will hosting a series of systems mapping workshops across the USA and UK to map problem themes related to nuclear security and non-proliferation in order to surface possible improvements that help to address some of the wicked problems associated with nuclear security.
Rapid advances in underwater drone technology – autonomous underwater vehicles that can be controlled by ship- or land-based operators – threaten to make the controversial Trident nuclear submarines vulnerable, according to Paul Ingram, the executive director of the British American Security Information Council.
On 23 November, the day the Strategic Defence and Security Report (SDSR) was released, former Defence Secretary Lord Browne warned of the possibility that the UK’s nuclear deterrent, Trident, will likely be rendered ‘o
During the course of its work, the Commission will seek submissions of evidence from interested parties. Written submissions, with the permission of those submitting evidence, will be published here and organised by theme.These are the initial questions that we are seeking submissions on, and we will be adding more as the commission’s work progresses:
BASIC and the Federation of American Scientists hosted a joint discussion on the state of the UK and European nuclear weapons debates, and the importance of this in a global context.
The SDSR was published last week and now we know: the in-service date for the Trident Successor submarines is to…
The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), planned for publication on 23 November 2015, is expected to include an update on the Trident renewal project and financial estimates. Main Gate decision is likely to be put to Parliament early 2016. Like every major government project, MoD procurement officials will have conducted a detailed confidential risk analysis for the construction, but this project requires a far broader, comprehensive risk analysis over a set of areas, as listed in this briefing.
Nuclear sharing arrangements and the active deployment of US theatre nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are viewed as critical components of its deterrence posture. Previously, this nuclear posture was aimed at the former Soviet Union (USSR) and Warsaw Pact alliance during the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War and the absorption of former Warsaw Pact states into NATOthe official justification for those systems remaining is not connected to any specified enemy.