The Trident Commission report on Britain’s nuclear weapons policy aims to distill core national security arguments and challenge vague pro-renewal stances. Public and political engagement remain minimal despite the crucial timing and evolving global threats. The Commission debates Britain’s independent nuclear deterrence and its role in NATO, ultimately questioning the alignment of current policies with global disarmament goals.
Blog
Building Dialogue: The Trident Commission and our nuclear future
Dialogue is the most crucial ingredient in determining a future where we no longer live in the shadow of nuclear destruction. Without dialogue we will not be able to overcome the widespread orthodoxy that claims it is now impossible for nuclear weapons to be abolished. Without dialogue we will not be able to convince potential proliferators not to take the nuclear path.
The Nuclear Weapon as a Symbol
Being the most powerful and destructive weapon ever conceived by human beings, able to annihilate entire populations, the nuclear weapon is a powerful symbol with multiple dimensions.
Let’s Call It a Bargaining Chip
Referring to Israel’s nuclear program as a bargaining chip is not a breakthrough idea. Scholars have argued before that in lieu of having a “deterrence policy that does not deter,” Israel might perceive its nuclear arsenal as a bargaining chip to negotiate with its Arab counterparts over regional security issues, including around a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.
Alternative proliferation methods? The nuclear fuel cycle and hydrodynamic testing
Nuclear security, that is, the protection of nuclear materials, technology, and knowledge, is an ever changing field in which academics, policy makers and industry representatives must be forever vigilant for potential new forms of proliferation and security challenges.
Going back to the Six-Party Talks, is there any hope?
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has given rise to much debate on the security challenges that it brings to the international system. Its deployment of ballistic missiles and testing of nuclear devices (2006, 2009, and 2013) have alarmed states around the world, and posed dangers and threats to the region. In fact, recent activity at North Korea’s nuclear facility has given rise to new concerns about the possibility of a fourth nuclear test.
Bumps on the road to Helsinki: Will we ever get there?
Eleven months before the 2015 NPT Review Conference is convened, there is still no sign that the Helsinki conference on the establishment of the WMD-free zone in the Middle East will be held. In what seemed to be a glimmer of hope in Geneva on May 14-15, the conference’s facilitator, co-conveners and future state parties to the zone met to discuss the conference’s modalities.
A Middle East free of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction
The idea of establishing a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East was spearheaded by Iran in 1974, followed by Egyptian endorsement. In 1990, under President Hosni Mubarak’s leadership, Egypt broadened the concept of the zone to include other weapons of mass destruction and lobbied incessantly to bring discussions of the zone to the upper echelons of international relations, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the United Nations.