[Trident replacement would] “be easily the most expensive defense procurement project for the decade from 2015/6, sucking the finances out of other major projects.” says Paul Ingram, executive director of BASIC. To read more:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joe-cirincione/british-budget-collapse-f_b_769959.html
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Prime Minister David Cameron confirmed before Parliament today that based upon a completed “value for money review” of the United Kingdom's deterrent, “the decision to start construction of the new submarines need not now be taken until around 2016.”
The Prime Minister also highlighted other changes in the nuclear posture:
Paul Ingram, BASIC's Executive Director, discusses decisions around the United Kingdom's Trident nuclear weapon system.
This roundtable meeting, jointly organized by the Arms Control Association, the British American Security Information Council, the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg, International Strategic Research Organization, aimed to evaluate the role that deterrence and nuclear weapons play in Turkey's security policy and NATO's defense posture.
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Prominent European statespeople who form a sub-group of the European Leaders Network have released a letter calling on NATO to make “disarmament a core element of its approach to providing security.” In their letter, they encourage the Alliance to “review its entire nuclear policy and posture with a view to facilitating progress in arms control, in a manner consistent with effective burden sharing and alliance cohesion, effective deterrence and a demonstrable commitment to collective defence.”
The United Kingdom has maintained unbroken nuclear weapons patrols since 1968. The rationale for this doctrine of continuous deterrence has been based on several pillars that are irrelevant in today’s environment. Rather than an absolute need for continuous deterrent, there is instead a great opportunity for Britain to take the lead as the most progressive of the nuclear weapons states by reducing the readiness and size of its
strategic force. Article originally published in RUSI Journal, Vol. 155, No. 2.
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