Since I just quoted Dr Ben Ouagrham-Gormley in the last post, it seems only fair that I mention this past article she wrote, published in the July/August issue of Arms Control Today.
The bottom line of her article, 'An Unrealized Nexus? WMD-related Trafficking, Terrorism, and Organized Crime in the Former Soviet Union' is this:
The September 2006 issue of The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science published, naturally, by The American Academy of Political and Social Science, had a special issue CONFRONTING THE SPECTER OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM (Oh dear, all caps; be afraid, be very afraid).
Anyway, one article, 'A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism', by Matthew Bunn, ran the numbers, literally, for measuring the global risk of nuclear theft and terrorism. Warning, you may want to reach for your former algebra books before reading further.
We've mentioned the unfortunate plight of former US intelligence analyst Richard Barlow before. But this October 19 Congressional Quarterly article highlights a different aspect of his story; namely, is Congress really interested in trying to prevent nuclear proliferation or does it just grandstand? No, no, really, that is a serious question.
If you’ve heard it once, you’ve heard the conventional wisdom a thousand times, ie, the nuclear black market will help terrorist groups obtain the materials and technology to make a nuclear, or a radiological weapon. Well, here’s good news, sort of.
As everybody should know by now Pakistan has long made it clear that the West has much chance of questioning Dr Khan about his network as a snowball has of remaining frozen in hell. But that does not mean additional information about the doctor's network can't be obtained. I and others have noted in the past that there have been some, if sporadic and fitful, attempts to prosecute some of Dr Khan's former colleagues and suppliers.
Speaking of wider proliferation concerns, I'd be remiss if I did not mention the recent report Project Butter Factory: Henk Slebos and the AQ Khan nuclear network by Frank Slijper (September 2007 ). From the press release:
You have to hand it to Germany: at least it is consistent. During Dr Khan’s day, some of his best suppliers were Germany companies. Firms like Leybold Heraeus helped with a uranium hexafluoride handling plant as well as other items. And a Leybold employee, Gotthard Lerch (who was on trial earlier this year, which I’ll post on in the future), remained in touch with the doctor long after he left Leybold to set up his own company.