BASIC's Executive Director, Paul Ingram, reflects on the NPT and where we are on the establishment of the Middle East WMD-free zone:
The NPT PrepCom this week has been overshadowed by the near-universal frustration over the lack of progress on holding a conference on a Middle East zone free of WMD. State after state got up in plenary to express that frustration, many condemning the co-sponsors’ decision in late 2012 to postpone.
BASIC Executive Director Paul Ingram was quoted extensively in this article on Egypt's decision to walk out of the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting happening in Geneva.
Over the coming two weeks, the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will meet, in Geneva, for the second time in the NPT’s current five year review cycle.
This week, the NPT nuclear weapon states—also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5: United Kingdom, United States, China, France, and Russia) meet in Geneva to reaffirm their commitments to nuclear disarmament and implementing the 2010 NPT Action Plan. The group will meet privately on Thursday, and on Friday will present a statement that will be carried through to the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting (PrepCom), which commences the following Monday, April 22nd.
BASIC Executive Director, Paul Ingram, was interviewed by Press TV after British Prime Minister David Cameron wrote a piece for the Telegraph, acknowledging his support of Trident and highlighting the country's need to replace the weapons system with a like-for-like program.
Paul Ingram counter's the Prime Minster's arguments here: http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/04/05/296582/british-pm-seeks-to-keep-controversial-trident-nukes/
The E3+3, Iran, and the Almaty talks
Last week's talks were deemed by many commentators as a failure. Rather than responding directly to the E3+3’s (P5+1's) agenda around initial small confidence-building steps, the Iranian delegation appears to have looked for reassurances that the end-state would include lifting the sanctions and recognition of Iran’s right to enrich, and that the group of six was serious in recognizing objectives of the Iranian delegation.
David Cameron argues for replacing the Trident nuclear system due to future uncertainties and threats from North Korea and Iran. The author criticizes this stance, highlighting the historical context, fragility of nuclear deterrence, and alternative security challenges. They argue that reliance on nuclear weapons is a misguided strategy in a rapidly changing global security environment.