After more than a year of uncertainty, President Trump announced that the United States would reimpose sanctions against Iran in violation of the JCPoA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), leaving the Iran Deal in limbo.
Vulnerability
Zero Days, Millions in damage: A scientist’s review of the RAND report Zero Days, thousands of nights.
A recent RAND report, released just two days after Wikileaks opened its Vault 7 that detailed the CIA’s entire stockpile of vulnerabilities and their suite of cyber tools (also referred as exploits), seeks to establish a protocol and the advantages of state intelligence agencies maintaining classified vulnerability stockpiles.
Report: Impact of Emerging Technologies on the Future of SSBNs
Our two latest reports assess the effect of emerging undersea technologies on ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and strategic stability.
A Primer on Trident’s Cyber Vulnerabilities
The second of BASIC’s 2016 Parliamentary Briefing series relating to the Trident debate is a primer on Trident’s cyber vulnerabilities. Cyber threats impact both critical civilian infrastructure and all military systems dependent upon digital control and communications.
Brexit: Impact on Trident
The potential fall-out from the UK vote to leave the EU cannot be over-estimated. The political, economic and constitutional implications are deeply uncertain. The market turmoil and the plunge in the value of the pound will translate into massive financial pressures on government spending. The pressures for constitutional referenda in Scotland and Northern Ireland have just strengthened dramatically.
The role of the nuclear test ban as a non-proliferation and arms control instrument
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was agreed in 1996 after more than 2000 nuclear tests had left a lasting, poisonous legacy. The treaty’s negotiations had already contributed to the indefinite extension of the NPT the year before (having contributed to the failures of the 1980 and 1990 NPT Review Conferences). Confidence in arms control and disarmament was high, and nuclear arsenals were falling dramatically. Strategic relations were good. But things look very different today, with high levels of distrust and low confidence in achieving further disarmament progress.
Moving the OEWG forward
Global multilateral nuclear disarmament has proven over the last 70 years to be a process characterised by stagnation, originating from a series of competing international interests.
Moving the OEWG forward
Global multilateral nuclear disarmament has proven over the last 70 years to be a process characterised by stagnation, originating from a series of competing international interests.