Abstract
The proposed US-Saudi nuclear agreement represents more than a civilian energy partnership; it is a strategic bargain with significant implications for US regional alliances, regional security, and the future of non-proliferation. For Washington, the deal offers a means to reinforce influence in the Middle East, limit Chinese and Russian involvement, preserve Saudi alignment, and support the US nuclear industry. For Riyadh, it promises energy diversification, technological advancement, and greater political leverage amid intensifying rivalry with Iran. Although the agreement would not immediately authorise domestic enrichment or produce commercial gains, it could establish the legal and institutional basis for long-term nuclear cooperation. The central concern is that civilian expertise may create a latent nuclear capability, reducing the time required for weaponisation during a future crisis. The absence of “gold standard” restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing, together with uncertainty over the adoption of the Additional Protocol, raises concerns. The deal may also produce a regional domino effect, encouraging other states to seek similar arrangements and prompting Iran to defend or expand its own programme. Beyond the Middle East, it could weaken universal non-proliferation norms by suggesting that strategic partners receive exceptional treatment. Its ultimate test will be whether cooperation can strengthen bilateral ties without enabling future proliferation.
The political turmoil produced by the US-Saudi Nuclear Agreement
In a latest development, the proposed US-Saudi Nuclear Agreement has generated an intense debate surrounding non-proliferation, US regional alliances and regional security dynamics. Emerging at a time of extreme geopolitical sensitivity, the 30-year agreement provides the Kingdom with a civilian nuclear programme worth billions of dollars, with US companies having a central role. While the new conditions introduced later surrounding Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords and conflicting claims regarding enrichment have created a political crisis, it is pertinent to analyse the overall implications of the deal.
Washington’s Calculus
Different but slightly converging motives have pushed both states towards this deal. For the US, the engagement with Riyadh represents multiple overlapping calculations. First, the agreement reflects an effort to reshape regional alignments. There is a perception that greater US involvement via a nuclear deal will provide more influence over the region, particularly in an attempt to regain lost ground in the ongoing war with Iran. This is also important given expanding foreign interests in the region. By offering nuclear cooperation, the US aims to preclude bigger Chinese or Russian involvement and prevent diversification of Saudi defence partnerships. Second, the agreement will help signal that better relations with the US will offer eligibility for such profound exceptions, waivers and privileged access. Third, the US aims to reshape regional balance of power by strengthening its relation with Riyadh amidst the confrontation with Tehran. Fourth, the close cooperation with Riyadh may be presented domestically as a part of a broader anti-Iran strategy to rally support from constituencies concerned with Israel’s security. Lastly, it will provide a much-needed boost to the American nuclear industry via lucrative contracts for US companies in a massive overseas market. However, all this poses a simultaneous dilemma: While a stronger Saudi Arabia could contribute as a counter-weight against Iran, it has the potential to undermine Israel’s longstanding nuclear advantage – an aspect that may concern Israel and its supporters.
Riyadh’s Broader Objectives
For Riyadh, the recent conflict appears to be a major motivation for upgrading its defence and security partnerships. The recent trilateral Makkah Joint Defence Agreement also reinforces this angle. It also desires enhanced technological capability of its energy sector. Above all, the Kingdom aims for security considerations as well as political empowerment in the region by the acquisition of civilian nuclear capability.
Why Now?
The timing of the agreement suggests two scenarios. First, from the US perspective, an apparent concession in the form of a deal could deepen Saudi cooperation against Iran in light of the ongoing conflict. Secondly, Saudi Arabia has been lobbying for the deal for many years not only vis-à-vis Washington but also other suppliers in different capacities but has not been able to secure a comprehensive nuclear agreement. Against this backdrop, there might be a perception that the US administration under President Trump is willing to move quickly.
The Enrichment Dilemma
The agreement, if operationalized, is neither an immediate approval to build an enrichment facility, nor would it generate immediate business for Cameco or Westinghouse. Technology-transfer, regulatory frameworks, export controls, US consent rights, facility licensing and safeguards would require significant time and negotiations. Nevertheless, the agreement creates a legal framework for US nuclear assistance to Saudi Arabia. In this context, the important aspect is that in the long run, civilian cooperation could gradually expand domestic expertise in the nuclear fuel process. A possibility that underscores the enrichment dilemma.
While enrichment itself does not necessarily lead to, or have to lead to, the manufacture of a nuclear weapon, it is one of the most important and sensitive steps towards making one, blurring the lines between civilian and military programs. Even if there is limited room for immediate enrichment on Saudi soil, the gradual and protracted enrichment will enable Saudi Arabia to be a nuclear-threshold state without immediately producing a nuclear weapon. This latent capability would complicate regional dynamics. Resultantly, the agreement may reduce the time required for weaponization during a future crisis.
The lack of Additional Protocol safeguards further exacerbates the non-proliferation challenges. While the Kingdom remains bound by the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, the Additional Protocol would have enabled broader information and greater access – creating a verification gap. Similarly, the deal does not impose the gold standard (a binding commitment to forgo domestic uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing, as the UAE accepted in 2009 vis-à-vis South Korea’s state-owned Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO)). Apparently, the Kingdom has not made a similar commitment, which could set new precedents for new agreements. Hence, there is a possibility that the political strength of the gold standard may be weakened in the future.
Major Implications
History shows nuclear proliferation spreads through a domino effect. The agreement with Saudi Arabia has the possibility of initiating a wave, where other regional US allies such as Oman, Kuwait, and Jordan will also expect similar arrangements. Such trends are likely to weaken nuclear non-proliferation standards. It will also impact how Iran interprets these developments, as Saudi advancements may provoke Iran to expand or defend its own programme. While the impact might not be immediate, the altering balance can potentially lead to a reassessment of its capabilities. Beyond the Middle East, the developments will be observed by other regions, influencing their future course of action accordingly. States particularly in the Asia Pacific and Eastern Europe might perceive that the political barrier to becoming a threshold state has become lower. The result might not be an immediate nuclear arms race but a gradual spread of nuclear-threshold capabilities.
In the ongoing and fluctuating talks between the US and Iran, the potential agreement could significantly weaken Washington’s negotiating position and credibility. By accepting conditions for Riyadh – previously denied for Tehran, the US would face challenges in convincing Iran to curb its programme and future ambitions.
In principle, the US Congress can block the agreement. However, political realities suggest a very slim chance. While the terms of the deal have dramatically changed following President Trump’s announcement that the deal’s implementation remains contingent upon the Kingdom joining the Abraham Accords – a condition not established earlier. It remains to be seen how the deal operationalises in the coming years.
Conclusion
The agreement demonstrates that geopolitical competition is being prioritised over long-standing non-proliferation norms. The scope of the potential agreement extends well beyond an export deal. As the present developments in the Middle East reflect, the agreement may alter the existing regional security landscape. The expansion of US interests’ conflicts with limiting regional proliferation. The proposed agreement might strengthen the US-Saudi bilateral relationship. However, it will likely impact the universal principles of non-proliferation and norms of the nuclear age. Henceforth, nuclear latency might be viewed not as an exception but as the norm.
Shaza Arif is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad. She can be reached at [email protected] / [email protected]
All views expressed, as well as any errors, remain the sole responsibility of the author.