This August, we solemnly mark the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in 1945. The bombings are remembered for their catastrophic humanitarian consequences, borne overwhelmingly by the civilians in the cities, as well as many prisoners of war who were forced into labour. While estimates vary, within the first few months the bombings are often estimated to have claimed 140,000 lives in Hiroshima and 73,000 lives in Nagasaki, including those affected by the blast and heat, and the survivors that suffered from acute radiation exposure. More than 210,000 people survived, going on to become the hibakusha (“bomb-affected people”) who today are recognised as leading voices on the global impacts of nuclear weapons. In commemoration of the bombings, BASIC has commissioned a series of articles from Japan and elsewhere. Here Manpreet Sethi, Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi, assesses what needs to be done to ensure another eighty years of nuclear non-use.

On 16 July 2025, on the 80th anniversary of the Trinity test that marked the dawn of the nuclear age, the Nobel Laureate Assembly for the Prevention of Nuclear War was organised at the University of Chicago. This is the site of Chicago Pile-1, the world’s first man-made, self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction of 1942 that eventually sired the atomic bombs through the Manhattan Project. The bombs, Little Boy and Fat Man, were then used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 Aug 1945 respectively.

The instant vaporisation of an estimated 220,000 people in both cities, coupled with the inter-generational impact of radioactivity, established the extraordinariness of these weapons. Their immense destructive potential has averted their physical use since then – despite several crises, false alarms, and close calls. Humanity has survived to mark the 80th anniversary of the first and only use of nuclear weapons in combat.

Today’s nuclear environment, however, begs the question whether mankind will be able to survive another 80 years without nuclear use. Guardrails of bilateral and multilateral agreements that had been slowly and steadily built around nuclear weapons over decades to create a sense of order are either lost or on the verge of disappearing. We are living in a time of geopolitical rivalries where there is a greater propensity for use of force and more emphasis on the build-up of hard power. Nuclear-armed nations are facing high trust deficits and perception gaps; they are making worst case assumptions of each other’s capabilities; and refusing to have strategic dialogues through which they could offer or seek clarifications.

*Delegates at the conference alongside a Henry Moore “Nuclear Energy” sculpture in Chicago*

Is it surprising, then, that we are witnessing an offence-defence arms race? It is somewhat like the Cold War, only worse, since the nuclear world today is multipolar. In fact, it not only comprises multiple bilateral nuclear dyads, but in some cases, these elongate into strategic chains.

As nine nuclear armed states expand and modernise their nuclear arsenals, one particularly startling idea that has made a come-back is that of limited nuclear war. It may be recalled that the idea of mutual assured destruction (MAD) so haunted Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev in the late 1980s that they categorically declared that nuclear wars “cannot be won and must never be fought.”

In recent times though, emboldened by technological developments of precision with low-yield nuclear weapons and improved missile defences, there is a renewed tendency to flirt with the idea of nuclear escalation management and control. Hence, NUTS, or nuclear use theorists − who once argued in the 1970s-80s that nuclear war fighting could be undertaken through logical and controlled operations − appear to be garnering traction once again.

“The more nations move towards the idea that they could contain a small nuclear war, the greater is the likelihood of the norm of non-use being broken.”

The idea of limited nuclear use or a “small” nuclear war threatens to disrupt the organising principle of nuclear deterrence premised on mutual vulnerability that has until now kept the possibility of nuclear war at bay. The lure of counterforce targeting could tempt nations into believing that limited, small nuclear wars can be custom-made to suit situations.

But if the taboo against use of nuclear weapons is broken once − through the conduct of a nuclear exchange that shows the “successful” ability of parties involved to keep the nuclear war limited − it could set a precedent for more to follow. And, there is no predicting the future thereafter. While the first user of the weapon might be careful to calibrate their response in order to cause minimum collateral damage, there can be no guarantee that the attacked party would follow the same rules. They might prefer a “quid pro quo plus” strategy, prompting another attack, and so on, thereby snowballing the use pattern into something bigger and far less controllable.

Therefore, the more nations move towards the idea that they could contain a small nuclear war, the greater is the likelihood of the norm of non-use being broken, leading to the conventionalisation of nuclear use. In a world of inter-state tensions, hyper-nationalist leaders and a misplaced technological confidence, such risks could only become greater.

It was to draw attention to the grimness of our times that the Nobel Laureate Assembly brought together about 100 Nobel laureates, nuclear experts, academics, and activists to brainstorm practical and actionable recommendations to pull the world back from the nuclear brink. The declaration from the event recommends putting pressure on global leaders to, inter alia:

Reaffirm their commitment to a test moratorium;
Not place nuclear weapons in outer space;
Fulfil the objectives of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
Establish strategic dialogues without pre-conditions and preconceived notions of outcomes;
Study the scientific, legal and military implications of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies;
Ensure enhanced human control and oversight over nuclear command and control;
Reject the concept of absolute security.

Even if one or two leaders of our times could heed the call of this declaration, it could turn the tide before we run out of time and luck.

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