On March 2014, during the Nuclear Security Summit held in the Netherlands, President Obama identified his number one concern as being the prospect of a nuclear weapon going off in Manhattan. UK Home Secretary Theresa May pinpointed her particular fear of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) acquisition of “chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons” in the “world’s first truly terrorist state”. Fortunately, there has not yet been a nuclear or radiological terrorist attack, but the smuggling of nuclear material remains a pivotal threat to nuclear security.
Arms control
UK Disagrees With EU Saudi Trade Embargo
Alexander Mosesov from Sputnik News featured a story about the UK’s disagreement with the EU-Saudi trade embargo. The article argues that the reaction by the UK to the decision was predictable. Paul Ingram was quoted in the article saying,
“This response [to oppose the embargo] from the British government is absolutely predictable. There is a strong belief in Whitehall [the British civil service] that the British defense industry depends upon exports to Saudi Arabia, and the strategic support the UK gives to Riyadh benefits UK influence in the region”
The OEWG is taking multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations forward
The new Open-ended Working Group (OEWG), established in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 70/33 adopted in December 2015, opened on 22 February in Geneva. It will meet over the course of 15 working days in February, May and August of 2016 and submit a final report in October.
Nuclear-free Mongolia: A Model for Northeast Asia?
For some countries, the response to grave feelings of national vulnerability has been the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Yet the global disarmament movement, and, specifically, advocates for denuclearisation in Northeast Asia have an unlikely yet powerful model of hope – Mongolia.
Lessons Learned from 70 Years of Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear disarmament has been the most desirable objective of global arms control policies since nuclear weapons were invented, along with general and complete disarmament. But it is also one that has generated most contention and conflict.
Why It’s Impossible to Hide Nuclear Work in 24 Days — Or 24 Years
“One of the most misleading distortions being floated by political opponents of the Iran nuclear deal is the “24-day” loophole meme: Iran would be able to hide all evidence of any nefarious nuclear weapons work during the 24 days it may take inspectors to gain access to a suspicious site,” wrote Yousaf Butt in this commentary piece about Iran's nuclear program for Jakarta Globe.
Concern About Iran’s Parchin Facility Not Supported by Images
“With debate flaring in Washington over the July 14 agreement between Iran and world powers, some analysts and politicians say activities at Parchin underline the risks of entering into a deal with the Islamic Republic,” reports Jonathan Tirone from Bloomsberg Business on August 11, 2015.
BASIC executive director, Paul Ingram was quoted in the article as saying: “Parchin is an active site and movement is inevitable. Attempting an impossible cleanup in full view of satellites and just before Congressional votes would be stretching conspiracy theories beyond breaking point.”
2014 Annual Activities Report
In 2014, BASIC prioritised its further engagement in building trust and dialogue amongst opinion-formers and decision shapers working in areas of nuclear deterrence, non-proliferation and disarmament.