UK Nuclear Weapons Policy and Diplomacy

Evidence submitted by Sir David Omand, GBC. Visiting Professor, Department of War Studies, King’s College London

MAY 2011

We benefit from the collective security arrangements of the North Atlantic Alliance including a framework of deterrence extended from the US to its European allies. As a result, the future risk of the UK becoming engaged in conflict remains very low. However, we know how unpredictable the international security environment can turn out to be. Looking ahead several decades we could be surprised by new and unforeseen threats; thus, we have no objective justification for seeking major changes today in the collective security that our NATO membership provides.

Evidence submitted by Profs. Keith Barnham, David Caplin, Tom Kibble and Jenny Nelson, Imperial College London

MARCH 2011

British nuclear weapons have never had credible independent military value. They were acquired and have been maintained as an expensive exercise in political and diplomatic prestige; primarily to impress and influence allies rather than deter adversaries. Whether that approach was ever worthwhile is questionable, but it is certainly no longer valid.

Britain’s key Role

The UK is at the heart of two recent critical initiatives to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Noon this Wednesday 13 July is the deadline for tabling Foreign Affairs questions for 19 July, an opportunity for MPs to encourage the government to take further constructive leads in these matters.