Abstract
The 2026 NPT Review Conference not reaching consensus, for the third consecutive time, signals a deeper structural strain within the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the Treaty’s interlocking legal obligations are being interpreted as increasingly separate rather than mutually reinforcing. The NPT is not only a non-proliferation and disarmament arrangement, but also a bargain that connects nuclear disarmament obligations with rights to peaceful uses under IAEA safeguards. It also rests on a collective-security logic among non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS), where non-proliferation obligations are undertaken alongside assurance that nuclear-armed states pursue disarmament in good faith under Article VI.
That interdependence now looks harder to sustain. New START expired in February 2026 without replacement, nuclear-armed states continue modernisation and, in some cases, expansion. At the same time, non-proliferation pressure remains heavily concentrated on Iran, North Korea, and potential “hedging” states such as South Korea and Saudi Arabia.
This perceived imbalance, more than any single crisis, erodes the Treaty’s normative authority—and asks what can be done to re-anchor disarmament and non-proliferation as a single obligation for all NPT parties.
Broken Promises on Disarmament: The 2026 NPT Review Conference and a Fraying Obligation
When the Eleventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) closed in New York on 22 May 2026 without a consensus outcome document, the reaction in disarmament circles was one of an expected disappointment rather than shock. This was, after all, the third case in a row, following the Review Conferences (RevCon) of 2015 and 2022. The results reflect a wider trend: the global framework for disarmament and arms control is being significantly eroded and challenged, leaving international peace and security more vulnerable than they have been in decades.
Conference President Do Hung Viet had put forward four versions of the draft outcome document, all meticulously revised in line with states parties’ wishes, only to see the process collapse anyway. A major contributing factor was the irreconcilable divide over Iran’s nuclear program, with states parties unable to reach consensus on the wording of Iran’s non-proliferation obligations or on how to address Tehran’s non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. Yet treating this as merely procedural fatigue understates what has happened. The repetition of lack of consensus is itself evidence of something more structural: the NPT’s interlocking legal obligations are increasingly being read as separable rather than mutually reinforcing, and that separation is what is now eroding the Treaty’s authority.
The NPT’s Grand Bargain Under Increasing Strain
It is important to recall the actual obligations established under the NPT, as the Treaty’s underlying bargain is considerably more nuanced than the simplified notion that nuclear-weapon states retain their arsenal while all other states renounce them. The Treaty relies on three pillars — non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear technology — and these were never meant to function independently. Non-nuclear-weapon states accepted permanent renunciation of nuclear weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on their civilian programmes in exchange for two things: a granted right to peaceful nuclear technology, and a binding promise, under Article VI of the NPT, that Parties of the treaty would “pursue negotiation in good faith” and “complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. This is, at root, a collective-security logic. When that conditionality breaks down, the Treaty does not lose its legal force, but its political legitimacy and the mutual confidence underpinning its implementation are weakened. It is the broader bargain of reciprocal restraint, verification, and progressive implementation—not the legal obligations themselves — that comes under increasing strain. In this sense, the absence of consensus, for the third time, reflects a systemic problem rather than an isolated conjunctural setback. The legitimacy of the NPT rests on the expectation that each pillar of the Treaty is implemented in good faith and that concessions by one group of states are matched by measurable progress by the others.
Disarmament in Retreat : The Erosion of Arms Control
That conditionality now looks difficult to sustain. New START was the last bilateral treaty constraining US and Russian strategic arsenals. Its expiration on 5 February 2026, with no successor agreement left, illustrates the erosion of arms control frameworks underpinning Article VI legal obligations. Washington’s own description of the moment was unambiguous: February 5, 2026 marked “the end of an era” — the end of US unilateral restraint, with officials arguing that a bilateral framework no longer reflects strategic realities in 2026 and beyond. Whatever the merits of that argument, the absence of a successor agreement leaves a significant gap in the arms control architecture underpinning the NPT’s disarmament bargain. As nuclear-weapon states are expected to demonstrate progress towards their Article VI obligations, the erosion of US-Russian arms control mechanisms risks further undermining confidence in the NPT Review Process. Diplomats and researchers had warned beforehand that this outcome was approaching: a side event convened by Austria and the Arms Control Association concluded that the absence of an arrangement after February 2026 could increase the risk of a new arms race and negatively affect the 2026 NPT Review Conference. Russia’s offer to observe New START’s central limits unilaterally for one further year was, at best, a temporary measure rather than a lasting framework — and one Washington has not yet reciprocated.
Meanwhile, arsenal modernisation has replaced reduction as the default posture among nuclear-armed states. All nuclear-armed states are modernising their nuclear forces, and several — including China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea — are also expanding their arsenals, while Russia and the United States continue extensive modernisation programmes. At the same time, the arms control agreements and confidence-building measures (CBMs) that once shaped nuclear competition have weakened, and even the norm against nuclear testing is growingly under pressure. The attitude of many actors reflects this broader trend.. Nearly fifty years after the NPT’s promise of good-faith steps toward disarmament, all nuclear-armed states are modernising their nuclear forces, while several are also expanding their arsenals. As a result, nuclear modernisation is increasingly seen as a challenge to the credibility and stability of the NPT system.
This situation would be damaging enough on its own, but it sits alongside an unrelenting non-proliferation agenda directed at others. Iran’s safeguards non-compliance, North Korea’s expanding missile and warhead programmes, and the prospect of South Korea, Japan or Saudi Arabia developing latent nuclear options have all featured prominently, including in Washington’s own explanation for the Review Conference’s outcomes, which blamed the inability of some NPT states parties to take Iran’s threat to global nonproliferation seriously. There is nothing wrong with non-proliferation vigilance — it is a legitimate and necessary pillar of the Treaty. The difficulty is one of sequencing and proportion: demands for restraint travel only in one direction when the other side of the bargain is visibly stalling. The UN’s disarmament chief said as much when she told the Conference plainly that non-proliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin, and it is simply wrong for nuclear-weapon states to assume that non-proliferation obligations will be upheld without their own commitment to, and implementation of, disarmament obligations.
Restoring the NPT’s Reciprocal Bargain
In September 2026, France takes over the United Kingdom’s chairmanship and steers the P5 Process, the forum that brings together the five nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to discuss their shared responsibilities during this review cycle. While the P5 typically issue joint statements ahead of Review Conferences, these carry limited impact unless backed by real practice. The key challenge is turning principles like restraint into working habits — through regular communication, transparency, and confidence-building measures. In line with its predecessor’s chairmanship, France’s role as P5 Chair should be understood as a delicate balancing exercise, promoting a “realistic and progressive” approach to Article VI of the NPT by preserving P5 dialogue, prioritising strategic risk-reduction measures, and maintaining channels of communication among nuclear-weapon states amid heightened geopolitical tensions. The French approach is therefore constructive but cautious: preserve the forum, push practical risk-reduction steps, and keep the three pillars of the NPT in balance.
That is a modest ambition, but the right one. The lesson of three consecutive deadlocks at NPT Review Conferences is not that consensus-based diplomacy has necessarily become unworkable ; rather, it is that consensus cannot be manufactured procedurally when the Treaty’s underlying obligations are no longer treated as a single, reciprocal commitment. Re-anchoring disarmament and non-proliferation as one obligation, rather than two unequal agendas, will not happen through declaratory statements alone. It requires nuclear-armed states to demonstrate — through verifiable steps, not pledges — that restraint still binds them as firmly as non-proliferation binds everyone else. Such a re-commitment would likely require reforms aimed at strengthening the institutional architecture of nuclear arms control, restoring confidence-building mechanisms between nuclear-armed states, increasing transparency on modernization programs, and developing more effective ways to operationalize and assess progress towards Article VI obligations. Absent that, the next Review Conference in 2031 will not be the fourth diplomatic disappointment in a row. It will be confirmation, if needed, that the Grand bargain itself no longer holds.
Alexis Cudey is the founder and editor of NotesDiplo, a weekly newsletter covering international affairs, diplomacy, and security issues. He holds a Master’s degree in European Affairs from Sciences Po Grenoble and an Advanced Master’s degree in International Law from the Université libre de Bruxelles. His academic background focuses on human rights, disarmament, non-proliferation, and peace studies.
All views expressed, as well as any errors, remain the sole responsibility of the author.