In this article, Dr Manuel Herrera Almela, Senior Policy Fellow at BASIC and Manager of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, reflects on the new deal on civilian nuclear energy between Saudi Arabia and the United States. The views expressed belong solely to the author of the article and do not necessarily reflect their government’s position, any affiliated institutions, or that of BASIC.
The news this week that the United States and Saudi Arabia have signed a landmark deal on civilian nuclear energy is understandably causing reverberations across policy circles in the Middle East and globally. Fears are growing that without robust oversight and careful handling of regional nations’ security concerns, it could pave the way to both a second nuclear-armed state (the first being Israel) and a dangerous arms race in the Middle East.
At the very least, there need to be credible, transparent safeguards in place. This has been the subject of intense scrutiny and confusion in the days since the announcement, with the release of contradictory statements about whether the deal will include the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a voluntary legal agreement that expands the safeguards on civilian nuclear programmes to cover additional checks, sampling, and access to nuclear sites.
Presented as a “peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement” – or “123 agreement” – alongside a bilateral safeguards agreement, the deal appears to represent a major sea change in US policy. This is because – based on currently available information (the full details have not been released) – it marks the first time in the history of the application of Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that the United States is reported to have agreed to assist another country in enriching uranium on its own soil, although Washington has recently denied this – technology that could theoretically allow a country to develop a nuclear weapon. Many countries producing nuclear energy do not enrich uranium domestically but instead import it. Media reports continue to suggest that the new deal could include a US-built enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia, subject to the outcome of a two-year study to decide whether domestic enrichment is necessary.
It is important to remain circumspect here: in the 24 hours since the deal was announced, President Trump published a statement casting doubt on whether enrichment on Saudi soil would be allowed, and unveiling new conditionalities about the deal being dependent on Saudi Arabia’s recognition of Israel. The lack of transparency on key elements of the deal has seeded confusion and doubt about its robustness. Clearly, the situation remains fluid, with many twists and turns likely in the days ahead.
But for many countries in the region, and for those across the globe, the deal is stoking fears that enriched uranium could eventually be diverted towards Saudi nuclear weapons development. The likelihood of Saudi Arabia developing a nuclear weapon is remote: for one thing, a nuclear weapons programme would entail extensive research in other military fields. However, the fact remains that wherever there is a uranium enrichment programme, fuel could be diverted – or efforts made to divert it – for non-peaceful uses or any uses not covered by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Furthermore, the government in Riyadh has been saying for years that they would develop a nuclear weapon if their regional rival Iran acquired one.
The deal’s repercussions for the region are significant. If Saudi Arabia were to develop its own nuclear weapon or if other nations assess this threat as credible, it could trigger a proliferation cascade involving other countries such as Iran seeking to cross the nuclear threshold to develop their own arsenals. Israel, currently the region’s only nuclear-armed state, could well seek to expand or modernise its own arsenal in order to maintain parity with Saudi Arabia.
For Israel, the Saudi-US deal is precipitous. The secrecy surrounding the deal could well be fomenting Israeli concerns that the United States has decided to switch its preferred ally in the region to Saudi Arabia. This, in turn, could make Israel fearful that both its own regional military superiority and its monopoly as the region’s only nuclear-armed state could be undermined by the new deal. This could spur a prolonged period of Israeli military expansionism.
There are acute challenges here. Firstly, the deal’s safeguards – both the new bilateral safeguards and IAEA terms – must also be implemented in a credible, transparent manner. These safeguards are vital to ensuring that nuclear material and facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not for the development of nuclear weapons or any other military purpose. As it stands, the text of the new bilateral safeguards agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United States has not been made public, preventing experts from assessing its robustness. There are also reports that the deal will not be subject to the IAEA “Additional Protocol”, the agency’s most rigorous monitoring safeguards. The positions of the two governments seem to be at odds: on 23 July, the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio appeared to suggest the deal would be subject to the Additional Protocol; Riyadh still refuses to accede to the Additional Protocol.
Secondly, the United States and Saudi Arabia need to take Israel’s security concerns seriously – not to mention other states in the region, including Iran, and beyond. Unless they do so, it is possible that Israel will attempt to sabotage the Saudi enrichment programme via both cyber and kinetic attacks, with potentially devastating results – as they have in the past with other regional neighbours. On Thursday 23 July, President Trump appeared to respond to Israeli concerns by stating that the deal hinged on Saudi Arabia recognising and normalising relations with Israel by joining the Abraham Accords.
Finally, there needs to be renewed efforts to enable dialogue between regional and global parties, to allay fears that Saudi Arabia could use its civilian nuclear programme for non-peaceful ends. Given the fractured geopolitical environment and protracted conflict in zones across the Middle East, creating spaces for constructive dialogue will not be easy, but it remains the only way to protect the security of lives and ecosystems in the Middle East and far beyond.