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  • Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation. Briefings on Nuclear Security 2. BASIC, Pugwash and Acronym. This is the second of the series of background briefings targeted at British MPs on the UK’s nuclear weapons policy and its context, July 2011.
  • Trident: The Initial Gate Decision. Briefings on Nuclear Security 3. BASIC, Pugwash and Acronym. This third briefing on Nuclear Security focuses on the Government’s announcement of the passing of the Initial Gate decision for the Trident renewal project on 18 May, 2011
  • What’s Next with Trident in the United States?
    Chris Lindborg and Christopher Carr
    This brief reviews the United States’ strategic nuclear submarine program within the context of U.S. and U.K. plans for replacing their fleets, April 2011.
  • A crisis in financing Britain’s replacement of Trident? Paul Ingram and Dr. Nick Ritchie
    It is time to reassess options for the replacement of the Trident nuclear missile submarines in the light of indications that the capital cost, to be funded from the Defence Ministry’s core budget, could run to 28 billion pounds over the next 10-15 years. But Ingram and Ritchie also argue that it would be a mistake to base a decision on cost alone, August 27, 2010.
  • US General says UK to get rid of Trident, Paul Ingram, February 2, 2009.
  • Oceans of Work: Arms Conversion Revisited, by Dr. Steven Schofield, January 24, 2007. The government launched its White Paper on Trident replacement on 4th December and announced a debate and vote in the Commons for March. This report puts the alternative case for arms conversion as integral to a ‘national needs’ program of civil R&D and manufacture, including major investment in off-shore renewable energy, both for security of supply and to help tackle the growing international threat for climate change.
  • UK Trident Replacement: too important to rush into, December 14, 2006. In a White Paper published on December 4, 2006 the Government decided to maintain the current Trident-based nuclear deterrent by procuring a new class of submarines. There are several reasons for believing that this decision is premature and can be delayed for a further 8-10 years. There are also significant military, strategic, procurement and diplomatic benefits to holding off a decision for another parliament. Given these advantages, the onus was on the Government to justify such an early decision.

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