Iran’s nuclear enrichment program is under close scrutiny from the international community, but the country’s government officials insist that its nuclear program is for peaceful civilian purposes only. BASIC monitor’s Iran’s nuclear program and international responses to Iran’s nuclear activities. Read below for the country report summaries from the Getting to Zero updates in reverse chronological order.
See our latest Iran Update or the Updates archive for more information and stories on Iran.
Deputy Director General Herman Nackaerts led a special IAEA team to Iran in late January for meetings with officials to address questions around the possible military dimensions of the country’s nuclear program. The Agency’s Board of Governor’s report on Iran in November released more details on alleged activities related to the possible development of nuclear weapons. Iran has continued to deny the allegations. Both sides noted that more discussions would be needed but sounded generally positive in their remarks. They agreed to hold another round of meetings on February 21-22 in Iran. Earlier in January, the IAEA confirmed that Iran had begun enriching uranium at the Fordow nuclear facility as anticipated. The facility is under Agency surveillance.
Iranian leaders were also signaling a renewed openness to the resumption of talks with the EU3+3/P5 +1 group that includes China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany. On January 19, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi suggested talks take place in Turkey. Catherine Ashton, EU foreign policy chief and EU3+3 representative, indicated that her office was still waiting for a formal response to her letter sent previously to Tehran.
The EU has agreed on a phased oil embargo to be completed on July 1, and an embargo of Iran’s central bank. The measure follows the passage of new U.S. policies to block any foreign financial institution that conducts transactions with the Central Bank of Iran. The U.S. penalties target foreign central banks involved with Iran in the sale or purchase of petroleum or petroleum products, and were expected to strain some allies that rely heavily on Iranian oil supplies.
Deputy Director of the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and head of its procurement department, Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, died in Tehran on January 11. Two men riding a motorcycle attached a magnetic bomb to Roshan’s car, which killed him and his driver. The method mirrored past killings of Iranian scientists involved in the country’s nuclear program in recent years. Iran accused the United States and Israel of the attack. U.S. officials condemned the killing, but Israeli officials refused to confirm or deny sponsorship.
U.S. Director of National intelligence James Clapper testified on January 31, conveying the unclassified elements of the Intelligence Community’s (IC) latest Worldwide Threat Assessment. Acknowledging Iran’s expanding enrichment capabilities, the assessment concludes that:
“Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.” The assessment also warned about Iran’s ballistic missile capability, saying that Iran “is expanding the scale, reach and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces, many of which are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload.” (p. 6)
The IC also judges that:
“Iran’s nuclear decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider Iran’s security, prestige, and influence, as well as the international political and security environment, when making decisions about its nuclear program.” (p.6)
On November 8, IAEA head Yukiya Amano released another safeguards report on Iran, which included more details on suspected Iranian nuclear weapons-related research and development efforts. The report points to information obtained by the IAEA and other members and confirmed by IAEA inspectors suggesting that Iran has worked in the past on designs and tests for an implosion nuclear device, computer modeling of a nuclear warhead, and designs for a miniaturized nuclear payload that would be fitted on a ballistic missile. It said that some weapons activities “may still be ongoing”.
The IAEA report also points to information on critical assistance from foreign sources, including Vyacheslav Danilenko, a former Russian nuclear scientist. IAEA information indicates Danilenko provided research papers and lectures for Iran’s Physics Research Center, a now defunct facility connected to the country’s nuclear program, as a contractor for a period of five years. Danilenko denies the allegations.
Iran has responded by calling the accusations baseless and maintains its claim that the IAEA’s information is based on forgeries. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also stated that Iran “will not budge an iota” from its path in the face of mounting international pressure. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said that Iran would address the allegations, and would be submitting to Amano a detailed written response on the report.
The United States and allies have been considering the imposition of more sanctions, pointing to both the alleged Iranian-linked assassination plot against the Saudi ambassador to the United States and as a response to the latest IAEA report’s conclusions. Debate within the United States has ensued over whether Iran’s Central Bank would be an appropriate target for further international penalties because of the potential for world oil prices to jump as a result. China and Russia were still against any new round of sanctions. However, both countries have joined the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany in producing a resolution for the IAEA on November 17 to show their unanimous agreement over their “deep and increasing concern” over Iran’s nuclear program. However this compromise resolution did not produce a renewed referral to the U.N. Security Council or issue a deadline.
Meanwhile, Amano has sent a letter to Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization requesting that Iran grant a special visit from the IAEA to permit inspectors to further investigate aspects of the nuclear program related to allegations raised in the IAEA’s latest report.
Russia has proposed a phased, “step-by-step” approach to engaging Iran about its nuclear program, under which Tehran could address IAEA questions and concerns and be rewarded with a simultaneous and gradual easing of sanctions. Iran’s official news agency reported Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seemed open to the idea. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi will visit Moscow to discuss his country’s nuclear program with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov.
On June 8, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Fereydoun Abbasi Davani, said Iran plans to triple its production of 20% enriched uranium. Iran also announced it was installing two more advanced models of centrifuges used to refine uranium, possibly at the Fordow underground bunker in the Qom province. This could significantly shorten the time needed to produce fissile material.
At an unpublicized meeting in June, influential Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal (former head of intelligence and Ambassador to London and Washington) suggested that if Iran comes close to developing nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia would likewise develop its own program. Turki warned senior NATO officials that Saudi Arabia would be compelled “to pursue policies which could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences.” These statements echo similar comments made by Turki in a 2009 leaked (Wikileaks) diplomatic cable, and lend weight to another 2008 cable in which the Saudi King Abdullah expressed fears over Iran’s nuclear program. Concerns about burgeoning Saudi nuclear intentions are amplified by the country’s refusal to publicly give up the right to uranium enrichment even though it is exempt from IAEA monitoring.
Iran began a 10-day military drill, code-named Great Prophet 6, on June 27. Also, the Iranian media displayed, for the first time, an underground missile silo in a secret location said to be loaded with medium-range Shahab-3 missiles. The Great Prophet 6 drills follow Iran’s second successful domestic satellite launch on June 15. The launch of the satellite, onboard a Safir rocket, is a move that seems to be in violation of U.N. sanctions that restrict activities relating to ballistic missiles. The satellite is intended to be used for topography missions and high-resolution mapping, according to Tehran. The United States has indicated it will bring Iran’s alleged violation before the U.N. Iran sanctions panel.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors produced on May 24 its regular update on the “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of SecurityCouncil resolutions.” This latest report [PDF made available by the Institute for Science and International Security] noted that no substantial progress had been made in determining that all of Iran’s nuclear activities have been in peaceful purposes. In particular, the report reiterated concerns about alleged “activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile,” and that since the last report, the “Agency has received further information related to such possible undisclosed nuclear related activities, which is currently being assessed by theAgency.” The report also stated that there are still “indications that certain of these activities may have continued beyond 2004.”
Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili, had sent a formal letter to EU foreign policy head Catherine Ashton in early May saying that Tehran is willing to join in more talks over its nuclear program with the P5+1/E3+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States). President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad voiced frustration with the subsequent and apparent rejection coming from the EU, whose representative said that Iran’s request for a resumption of talks indicated no new proposals or concessions that would lead to addressing concerns about the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. During a press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on May 17, Lady Ashton indicated that she was still working on a formal reply to Tehran, and would be continuing consultations with the United States and other partners first.
Within recent days, the EU blacklisted more individuals and companies for their connections to Iran’s nuclear program and the United States also imposed sanctions against more foreign entities for having conducted business with Iran’s energy sector. Earlier in May, U.N. investigators reported that sanctions were slowing Iran’s nuclear program overall. Also, U.N. investigators have alleged that Iran and North Korea have been sharing ballistic missile technology in violation of international sanctions.
In conjunction with National Nuclear Technology Day observances in early April, Iranian officials lauded their country’s nuclear accomplishments in the midst of an intensifying sanctions regime and the Stuxnet computer virus that plagued the nuclear program last year. They also announced the successful testing of advanced centrifuges, which would replace their older model centrifuges currently in operation. However, experts are dubious about Iran’s current ability to mass produce advanced centrifuges in the near future.
Russian engineers completed a successful pre-launch test of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, which is to be used for electrical supply. The plant has incurred numerous setbacks, with a significant technical problem delaying its launch back in February, which necessitated the unloading of fuel rods. Bushehr began low-level operations in mid-May and Iranian officials have said that the plant should now begin full operations by July.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke before the U.S. Congress on May 24, warning that the United States will need to sustain international pressure on Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons: “The more Iran believes that all options are on the table, the less the chance of confrontation.” Earlier in May, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak told Haaretz that even if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, that it would probably not use them against Israel.
The IAEA’s latest report on Iran’s compliance with its safeguards agreement and U.N. Security Council resolutions held little in the way of new and substantial developments. The Agency confirmed that Iran was enriching uranium apace, despite having experienced a setback in which it had to remove 1,000 centrifuges, possibly as a result of the Stuxnet computer virus. The IAEA was unable to report any progress on receiving requested information about Iran’s nascent Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom, and affirmed that it “remains concerned about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.” Iran was in the midst of pushing to upgrade its uranium enrichment facilities, moving from the current IR-1 centrifuges to carbon fiber IR-2 or IR-4 centrifuges. This improvement would increase the efficiency of uranium enrichment and significantly reduce the time necessary for ‘break-out’. However, it has been estimated that the entire centrifuge upgrade process may take as long as two years.
The latest U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) suggests that the Iranian leadership has been divided over whether or not to pursue nuclear weapons and that Tehran is several years away from having a nuclear weapons capability. Robert Einhorn, special advisor for non-proliferation and arms control at the State Department, went on the record to say that he believes that at the very least, Iran is “moving to the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability.”
Iran informed inspectors that it had run into significant trouble at the Bushehr nuclear reactor in February, which required them to unload 163 fuel rods. The problem was apparently the result of a damaged cooling pump and not Stuxnet.
Iran is reported to have been trying to obtain Norwegian missile technology, possibly for use in a potential nuclear warhead delivery system. Both South Korea and Singapore have seized possible nuclear or missile components bound for Iran in the past six months, indicating that it may be stepping up its smuggling operations in response to the latest round of international sanctions. Malaysia has recently seized equipment from two cargo containers believed to contain materials that could be used in nuclear weapons programs. They have begun the process of verification, but note that this process could take weeks or even months and that Malaysia is also seeking information from China, from which the containers had been shipped.
Iranian officials have been suggesting engagement in cooperative nuclear deals with other states in the region, covering trade in both nuclear goods and services, although there were few details. There have been a number of cautionary interceptions of exports from Iran recently, but no clear indication of illicit activity.
Negotiations between Iran and the E3+3 (France, Germany, Britain, the United States, Russia and China) in mid-January in Istanbul failed to make progress. Iran set out preconditions before it would agree to discuss its nuclear program, including the end of U.N. sanctions and a formal acknowledgment of its right to enrich uranium. The E3+3 are requiring Iran to first cooperate more with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and suspend uranium enrichment, before they would agree to lift sanctions. Also discussed was the possible revival of the proposal for Iran to export a portion of its low enriched uranium stocks in exchange for fuel prepared for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), but no progress could be reported on that front either. Both sides have said that they are open to further discussions, but no dates have been set.
Iran hosted a tour by diplomats of its nuclear facilities. Invitations were extended to Hungary, which holds the rotating presidency of the European Union, and also Russia and China, but not the United States, United Kingdom, Germany or France. The United States dismissed the Iranian initiative as “antics” meant to obscure Iran’s lack of cooperation with the IAEA. The EU, Russia and China rejected the invitation. Countries that sent representatives included Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, Oman, Syria and Venezuela.
Iran appears to be coping with the subsidies cuts meant to curb government spending. Russia, for its part, pushed to keep the removal of sanctions as a viable incentive for Iran prior to the Istanbul conference. During a meeting between U.K. Foreign Secretary William Hague and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on February 15, they acknowledged their disagreement over whether world powers should push for more sanctions. Lavrov said that more sanctions could further worsen prospects for diplomatic progress over Iran’s nuclear program and called for an action plan that would include “creative approaches” with step-by-step concessions from both sides. China has been accused of failure to properly implement sanctions, allowing Iran to buy materials for its nuclear program that it cannot produce domestically.
Russia has called upon NATO to join forces to investigate the Stuxnet virus cyber attack, comparing the potential but unrealized damage to Bushehr to the Chernobyl disaster, something denied by Iran. The United States has been accused of jointly working on developing and testing the virus with Israel. The IAEA’s cameras captured Iranian scientists hauling broken centrifuges out of the Natanz enrichment facility around the time that the Stuxnet virus was thought to have hit. But the film also shows them rapidly replacing the equipment and leaving in doubt the overall impact the virus will have had on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.
Israeli intelligence has provided conflicting reports on Iranian nuclear developments. Brigadier General Aviv Kochavi, Israel’s chief of military intelligence, has stated that Iran has not yet begun the process of developing a nuclear bomb, but that once such a decision was made it would only take a year or two to achieve. Meir Dagan, former head of Mossad’s overseas intelligence services, has spoken out on the issue as well, stating that Iran would not have a bomb until 2015 at the earliest. According to a Wikileak diplomatic cable, Israel encouraged the United States to consider military action against Iran in 2009. The U.S. Intelligence Community’s latest assessment concludes that Iran’s leadership has internal disagreements over whether to pursue a full-fledged nuclear weapons program.
The head of the physics department at Tehran’s Imam Hossein University, Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, has been appointed the new director of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, replacing Ali Akbar Salehi, who was recently confirmed in his new position of foreign minister. Abbasi-Davani survived a bomb attack on November 29, 2010. A separate attack on the same day killed another physicist, Majid Shahriari. Iran has blamed Israel and the United States for the attacks.
No major progress appears to have been made during the P5+1 meeting with Iran in Geneva earlier in December. The talks were held between the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili, and EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, who was representing the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany. The P5+1 have pushed for Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program until Iran complies with IAEA and U.N. guidelines and resolutions and becomes convinced of the peaceful nature of Iran’s program, whereas Iran contends that it has followed all legal requirements and therefore has a right to continue enrichment. President Ahmadinejad was quoted as saying “there were positive points in [the Geneva] talks.” The parties were expected to head back to the discussion table during the latter half of January in Istanbul.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad removed Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and replaced him with the head of the Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, who took his new position on December 18. The move was thought to stem from President Ahmadinejad’s disagreements with Mottaki. Both President Ahmadinejad and the new Foreign Minister, Salehi, were to attend in Turkey a regional summit on economic cooperation on December 22, and were expected to meet with officials on the sidelines to discuss prospects for negotiations around Iran’s nuclear program.
On December 7, while still Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki announced that nuclear disarmament should be implemented “without discrimination”. However, the news that almost every country neighboring Iran has expressed concerns to the United States about Tehran’s nuclear program, has been seen as highly embarrassing for the regime. Arab leaders such as King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia have urged the United States to take pre-emptive military action against Iran. The King suggested that the United States “cut off the head of the snake” while leaders in Bahrain and Jordan have also expressed concerns over Iranian intentions.
Domestic troubles in Iran have been highlighted by the leader of the opposition, Mir Mousavi, claiming that the Wikileaks cables “show our vulnerable situation in the region, a situation fuelled by adventurism.” However President Ahmadinejad immediately refuted the information contained in the cable leaks suggesting that it was a form of “psychological warfare” and that the United States deliberately leaked the information in order to put pressure on Iran.
Iran may still be struggling with the Stuxnet worm that attacked its nuclear facilities. President Ahmadinejad admitted at the end of November that the Stuxnet virus infected Iranian nuclear sites but insisted that it has been dealt with. However, experts have warned that the virus is quite complex and therefore could be difficult to remove.
Two senior Iranian nuclear scientists were attacked with bombs while in their vehicles; one fatally, in separate incidents on November 29 in Tehran. Iran accused Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States of conducting the assassinations, though Catherine Ashton, representing the EU, condemned the attacks. Also, suspicions have been raised about a possible connection with the deadly attack on an Iranian physicist earlier in 2010.