NATO can and should reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons. First, President Obama with his April 2009 Prague speech has changed the way in which nuclear deterrence is discussed in many NATO member states.
Publication
A Progressive Nuclear Policy: Rethinking Continuous-at-sea deterrence
The United Kingdom has maintained unbroken nuclear weapons patrols since 1968. The rationale for this doctrine of continuous deterrence has been based on several pillars that are irrelevant in today’s environment. Rather than an absolute need for continuous deterrent, there is instead a great opportunity for Britain to take the lead as the most progressive of the nuclear weapons states by reducing the readiness and size of its
strategic force. Article originally published in RUSI Journal, Vol. 155, No. 2.
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Nuclear Security after the Washington Summit
The Washington summit on nuclear security delivered some positive outcomes. But it is imperative that states do not now become complacent; there is much still left to do to ensure that nuclear weapons and material do not fall into the wrong hands. The ultimate gauge of the summit’s success will be whether actions now follow words. Published originally in the RUSI Journal, June/July 2010, Vol. 155, No. 3.
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A crisis in financing Britain’s replacement of Trident?
It is time to reassess options for the replacement of the Trident nuclear missile submarines in the light of indications that the capital cost, to be funded from the Defence Ministry's core budget, could run to 28 billion pounds over the next 10-15 years. But Paul Ingram and Nick Ritchie also argue that it would be a mistake to base a decision on cost alone.
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Related publication:
New players in the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program: Brazilian, Turkish, and Iranian objectives
The reasons for the impasse over Iran's nuclear program go beyond current debates on nuclear non-proliferation, sanctions, and threats of military action. This paper reviews the causes of the impasse from a broader perspective and also surveys the motives of Brazil and Turkey to engage in the diplomacy surrounding Iran's nuclear program.
Stopping New START?
This BASIC Backgrounder covers the essential developments in the Senate ratification hearings for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and Russia on reductions to their deployed long-range nuclear weapons arsenal.
Getting to Zero Update
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review conference concluded at the end of May on a positive note. However, the months ahead look uncertain. Diplomatic relations over the North Korean and Iranian programs continue to deteriorate, and there still lacks a firm indication on whether the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will be ratified by the end of the year.
NATO’s Nuclear Posture discussed at the NPT Review Conference
The prospect of a shift in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's position on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in 2010 was the subject of a BASIC event held at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.