Courtesy of the Secrecy News blog, a project of the Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy, comes this post:
Analysis
Famous last words
Since I just quoted Dr Ben Ouagrham-Gormley in the last post, it seems only fair that I mention this past article she wrote, published in the July/August issue of Arms Control Today.
The bottom line of her article, 'An Unrealized Nexus? WMD-related Trafficking, Terrorism, and Organized Crime in the Former Soviet Union' is this:
The P[b(j)] of Proliferation
The September 2006 issue of The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science published, naturally, by The American Academy of Political and Social Science, had a special issue CONFRONTING THE SPECTER OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM (Oh dear, all caps; be afraid, be very afraid).
Anyway, one article, 'A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism', by Matthew Bunn, ran the numbers, literally, for measuring the global risk of nuclear theft and terrorism. Warning, you may want to reach for your former algebra books before reading further.
Congressional oversight? Surely you jest
We've mentioned the unfortunate plight of former US intelligence analyst Richard Barlow before. But this October 19 Congressional Quarterly article highlights a different aspect of his story; namely, is Congress really interested in trying to prevent nuclear proliferation or does it just grandstand? No, no, really, that is a serious question.
The Reports of the Nexus Are Greatly Exaggerated
If you’ve heard it once, you’ve heard the conventional wisdom a thousand times, ie, the nuclear black market will help terrorist groups obtain the materials and technology to make a nuclear, or a radiological weapon. Well, here’s good news, sort of.
Singing about Dr Khan in South Africa
As everybody should know by now Pakistan has long made it clear that the West has much chance of questioning Dr Khan about his network as a snowball has of remaining frozen in hell. But that does not mean additional information about the doctor's network can't be obtained. I and others have noted in the past that there have been some, if sporadic and fitful, attempts to prosecute some of Dr Khan's former colleagues and suppliers.
The measure of Dr Khan
Speaking of wider proliferation concerns, I'd be remiss if I did not mention the recent report Project Butter Factory: Henk Slebos and the AQ Khan nuclear network by Frank Slijper (September 2007 ). From the press release: