TacNukes News summarizes recent developments and resources covering tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe. In this edition of TacNukes News, the political and security environment relevant to making progress on tactical nuclear weapons arms control continued to deteriorate as Russia-U.S. relations worsened and the Ukraine crisis showed no signs of winding down.
This newsletter is compiled and distributed by BASIC. As part of a broader joint project on reducing the role of TNW in Europe, BASIC is cooperating with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), with funding from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.
The views expressed in the resources and references below do not necessarily reflect those of the project funder or partners.
The current project page is available here on BASIC’s website.
This will be the last newsletter as the project concludes, but you can subscribe to BASIC’s other email updates to stay on top of these issues and more.
IN THIS EDITION
- PARTNER-RELATED PUBLICATIONS
- The Ukraine Crisis and Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Impacts on German Arms Control Objectives
- The Experience of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones
- A glance at the Ukraine crisis’s impact on nuclear weapons considerations
- ARMS CONTROL
- NATO Deputy Secretary General affirms hope for arms control; prospects under additional strain with INF dispute
- NATO AND RUSSIA
- Ukraine crisis, military exercises bring more attention to nuclear postures
- UNITED STATES
- Congressional committee worried about B61 bomb costs but recommends full financial support
- COMING UP
- Release of UK Defence Committee report on NATO
- NATO Summit
- The Ukraine Crisis and Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Impacts on German Arms Control ObjectivesExcerpt: “Russia’s annexation of Crimea will make it harder for Germany to achieve its disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Joint action by Russia and the United States to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals appears unlikely in the medium term. And that reduces the chances of tactical nuclear weapons being included – as Germany would prefer – in a future arms control accord. While existing nuclear arms control agreements have not thus far been openly called into question, they may yet become consumed by the ongoing Ukraine crisis.”
-Oliver Meier, SWP Comments, June 2014
- The Experience of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones
This report examines nuclear weapon-free zones and the lessons-learned that could be applied to the issue of tactical nuclear weapons currently based in Europe. The report was originally a background paper for the SWP-BASIC workshop on: “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Practice”, Berlin, March 27-28, 2014.
-Marc Finaud, BASIC Report, May 29, 2014
- A glance at the Ukraine crisis’s impact on nuclear weapons considerations
-Chris Lindborg, BASIC This Week, May 27, 2014
Deputy Secretary General affirms hope for arms control; prospects under additional strain with INF dispute
NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow addressed the alliance’s annual conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation (June 23rd, Interlaken, Switzerland), and reflected on the implications of the increasingly troubled relationship between Russia and NATO countries for future arms control progress:
“One of the issues that we have sought to discuss with Russia was transparency on short-range nuclear weapons. We felt that the vast asymmetry in numbers between Russia and NATO would make negotiations about their reduction or eventual elimination difficult and protracted. But we also felt that transparency measures would serve a most useful purpose: to enhance our security by building trust. Regretfully, that trust is now at a new low.
I do not believe we are entering a new Cold War, as some observers suggest. Even during the darkest days of the Cold War, NATO sought engagement with the Soviet Union. And perhaps we need to revisit some of the approaches that we developed during that period. Even if some of our interests during the Cold War were irreconcilable, we managed to make progress in other areas. And we concluded some far-reaching arms control agreements. Such an approach – pragmatic, and without overblown expectations – might be the right way forward again now.”
The environment for reaching new arms control agreements further dimmed as the United States publicly confirmed on July 28th previous reports, saying that Russia violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by flight-testing a ground-launched cruise missile in a range prohibited by the agreement (NYT, 7/28). The INF Treaty, agreed between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, bans missiles with a range between 500-5,500 km (about 310-3,400 miles). Moscow has denied the contention in the past. Washington is expected to try to resolve the issue with Moscow and to keep the treaty in force (Reuters, 7/29), but the process ahead may be difficult, and the dispute further sets back the confidence needed to address other arms control issues, including on TNW.
Further Reading
- Options for transparency and Confidence-Building measures Related to Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Cost-Benefit matrix
Jacek Durkalec and Andrei Zagorski, PISM–IMEMO RAN Workshop Report, July 2014
- Slowing nuclear weapon reductions and endless nuclear weapon modernizations: A challenge to the NPT (see in particular sections on United States, Russia, and NATO)
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 70, no. 4, pp. 94-107, July/August 2014
- Arms Control is Not the Answer to Our Putin Problem
Thomas Moore, Arms Control Wonk, July 17, 2014
- The Sources of Putin’s Conduct (addresses arms control)
Jeffrey Lewis, Foreign Policy, July 15, 2014
- Congressman Clarifies U.S. INF Concerns (on intermediate-range nuclear forces, not TNW, but addresses general Russia-U.S. arms control context)
Tom Z. Collina, Arms Control Today, June 2014
Ukraine crisis, military exercises bring more attention to nuclear postures
Near the end of May, when asked whether NATO might decide to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on newer member territory because of the Ukraine crisis, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen asserted: “At this stage, I do not foresee any NATO request to change the content of the NATO-Russia Founding Act (the 1997 agreement)” (Reuters, 5/19). The agreement, in part, affirms that NATO will refrain from deploying nuclear weapons or basing large numbers of foreign troops on the territory of its newer member states that joined the alliance during three waves of eastward enlargement between 1999 and 2009. The United States had earlier in the month deployed B-2 and B-52 nuclear-capable strategic bombers to Europe as part of an annual exercise. U.S. Strategic Command said in its press release that the timing was “unrelated to real-world events”.
Russia announced that it was including its Iskander-M tactical missiles (a nuclear-capable system) in previously-scheduled military exercises from May 27-June 5, in the “Western Military District” (GSN, 6/2). The district includes the Kaliningrad exclave, an area between NATO allies Lithuania and Poland. Russia warned in the past that they would deploy tactical Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad if the United States and NATO proceeded with the deployment of missile defense in Europe (TacNukes No. 8, Russia, 2/24). There was no confirmation that the system was deployed to Kaliningrad in particular.
Further Reading and Resources
- Bombs Away: The Case for Phasing out U.S. tactical nukes in Europe
Barry Blechman and Russell Rumbaugh, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014
- Italy’s Nuclear Anniversary: Fake Reassurance for a King’s Ransom
Hans M. Kristensen, FAS Strategic Security Blog, June 30, 2014
- Assuring Our Allies? What a Pentagon Bomber Mission Says about Tactical Nukes in Europe
Gabrielle Tarini, Nukes of Hazard Blog, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, June 24, 2014
- Ukraine shows uselessness of NATO nukes in Europe
Tom Sauer, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 23, 2014
- Short-sheeting European security
Steve Andreasen, StarTribune, June 19, 2014
- Nuclear Bombs Should Stay in Europe
Harrison Menke, The Daily Signal, June 19, 2014
- The Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Responding to the Crisis in Crimea
Video and audio available from this PONI Live Debate between Peter B. Doran, Director of Research, the Center for European Policy Analysis and Kingston Reif, Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, May 19, 2014
- Nuclear Exercises Amidst Ukrainian Crisis: Time For Cooler Heads
(Includes section near the bottom of the article on “The Irrelevance of Tactical Nuclear Weapons”)
Hans M. Kristensen, FAS Strategic Security Blog, May 16, 2014
Congressional committee worried about B61 bomb costs but recommends full financial support
The U.S. House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies recommended meeting the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) full request of $643 million for the B61 Life Extension Program in FY 2015, but warned “…the high cost of the program will continue to exert significant pressure on the NNSA’s budget.” (See p. 130 of June 20th report accompanying bill H.R. 4923, passed July 10, referred to Senate July 14. The Senate’s report has not yet been made available to the public.)
[B61-12 –Photo credit: NNSA]
Further Reading
- NATO: Help buy your nuclear catch-22
Eric Tamerlani, The Hill Congress Blog, June 20, 2014
- B61s in Europe: Sharing is Caring
Kingston Reif, Nukes of Hazard Blog, June 14, 2014
- On the Path to a “3+2 Vision” for U.S. Nuclear Forces
John R. Harvey, U.S. Department of Defense, Presented to the Peter Huessy Breakfast Seminar Series, June 13, 2014
(Made available by NukeWatch New Mexico)
- House Bill Seeks Answers on Costs of NATO Nuclear Burden-Sharing
Rachel Oswald, Global Security Newswire, June 11, 2014
- Billion Dollar Boondoggles: Challenging the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plan to Spend More Money for Less Security
The Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, May 2014
(See page 3 for coverage of B61.)
- The UK Defence Committee will publish a report on “Towards The Next Defence And Security Review: Part Two–NATO”
The Report will be available on the Committee’s website: www.parliament.uk/defcom starting July 31, 2014. - NATO Summit in Wales, United Kingdom, September 4-5, 2014
Review of relations with Russia and impact of the situation in Ukraine, the transition in Afghanistan, a readiness action plan for allies, and defense capacity building for non-NATO countries, are expected to be among the issues on the agenda. NATO website: www.nato.int
British Foreign Secretary Hague and NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen unveil 2014 NATO Wales Summit logo
Brussels, Belgium, June 25, 2014. [Photo credit: U.S. State Department]