This article, co-authored by Dr Chiara Cervasio and Professor Nicholas J. Wheeler, originally published in The Diplomat, is part of an occasional series of contributions reflecting on the lessons of the Pahalgam episode for managing and preventing future crises in South Asia. We invite future contributions from expert and practitioner communities. The views expressed belong solely to the author of the article and do not reflect their government’s position, any affiliated institutions, or that of BASIC.
The world breathed a sigh of relief following the news that effective mediation efforts led by the Trump administration had facilitated a ceasefire between India and Pakistan. Recurring crises, especially in the wake of terrorist attacks, are a defining feature of India-Pakistan relations. However, the recent Pahalgam crisis has witnessed—for the first time between two nuclear armed states—the use of missiles and drones targeted at key air bases. Both sides have operated on the assumption that this level of military conflict can be maintained without this triggering deliberate or inadvertent nuclear escalation. Yet, once again, third party intervention—especially from the United States—was necessary to manage escalation and find a diplomatic off-ramp. A critical question then remains: how stable is a nuclear dyad in which each successive bilateral crisis sees heightened kinetic military activities, with both sides continuing to rely on third-party intervention to prevent full-scale conflict?
Pahalgam may well mark the consolidation of a playbook for crisis management between India and Pakistan that began to emerge in 2016 with India’s “surgical strikes” against suspected Pakistani terrorist training camps across the Line of Control (LoC) and was fully established with the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis. Earlier crises—the 1999 Kargil conflict, which remained confined to the mountainous region of Kashmir and where Indian airpower was not used across the LoC; the 2001-2002 standoff, which was resolved without the use of force; and the 2008 Mumbai crisis, where India exercised military restraint—exhibited a consistent pattern of caution, in which neither side pushed the other into a choice between a humiliating defeat or nuclear escalation.
However, Pulwama-Balakot marked a clear break from past patterns of restraint between the two nuclear armed states. Attributing direct responsibility to Pakistan for the killing of 40 Indian security personnel by Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM, an Islamist group committed to bringing all of Kashmir under Pakistani control), Indian airpower was used for the first time since the 1971 India-Pakistan War against a suspected terrorist training camp at Balakot inside undisputed Pakistani territory. This strike signalled India’s belief that it could use a certain level of conventional force against Pakistan without this escalating to the nuclear level. However, in contrast to India’s 2016 “surgical strikes”, Pakistan responded by launching an air attack across the LoC. In the ensuing dogfight, an Indian aircraft was shot down and the pilot captured. Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman was returned within a few days, providing a fortuitous and perhaps even lucky off-ramp to end the crisis.
Nationality of war
Since then, the India-Pakistan crisis management playbook has been shaped by two key features. First, beginning with Pulwama-Balakot, each bilateral crisis has set a new and more dangerous threshold for military action on both sides. Second, de-escalation has relied on a mutual confidence that neither side will pursue kinetic actions beyond the point that pushes the other into choosing between a humiliating defeat and nuclear escalation. Elsewhere, we have referred to this as “confidence in crisis”, arguing that it has been driven by several key factors.
First, the rationality of nuclear fear has ensured that any use of force has been calibrated and controlled, especially as geographical proximity creates a shared understanding of the risks and devastating consequences that both countries would face in a nuclear exchange. Second, a limited structure of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and the existence of formal and informal lines of communication have provided guardrails–albeit fragile ones–that Indian and Pakistani crisis managers have utilized during crises. Another key driver of confidence in crisis has been the ability to craft domestic narratives of success. This opens up a space for leaders on both sides to save face and de-escalate by each claiming victory. Lastly, third parties, especially the United States, have so far served as a stabilizing force, pushing both sides to exercise restraint and find a diplomatic off-ramp for de-escalation. Mike Pompeo, then U.S. Secretary of State during the first Trump administration, claimed in his 2023 memoir—though the veracity of this account remains disputed—that both India and Pakistan feared the other was preparing its nuclear forces during the crisis. He argued that U.S. diplomatic engagement with both sides was critical to prevent further escalation.
Pahalgam seems to have aligned with the same India-Pakistan crisis management playbook. Both sides raised the threshold of military action beyond that of previous confrontations, engaging in conventional exchanges that carried unprecedented risk and extended beyond the disputed territory of Kashmir—even as there was massive shelling across the LoC. Both sides used stand-off missiles and drones to strike deep into each other’s territories. Crucially, they targeted each other’s military bases, crossing an escalation threshold that had long been a hallmark of restraint in past India-Pakistan crises. It remains to be seen whether these escalations from past crises represent a “new normal” in which both sides are willing to test–and potentially reset–how far they believe they can climb the escalation ladder without this triggering a nuclear response.
Nevertheless, it appears that some of the mechanisms of India-Pakistan restraint did come into play. As with Pulwama-Balakot, each side mobilized face-saving narratives to claim victory in the crisis. India signalled to Pakistan that Operation Sindoor—India’s military response to the Pahalgam attack—represents a potential doctrinal shift of conventional military response to deter sub-conventional attacks. This escalatory posture demands close scrutiny: how will Pakistan respond to similar attacks in the future and would this lead to still higher levels of Indian retaliation?
Pakistan too has been quick to claim victory, symbolized in the Pakistani narrative by the alleged shooting down of five Rafale fighter aircrafts. Operation Bunyanum Marsoos (Pakistan’s military response to Operation Sindoor) was framed domestically as a demonstration of Pakistan’s ability to maintain deterrence at the conventional level and deny India the option of conducting conventional operations under the nuclear shadow. Pakistan’s response is claimed to show its operational readiness and capacity to conduct multi-domain conventional deterrent operations in a way that avoids civilian targets and does not increase the risks of nuclear escalation.
“There is a serious risk that (over)confidence in the ability to avoid a nuclear catastrophe may slip into complacency…
The other key mechanism of restraint has been the role of third parties, especially US intervention. As with the Pulwama-Balakot crisis, US diplomacy appears to have played a pivotal role in preventing further escalation. By contrast, the contribution of formal CSBMs to de-escalation has been limited. It is true that the 1988 India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement—which prohibits attacks on each other’s nuclear installations—held firm under the strain of this crisis, underscoring the enduring value of this long-standing CBM. However, US intervention, rather than institutionalized dialogue or bilaterally agreed CBMs, continues to serve as the most effective crisis management tool between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the Pahalgam crisis, US engagement was hesitant and ambiguous. US president Donald Trump remarked after the 22 April attack that he was “sure they’ll figure it out one way or the other . . . There’s great tension between Pakistan and India, but there always has been.” Indeed, with both sides engaging in missile and drone attacks, Vice-President J.D. Vance told reporters that whilst the United States was encouraging both sides to show restraint and “deescalate a little bit”, the conflict was “fundamentally none of our business.” However, within 24 hours, the US position had dramatically shifted—Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio engaged in backchannel diplomacy with both Delhi and Islamabad to help broker a ceasefire. What appears to explain this volte-face by the Trump Administration is the escalating series of missile and drone attacks against each other’s air bases. Fearing the conflict was in danger of spiraling out of control, US diplomacy became actively engaged in finding a mutually acceptable off-ramp. President Trump later claimed credit for facilitating the ceasefire by pointing to prospective trade deals, but it remains unclear what specific off-ramp was offered or accepted by the parties.
The unevenness of US engagement in the Pahalgam crisis underscores the long-term unreliability of India and Pakistan “outsourcing escalation control” to the United States. While external mediation can offer a crucial safety net during moments of acute crisis, it cannot substitute for building robust bilateral crisis management and prevention mechanisms. The responsibility to prevent future escalation lies squarely with India and Pakistan. Especially in the wake of Pahalgam—where new and more dangerous military thresholds were set—it is imperative that both sides assume ownership of their deterrent relationship. There is a serious risk that (over)confidence in the ability to avoid a nuclear catastrophe may slip into complacency, and this underlines the need for India and Pakistan to develop new crisis management and prevention protocols and mechanisms to reduce the risks of escalation.
Real-time crisis communication
We suggest three ways in which this can be done. First, a leader-to-leader hotline should be established as a trusted confidential line of communication between the leaders of India and Pakistan. Although it was reported that there had been some communication between the two National Security Advisors (NSAs) and the two military chiefs, it is not evident how far these communications were facilitated by US mediation and whether they played a significant role in de-escalating the crisis. One important lesson from past nuclear standoffs–especially the Cuban missile crisis–is that leaders of adversarial nuclear states can sometimes forge empathetic channels of communication that help pull their countries back from the brink. A leader-to-leader hotline would provide an opportunity for real-time crisis communication designed to signal reassurance and not threats, providing a vital channel for timely de-escalation.
Second, a Track 2 forum for dialogue could be created to explore how India and Pakistan might better communicate in times of crisis —what we have called elsewhere the “South Asian Standing Communication Secretariat (SASCS)”. Such a body could reflect on how signals were (mis)interpreted in past crises, and how signals might be better crafted in the future. The purpose of the Secretariat would be to contribute to reducing the risks of future crises and if they occur, ensure that decision-makers have available a menu of possible de-escalation options. Proposals developed in such a Track 2 body could be potentially implemented at the Track 1 level.
Third, to combat the spread of violent language and nuclear jingoism in the media in India and Pakistan, both countries should enforce guidelines for responsible reporting. These guidelines should prioritize accuracy, fact-checking and transparency while discouraging sensationalism and narratives that fuel tensions. Such narratives can shape perceptions, attitudes and beliefs of the public by reinforcing nationalist sentiments. Moreover, media narratives in both countries can deliberately misrepresent the other side through misleading or misinformed rhetoric which further exacerbate tensions. For instance, during Pulwama-Balakot media outlets in India and Pakistan initially reported using escalatory language that mirrored the nationalist rhetoric of their respective governments. Adhering to responsible guidelines can contribute to mitigating the spread of misinformation and reduce misperceptions between the two countries.
If the Pahalgam crisis has taught us anything, it is that South Asia’s nuclear peace cannot rest on India or Pakistan’s overconfidence in their ability to manage or control escalation, on the uncertain availability of third-party intervention—especially from the United States–or on the unpredictable hand of luck. The most important lesson that Indian and Pakistani leaders can draw from Pahalgam is that the only lasting way to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict is to build a new regime of crisis management and prevention, grounded in the recognition that neither side can escape a condition of mutual vulnerability. This requires a fundamental shift in thinking: one that views mutual restraint not as weakness, but as strategic prudence. Without such a shift, each future crisis will be harder to manage—and the margin for miscalculation will narrow dangerously.