



BASIC

Reporting Practices in the NPT:

Historical Development and Future Options

Matthew Hartwell

APRIL 2026

■ **BASIC is an independent, non-profit think tank working to safeguard humanity and Earth's ecosystem from nuclear risks and interconnected security threats for generations to come.**

We have a global reputation for convening distinctive, empathic dialogues that help states overcome complex strategic and political differences.

Our established networks and expertise, developed since 1987, enable us to get the right people in the room and facilitate effective, meaningful exchange between siloed and often hostile political communities.

**The British American
Security Information
Council (BASIC)**

Work + Play
111 Seven Sisters Rd
Finsbury Park
London N7 7FN

Charity Registration No:
1001081

T: +44 20 3488 6974
www.basicint.org

© The British American Security Information Council (BASIC), 2026

The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of BASIC.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without any prior written permission of the copyright holder.

Please direct all enquiries to the publishers.

Authors



Matthew Hartwell

Matthew Hartwell is a Policy Fellow in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at BASIC. He is also an associate with the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School. Matthew's expertise includes nuclear strategy, arms control, and the humanitarian impacts of nuclear war. He holds a PhD in International Relations from American University's School of International Service, where his dissertation focused on the evolution of population protection in American Cold War-era nuclear policy. While completing his doctorate, Matthew was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School and a Hans J. Morgenthau Fellow at the Notre Dame International Security Center.

Acknowledgements

This brief is part of BASIC's NPT Support Project, which through 2025-2026 has sought to help lay the foundations for the "best possible outcome" at the 2026 NPT Review Conference by identifying possible avenues for consensus building. The project is generously funded by the UK Government's Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre (CPACC). The report does not directly reflect the views of the British Government. BASIC is grateful for the financial support received for this project.

Contents

Introduction	5
<hr/>	
Section 1: The Evolution of Reporting	6
<hr/>	
Section 2: Reporting at the 2022 Review Conference	8
<hr/>	
Section 3: Current Approaches to Reporting	11
<hr/>	
Section 4: Next Steps for the 2026 Review Conference and Twelfth Review Cycle	12



Introduction

While the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) to place their nuclear activities under safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, it contains no comparable institutional mechanism to assess nuclear-weapon States' (NWS) compliance with disarmament goals.

Without such binding mechanisms, reporting has become the primary means of evaluating progress on disarmament. Alongside the expansion of expectations placed on NWS since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, reporting by NNWS has also gained prominence, albeit with more voluntary expectations. As transparency has emerged as a key issue in recent review cycles, reporting, alongside other measures such as interactive dialogues, has become an increasingly important concern for States Parties.

This brief examines the evolution of reporting within the NPT review process and, looking ahead to the 2026 Review Conference (RevCon), proposes practical

options to strengthen reporting beyond the current cycle. First, this brief traces the development of reporting within the NPT review process from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference through the 10th review cycle (2017–2022). Second, this brief analyses national implementation reports produced throughout the tenth review cycle, examining the scale and structure of NNWS reporting and assessing divergences in NWS reports submitted to the 2022 RevCon. The third section of this brief examines States Parties positions on routes to enhance reporting in the current review cycle. The final section looks ahead to the 2026 RevCon and beyond the current review cycle, outlining potential pathways to strengthening reporting for NWS and NNWS.

The Evolution of Reporting

The political salience of reporting increased significantly with the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.¹

Faced with resistance from NNWS to the Treaty's indefinite extension without disarmament assurances, States Parties agreed to three decisions – on strengthening the review process, the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and treaty extension – as well as a resolution on the Middle East. As part of this package, decisions one and two introduced language on the need to periodically evaluate achievements and shortcomings and identify areas for progress in future review cycles.² The 2000 RevCon sought to operationalise the somewhat broad language set out in 1995: Step 12 of the “13 Practical Steps” in the consensus Final Document encouraged “regular reports” by all States Parties on implementation of Article VI commitments.³

Subsequent initiatives within the NPT review process attempted to introduce greater structure and detail following variation in initial NWS reports. At the 2008 PrepCom, a Japanese proposal encouraged NWS to include information on reductions in nuclear stockpiles, warheads, delivery systems, and supporting infrastructure; progress on dismantlement; fissile material production, excess declarations, and disposition; doctrinal changes; and plans for future disarmament.⁴

Building on this work, at the 2010 RevCon, Australia and New Zealand proposed systematising reporting under four categories: nuclear doctrine, fissile material policy, warhead and delivery vehicle numbers, and strategic and tactical reductions.⁵

The 2010 RevCon led to further steps toward institutionalising reporting. States Parties stopped short of mandating the detailed and standardised disclosures advocated by Japan and Australia-New Zealand. Nevertheless, the conference expanded on the somewhat indeterminate framework developed in 1995 and 2000. The 64-point Action Plan, adopted by consensus at the RevCon, included a set of measurable actions across all three pillars of the treaty. The plan's comprehensiveness, alongside failures to achieve consensus in subsequent RevCons, ensured that it has become the primary basis for reporting requirements. The plan also included three actions that explicitly addressed reporting: action 5 called on NWS to report on progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament at the upcoming 2014 PrepCom, action 20 noted that all States Parties should submit regular reports, and action 21 encouraged NWS to agree on a standard reporting format.⁶

In the run-up to NWS reporting at the 2014 PrepCom, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDII) led efforts to further progress on the 2010 Action Plan through increasing the level of detail and the degree of standardisation in reporting. In 2011, building on the earlier work produced by Japan and Australia-New Zealand, the group introduced a draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form structured around actions 3 and 5(a) of the 2010 Action Plan.⁷

1 References to reporting predate the conference; in the Final Report of the PrepCom for the 3rd RevCon, NWS were invited to “provide information relevant to the implementation of various articles of the Treaty, including especially Article VI”. “NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.10,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom14/documents/WP10.pdf>

2 “NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I),” FAS, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://nuke.fas.org/control/npt/docs/2142.htm>

3 The document noted that reporting should cover implementation of Article VI, the ultimate goal of general disarmament in 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996. “NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II),” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/GENERAL-DOCS/2000FD.pdf>

4 “NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.10,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom08/papers/WP10.pdf>

5 “NPT/CONF.2010/WP.40,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/documents/WP40.pdf>

6 Expanding the reporting categories established in 2000, Action 20 added the 13 Practical Steps and implementation of the action plan agreed to at the conference. “2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/2010NPTActionPlan.pdf>

7 Action 3 calls on NWS to “to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons”. Action 5 calls on NWS to engage with “rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons”.

At the 2012 PrepCom, the NPDI reaffirmed this approach, producing further ideas for disarmament-relevant information to be included in a standard reporting form. Across these proposals, suggested categories for reporting centred on nuclear warheads and delivery systems, weapons and delivery systems dismantlement, fissile material production, and the role of nuclear weapons in security concepts, doctrines and policies.⁸

The P5 process pursued an alternative approach to advance standardisation in NWS reporting. The first major element of this approach was the development of a common reporting framework, which was first broached following the third P5 conference in June 2012.⁹ Developed under France's leadership, this framework, which was agreed upon in advance of the 2014 PrepCom, organised NWS reports under common sections and sub-sections.¹⁰ The first three sections followed the three pillars of the NPT – disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy – while the final section centred on other actions taken to implement and/or strengthen the NPT. In contrast to the NPDI's more prescriptive approach, the P5 framework refrained from requiring detailed, standardised data on disarmament progress. In parallel, the P5 established a working group led by China to develop a "glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms" in July 2011.¹¹ The process resulted in the creation of a document encompassing 227 terms across six thematic areas, which was presented at the 2015 RevCon.¹²

At the 2014 PrepCom and the 2015 RevCon, the NPDI continued to lead efforts to strengthen reporting. Building on earlier initiatives, the group emphasised differentiated reporting expectations for NWS and NNWS. For NWS, the group called for the adoption and consistent use of a standard reporting form, with regular – ideally annual – reports on nuclear disarmament activities throughout the review cycle and reiterated its earlier recommendations on the categories of information to be included in these reports.¹³ In addition, the NPDI introduced a reporting template for NNWS to enhance participation among all States Parties. Based directly on the 2010 Action Plan, the template offered NNWS a framework for reporting on implementation of commitments across the three pillars of the Treaty, with extraneous actions excluded.¹⁴

Throughout the 10th review cycle, the NPDI, joined increasingly by others – for example, the New Agenda Coalition – continued efforts to advance proposals to address the lack of detail and standardisation in reporting. The NPDI introduced a new draft template, this time extending the approach developed for NNWS to NWS, with appropriate modifications to reflect their distinct obligations. Rather than focusing solely on disarmament, this template operationalised the 2010 Action Plan through standardised reporting across all three pillars of the Treaty.¹⁵ Other States Parties and groups most often maintained an approach more directly centred on NWS reporting concerning disarmament obligations. The New Agenda Coalition, for example, argued that NWS reports remained "inconsistent and patchy" and therefore insufficient to evaluate Article VI implementation. While the group's proposal drew heavily on earlier NPDI initiatives, it went further by advocating for the introduction of baselines and benchmarks to measure progress.¹⁶

8 "NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom12/documents/WP12.pdf>

9 "Third P5 Conference: Implementing the NPT – Joint Statement," U.S. Mission Geneva, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://geneva.usmission.gov/2012/06/29/third-p5-conference/>

10 "Joint Statement on the P5 Beijing Conference: Enhancing Strategic Confidence and Working Together to Implement the Nuclear Non Proliferation Review Outcomes," U.S. Mission Geneva, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/04/24/joint-statement-on-the-p5-beijing-conference-enhancing-strategic-confidence-and-working-together-to-implement-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-review-outcomes/>

11 "Joint Statement on First P-5 Follow-Up Meeting to the NPT Review Conference," U.S. Department of State, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/167492.htm>

12 "P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms," U.S. Department of State, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/243293.pdf>

13 "NPT/CONF.2015/WP.16," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/documents/WP16.pdf>

14 "NPT/CONF.2015/WP.17," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/documents/WP17.pdf>

15 "NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom17/documents/WP17.pdf>

16 "NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.13," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom17/documents/WP13.pdf>

Reporting at the 2022 Review Conference

Non-Nuclear Weapon State Reporting

NNWS reporting increased moderately compared to the 9th review cycle, with a higher overall number of national reports submitted, particularly at the 2022 RevCon. Despite this increase in scale, reporting practices were uneven across the 10th review cycle.

Report length varied widely, ranging from submissions of a single page to extensive reports up to 44 pages. Beyond variation in length, engagement across the review cycle was uneven. Regular reporting was concentrated among a small number of States Parties – most notably, Japan, Austria, and New Zealand – many of whom submitted reports consistently at PrepComs and the RevCons. By contrast, most NNWS submitted only a single report for the RevCon.

Table 1: NNWS Reports – Frequency and Length.¹⁷

	Reports by NNWS	Reports on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones	Updated/ Repeated Reports	Average Report Length ¹⁸
2017	9	2	N/A	13.9
2018	6	0	5	14.5
2019	8 ¹⁹	1	5	9.6
2022	41 ²⁰	4	11	9.8

¹⁷ The data in this table is based on reports available through the Reaching Critical Will Website.

¹⁸ These figures exclude States Parties reports on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones.

¹⁹ In addition to a financial report.

²⁰ In addition to a background paper prepared by the United Nations Secretariat, a letter from the President of the second session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, a report submitted by the Permanent Council of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and a P3 Ministerial Statement.

NNWS reporting displayed a high degree of structural diversity throughout the 10th review cycle. While the 2010 Action Plan served as the primary reference point, States Parties applied the goals outlined in this document in various ways. A relatively small group of NNWS used the NPDI template, or close variants, producing reports that systematically tracked implementation against individual actions in the action plan. A larger group of States Parties organised their submissions around the action plan, but combined or omitted actions, or grouped reports broadly under the three pillars. Other States Parties linked their reports only tangentially to the plan, using it as a general point of reference, or, in a few cases, focused on specific issues or articles in the original text of the Treaty.

Table 2 examines the variation in NNWS reports across the 10th review cycle, categorising States Parties submissions based on the principal structural differences outlined in the paragraph above.

Nuclear Weapon State Reporting

National reports submitted by NWS to the 2022 RevCon demonstrate a high degree of structural uniformity alongside variation in substance.

Despite minor differences in the use of the common reporting framework introduced by the P5, and, in some cases, omitted sections, all reports followed the same overarching structure. Despite this formal alignment, the type of information provided and the extent of information shared differed significantly. Some reports included quantitative data, historical accounting, and implementation details. In other cases, reports remained largely qualitative, relying on declaratory policy statements or broad descriptions of intent with limited supporting detail.

Table 3 (page 10) examines areas of convergence and divergence in Section I (reporting on national measures relating to disarmament) of the five NWS reports.

Table 2: NNWS Reports – Structural Variation.²¹

	2017	2018	2019	2022
Using the NPDI template	4	4	3	5
Following the 2010 Action Plan with actions combined and/or omitted	1	1	3	15
Broadly linked to the 2010 Action Plan	1	1	1	6
Loosely linked to the 2010 Action Plan	1	0	0	6
Centred on specific issues	0	0	0	3
Centred on Treaty articles	0	0	0	2

²¹ The data in this table is based on reports available through the Reaching Critical Will Website.

Table 3: Variation in Nuclear Weapon States' National Reports (Section I)

	United States	United Kingdom	France	Russia	China
I. National Security Policies, Doctrine, and Activities Associated with Nuclear Weapons					
Nuclear Policy and Doctrine	Deterrence policy linked to ongoing National Defense Strategy Review; detailed force posture and alert practices; extensive coverage of nuclear safety and surety.	Deterrence policy set out in the Integrated Review; minimum credible deterrence; conditional negative security assurances; strong emphasis on NATO and bilateral cooperation.	Doctrine set out in regular public communications; strict sufficiency and defensive deterrence; one-time nuclear warning concept; exclusive political control; conditional negative security assurances	Doctrine defined in Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation; detailed conditions for nuclear use; extensive list of external military risks; emphasis on war prevention and non-nuclear deterrence.	Normative framing centred on no-first use; minimum deterrence and self-defence; unconditional negative security assurances; emphasis on global and regional strategic balance.
II. Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Arms Control (including Nuclear Disarmament) and Verification					
Modernisation	Brief descriptions of modernisation programmes; no timelines or cost.	Justification for renewal programmes; provides some specific details; no cost breakdown.	Brief reference and justification; no specific details.	Emphasis on non-nuclear modernisation.	Acknowledgement of modernisation for safety and reliability; no specific details.
Warhead numbers / force levels	Provides national stockpile total and references New START ceilings.	Provides upper stockpile limit.	Provides upper stockpile limit.	No national totals; relies on treaty ceilings/history.	No specific data provided.
Dismantlement information	Provides historical reductions/ cumulative dismantlement totals.	References to past reductions; no specific quantitative data.	References to past reductions; limited quantitative data.	Reductions referenced indirectly via past treaties.	Not addressed.
Fissile material	Quantitative disclosure of inventories and excess declarations.	Statements on moratorium; no quantitative data.	Statements on moratorium and production facility dismantlement.	Statements on moratorium; references to historic HEU downblending programs and facility dismantlement.	Reference to historical scaling back of development and production base; no quantitative data.
III. Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures					
Approach	Significant focus on P5 process, data exchanges, inspections, and notifications.	Transparency treated as a tool to build trust and confidence; civil society and P5 dialogues emphasised.	Transparency treated as a tool to build trust and reduce risk; national level efforts and P5 process emphasised.	Transparency tightly bounded; national level efforts and P5 process emphasised.	Levels of transparency a national strategic calculation; P5 process emphasised.
IV. Other Related Issues					
Key focus	Implementation of commitments under disarmament and arms control agreements.	Efforts to support the Conference on Disarmament and agree to a programme of work.	Nuclear disarmament in the context of general and complete disarmament.	Not included in the report.	Ballistic missile defence; deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific; militarisation of space.

Current Approaches to Reporting

Throughout the present review cycle, NNWS have expanded their focus on building transparency not just by enhanced reporting requirements but also through pressing for the presentation and interactive discussion of national reports.

Despite this new focus, States Parties' support for strengthening reporting requirements demonstrates a high degree of convergence, alongside divides over issues such as the respective responsibilities for NWS and NNWS. Many States Parties and groups have reiterated support for existing proposals, while others have advanced additional recommendations aimed at addressing perceived shortcomings, with particular emphasis on NWS reporting. Taken together, proposals centre on three elements: increasing standardisation for all States Parties, improving the content of NWS reporting, and more regular submissions.

Evidence from the current review cycle points to substantial support among States Parties for a more standardised approach to reporting. Building on its earlier work, the NPTDI introduced a new reporting template at the 2025 PrepCom, aiming to operationalise the 2010 Action Plan through a single framework applicable to all States Parties by differentiating between reporting expectations for NWS, NNWS with "advanced nuclear capabilities", and NNWS without "advanced nuclear capabilities".²² A significant number of States Parties have expressed support for the template, either endorsing it as the basis for standardised reporting or a useful foundation for progress. At the same time, a divide exists over the appropriate balance of reporting obligations. While certain States Parties have advocated for uniform standardisation, others emphasise the special responsibility of NWS.

With respect to the quality of NWS reporting, many States Parties and groups have called for improve-

ments to the P5 common reporting framework.²³ Although proposals vary, there is broad agreement on the need for clearer expectations regarding the scope and depth of information to be provided by NWS. States Parties have particularly emphasised the importance of more detailed data on nuclear arsenals, nuclear doctrines, fissile material holdings, and nuclear doctrine. Beyond these core concerns, more ambitious proposals – such as linking NWS reporting to disarmament benchmarks – reflect a growing interest among certain States Parties in moving toward an accountability-based approach to measuring Article VI progress.²⁴

On the issue of frequency, NNWS positions have converged around the expectation that NWS should submit reports twice per review cycle. Divergences persist regarding the timing of submissions, with some States Parties tying reporting schedules to preferred modalities for the presentation and interactive discussion of national reports. As with debates over standardisation, views vary regarding the frequency of NNWS reporting. While some States Parties have called for regular reporting by all States Parties, the more common position centres on enhancing reporting obligations for NWS, or, in some cases, for NWS alongside NNWS under nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements or with advanced nuclear capabilities. This divide emerged as an issue at the 2025 PrepCom, where calls for enhanced reporting requirements for NNWS under nuclear sharing or extended deterrence arrangements met resistance, particularly from the US, due to concerns that the proposals threatened to establish a third category of States Parties under the NPT.²⁵

²² "NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.30," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/documents/WP30.pdf> NNWS with advanced nuclear capabilities refers to states with the materials and technical capacity to develop nuclear weapons rapidly.

²³ See, for example, "NPT/CONF.2026/PC.1/WP.6," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom23/documents/WP6.pdf>; "NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/WP.6," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/documents/WP6.pdf>

²⁴ For one example of this accountability-focused approach to reporting, see "Statement by The Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/1May_NAM.pdf

²⁵ See, for example, "Statement by the United States on Cluster 3 Specific Issue: Strengthened Review Process," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/7May_US_2.pdf

Next Steps for the 2026 Review Conference and Twelfth Review Cycle

Although the RevCon has not yet taken place, a number of States Parties have already submitted national reports.

While these early submissions do not allow firm conclusions to be drawn about the overall direction of reporting, they nonetheless reflect continued engagement with this process. In this context, it is useful to look beyond the immediate review cycle and consider practical routes through which NWS and NNWS reporting could be enhanced for the next review cycle. Focusing on modest improvements – rather than large-scale reform – offers a realistic basis for strengthening reporting.

Enhancing Non-Nuclear Weapon State Reporting Practices

For NNWS, the principal opportunity for progress lies in the more systematic use of standardised templates. Reports that closely follow the NPDI template – or close variants of it – offer clear advantages in terms of comparing progress between States Parties and across review cycles. Wider use of such templates would not require new negotiated commitments but could reduce the current fragmentation in NNWS reporting. More consistent NNWS reporting could also have indirect effects on NWS reporting. By reinforcing expectations of reciprocity through structured engagement with agreed commitments, improved NNWS reporting would help set expectations that shape norms within the review process. These practices can shape expectations for NWS, even in the absence of revisions to the P5 common reporting framework.

Enhancing Nuclear Weapon State Reporting Practices

The P5 common reporting framework meets NWS core political requirement of flexibility. The emphasis on shared structure has allowed NWS to participate without accepting binding requirements for information sharing deemed to undermine national security. As this feature has been central to its durability, some level of diversity in reporting practice is, therefore, unlikely to disappear in the near term. This dynamic is reinforced by the current political context. The stagnation of the P5 process – the most likely venue for further developments in NWS reporting practices – limits prospects for changes to the common framework. Efforts to enhance NWS reporting are more likely to succeed if they work within existing structures, rather than seeking more challenging large-scale revisions.

Even in the absence of political support among the P5 for significant changes to the common reporting framework, it remains valuable for NNWS to articulate the types of information they consider appropriate for inclusion in national reports. Clarification of information disclosures – for example, relating to doctrine, force posture, or fissile material – can serve as a guide for reporting practices. This signalling will be unlikely to constrain NWS national discretion in reporting, particularly considering reversals in scale of disclosures on disarmament-relevant information throughout recent review cycles. However, sustained pressure, particularly if it results in shifts in the reporting practices of one or more NWS, could contribute to establishing shared reference points for what constitutes meaningful reporting.

Improvements to NWS reporting need not be limited to the politically challenging task of pressing NWS to increase the level of detail in their disclosures. While a decline in tension among the P5, particularly concerning nuclear weapon competition, may open the door for greater transparency via reporting, it remains likely that national security concerns will continue to shape the scale of disclosures in the near term. This being said, examples from recent PrepComs and the 2022 RevCon point to two complementary and more immediately attainable voluntary pathways for NWS to enhance reporting. Importantly, neither approach would require substantive alterations to the P5 common reporting framework or require the sharing of information deemed incompatible with national security concerns.

The first option involves framework-based submissions that more directly cross-reference information in national reports to the commitments in the 2010 Action Plan. The UK's national report submitted for the 2022 RevCon provides a useful, albeit somewhat limited, illustration of this approach that could serve as a starting point for further progress. While the UK's report followed the P5 common reporting framework, it periodically identified where specific policies, measures, or activities correspond to individual action plan commitments. Throughout the text of the report, 26 actions were cited in total, with two actions referenced twice.²⁶ This approach did not include additional disclosure compared to other NWS reports. Instead, by explicitly linking existing information to agreed commitments, this format can strengthen the ability to track progress over time. Greater rigor in consistently referencing action plan commitments in the text of national reports, alongside wider adoption of this approach among NWS, would improve comparability across reports.

The second option involves the use of complementary documentation alongside national reports submitted under the P5 common reporting framework. France's practice at the 2025 PrepCom offers an example of how supplementary materials could help aid greater standardisation. During a side event at the PrepCom, the French delegation shared a document on measures to implement the 2010 Action Plan. This "aide-mémoire" systematically cross-referenced Action Plan commitments to the relevant sections of France's national report and included brief descriptive summaries of the measures undertaken.²⁷ While the introduction to the document noted that the 2010 Action Plan is not intended to serve as a reporting framework, this document represents the closest NWS have come to the type of standardisation pushed for by the NPDI and others. This parallel reporting format could serve as a pragmatic mechanism for enhancing the utility of the P5 common reporting framework, while preserving the flexibility that remains central to the NWS participation.

The most realistic path to enhance reporting is to build incrementally on practices that already maintain some support among States Parties.

Wider use of standardised templates for both NNWS and NWS, and clearer cross-referencing to agreed commitments and complementary documentation for NWS, could all improve the quality and utility of reporting without requiring a significant institutional change.

²⁶ Actions cited in the UK's national report: 2; 5(c), 5(d), and 5(g); 8; 9; 13; 15; 19 (twice); 21 (twice); 22; 25; 26; 28; 31; 35; 36; 37; 45; 48 (twice); 52; 53; 54; 55; and 60.

²⁷ The UK's recently released 2026 national report has borrowed from the French example, combining its method of cross-referencing information to the commitments in the 2010 Action Plan with a separate annex.

BASIC promotes meaningful dialogue amongst governments and experts in order to build international trust, reduce nuclear risks, and advance disarmament.

**The British American Security
Information Council (BASIC)**

Work + Play
111 Seven Sisters Rd
Finsbury Park
London N7 7FN
