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A Zone of Potential Agreement?

Transparency and Accountability at the 2026 NPT Review Conference

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Introduction

Interest in improving transparency and accountability in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is not a new issue.

Early efforts to strengthen the Treaty review process in 1995 were framed around the concept of “permanence with accountability”; if the non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS) were to agree to an indefinite extension of the Treaty essentially giving up some of the leverage they held over the nuclear weapon States (NWS), then they wanted more ways to be able to hold those NWS to account. The adoption of Decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on strengthening the review process for the Treaty established the current review process structure with a view to “assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized”.¹ Since 1995, transparency has been increasingly linked to calls for greater accountability, with a number of Review Conferences (RevCons) making recommendations on how the NWS in particular could demonstrate their commitment to the Treaty through transparency.²

The current review cycle has seen renewed momentum on the relationship between transparency and accountability, with a number of States Parties having submitted working papers on the topic throughout the cycle.³ Yet despite the considerable attention transparency has received in recent discussions among States Parties, conceptual ambiguity persists. As the UK’s working paper on Transparency and Nuclear Disarmament submitted to the 2022 RevCon observed, “the various aspects of transparency in the context of nuclear disarmament, and the benefits, potential and risks associated with them,

are not fully understood, and in some instances may even be contested”.⁴ There remains a lack of clarity around what transparency means in practice and how it relates to the broader goal of accountability. Without a shared understanding of the concept, efforts to advance concrete measures risk talking past one another. This report seeks to address that gap. It aims to provide conceptual clarity on transparency, to collate the various proposals that have been put forward for improving transparency within the NPT framework, and to consider how these ideas might be taken forward at the 2026 RevCon.

The report proceeds in three sections:

- **Section 1** takes a step back to examine the concept of transparency more broadly, defining it as a spectrum of informational activities rather than a single, fixed practice. This section looks at examples of information-sharing activities, the value of transparency, and makes the case for considering dialogic practices of transparency.
- **Section 2** then turns to transparency in the specific context of the NPT, offering a brief history of the concept’s development since 1995 before focusing on the proposals advanced during the current review cycle and the responses these have elicited from States Parties (see also Annex A).
- **Section 3** explores the path forward, identifying key areas of convergence and divergence among NPT States Parties, discussing considerations relevant to building consensus, and offering a set of recommendations for the RevCon.

1 “NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part 1), Annex,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/GENERAL-DOCS/outcome1995-1.pdf>

2 “2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/2010NPTActionPlan.pdf>; “NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II),” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/GENERAL-DOCS/2000FD.pdf>

3 For examples from the first and third PrepCom, see “NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.18,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom23/documents/WP18.pdf>; “NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.1,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/documents/WP1.pdf>

4 “NPT/CONF.2020/WP.42,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/documents/WP42.pdf>

What is Transparency?

One definition of transparency provided by the Cambridge Dictionary is: “The quality of being done in an open way without secrets”.⁵ Transparency then describes a state of openness, but in international relations, no state can be completely “open” due in the most part to national security concerns and domestic political barriers. This is particularly true in the nuclear domain. As such, it is important not to think of transparency as a binary condition.

This report suggests defining transparency as a spectrum of information-sharing activities with varying degrees of depth, formality, and interactivity.

To appreciate the breadth of this spectrum, it is useful to examine practices of transparency through a series of analytical dimensions: *what* is made transparent, *who* participates, *where* the exchange takes place, *when* the information pertains to, and *how* it is implemented.

- **What is made transparent:** Transparency measures may relate to materials, such as the quantities and locations of fissile stocks; to technical capabilities, such as the design or capacity of relevant facilities; to operational matters, such as the status and posture of deployed systems; to doctrine, such as the conditions under which weapons might be used; or to process, such as the procedures and decision-making frameworks that govern policy.

- **Who participates:** This dimension concerns the parties involved in any information-sharing activities. Transparency measures may be bilateral, exchanged between two states, or multilateral, shared among a wider group. In the nuclear domain, however, States most commonly demonstrate transparency through unilateral actions and declarations. Related to this is the question of audience: whether the information is made available to the general public or restricted to a defined set of recipients, such as treaty partners, institutional members, or an agency, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
- **Where the exchange takes place/where the mandate for the exchange comes from:** Closely related to who participates is the institutional context in which the information is shared. Negotiated or formal transparency measures encompass more detailed and often costly information exchanges established through legally binding bilateral or multilateral agreements, typically embedded within verification regimes.⁶ Others arise as expectations associated with membership of a particular institution or regime; transparency expectations embedded in the NPT review process are an example of this. Still others are informal, voluntary offerings made outside any binding framework, for example, unilateral, publicly made declarations.

⁵ “Transparency,” Cambridge Dictionary, accessed February 16, 2022, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/transparency>

⁶ “Food-for-Thought Paper: Transparency, Verification, and Confidence-Building in the Context of Nuclear Disarmament,” *IPNDV*, January 2018, <https://www.ipndv.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/IPNDV-WG1-FFT-Transparency-Verification-and-Confidence-Building-Final.pdf>

- **When the information pertains to:** There is also a temporal dimension. The information disclosed may be historical, shedding light on past activities; current, reflecting the present state of affairs; real-time, offering continuous or near-continuous updates; or forward-looking, concerning future plans and intentions. Other analysts have suggested that starting with historical transparency is an easier first step to building a culture of transparency.⁷
- **How it is implemented:** Transparency measures may rely on unverified declarations, verified data exchanges, voluntary demonstrations, or technical monitoring arrangements. A further distinction exists between information that is voluntarily offered by the disclosing party and information that is accrued through non-voluntary means, such as national technical capabilities or independent verification mechanisms.

When you look at different case studies through the framework of these questions, you'll see that transparency is done in many different ways. You can have highly formalised transparency with strong verification mechanisms but limited public access, like many of the US/Russia bilateral arrangements, or you can have less formal but more publicly accessible transparency, like the US unilateral 2024 stockpile declaration. The section below discusses some examples.

EXAMPLES

Transparency in Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament

The first two decades of US-Soviet nuclear competition were marked by a singular lack of transparency. Transparency measures, typically embedded in arms control agreements, were negotiated only after near-parity in strategic arsenals was achieved in the early 1970s. The first major set of arms control agreements, the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which were both signed in 1972, introduced limited principles of formal transparency by obligating each side to disclose details regarding the development of its nuclear forces.⁸

Once the US and Russia began to move forward with arms control measures involving more significant limitations after the end of the Cold War, bilateral transparency measures became more intrusive in line with the evolving nature of verification embedded in these treaties.

The START Treaty, which entered into force in 1994, incorporated an extensive suite of transparency measures to meet the complexity of the Treaty and the scope of mandated reductions. These measures included data exchanges with detailed information on the numbers and locations of strategic delivery vehicles, on-site inspections, and continuous monitoring activities at certain sites.⁹ The New START Treaty, which entered into force in 2011, preserved a streamlined version of these mechanisms.¹⁰

A parallel system of transparency, national technical means, plays a somewhat distinct yet important role in enhancing transparency. Rather than a voluntary or treaty-bound form of information disclosure, national technical means are “nationally owned and operated technologies and techniques used to monitor the treaty obligations of another state”, including information obtained by intelligence organisations.¹¹ National technical means are difficult to cite as a transparency measure due to their involuntary and secretive nature. However, mutual agreements not to interfere with national technical means, for example, through deliberate concealment measures, have supported the levels of transparency necessary for verifying compliance. Language on mutual non-interference originated in the ABM Treaty and continued through to the New START agreement.¹²

In the context of non-proliferation, transparency is understood as a flow of information that demonstrates the peaceful nature of states’ nuclear activities. Unlike primarily bilateral arms control agreements, the core of this system of transparency

7 Camille Grand, “Nuclear Weapon States and the Transparency Dilemma,” in *Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions*, ed. Nicholas Zarimpas (Oxford University Press, 2003).

8 Pavel Podvig, “Transparency in Nuclear Disarmament,” *UNIDIR*, March 2012, <https://unidir.org/files/publication/pdfs/transparency-in-nuclear-disarmament-390.pdf>, 4-5.

9 “START I at a Glance,” *Arms Control Association*, July 2022, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start-i-glance>

10 These measures formally ended with Russia’s suspension of New START. Shannon Bugos, “Russia Suspends New START,” *Arms Control Association*, March 2023, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-03/news/russia-suspends-new-start>

11 “Coming to Terms with Security: A Handbook on Verification and Compliance,” *UNIDIR*, 2003, <https://unidir.org/files/publication/pdfs/coming-to-terms-with-security-a-handbook-on-verification-and-compliance-en-554.pdf>, 20.

12 “Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” U.S. Department of State, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf>

was established multilaterally through the NPT and conducted through bilateral relationships between the IAEA – responsible for administering the safeguards system – and states demonstrating willingness to make their civilian nuclear programmes sufficiently transparent to support IAEA verification efforts. As the IAEA notes, “Transparency in nuclear activities in a State increases the IAEA’s understanding of the nuclear programme, facilitates analysis of its coherence and consistency, and ultimately increases confidence in the conclusions drawn by the IAEA for that State”.¹³

The levels of transparency required for IAEA verification have increased over time, if not in a wholly linear fashion, leading to changes in what aspects of a state’s civilian nuclear program are made transparent. Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA), established in 1971, states demonstrate transparency through measures including allowing the IAEA to undertake on-site inspections and providing declarations of nuclear material.¹⁴ States signed up to the Additional Protocol extend their level of voluntary transparency by enhancing the IAEA’s access necessary to fill information gaps under CSAs and allow the agency to develop a comprehensive picture of a state’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities. In practice, this has included states providing the IAEA with the authority to visit any facility, including undeclared facilities, on short notice.¹⁵ In addition, all of the NPT NWS have signed voluntary offer safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Under these agreements, the IAEA can apply safeguards to eligible nuclear material and/or facilities in civilian activities designated by the state.¹⁶ Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran committed to a degree of transparency unmatched in the non-proliferation regime, encompassing provisions such as challenge inspections, daily access for IAEA inspectors at the Natanz facility, continuous surveillance of centrifuge production and stored excess centrifuges, and oversight of uranium ore production.¹⁷

The above-mentioned examples demonstrate cooperative and negotiated forms of transparency; however, in the nuclear domain, the most common form of

transparency, especially for smaller NWS, comes through unilateral declarations and actions. There are many examples of unilateral efforts to demonstrate transparency.

The US, for example, has historically demonstrated significant transparency regarding stockpile numbers. In 2010, the Obama administration declassified the total size of the US nuclear stockpile, revealing that it stood at 5,113 warheads as of September 2009. This was accompanied by a disclosure of the history of the stockpile dating back to 1962, providing an unprecedented level of historical transparency.¹⁸ The Biden administration continued this practice, releasing updated stockpile figures in 2021 disclosing a total of 3,750 warheads as of September 2020.¹⁹ The UK has similarly made unilateral disclosures about the size and composition of its nuclear forces in the past. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (a demonstration of unilateral transparency in itself) revealed that the UK possessed fewer than 160 operationally available warheads and a total stockpile of no more than 225 warheads.²⁰

This range of examples illustrates the variety of practices through which nuclear transparency can be demonstrated and sustained. No one form of transparency is better than another, for they each serve distinct purposes and operate under different conditions. For example, treaty-based transparency measures provide legally binding, often verifiable, and therefore highly credible assurances, but they are necessarily limited in scope to what states are willing to negotiate and codify. Unilateral disclosures are more flexible and can be made without the lengthy timelines associated with treaty negotiation, but they are discretionary, reversible, and often not verifiable.

Whilst each transparency practice might appear modest in isolation, taken together, they may contribute to a sustainable culture of transparency which has a number of benefits.

13 “Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols,” IAEA, May 2016, https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/SVS-21_web.pdf, 19.

14 “IAEA Safeguards Agreements at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, November 2024, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/iaea-safeguards-agreements-glance>

15 “IAEA Safeguards Agreements at a Glance.”

16 “IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2022 Edition,” IAEA, https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/PUB2003_web.pdf, 12.

17 Steven Miller, “The Struggle to Save the JCPOA: Negotiations to Nowhere?,” In *Nuclear Risks and Arms Control - Problems and Progresses in the Time of Pandemics and War*, eds. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino et al (Springer Proceedings in Physics, 2023), 136.

18 Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2010,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 66, no. 3 (2010): 57-71.

19 “Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” U.S. Department of State, October 5, 2021, <https://2021-2025.state.gov/transparency-in-the-u-s-nuclear-weapons-stockpile/>

20 “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,” HM Government, October 2010, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a78da21ed915d0422065d95/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf>

Beyond Numbers: The Role of Dialogue and Consultative Mechanisms in Nuclear Transparency

Support for enhancing nuclear transparency references the benefits of domestic public access to information, as well as its role in demonstrating responsible stewardship and the fulfilment of certain commitments, but overwhelmingly, transparency is described as a tool to build confidence through enhancing predictability and thereby reducing uncertainty and misperceptions among states.²¹ In a condition of nuclear secrecy, potential adversaries are liable to follow worst-case analysis. By sharing information on the status of nuclear arsenals, the role of nuclear forces in national security strategies, and plans for modernisation, states can enhance predictability and reduce the possibility of misperception.²² Transparency measures can also pave the way for progress through a gradual learning process in which states grow to understand the benefits of successful initial, limited measures and proceed with further steps.²³

Transparency measures in the form of numbers, declarations, and observations, however, only take you so far. They provide necessary baseline information but insufficient insight into the motivations, intentions, and decision-making processes that ultimately drive nuclear behaviour and pose the greatest risks of misunderstanding. The argument, then, is that transparency measures help to build confidence the most when they go beyond numbers and declarations, to include interactive opportunities to develop understanding of why states take certain actions and implement certain policies.

That is not to say that information disclosure is not useful or necessary; rather, considering dialogue as a function of transparency helps to transform raw disclosure into more meaningful understanding between actors that can better serve the purposes of transparency.

When transparency incorporates dialogue elements, it creates opportunities for explanation, questioning, clarification, and the development of shared understanding that would be essential in a future disarmed world.

Such a dialogue-centred model of transparency can operate through both formal and informal channels, and there are examples of both types already in existence.

EXAMPLES

Formal and Informal Consultative Mechanisms

New START

The New START Treaty coupled its verification regime (data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections) with a standing body, the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), established “to promote the objectives and implementation” of the Treaty.²⁴ The BCC was required to meet at least twice each year in Geneva, and either Party could request an additional session.²⁵ Its first session was held between 28 March and 8 April 2011, and its last session took place from 5–14 October 2021. A follow-up was planned for November 2022 but was postponed by Russia in protest of US support for Ukraine.²⁶

The BCC’s remit was broad, covering: 1) resolving compliance/implementation questions, 2) establishing measures to improve the effectiveness of the Treaty, 3) clarifying features of certain missiles/launchers under Article V (3) of the Treaty, 4) determining how the Treaty applies to new strategic offensive arms, 5) and addressing any other issues raised by parties.²⁷ In practice, the BCC served as a forum for three objectives: discussing compliance

21 Nicholas Zarimpas, “Introduction,” in *Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions*, ed. Nicholas Zarimpas (Oxford University Press, 2003), 7.
22 Podvig, “Transparency in Nuclear Disarmament,” 2.
23 Camille Grand, “Nuclear Weapon States and the Transparency Dilemma,” in *Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions*, ed. Nicholas Zarimpas (Oxford University Press, 2003), 48.

24 “New START Treaty,” NTI, accessed February 16, 2026, https://media.nti.org/documents/new_start_treaty.pdf
25 “Protocol to the treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” NTI, accessed February 16, 2026, https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/new_start_protocol.pdf, 142.
26 “Russia expects US to attempt to organize New START commission’s session in 2023,” TASS, November 29, 2022, <https://tass.com/politics/1543507>
27 “Protocol to the treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.”

and implementation, coordinating data exchanges, and negotiating changes to the treaty protocol.

Evidence shows that Parties used the BCC to resolve questions and potential disputes over implementation and compliance. On the American side, successive Annual Implementation Reports note that implementation-related questions were raised in the BCC.²⁸ Russian officials have likewise publicly acknowledged raising questions about US implementation during BCC sessions.²⁹ There is also circumstantial evidence of the BCC being used to address another part of its remit: addressing concerns over new kinds of strategic offensive arms. In May 2019, Undersecretary of State Andrea Thompson stated that the US had begun discussions on new Russian weapons systems' potential under New START counting rules, though she did not specify whether those discussions were conducted within the BCC.³⁰

Beyond discussing implementation-related treaty issues, BCC meetings led to the production of agreements determining information exchanges on ICBMs and SLBM launches.³¹ At the third BCC meeting in February 2012, each side agreed to exchange telemetry on the launch of one ICBM or SLBM during the time between 5 February 2011 and 31 December 2011.³² These agreements on exchanging telemetric information continued even at a meeting in March 2020, when the BCC was unable to convene due to the COVID-19 pandemic.³³ Separately, Article VII, paragraph 5 sets up the BCC as the forum for consultations around releasing information from the bi-annual data exchange to the public.³⁴

The BCC was also established as a forum to negotiate changes to different elements of the Treaty. First, parties were able to use the BCC to agree to non-substantive changes to the Protocol that do not alter "substantive rights or obligations" under the agreement (Article XV, paragraph 2).³⁵ Beginning in

February 2012, Bilateral Consultative Commission Agreement numbers 1 to 8 made slight changes, primarily on procedures for the collection and exchange of telemetric Information. The BCC could also be used to negotiate formal amendments to the Treaty itself. However, as any agreed amendment had to follow full entry-into-force procedures (Article XV, paragraph 2) – in the American context, Senate advice and consent – this option was not pursued.³⁶

OPANAL

The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco embedded three consultation mechanisms in the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) framework: implementation consultations, amendment consultations, and compliance and dispute consultations.

For implementation consultations, the Treaty provides two principal routes to establish consultations. Article 6 of the Treaty creates an option to convene a meeting of all signatories to "consider in common questions which may affect the very essence of this instrument, including possible amendments to it".³⁷ This meeting can be convened at the request of any signatory state or when the Agency determines it is necessary. Separately, under Article 9 of the Treaty, the General Conference may hold special sessions when the Council believes that "the circumstances so require".³⁸

The format for amendment consultations set out in Article 29 of the Treaty states that any Contracting Party may propose an amendment by submitting it to the Council through the General Secretary. The General Secretary will then circulate the proposal to all Contracting Parties and to signatories, using the option to convene a meeting of all signatories outlined in Article 6 of the Treaty. The process then unfolds in two steps. First, following the meeting of all signatories, the Council convenes a special session of the General Conference in which the adoption of the proposed amendment requires a two-thirds majority of Contracting Parties present.³⁹ Between 1990 and 1992, the General Conference

28 For one example, see "New START Treaty Annual Implementation Report," U.S. Department of State, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/New-START-Treaty-Annual-Implementation-Report.pdf>

29 "Russia, US start consultations on extending START treaty - diplomat," TASS, September 12, 2017, <https://tass.com/politics/965274>

30 Amy Woolf, "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions," *Congressional Research Service*, last modified November 27, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R41219/R41219.61.pdf, 2.

31 "Protocol to the treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," 145.

32 "Decision on the Number of Launches of ICBMs and SLBMs Conducted in 2011, on Which an Exchange of Telemetric Information Will Be Carried Out in 2012," U.S. Department of State, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/223934.pdf>

33 "New START Treaty Annual Implementation Report," U.S. Department of State, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Annual-New-START-Report.pdf>

34 "New START Treaty."

35 "New START Treaty."

36 "New START Treaty: Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) Agreements," Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.acq.osd.mil/asda/ssipm/sdc/tc/nst/NSTBCCAgreements.html>

37 "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (with annexed Additional Protocols I and II)," United Nations Treaty Collection, accessed February 19, 2025, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20634/volume-634-I-9068-English.pdf>

38 "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (with annexed Additional Protocols I and II)."

39 "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (with annexed Additional Protocols I and II)."

altered the title of the Treaty and adopted a package of amendments to six articles.⁴⁰

For compliance and disputes, the consultation process is an escalation pathway outlined in Articles 15 and 16. Article 14 of the Treaty establishes baseline reporting requirements: semi-annual reports to OPANAL and the IAEA. If compliance questions emerge, the General Secretary, with Council authorisation, may request a Party to provide supplementary information (Article 15). Article 16 triggers “special inspections” carried out 1) by the IAEA, under safeguards agreements; 2) by the Council, in cases where a Party suspects prohibited activity, or a suspected Party requests an inspection. Following the special inspection, the Council may decide (or any Contracting Party may request) that a special session of the General Conference be convened to consider the inspection reports. During the session, the General Conference may issue recommendations to Parties and submit reports to the UN Secretary-General for transmission to the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly.⁴¹

Whilst the examples of New START and OPANAL illustrate how formal consultative mechanisms add value to raw information disclosures, the P5 Process workstream on nuclear doctrines provides a more informal example of the relationship between information disclosure and dialogue. Launched in 2009 in the margins of the PrepCom for the 2010 NPT RevCon, the P5 Process brought together the five NPT NWS in a standing dialogue on issues related to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control. Unlike the BCC or OPANAL’s consultative framework, the P5 Process operates without a treaty basis, formal mandate, or binding obligations. It is, in essence, a political dialogue, convened by consensus, structured around rotating presidencies, which produces very little in terms of public output. Throughout the P5 Process, the NWS have frequently consulted on issues of nuclear doctrines, with the nuclear doctrines workstream being one of the few workstreams to continue following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

A 2019 European Leadership Network publication reported that the “doctrines discussion is, according to P5 officials, getting to the heart of what the P5 should be discussing to increase trust and transparency between themselves and with the non-nuclear-weapon states”.⁴² The doctrines discussion gives an opportunity for the P5 to question and clarify each other’s posture and doctrines to make sure that what is publicly presented is privately understood. Such engagements can help to facilitate mutual understanding and the reduction of risk caused by misperception.

The above examples illustrate that transparency can be enhanced through treating information disclosure and dialogue not as separate functions but as integrated elements of a coherent system.

The value of transparency lies not simply in the information exchanged but in the relationships, habits, and shared understandings that the combination of disclosure and dialogue can help to foster over time. Numbers, in short, open the conversation; it is dialogue that helps give them further meaning.

40 “Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco),” U.S. Department of State, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4796.htm#:~:text=The%20Treaty%20of%20Tlatelolco%20was,Belize%20and%20Guyana%20of%20membership>

41 “Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (with annexed Additional Protocols I and II).”

42 Maximilian Hoell, “The P5 Process: Ten Years On,” *European Leadership Network*, September 2019, <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/190925-P5-Process-Max-Hoell-FINAL-2.0-1.pdf>, 5.

Nuclear weapons are an uncommon domain where democratic governments justify withholding information, and less democratic states have historically adopted selective transparency.

The Limits to Transparency

National security considerations have always shaped states' approaches to transparency, as information about nuclear forces can confer assurance, as well as a strategic advantage to an adversary. Based on the traditional logic of deterrence, a state must credibly convince an adversary of its capability and will to resort to force. Some level of transparency is, therefore, part of a credible deterrence strategy. Nevertheless, any strategic benefits of transparency are placed clearly against potential strategic threats. First, as deterrence is predicated on the survivability of nuclear forces, maintaining uncertainty about capabilities, and particularly deployment patterns, can serve to strengthen deterrence through protecting a state's second-strike capability.⁴³ Second, beyond ensuring the survivability of nuclear forces, ambiguity, particularly over levels of technological development, can serve a strategic role for states in an inferior position. Finally, while the transparency and verification measures established through arms control regimes can demonstrate compliance, they also introduce risk, namely that information gathered could have a strategic utility beyond the scope of an agreement.⁴⁴

Nuclear secrecy has also been tied to non-proliferation concerns. Intrusive verification measures can require the disclosure of technical details that, if revealed, risk providing important information to would-be proliferators. While the basic physics of nuclear weapons are widely understood, detailed

engineering, design, and technical information could provide the necessary information to significantly reduce the time, cost, and technical barriers required for a state to develop a functional weapon, while simultaneously reducing the likelihood of detection.⁴⁵ Secrecy can also serve a political or strategic purpose, whether as a form of hedging, i.e., nuclear latency as a deterrence strategy, or as a route for a state to shield itself from diplomatic sanctions or military strikes as it moves towards weaponisation.

Beyond national security considerations, domestic-level factors can shape states' willingness to adopt transparency measures. One set of work centres on how democratic societies with robust internal transparency tend to be more open to external transparency.⁴⁶ This being said, democracy is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for transparency. Nuclear weapons are an uncommon domain where democratic governments justify withholding information, and less democratic states have historically adopted selective transparency. Further research highlights the role of political and bureaucratic culture in shaping attitudes toward transparency. States with a highly embedded history of secrecy are unlikely to naturally align with a transparency agenda.⁴⁷ Bureaucratic culture can reinforce these tendencies. Many nuclear programmes emerged under conditions of extreme secrecy, and organisational habits are likely to persist without institutional incentives or political leadership driving change.⁴⁸

43 Harald Müller and Annette Schaper, "Nuclear Transparency and Registers of Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Materials," *PRIF*, January 1, 2010, https://www.prif.org/fileadmin/Daten/Publikationen/Prif_Reports/2010/prif97.pdf, 12

44 Jane Vaynman, "Better Monitoring and Better Spying: The Implications of Emerging Technology for Arms Control," *Texas National Security Review* 4, no. 4 (2021), 34-36.

45 Annette Schaper, "Transparency and Secrecy in Nuclear Weapons," *WMDC*, August 2005, <https://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No34.pdf>

46 Olga Olikier, Franziska Stärk, Dmitry Stefanovich and Maren Vieluf, "Truth or Dare: Transparency, Ambiguity, and Prospects for New International Commitments in the Nuclear Realm," *IFSH*, January 27, 2023, <https://www.ifsh.de/en/news-detail/new-deep-cuts-working-paper-on-transparency-ambiguity-and-prospects-for-new-international-commitments-in-the-nuclear-realm>, 4.

47 Grand, "Nuclear Weapon States and the Transparency Dilemma," 36.

48 Annette Schaper, "Looking for a Demarcation - between Nuclear Transparency and Nuclear Secrecy," *PRIF*, 2004, https://www.prif.org/fileadmin/Daten/Publikationen/Prif_Reports/2004/prif68.pdf, 3-6.

The Evolution of Transparency and Accountability in the NPT

Preliminary Efforts to Enhance Transparency and Accountability

1995–2022

Transparency and accountability have increasingly become a central concern for State parties to the NPT. Although the Treaty does not contain any explicit mechanisms to measure implementation, successive review cycles since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference have sought to develop measures to enhance transparency and accountability. Tracing the evolution of these efforts through to the 2022 RevCon reveals States Parties' growing interest in transparency and accountability, an evolving understanding of what this means in practice, as well as ongoing deficiencies in translating proposals into formal measures.

The 1995 Treaty Review and Extension Conference tasked States Parties with two objectives: reviewing the Treaty's implementation and deciding on its continuation past the original 25-year term. Many NNWS resisted indefinite extension without concrete assurances that NWS would meet their disarmament obligations. To secure agreement, the conference produced a negotiated package comprising three decisions and a resolution on the Middle East. The three decisions brought in a strengthened treaty review process, which introduced PrepComs, the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and the indefinite extension of the Treaty, and were collectively framed around the idea of "permanence with accountability". The significance of the strengthened review process decision in 1995 was to ensure

enhanced accountability of States Parties, but particularly NWS, for their implementation of the Treaty.⁴⁹

The 2000 RevCon, which delivered a consensus on the 13 Practical Steps, a systematic plan for nuclear disarmament, included measures that sought to give practical meaning to the 1995 commitments. Step 12 encouraged all States Parties to submit regular reports on their implementation of Article VI and related commitments. This measure was intended to create a shift from ad hoc transparency to a more institutionalised expectation. Step 9 also called for increased transparency by NWS regarding their nuclear weapon capabilities and the implementation of the Article VI commitment, framing further voluntary transparency measures as a confidence-building tool to support progress on disarmament.⁵⁰

The 2010 RevCon revived momentum on transparency and accountability after the 2005 RevCon failed to produce a consensus outcome. While the 2004 PrepCom and 2005 RevCon saw an increase in national reporting – building on the strengthened provisions adopted in 2000 – reporting levels declined over the subsequent review cycle. The 2010 RevCon achieved progress by adopting a 64-point Action Plan with specific measures aimed at strengthening transparency and accountability. Action 5 (g) of the plan called upon the NWS to "further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence".

49 "NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)," FAS, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://nuke.fas.org/control/npt/docs/2142.htm>

50 "NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/GENERAL-DOCS/2000FD.pdf>

Additional actions provided more details of specific measures: Action 20 stated that States Parties should submit regular reports on their implementation of the Action Plan beginning at the 2014 PrepCom, while action 21 encouraged NWS to develop a standard reporting format and agree on “appropriate reporting intervals”.⁵¹

The 2010 RevCon also directly linked transparency to two further core disarmament pillars: verification and irreversibility. Irreversibility and verification, long-standing focuses of disarmament and non-proliferation, became embedded within the review process at the 2000 RevCon, with steps five and thirteen of the 13 Practical Steps.⁵² Following on in 2010, action 2 of the Action Plan committed all States Parties “to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations”.⁵³ Between these two conferences, these three principles had become increasingly treated as fundamental elements of disarmament. While the link between these principles is often vaguely defined, there is agreement that a strong verification regime can help support irreversibility.⁵⁴

Because transparency is a prerequisite for effective verification – and higher levels of transparency strengthen confidence in verification – transparency can reinforce irreversibility as part of a mutually supporting triad.

Consistent with the decision at the 2010 RevCon, all NWS and certain NNWS submitted national reports in advance of the 2014 PrepCom. However, NWS reports presented at the 2014 PrepCom and 2015 RevCon varied in both overall structure and depth of detail, making structured comparisons between reports a challenge.⁵⁵ Even prior to the submission of national reports in 2014, some States Parties highlighted this problem and advocated for more

standardised reporting formats, particularly for the NWS. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPD), building on earlier work by Japan and Australia-New Zealand, spearheaded this initiative, producing a draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form at the 2012 PrepCom, which was submitted in an amended form at the 2015 RevCon.⁵⁶ Without a consensus document at the RevCon, these efforts did not translate into significant formal commitments. The most tangible step from the NWS was a glossary of key terms submitted by China on behalf of the P5.⁵⁷

The 2022 RevCon again concluded without a consensus document. Nonetheless, it saw a marked increase in the number of national reports from NWS and certain NNWS, even though the submissions lacked standardisation. Despite the lack of consensus, both the Draft Final Document and the President’s Working Paper affirmed the importance of transparency and accountability, reflecting the expansion of interest in this area among States Parties. More specifically, the Draft Final Document included several relevant measures:

1. NWS developing a standardised reporting form;
2. NWS presenting national reports twice per review cycle;
3. PrepCom Chairs allocating time under cluster 1 for a structured discussion on national reports, particularly NWS;
4. 2026 RevCon dedicating time in Main Committee 1 (MC1) to the review of national reports.⁵⁸

In addition, States Parties adopted a decision, agreed on 26 August 2022, to establish a Working Group on the “further strengthening of the review process of the treaty” with a mandate to “discuss and make recommendations to the preparatory committee on measures that would improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination, and continuity of the review process of the treaty”.⁵⁹

51 “2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/2010NPTActionPlan.pdf>

52 “NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II),” 14-15.

53 “2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan.”

54 Alberto Muti, Grant Christopher, and Noel Stott, “The Role of Verification in Supporting Irreversible Nuclear Disarmament,” *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 6, no. 2 (2023): 293.

55 Paul Meyer, Henrik Salander, Zia Mian, “Why the NPT needs more transparency by the nuclear weapon states,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, April 8, 2015, <https://thebulletin.org/2015/04/why-the-npt-needs-more-transparency-by-the-nuclear-weapon-states/#:~:text=Why%20the%20NPT%20needs%20more,Bulletin%20of%20the%20Atomic%20Scientists>

56 “NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom12/documents/WP12.pdf>; “NPT/CONF.2015/WP.17,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 20, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/documents/WP17.pdf>

57 “P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms,” U.S. Department of State, April 2015, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/243293.pdf>

58 “NPT/CONF.2020/CRP.1/Rev.2,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 24, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/documents/CRP1_Rev2.pdf, 28.

59 “Decision on the next review cycle: 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” United Nations Digital Library, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3985558?v=pdf&ln=en>

Transparency and Accountability in the 11th Review Cycle

2023–2026

The Working Group on further strengthening the review process met in July 2023 alongside the first PrepCom for the 11th review cycle. Based on the mandate described above, the group explored three themes: efficiency and effectiveness, transparency and reporting, and coordination and continuity. States submitted a range of proposals on these issues, but the topic of transparency and accountability clearly came to dominate the discussions. These discussions on transparency and accountability centred on two principal themes. The first concerns longstanding efforts for more standardised and regular reporting. Many States Parties and groups have continued to call for a common reporting format for NWS, one that includes detailed, comparable information. The second set of proposals centre on the presentation and interactive discussion of national reports, particularly of NWS. Numerous States Parties and groups have advocated for introducing interactive review sessions at PrepComs and/or RevCons, or have called for NWS to consult with and receive the views of States Parties before submission. Many States Parties have also called for civil society organisations and/or independent experts to be included in these processes. The chair of the Working Group produced a draft set of recommendations which included proposals along these lines, but the group failed to find consensus on these recommendations which were rejected by China, Russia, and Iran. The Working Group has not met again.⁶⁰

Nevertheless, interest in the topics of transparency and accountability have only continued to rise over the course of this review cycle, with a number of States Parties continuing to put forward proposals for enhancing transparency and accountability through reporting and interactive discussions on these reports. One of the most sustained advocates for improved transparency and accountability is the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI).⁶¹ From its inception, the NPDI has placed the development of a standard reporting form for NWS at the centre of its work programme, consistently submitting working papers on the subject across successive NPT review cycles. The NPDI describes itself as a champion for increasing transparency as indispensable for nuclear disarmament, arguing that enhanced transparency builds trust and confidence and facilitates further reductions in nuclear arsenals towards their total elimination, with the adoption of a standard reporting form a useful tool to this end. Another particularly active informal grouping within the current review cycle has been the tripartite cooperation between Ireland, Switzerland, and New Zealand, who have jointly advanced proposals focused specifically on transparency and accountability mechanisms for NWS.

Despite widespread support for the broad principles of improved reporting and interactive dialogue on these reports, there is a lack of clarity among States Parties about the specific format for these review sessions.

Below is an overview of the main proposals by individual States Parties, groups of States Parties, and international organisations.

⁶⁰ "NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.34," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 27, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom23/documents/WP34.pdf>; "Pragmatic Steps to reinforce the NPT on the way towards the 2026 Review Conference," European Leadership Network, December 2023, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/23_11_24_WP-Policy-Brief_online.pdf

⁶¹ NPDI was founded after the 2010 NPT Review Conference by Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates — subsequently joined by Nigeria and the Philippines — with the advancement of the nuclear disarmament agenda and greater transparency in the way NWS fulfil their disarmament commitments as its primary goals.

Box 1:

Proposals for Enhancing Transparency and Accountability: 2023–2025

The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative

Proposals for reporting:

- States Parties use a reporting template with varying requirements for NWS, NNWS with advanced nuclear capabilities, and NNWS without advanced nuclear capabilities.
- NWS submit national reports twice per review cycle (no later than four weeks before the 2nd PrepCom and the RevCon).
- Suggests States Parties consider creating an independent publication on NPT reporting.

Proposals for interactive dialogue:

- Submission of national reports followed by an “open explanation and interactive discussion” including NNWS and civil society.
- Interactive discussion location: 2nd PrepCom – Cluster 1; RevCon – MC1.
- Regular updates and improvements to the quantity and quality of information contained in the publicly accessible repository established by the Secretary-General.⁶²

⁶² “NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.30,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/documents/WP30.pdf>

The European Union

Proposals for reporting:

- Further qualitative improvements to NWS reporting, including adopting a revised, standardised reporting template, building on the 2013 NWS model reporting framework and best practices developed since.
- Recognises the importance of standardised templates for NNWS.

Proposals for interactive dialogue:

- 1st PrepCom includes a dedicated session for NWS to consult with and receive the views of other States parties and civil society on expectations for reports.
- 3rd PrepCom for each review cycle includes peer-to-peer review sessions for review of NWS draft reports.
- Each RevCon includes a peer-to-peer review session dedicated to the review of NWS reporting.
- Peer-to-peer review sessions at the 3rd PrepCom and RevCon should be interactive and involve all States Parties and civil society.
- Peer-to-peer review sessions for NNWS reports considered, on a voluntary basis.⁶³

⁶³ “NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.1,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/documents/WP1.pdf>

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

Proposals for reporting:

- NWS report on their implementation of concrete, measurable, and timebound actions on nuclear disarmament to the RevCon in a structured manner.
- Reports should contain comparable information, including the number, type, and status of nuclear warheads, the number and types of delivery vehicles, the amount/stock of fissile material produced for military purposes, and measures taken to reduce nuclear weapons, and their role and significance in military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies with a view to total elimination.

Proposals for interactive dialogue:

- NWS reports considered and interactively discussed during the review cycles, including at MC1 of the RevCon.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ "NAM Cluster 1 Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 1 May 2025," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/1May_NAM.pdf

Aotearoa New Zealand, Ireland, Switzerland

Proposals for reporting:

- Qualitative and quantitative expansion in NWS reporting.
- PrepCom chairs produce a joint report on recommendations to improve monitoring of and reporting on implementation of Article VI obligations for each RevCon.

Proposals for interactive dialogue:

- PrepCom chairs allocate dedicated meeting time under Cluster 1 for structured discussion on States Parties' national reports. NWS – jointly or individually – present on implementation of their Article VI obligations in this session.
- RevCon allocates time in MC1 for a structured dialogue, drawing upon national reporting and PrepCom chairs' joint report (see above).⁶⁵

⁶⁵ "NPT/CONF.2026/PC.1/WP.6," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom23/documents/WP6.pdf>

The Stockholm Initiative

Proposals for reporting:

- All States Parties report on their implementation of obligations and commitments using a standardised reporting format, for example, the NPTDI template.
- Each NWS submits national reports at least twice in every review cycle, at appropriate intervals, on the basis of a standardised reporting form.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ "NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/WP.13," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/documents/WP13.pdf>

France

Proposals for reporting:

- Encourages NWS and NNWS to submit substantive reports.⁶⁷

Proposals for interactive dialogue:

- Dedicated session during the 3rd PrepCom for interactive discussion on the expectations, priorities, and information included in reports.
- Sessions should be open to all States Parties to receive feedback on national reports (particularly NWS) from other States Parties and civil society.
- RevCons include two dedicated sessions for peer-to-peer review of national reports – one for NWS and one for NNWS – held in Main Committee 3 (MC3).
- States Parties and civil society should participate in these sessions.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ "France Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/7May_France_SI.pdf

⁶⁸ "NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.37," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom23/documents/WP37.pdf>

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

OPTION 1

- Establish side events during each NPT review cycle – one at each of the three PrepComs and one at the RevCon – to promote interactive dialogue.
- NWS submit reports to respective Chairs at least six weeks in advance, outlining: 1. progress on Article VI obligations. 2. priority areas identified by NNWS.
- Reports made publicly available on the meeting website.
- Each side event could be moderated by an external expert.

OPTION 2

- Interactive dialogues held for NWS twice per review cycle: 2nd PrepCom and the RevCon.
- Each NWS submits a standardised national report eight weeks in advance, made public on the meeting website.
- States Parties submit questions and comments four weeks before the session.
- UNODA compiles these inputs into an organised document shared with the NWS under review at least two weeks before the dialogue.
- Reports, questions, and a factual summary of the discussion published after the session.

OPTION 3

- An independent team of experts, coordinated by UNODA, prepares a report on each NWS based on previously agreed information areas.
- Reports drafted in consultation with the State under review, following a methodology developed by States Parties, and published in advance on the meeting website.
- Each NWS submits a written response, and other States Parties send questions and comments four weeks before the session; UNODA organises questions and comments thematically and shares with the NWS under review at least two weeks before the session.
- Hold an interactive discussion consisting of two sessions totaling six hours once per review cycle, during the plenary sessions of the 3rd PrepCom.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ James Revill, Victoria Viana Souza Guimarães, and Luiza DelaFlora Cassol, "Exploring Reporting and Interactive Dialogue Options for NPT Disarmament Obligations," UNIDIR, April 25, 2025, https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/UNIDIR_Exploring_Reporting_Interactive_Dialogue_Options_NPT_Disarmament_Obligations.pdf

PrepCom 2025 Draft Document Language

Despite the absence of consensus at the 2025 PrepCom, draft texts nonetheless offer insight into the potential areas of convergence ahead of the 2026 RevCon, as well as the clear red lines for certain States Parties. A comparison of the three key documents coming out of the PrepCom – Draft Chair’s Elements Paper on Strengthening the Review Process, Revised Draft Decision: Strengthening the Review Process, and Revised Draft Recommendations – shows that several elements of the original proposals (in the Draft Chair’s Elements Paper on Strengthening the Review Process) proved unacceptable to some delegations, and, by the completion of the Revised Draft Recommendations, some of the more substantive proposals had been abandoned.

Substantive language on enhancing transparency and accountability can be found in the Draft Chair’s Elements Paper on Strengthening the Review Process. This document included five proposals on enhancing transparency and accountability:

1. NWS should present using a standard template, without prejudice to national security.
2. NNWS may develop a corresponding standard template, including considerations for nuclear sharing and umbrella arrangements.
3. National reports should be submitted at least three months before the RevCon.
4. Discussion on NWS (and possibly NNWS) national reports for the 2026 RevCon to take place in the subsidiary body of MC1, with the committee establishing a subsidiary body for national reports.
5. The chair of this body may invite a representative from an independent organisation to provide an overview of the state of nuclear disarmament and progress toward Article VI commitments prior to States Parties’ presentations.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ “NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/CRP.1,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/documents/CRP1.pdf>

Revised Draft Decision: Strengthening the Review Process included both subtle and more substantive changes to the original proposal. On the first recommendation, the document removed any mention of NWS reporting using a standard template, as well as the qualifier that reporting should be undertaken without prejudice to national security. On the second recommendation, the document omitted the language encouraging NNWS to adopt a standard reporting template with considerations for nuclear sharing and umbrella arrangements. The third recommendation adjusted the reporting timeline, replacing the requirement for submission at least three months in advance of the RevCon with “in due time”. The fourth and fifth recommendations in the original document were omitted entirely. Instead, the document noted that “the 2026 Review Conference should consider further modalities for the consideration of the national reports of nuclear-weapon States within the context of an interactive dialogue during Review cycles”.⁷¹

The Revised Draft Recommendations outlined a middle ground approach between the two previous documents. Recommendations 14 and 17 reiterated long-standing commitments regarding the role of transparency. The first called on States Parties to uphold the principles of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency set out in 2010; the second reaffirmed transparency – alongside risk-reduction and confidence-building measures – as a tool for conflict prevention. The main recommendation in the document reversed some of the changes in the revised draft decision on NWS reporting requirements. Specifically, recommendation 25 reintroduced the language in the original document calling on NWS to report using a standardised template “including comparable and numerical information on their Treaty obligations and related commitments” and restored the language that reporting should be conducted without prejudice to national security.⁷² However, the document continued to omit language present in the original document recommending interactive discussions of NWS reports.

⁷¹ “NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/CRP.3/Rev.1,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/documents/CRP3Rev1.pdf>

⁷² “NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/CRP.4/Rev.1,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/documents/CRP4Rev1.pdf>

Current Areas of Convergence and Divergence Among States Parties

States Parties hold divergent views on the purpose, scope, and necessary institutionalisation of transparency and accountability within the NPT review process. While there is broad consensus that transparency has value, States Parties disagree over whether it should primarily function as a confidence-building and risk-reduction tool, a measure to support a step-by-step disarmament process, or an accountability mechanism for enforcing NWS compliance with NPT disarmament obligations. These differences translate into contrasting positions on proposals to enhance transparency and accountability. This section outlines the positions of key States Parties and groups on transparency and accountability measures at recent PrepComs, with particular attention to national reporting, interactive review mechanisms, and benchmarks and timelines.

Given the scale of NPT membership, states participate in and are analysed through a web of regional and issue-specific groupings, which often overlap. These groupings become visible in the formal architecture of NPT meetings through collective group statements and working papers, where clusters of states present shared positions or common concerns. States are also frequently banded together on the basis of memberships they hold in other forums and organisations – the G77, the African Union, or the Arab League, for instance – which may or may not map neatly onto their NPT priorities. It would be a mistake, however, to treat any of these groupings as monolithic blocs. States Parties within larger groupings, for example, the NAM, by far the largest group within the NPT, are far from uniform in all of their positions on NPT issues.⁷³ Nevertheless, for the purpose of this analysis, the NAM and TPNW group of States are discussed as groups, noting occasionally their differences. A more extensive collection of States Parties' positions on reporting, presentation and review of national reports, and concerns regarding specific measures, is set out in Annex A.

United States

For the US transparency and accountability at the 2025 PrepCom were framed principally as

mechanisms for demonstrating compliance with NPT obligations.⁷⁴ Throughout the Biden administration, transparency both within and outside the NPT process was more broadly understood as a confidence-building tool to enhance stability and a step to support progress on non-proliferation and disarmament.⁷⁵ US statements at the 2025 PrepCom highlight several examples to illustrate their commitment to transparency, often juxtaposed with China and Russia's behaviour. Statements cite providing information on the US's nuclear weapons stockpile, alongside transparency in its nuclear doctrine, military budgets, and modernisation as its primary contribution.⁷⁶ Furthermore, a component of recent US transparency efforts has involved hosting international diplomats and academics at national laboratories for "transparency visits", which showcase the National Nuclear Security Administration's subcritical experiments.⁷⁷

At the 2025 PrepCom, US statements communicated cautious support for select measures aimed at strengthening transparency and accountability. On the one hand, a statement at the 2025 PrepCom outlined the US's support for presentation and interactive discussion of national reports. However, this support is predicated on the involvement of all NWS in this process. Moreover, US statements oppose reporting proposals seeking to establish "benchmarks, targets, and timelines" for assessing progress on disarmament.⁷⁸ This stance marks a modest shift from the more supportive language expressed at the 2024 PrepCom on enhancing transparency.⁷⁹ Statements at the 2025 PrepCom also came out strongly against the proposals in the Draft Chair's Elements Paper to extend reporting to NNWS in nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements, stating that attempts to create a third category of States Parties "only seek to malign security alliances by confusing the facts, law, and historical record".⁸⁰

74 "US Cluster 1 Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 1 May 2025," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/1May_USA.pdf

75 "US Opening and General Statement, 2nd PrepCom, 22 July 2024," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/statements/22July_US_.pdf

76 "US Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/7May_US_2.pdf

77 For one example, see "NNSA demonstrates transparency in its operations and support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by hosting visitors at Sandia and Nevada site," U.S. Department of Energy, July 15, 2024, <https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-demonstrates-transparency-its-operations-and-support-comprehensive-nuclear-test>

78 "US Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025," "US Closing Session Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 9 May 2025," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/9May_USA.pdf

79 "US Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 2nd PrepCom, 30 July 2024," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/statements/30July_US.pdf

80 "US Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025."

73 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova. "Chapter Two: NAM, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the 2010 NPT Review Conference." *Adelphi Series* 51, no. 427 (2011) 37–80

France

France presents transparency and accountability within the NPT in two principal ways: first, as a confidence-building measure to strengthen trust and help create the conditions for disarmament; second, as a risk-reduction tool to help prevent misperception through fostering mutual understanding.⁸¹ French statements from the 2025 PrepCom went to great lengths to showcase its own practices as examples of substantive transparency, often contrasting these efforts with China's perceived lack of transparency.⁸² Central to France's messaging is its "inclusive consultation process" – for example, presenting its national report at a side event during the 2022 RevCon and maintaining a similar approach throughout the current review cycle.⁸³ French statements also emphasise historic transparency measures accompanying the reduction of its nuclear arsenal throughout the 1990s and the more recent declaration from 2008 regarding the composition of its nuclear arsenal.⁸⁴

French statements from the 2025 PrepCom support establishing an interactive, structured, and in-depth dialogue on national reports submitted by both NWS and NNWS. This dialogue would be mandatory for NWS and voluntary for NNWS. France advocates for this dialogue to be held within MC3 and to remain open to the participation of all States Parties, as well as civil society.⁸⁵ Regarding standardised reporting, France did not endorse the adoption of a specific template, such as the NPDI draft form. Instead, the French national report notes that the comprehensiveness of its national report allows for monitoring its implementation of the 2010 Action Plan.⁸⁶ French statements encourage both NWS and NNWS to follow its example and demonstrate similar transparency by submitting substantive reports.⁸⁷

United Kingdom

The UK's national reports and statements at the 2025 PrepCom framed transparency within the NPT in two ways: first, as a means to build trust and understanding; second, as part of a broader framework – alongside irreversibility and verifiability – underpinning confidence in a step-by-step disarmament programme.⁸⁸ This position represents a shift from the 2024 PrepCom, where UK statements more explicitly centred on transparency's role in providing accountability by demonstrating States Parties are meeting their NPT obligations.⁸⁹ UK statements from the 2025 PrepCom cite a range of practices as evidence of the UK's commitment to transparency, including consultations with stakeholders during the drafting of its national report, and further measures, including parliamentary scrutiny of nuclear policy, and ongoing dialogue with the P5, allies, and partners.⁹⁰ As with the rest of the P3, the UK contrasts these efforts with what it characterises as China's lack of transparency.⁹¹

UK statements from the 2025 PrepCom indicate support for further dialogue on dedicating formal meeting time within the NPT review cycle to discuss national reports, as well as for voluntary mechanisms that encourage NWS and NNWS to demonstrate transparency. However, like the US, the UK opposes any proposals that would "apply arbitrary disarmament benchmarks and timelines".⁹² This position represents a modest reduction in the level of support for enhancing transparency and accountability through concrete measures. At the 2024 PrepCom, the UK's Cluster 3 Specific Issues statement endorsed two specific steps: improving the "quality and consistency" of NWS reporting and introducing interactive consideration of national reports.⁹³

81 "NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2," United Nations Digital Library, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://digitalibrary.un.org/record/4081218?v=pdf#files>

82 "France Cluster 1 Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 2 May 2025," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/2May_France.pdf

83 "NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2."

84 "France Cluster 1 Statement, 2nd PrepCom, 25 July 2025," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/statements/25July_France.pdf

85 "France Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025."

86 "NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/2."

87 "France Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025."

88 "NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/3," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/documents/NR3.pdf>

89 "UK Cluster 3 Specific Issues Statement, 2nd PrepCom, 30 July 2024," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/statements/30July_UK_WG.pdf

90 "UK Cluster 1 Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 1 May 2025," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/1May_UK.pdf

91 "UK Opening and General Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 29 April 2025," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/29April_UK.pdf

92 "UK Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/7May_UK.pdf

93 "UK Cluster 3 Specific Issues Statement, 2nd PrepCom, 30 July 2024."

Russia

Russia frames transparency and accountability as a means of demonstrating compliance with obligations under the NPT. Based on its limited, legalistic position, Russian statements strongly reject accusations concerning its lack of transparency, citing its regular submission of national reports under the agreed reporting framework as evidence of its commitment. Russia's position on transparency as a potential confidence-building or risk-reduction measure diverges sharply from the P3. Russian statements argue that, given the disparities in nuclear arsenals and the intricacies of strategic stability, "mechanically increasing transparency" may heighten rather than diminish strategic risks. Instead, Russia maintains that it is down to each state to adjust its transparency measures to its perception of the strategic environment and its own national security needs.⁹⁴

Grounded in its view that increased transparency can pose national security risks, Russia supports the status quo: retaining the existing transparency arrangements for NWS – specifically, the 2013 common reporting framework – which it considers sufficient to meet its NPT obligations.⁹⁵ Statements warn against what it perceives as excessive measures, framing these proposals as a route to "convert the NPT review process into a means of oversight and coercion".⁹⁶ Although Russia seeks to preserve the status quo for NWS, it maintains that any effort to enhance transparency and accountability should apply to all States Parties, not solely the NWS. More specifically, throughout the 2024 and 2025 PrepComs, Russian statements called on NNWS, particularly those participating in nuclear-sharing or extended deterrence arrangements, to present reports on the implementation of their disarmament obligations.⁹⁷

China

China's statements at the 2025 PrepCom took something of a middle-ground position on the role of transparency between the P3 and Russia. On the one hand, statements call on NWS to adopt transparency alongside measures to enhance trust.⁹⁸ However, echoing Russia's stance, Chinese statements emphasise that states will differ in what they consider acceptable levels of transparency, given divergent national security assessments rooted in variations in the "scale of their nuclear forces, nuclear policies, and security environments".⁹⁹ Chinese statements further underscore that transparency is "a means, not an end" and should therefore remain subordinate to the overarching goal of advancing nuclear disarmament within the NPT.¹⁰⁰ Based on its position on differentiated responsibility among NWS, Chinese statements highlight its "stable, consistent and predictable" nuclear doctrine as its key contribution to transparency.¹⁰¹

Chinese statements from the 2025 PrepCom support the continued submission of national reports by NWS under the P5 common framework, arguing that efforts to introduce standardised reporting would privilege certain NWS and thereby reinforce existing power asymmetries. Chinese statements also maintain that the frequency of reporting should remain a matter of voluntary negotiation among the NWS. On proposals to review national reports, Chinese statements are moderately positive, noting that further discussion on specific modalities is needed and that any review should not be conducted in the subsidiary body of the First Committee. In line with the Russian position, it argues that states engaged in nuclear sharing or extended deterrence arrangements should be incorporated into any formal process for reviewing national reports.¹⁰²

94 "Russia Cluster 3 Specific Issue Paper, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025," The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, May 8, 2025, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/2014653/

95 "Russia Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025;" "Russia Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 2nd PrepCom, 30 July 2024," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2025, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/statements/30July_Russia.pdf

96 "Russia Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025;" 97 "Russia Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025;" "Russia Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 2nd PrepCom, 30 July 2025."

98 "NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.39," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2025, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/documents/WP39.pdf>

99 "China Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025," Ministry of Foreign Affairs People's Republic of China, May 9, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjzg_663340/jks_665232/kjfywj_665252/202505/t20250509_11618159.html

100 "China Cluster 1 Statement, 2nd PrepCom, July 23, 2024," Ministry of Foreign Affairs People's Republic of China, July 26, 2024, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjzg_663340/jks_665232/kjfywj_665252/202407/t20240726_11461333.html

101 "China Opening and General Statement, 2nd PrepCom, 23 July 2024," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/statements/23July_China.pdf

102 "China Cluster 3 Specific Issues Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025;" "China Cluster 3 Specific Issues Statement 2, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025," Ministry of Foreign Affairs People's Republic of China, May 9, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjzg_663340/jks_665232/kjfywj_665252/202505/t20250509_11618165.html

Non-Aligned Movement States Parties

NAM States Parties present transparency and accountability as core requirements necessary to assess NWS progress, particularly in meeting disarmament obligations. PrepCom statements are significantly more explicit about the link between transparency and accountability, rejecting the position that enhancing transparency is primarily a confidence-building measure to create the conditions necessary for disarmament.¹⁰³ Instead, for NAM States Parties, transparency, sometimes referred to as measurability, is a route to address NNWS concerns and suspicions and establish if NWS have been meeting timelines on disarmament.¹⁰⁴ Accountability is understood as a means for NWS to fulfil their obligations under the NPT, demonstrated through “timebound actions on nuclear disarmament with established deadlines”.¹⁰⁵

This understanding of transparency and accountability leads to some overlap with the views of States Parties outlined above, as well as more substantive, accountability-centred proposals. Regarding the areas of convergence, the NAM Group and many NAM States Parties individually have called for periodic and structured reporting, using a standardised and detailed reporting form.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, many NAM States Parties have called for the introduction of a structured, interactive review mechanism.¹⁰⁷ Despite broad agreement on the importance of these two measures, positions on modalities for interactive sessions and the involvement of NNWS in reporting requirements differ somewhat among NAM States Parties.¹⁰⁸ In regard to the more maximalist

positions to enhance accountability, NAM States Parties’ statements also include calls for disarmament benchmarks and timelines, a position strongly rejected by all NWS.

Iran

Iran positions transparency as a mechanism for assessing NWS implementation of treaty commitments.¹⁰⁹ Iran’s national report emphasises that meaningful transparency must come from NWS, arguing that opacity regarding capabilities, doctrines, and modernisation undermines the NPT and international security. For example, Iran’s Cluster 1 Statements at the 2024 and 2025 PrepComs framed the UK as a prominent example of inadequate NWS transparency and as evidence of the widening gap between NWS obligations and practice.¹¹⁰ By contrast, Iran highlights its own transparency record by underscoring its cooperation with the IAEA, positioning itself as a state meeting its transparency responsibilities as a NNWS.¹¹¹

There is a lack of strong evidence to assess Iranian support or opposition for existing proposals to enhance transparency and accountability. On the one hand, the Iranian Cluster 3 statement from the 2024 PrepCom outlines support for measures such as interactive debates and expert panels.¹¹² However, this language was not repeated in 2025, as the Iranian statement on Cluster 3 Specific Issues solely focused on treaty withdrawal.¹¹³ Nevertheless, this shift in focus was not accompanied by denunciation of specific measures to enhance transparency and accountability, and could, therefore, represent an understandable shift in national priorities between the two PrepComs.

¹⁰³ “NAM Cluster 1 Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 1 May 2025,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/1May_NAM.pdf

¹⁰⁴ “Philippines Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/7May_Philippines.pdf; “South Africa Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 2 May 2025,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/2May_SouthAfrica.pdf

¹⁰⁵ “NAM Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 2nd PrepCom, 30 July 2024,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/statements/30July_NAM.pdf

¹⁰⁶ “NAM Opening and General Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 28 April 2025,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/28April_NAM.pdf

¹⁰⁷ “Philippines Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/7May_Philippines.pdf; “Thailand Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/7May_Thailand.pdf

¹⁰⁸ The majority position among NAM-aligned States Parties is that the main burden of standardised reporting should fall on NWS, and the review of NWS reports should be held in MC1.

¹⁰⁹ “Iran Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 2nd PrepCom, 7 May 2024,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/statements/30July_Iran_WG.pdf

¹¹⁰ “Iran Cluster 1 Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 1 May 2025,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/1May_Iran.pdf; “Iran Cluster 1 Statement, 2nd PrepCom, 25 July 2025,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/statements/25July_Iran.pdf

¹¹¹ “Iran Opening and General Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 30 April 2025,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/30April_Iran.pdf; “Iran Cluster 2 Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 5 May 2025,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/5May_Iran.pdf

¹¹² “Iran Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 2nd PrepCom, 7 May 2024,”

¹¹³ “Iran Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/7May_Iran.pdf

While there is broad consensus that transparency has value, States Parties disagree over whether it should primarily function as a confidence-building and risk-reduction tool, a measure to support a step-by-step disarmament process, or an accountability mechanism for enforcing NWS compliance with NPT disarmament obligations.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons States Parties

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Group's statements from the 2nd and 3rd PrepCom include scant focus on transparency and accountability.¹¹⁴ This being said, a report submitted by Austria for the Third Meeting of States Parties reflects a broader conception of these terms than is typically advanced within NPT forums. The document frames transparency around the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons, nuclear use scenarios, compliance with international humanitarian law, historical near-misses, and nuclear testing impacts. Moreover, the report advances a detailed agenda for NWS, in particular, to enhance transparency. These proposals include independent analysis of arsenal modernisation and expansion, systematic transparency on nuclear use scenarios, and clearer information on targeting practices.¹¹⁵

Despite this broader position on transparency and accountability, looking at two TPNW-aligned States Parties, Austria and Aotearoa New Zealand, it is evident to see a level of support for different measures within the NPT process. Austria, echoing the position of many States Parties, emphasises transparency as a confidence-building tool essential for more meaningful discussions on Article VI.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, it places a broader focus on linking transparency to inclusive and open working methods, supporting wider participation in meetings, stronger roles for civil society and affected communities, and a more transparent negotiating process within the NPT.¹¹⁷ Aotearoa New Zealand, by contrast, focused on more formalised and structured review mechanisms. Statements from the 2025 PrepCom advocate an interactive peer-review process for NWS and call for a one-off subsidiary body to determine modalities for strengthened reporting and accountability in the post-2026 review cycle.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ "TPNW Opening and General Statement, 2nd PrepCom, 22 July 2024," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/statements/22July_TPNW.pdf; "TPNW Opening and General Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 28 April 2025," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/28April_TPNW.pdf

¹¹⁵ "TPNW/MSP/2025/7," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/3msp/documents/7.pdf>

¹¹⁶ "Austria Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/7May_Austria.pdf

¹¹⁷ "Austria Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 2nd PrepCom, 31 July 2025," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2026, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom24/statements/31July_Austria.pdf

¹¹⁸ "Aotearoa New Zealand Cluster 3 Specific Issue Statement, 3rd PrepCom, 7 May 2025," Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 19, 2025, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/statements/7May_NZ.pdf

The Path Forward

The States Parties' positions described above, and detailed in Annex A, demonstrate a general convergence on the desire to improve transparency and accountability in the NPT review process. The key divergences between States Parties lie in how best to do this.

Reporting

Concerning the national implementation reports, all States Parties converge around the principle that demonstrating transparency through reporting is a good thing. Where they diverge is on the structure, content, and frequency of reporting specifically for the NWS.

The NWS use the P5 Common Reporting Framework, developed in 2013 pursuant to action 21 of the 2010 Action Plan, which provides loose categories of topics under which relevant information is reported across all three pillars of the NPT. A number of NNWS, and the NPDI group in particular, have consistently advocated for improving the structure and ease of comparison between reports by using a standardised reporting template with the most recent proposed template being submitted by the NPDI to the 2025 PrepCom.¹¹⁹ Whilst standardised reporting commands significant support among NNWS, NWS positions are divided. France, while not endorsing a specific template such as the NPDI draft form, has pointed to the comprehensiveness of its own national report as a model, arguing that it already allows for monitoring implementation of the 2010 Action Plan. The UK has expressed support for improving the “quality and consistency” of NWS reporting, and the US has signalled general support for enhanced

transparency in reporting, provided it is applied equitably across all NWS. Note that these P3 States do not support a specific template, but are open to finding a middle ground. Russia and China, by contrast, consider the existing 2013 Common Reporting Framework sufficient and push back strongly on the idea of standardised reporting.

Embedded within calls for standardised reports are requests for the NWS to report on more items, some of which are listed in Box 2. These demands go considerably beyond what most NWS have been willing to provide. Russia has been particularly resistant, arguing that “mechanically increasing transparency” in the context of disparate arsenals and complex strategic stability dynamics may heighten rather than diminish strategic risks. China has similarly emphasised that acceptable levels of transparency will differ among NWS given variations in the scale of their nuclear forces, nuclear policies, and security environments. Even among the P3, where transparency practices are more developed, the level of detail demanded by NAM and the NPDI — particularly on warhead numbers and fissile material stocks — exceeds what has historically been reported within the NPT framework and what the NWS are likely to deem acceptable, particularly in the current security environment.

On the frequency of reporting, several proposals from NNWS call for NWS to submit national reports at least twice per review cycle. However, the NWS have shown little willingness to commit *formally* to reporting more than once per cycle. In trying to come to consensus on reporting frequency, considerations should be given to the question of time and resources. National reports are substantial undertakings, particularly for NWS, whose reports must address activities and policies spanning all three pillars of the Treaty. The drafting process involves coordination across multiple government departments and often requires interagency clearance at senior levels before submission. For States Parties that take the process seriously, producing a report of sufficient quality and detail to withstand international scrutiny is a task measured in months rather than

¹¹⁹ “NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/WP.30,” Reaching Critical Will, accessed February 16, 2026, <https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom25/documents/WP30.pdf>

weeks. Requiring NWS to produce two such reports per review cycle would effectively double this burden, and may in practice result in either a dilution of the quality and detail of each report or the submission of a preliminary report that differs only marginally from the final version, undermining the rationale for multiple submissions.

The existing practice is for NWS to submit a single national report ahead of the RevCon. That said, some NWS have voluntarily gone beyond this minimum. France and the UK, for example, have presented drafts of their national reports at side events throughout the current review cycle and have also engaged in other consultations with stakeholders during the drafting process for the national reports they will submit to the 2026 RevCon. These voluntary presentations of draft reports ahead of the formal submission serve as good faith demonstrations of transparency, and suggest that more frequent engagement on reporting content is achievable in practice, even if NWS are unwilling to codify it as a formal commitment. The gap between NNWS demands for twice-per-cycle reporting and NWS willingness to commit only once may therefore be partially bridged through voluntary measures, though for many NNWS, particularly those within the NAM, voluntary practices remain an inadequate substitute for institutionalised obligations.

A further point of contention concerns whether enhanced reporting obligations should extend beyond the NWS. Russia and China have consistently argued that any strengthened reporting framework should apply to all States Parties, with particular emphasis on NNWS participating in nuclear-sharing or extended deterrence arrangements. This position found some traction in the 2025 PrepCom process with the first Draft Decision on Strengthening the Review Process including language encouraging NNWS to develop a corresponding standard template with considerations for nuclear sharing and umbrella arrangements. However, the US has drawn a firm red line on this issue, rejecting proposals that would create reporting obligations for NNWS in such arrangements. Whilst not as vocal, France and the UK also reject such calls that suggest a “third category” of State Parties in the NPT.

Box 2:

Proposed Items to Include in Standard Reporting Form

- 1 Plans related to the modernisation of nuclear weapons, and related changes to their nuclear capabilities.
- 2 The number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed) of nuclear warheads.
- 3 The number and type of delivery vehicles.
- 4 The number of weapons stored outside of a nuclear-weapon State's national territory.
- 5 The measures taken to reducing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.
- 6 The measures taken to reduce the risk of unintended, unauthorised or accidental use of nuclear weapons.
- 7 The measures taken to de-alert or reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems.
- 8 The number and type of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts.
- 9 The amount of fissile material for military purposes.
- 10 Steps taken to increase negative security assurances.

Interactive Dialogues

The majority of States Parties have coalesced around the principle that interactive discussion on national reports should take place within the formal Treaty review process, rather than being confined to side events or informal consultations. This broadly aligns with Option 2 of the UNIDIR report as described in Box 1, which envisages interactive dialogues held for each NWS at defined points within the review cycle, with standardised procedures for the submission of reports, questions, and follow-up.¹²⁰ All five NWS have expressed at least conditional support for some form of structured dialogue on national reports, though they differ on modalities. France has been the most forward-leaning, advocating for interactive sessions open to all States Parties and civil society. The US and the UK have signalled cautious support, provided all NWS participate. Even Russia and China, while resistant to more ambitious proposals, have not categorically rejected the concept of interactive discussion, instead seeking to shape its terms.

There is convergence around the expectation that interactive dialogue must involve all five NWS, not merely those willing to participate voluntarily. The US has been explicit on this point, conditioning its support for interactive sessions on the participation of all NWS. This insistence reflects a widely shared concern that a process involving only the P3 would be asymmetric and counterproductive, rewarding opacity while penalising those States Parties already demonstrating greater transparency. The principle that interactive review should apply universally to NWS, rather than on a self-selecting basis, is one of the few points on which the P3, NAM States Parties, and cross-regional groupings are broadly aligned.

There is also general acceptance that NNWS participation in interactive dialogue as presenters of their own national reports is a positive thing. Whilst reticent to put any further obligations on NNWS, their participation on a voluntary basis would help to reinforce the understanding that the NPT imposes obligations on all States Parties across its three pillars, not solely on NWS under Article VI, and that transparency and accountability, as well as upholding the NPT, are shared responsibilities. Broadening participation also makes interactive dialogue more politically sustainable for NWS, as a process perceived as a forum for collective accountability is more likely to

secure their continued engagement than one framed as an interrogation of the five.

Despite this convergence on broad principles, significant disagreements persist on the modalities for embedding such a dialogue into the review process. The first disagreement is on the location of these interactive sessions. While most of the NWS are willing to agree to the NNWS calls to more formally institutionalise such a dialogue into the treaty review process, there is a disagreement as to whether this process should come under MC1 or Main Committee 3 (MC 3), or a subsidiary body of either if taking place at the RevCon, or Cluster 1 or Cluster 3 if taking place at a PrepCom. MC1/Cluster 1 broadly deals with disarmament and security assurances, whilst Subsidiary Body 1 (SB1) deals with disarmament next steps. Main Committee 3 /Cluster 3 deals with peaceful uses, and other issues, and Subsidiary Body 3 (SB3) deals with “other issues” which has previously included strengthening the review process.¹²¹ The divide here is, generally speaking, between the NNWS and the NWS and connects to the issue of whether interactive dialogue on the national reports should focus only on disarmament or all pillars that States Parties report on. Aotearoa New Zealand, Ireland, Switzerland as the “Transparency 3”, NPDI and NAM States have all tried to tie interactive dialogue on reporting directly to disarmament, and as such see the appropriate location as sitting under MC1/SB1. For these States Parties, the primary purpose of enhanced transparency is to assess NWS progress on their Article VI obligations, and locating the dialogue within the disarmament architecture of the review process reflects and reinforces that purpose.

The NWS, by contrast, generally prefer that interactive dialogue be located under MC3/SB3. Locating interactive dialogue under MC3/SB3 carries a different implication about the nature and scope of the exercise. Under MC3/SB3, the discussion would be framed as part of the broader review of treaty implementation across all three pillars – disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses – rather than as a focused accountability mechanism directed at NWS disarmament performance only (although disarmament would feature heavily wherever the dialogue took place). For NWS, this framing is more comfortable: it positions the dialogue as a collective review of the treaty’s implementation rather than an examination of whether NWS are meeting their specific

¹²⁰ James Revill, Victoria Viana Souza Guimarães, and Luiza DelaFlora Cassol, “Exploring Reporting and Interactive Dialogue Options for NPT Disarmament Obligations,” 29.

¹²¹ Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “NPT Review Process: An Explainer,” VCDNP, July 2023, https://vcdnp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/web_npt_review_process_07212023.pdf

disarmament obligations and better enables inclusion of NNWS in the process. Suggestions that the interactive dialogue comes under MC1/SB1 are unlikely to win round most of the NWS.

The second area of divergence concerns the frequency and timing of interactive sessions. The NPDI proposes that NWS present national reports twice per review cycle with interactive discussion following each submission. UNIDIR's Option 2 similarly envisages two rounds of dialogue, at the second PrepCom and the RevCon. France has proposed a dedicated session during the third PrepCom, while the EU advocates for a phased approach spanning the entire review cycle, with consultations at the first PrepCom, draft report reviews at the third PrepCom, and final reviews at the RevCon. As with reporting frequency, NWS have shown reluctance to commit to multiple formal interactive sessions per cycle, even as some have engaged voluntarily in informal consultations and presentations at various points.

The question of where within the review cycle interactive sessions should be located also deserves consideration. Several proposals, including those from the NPDI and UNIDIR, envisage interactive dialogue taking place at the RevCon. However, RevCons are already the most demanding and time-pressured events in the NPT calendar. Over the course of four weeks, delegations must negotiate across multiple main committees and subsidiary bodies, engage in intensive consultations on outcome documents, and manage the political dynamics of a process that must produce consensus. Adding dedicated interactive sessions on NWS national reports, with the procedural requirements of advance submissions and written questions, would place further strain on States Parties as they prepare for, and negotiate, at RevCon. This consideration lends weight to proposals that locate interactive dialogue at a PrepCom rather than the RevCon. States Parties and commentators have long questioned the utility of PrepComs, which can lack focus and purpose. Dedicating substantive meeting time at the third PrepCom to interactive dialogue on NWS national reports would help address this deficit, giving the final PrepCom before the RevCon a concrete and meaningful function. It would also ensure that the dialogue takes place at a point in the review cycle where its conclusions can inform the negotiation of outcome documents at the RevCon, without competing for time and political attention with those negotiations themselves. That being said, moving the interactive discussion on national reports to the PrepCom is unlikely to be popular with the majority of

the NNWS who have expressed a strong preference for these to take place at RevCon.

Conclusion: A Zone of Potential Agreement?

Drawing on the discussion above, a narrow but identifiable zone of potential agreement exists ahead of the 2026 RevCon.

Enhanced reporting is unlikely to be something that the States Parties action a decision on, but there is scope for consensus language in the outcome document along the following lines. First, on the structure and content of NWS reporting, the most viable formulation would call on NWS to enhance the quality of their national reports by building on the 2013 P5 Common Reporting Framework, with a view to facilitating greater comparability between reports and enabling more meaningful assessment of progress on Article VI obligations. Both the 2022 revised draft outcome document and the 2025 PrepCom draft recommendations document offer useful formulations, but it is unlikely that States Parties will agree to go further than the 2022 formulation.¹²²

Second, the outcome document could acknowledge and welcome the voluntary transparency efforts undertaken by certain States Parties during the current review cycle. Language praising States Parties that have presented draft reports, held consultations with stakeholders, or engaged in informal briefings ahead of formal submission would be beneficial for two reasons. First, recognising the good faith efforts of those States who have engaged in such practices is likely to encourage those States to continue with such practices in future cycles, regardless of what other NWS might be doing. Secondly, by elevating voluntary best practices into the outcome document, such language would establish a normative baseline against which future reporting efforts can be measured. Doing so creates soft expectations that, over successive review cycles, may gradually shift the threshold of what is considered acceptable NWS transparency. This approach carries the additional advantage of being difficult for any delegation to oppose because praising voluntary

¹²² The 2022 formulations reads: "In line with Action 21 of the 2010 Action Plan, the nuclear-weapon States will develop further the standard reporting form including, inter alia, on nuclear arsenals and capabilities, without prejudice to national security, as well as national measures related to nuclear disarmament including their nuclear policies, doctrines and nuclear risk reduction measures." "NPT/CONF.2020/CRP.1/Rev.2"-- paragraph 35a

action does not create obligations, yet it signals the direction of travel the treaty community expects.

Third, the outcome document could encourage all States Parties, including NNWS, to submit national reports on their implementation of NPT obligations and commitments, using a format appropriate to their circumstances. This formulation would respond to the consistent demand from Russia and China that enhanced transparency apply universally, not solely to NWS, while avoiding the creation of differentiated reporting obligations for NNWS in nuclear-sharing or extended deterrence arrangements. By encouraging rather than requiring NNWS reporting, and by leaving the format open-ended, the language would sidestep the most contentious aspects of the debate while reinforcing the principle that transparency is a shared responsibility across all three pillars of the treaty.

Where a decision might be able to be made is on a mechanism to improve transparency and accountability in the review process that focuses on interactive dialogue. While consensus on the most ambitious proposals remains out of reach, the positions of key States Parties and groups suggest that a decision along the following lines could be possible:

- All NWS and those NNWS willing to do so agree to submit their national reports two months prior to the RevCon to allow time for others to digest and submit questions to the reporting state ahead of the RevCon.
- During the RevCon, time is dedicated to special sessions either in a dedicated Subsidiary Body, where the five NWS and those NNWS willing to engage, present and discuss their national reports.
- The RevCon chair would facilitate the session. Each presenting state would provide a summary of its report, followed by a structured exchange based on the pre-submitted questions which UNODA would collate, with limited time left at the end for further questions or clarifications from the room.
- All States Parties and Civil Society representatives should be permitted to attend. Ensuring that the sessions are open reinforces the message that transparency and accountability are collective endeavours, and that the review process benefits from the widest possible engagement.
- Following the interactive sessions, the chair of the RevCon should produce a factual summary of the discussions, to be made publicly available. This summary would provide a formal record of the exchange and ensure that the dialogue feeds directly into the negotiation of outcome

documents, giving the interactive sessions a tangible connection to the broader review process rather than allowing them to exist as a standalone exercise with no institutional follow-through.

States Parties could take the modest decision to commit to doing this once per review cycle, noting this does not preclude future decisions to further enhance such a transparency and accountability mechanism. The recommendation of this report is to start small and with something that is likely to get broad agreement. States Parties have been discussing enhanced transparency and accountability mechanisms for the better part of two decades. The proposals on the table are well developed, the areas of convergence are identifiable, and the broad parameters of what NWS will and will not accept are clear. What has been lacking is not ideas but the political will to agree to implementation.

A decision at the 2026 RevCon to operationalise a single interactive session at the RevCon for the next cycle would be a concrete step toward the transparency and accountability mechanism that the majority of States Parties have called for. Whilst it might not meet more ambitious calls for benchmarks or timelines on disarmament, it would help to set a new precedent that could be built on in the future. The perfect should not be the enemy of the good, and a functioning mechanism that can be strengthened over time is worth considerably more than an ambitious proposal that remains on paper indefinitely.

Importantly, such a decision need not be contingent on agreement on a broader outcome document. A decision on enhancing transparency and accountability through interactive dialogue could be adopted as a freestanding decision at the 2026 RevCon, similar to the 1995 decision on Strengthening the Review Process which was agreed whilst States Parties were unable to reach consensus on a final document. Decoupling this decision from the fate of the broader outcome document could both increase the likelihood of its adoption and strengthen its durability.

PrepCom 2025

States Parties Positions on Enhancing Transparency and Accountability

State Party/Group	Support for Proposals to Enhance Reporting	Support for Proposals to Enhance Presentation/ Review of Reports	Issues
USA		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Presentation and interactive review of reports, so long as all other NWS do the same. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rejects proposals that seek to establish benchmarks, targets, and timelines. ▪ Critique Chair's Elements Paper for placing an emphasis on nuclear burden sharing and extended deterrence in NNWS reporting.
UK		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Open to discussing dedicating formal meeting time to discuss reports. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strongly oppose recommendations applying arbitrary disarmament benchmarks and timelines.
France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Encourage NWS and NNWS to submit substantive reports. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establishment of an interactive, structured, and in-depth dialogue on reports submitted by both NWS and NNWS (mandatory for NWS). ▪ Dialogue open to all States Parties and civil society. ▪ Dialogue held within the Commission III. 	
China	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NWS voluntarily negotiate frequency of submitting reports and continue to submit reports under the common framework. ▪ States under the nuclear umbrella fulfil their reporting responsibilities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Willing to engage in consultations on methods for reviewing reports. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consideration of reports should not be carried out in the subsidiary body of MC1. ▪ If reports of NWS are to be reviewed, reports from NNWS under the nuclear umbrella should also be included.
Russia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The common reporting framework for NWS needs no updating. Reports on Treaty implementation should cover all three pillars and should be presented by both NWS and NNWS (primarily NATO members and participants in nuclear sharing). 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Oppose proposals aimed at imposing unreasonable obligations regarding accountability in nuclear disarmament matters.
EU Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Further development of standardised reporting templates for NWS and NNWS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establishing a process within the cycle for reviewing implementation by State Parties (particularly NWS). ▪ Session dedicated to reviewing NWS reports at RevCon. 	

State Party/Group	Support for Proposals to Enhance Reporting	Support for Proposals to Enhance Presentation/ Review of Reports	Issues
Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adoption of standardised reporting templates. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Process to establish a standardised reporting templates for NNWS should not be pre-empted by recommendations at this PrepCom.
Sweden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Qualitative improvements to reports through developing a standardised template. NPDI's proposals are a good starting point. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Session at RevCon for reviewing NWS reports. Institutionalising reviewing reports for the next Review Cycle. Sessions involve all States Parties and civil society. 	
Ireland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Updated reporting format for NWS covering quantitative and qualitative elements. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interactive dialogue on NWS reports. Cite UNIDIR report as a potential model for peer review-type processes. 	<p>Chair's Elements Paper:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Subsidiary body is supposed to be forward looking. Suggest the establishment of a new, one-off subsidiary body at the 2026 PrepCom to consider modalities. Issue with proposed frequency of NWS reporting.
Netherlands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All States Parties, (particularly NWS), to make use of the NPDI reporting template. 		
Belgium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Standard reporting template for NWS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Focused and interactive discussion during a dedicated session on NWS reports. 	
NAM Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Accountability of NWS through benchmarks, concrete, measurable, and timebound actions with established deadlines. NWS report under pillar 1 on their implementation through reports containing comparable information. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NWS reports considered and interactively discussed during the review cycles including at MC1 during RevCon. 	
Phillipines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Standard reporting format for NWS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Allocation of dedicated time at RevCon for a structured and interactive dialogue on NWS reports. 	
African Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Systematic, standardised and detailed reporting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reports subject to interactive discussions under MC1 at the next RevCon. 	

State Party/Group	Support for Proposals to Enhance Reporting	Support for Proposals to Enhance Presentation/ Review of Reports	Issues
ASEAN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Benchmarks, and concrete, measurable, timebound actions with established deadlines. ▪ NWS report on implementation of their obligations in a structured manner that allows NNWS to engage constructively. 		
South Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Clear, transparent and measurable benchmarks with defined timelines for how NWS will fulfil their disarmament obligations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Substantive and interactive discussions, which can be organised based on specific topics agreed to by States Parties. 	
Zimbabwe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Progress towards an agreed standard reporting form. 		
Malaysia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reporting undertaken using a standardised template. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Institutionalising dedicated time during PrepCom sessions for presentation and discussion of reports, particularly NWS. ▪ Establishment of mechanisms to monitor implementation. 	
Thailand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Comprehensive, standardised reporting by NWS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Structured, interactive review mechanisms where reports are submitted well in advance of RevCon; subject to examination in dedicated sessions; measured against benchmarks and deadlines. 	
Mozambique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Enhanced standardised reporting, especially by NWS. 		
NAC Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Systematic, standardised and detailed reporting by NWS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NWS reports subject to interactive discussions under MC1 at REVCON. ▪ NWS set out clear, transparent and measurable plans with timelines and benchmarks 3. NWS submit reports for peer review during formal sessions. 	
Aotearoa New Zealand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Modest, practical improvements to reporting by NWS under the disarmament pillar. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interactive and structured peer review mechanism. 	<p>Chair's Elements Paper:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Subsidiary body should be established as a one-off and tasked with outlining modalities. ▪ Interactive dialogue should be held in plenary meetings of the PrepComs or Main Committees of the RevCon.

State Party/Group	Support for Proposals to Enhance Reporting	Support for Proposals to Enhance Presentation/ Review of Reports	Issues
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reports mandatory for all NPT parties. ▪ Include information on progress made in dismantling their nuclear arsenals and on actions taken to fulfil their obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NWS formally presenting reports included within the formal agenda of the 11th RevCon. 	<p>Chair's Elements Paper:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Prefer to address these topics within Main Committee I rather than SB1. ▪ Subsidiary body's work could neglect other issues related to the future of nuclear disarmament.
Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NWS presents reports twice in every review cycle: 2nd PrepCom and RevCon. ▪ NPDI proposal on standardised reporting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 2nd PrepCom allocates time under cluster 1 and RevCon allocates time in Main Committee I, to hold interactive discussions on NWS reports. 	<p>Chair's Elements Paper:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cite point made by Australia on nuclear sharing/ nuclear umbrella states reporting. ▪ Note the importance of civil society.
NPDI Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strengthen NPT reporting and accountability mechanism through standardised template. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strengthening NPT reporting and accountability mechanisms through interactive dialogue. 	
Kazakhstan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Regular reporting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Open dialogue, and inclusive engagement between NWS and NNWS. 	
Republic of Korea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Standard format for reports and regular and detailed reports by NWS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Dedicated sessions to review standardised reports. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No additional burdens should be placed on NNWS regarding reporting.
Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Improved and standardised reporting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interactive dialogue between NWS and NNWS. 	<p>Chair's Elements Paper:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reject language that would implicitly create a third category of States Parties.
Norway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Allocating time for a discussion on standardised reporting at RevCon. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NWS reports presented individually, followed by an interactive debate at the RevCon and during the next Review Cycle. 	
Kiribati	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NWS present reports that address information on how they are dismantling their nuclear weapons and actions fulfilling their obligations to pursue negotiations in good faith. 		
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NWS submit reports twice per review cycle, at a time that will allow meaningful engagement. ▪ NPDI reporting template. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Recognise France and the UK's presentation of draft reports; encourage other NWS to follow. ▪ Engagement with reports should be included in formal plenary sessions. 	<p>Draft Decision – Strengthening the Review Process:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Suggest avoiding text that can be seen as advancing a reinterpretation of the Treaty's legal categories (paragraph 2b).

State Party/Group	Support for Proposals to Enhance Reporting	Support for Proposals to Enhance Presentation/ Review of Reports	Issues
Turkiye	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Open to exploring the use of draft standardised templates; NPDI's template is a practical instrument for evaluating commitments. 		<p>Draft Decision – Strengthening the Review Process:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Introducing new substantial elements will impede the process.
Sri Lanka	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Concrete, time-bound and transparent steps towards the nuclear disarmament – subject to regular reporting and scrutiny. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Concrete, time-bound and transparent steps towards the nuclear disarmament – subject to regular reporting and scrutiny. 	
Egypt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formalised mechanism through which NWS submit reports developed according to an agreed standardised template, in a way that allows for the identification of gaps and areas of developments, and the establishment of benchmarks and timeframes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formal review and discussion of reports at the RevCon and PrepCom in a structured, focused, comparable, business-like, and interactive manner. 	<p>Draft Decision – Strengthening the Review Process:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishing a subsidiary body under MC1 for the sole purpose of discussing transparency and accountability would allow for a focused discussion, without prejudice to other important items allocated to SB11. Highlight voluntary nature of the reports to be submitted by NNWS.

Source: PrepCom 2025 statements available on the Reaching Critical Will website.

General support for enhancing transparency and accountability:

Finland, Portugal, Poland, Czechia, Bulgaria, Italy, Romania, Croatia, Malta, Denmark, Ukraine, Cambodia, Guyana, Singapore, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Iran, Brazil, Hungary, Estonia, Switzerland, Australia.

No mention of transparency and accountability:

Slovenia, Greece, Vietnam, Indonesia, Mauritania, Bangladesh, Mongolia, Jamaica, Nepal, Armenia, Holy See, Myanmar, Costa Rica, Lithuania, Baltic States, Vienna Group of Ten, Russia/ Belarus, TPNW Group, Stockholm Initiative.

No data:

UAE, Arab Group, Oman, Uruguay, Yemen, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Kuwait, Belarus, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Cuba, Sudan, Syria, Honduras, Nicaragua, Lebanon, Jordan, Burkina Faso, Panama, Algeria, Kyrgyzstan, Senegal, Luxembourg, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, San Marino, Libya, Bahrain, Djibouti, Gabon, Congo, Niger, League of Arab States, Colombia, Chile, Iraq, Timor Leste.

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