

Youth, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Recommendations from Early-Career Experts to the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Introduction

In October 2019, His Excellency Ambassador Cho Tae-yul of the Republic of Korea introduced the then draft resolution on Youth, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (A/RES/74/64) to the UN General Assembly's First Committee, noting that the resolution forms part of the Republic of Korea's contribution to championing Action 38 of the Secretary-General's disarmament agenda. In his remarks, the Ambassador affirmed that empowering youth in the "Agenda for Disarmament" and non-proliferation is meaningful not merely for creating diversity in the sector, but for "nurturing young experts who will lead our collective efforts in the future," and creating "positive momentum for disarmament discussions that have been polarised and remained at a standstill for quite some time."¹ The UN General Assembly reaffirmed the important and positive contribution that young people can make in sustaining peace and security through its unanimous support of its biennial resolution on "Youth, disarmament and non-proliferation", adopted on 12 December 2019 and on 6 December 2021.

BASIC, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the Republic of Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROK MOFA), saw this as an opportunity for significant and meaningful engagement of young and early career researchers around the world with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) process, through BASIC's Emerging Voices Network (EVN).

This working paper is the direct outcome of a series of events co-organised by BASIC, the UNODA and ROK MOFA. Immediately following a plenary event facilitating discussion and engagement amongst youth and senior leaders on the NPT, four youth working groups focussed on developing recommendations to advance the NPT's three pillars as well as equity, inclusion and diversity amongst its stakeholders. These recommendations were then presented directly by youth leaders to senior leaders, including: President Designate to the 10th NPT Review Conference, H.E. Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen; CTBTO Executive Secretary, Dr Robert Floyd; IAEA Director General, Ambassador Rafael Grossi; Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations, Mr Thomas Markram; and IAEA External Relations Officer, Mr Nuno Luzio.

After receiving feedback from these senior leaders, these four working groups now present their recommendations to NPT Member States below.

¹ Statement by HE Ambassador Cho Tae-yul of the Republic of Korea to the First Committee of the 74th Session of the UN General Assembly, 11 October 2019.
<https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/statement-by-republic-of-korea-gd-oct-11-19.pdf>

Non-Proliferation

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The scope and scale of proliferation risks continues to increase with innovation and technological growth in nuclear, and international, security. Nuclear non-proliferation remains central to the NPT's future and the future of international peace and security more broadly. At the same time, changes in the international landscape provide both challenges and opportunities for advancing nuclear non-proliferation. Approaches to non-proliferation must continue to evolve to keep pace with these changes. This section of this working paper provides recommendations from youth and early career experts on non-proliferation within the NPT framework.

Gaps in the NPT Framework

1. Emerging technologies (e.g., additive manufacturing, 3D printing, artificial intelligence) have the potential to facilitate nuclear proliferation. However, the specific proliferation risks posed by a variety of emerging technologies are largely unknown. At the same time, some emerging technologies may contribute to preventing proliferation.
2. Irresponsible behaviour by great powers, including modernisation of nuclear arsenals and undermining of negative security assurances (most notably through Russia's invasion of Ukraine), impairs efforts to promote non-proliferation.
3. Despite non-proliferation and disarmament both being core components of the NPT, they are often treated as separate issues and the link between the two is often not fully appreciated. For example, in a world with complete and irreversible disarmament, non-proliferation safeguards and monitoring to detect any nuclear testing would likely still be needed. The CTBTO's work is an excellent example of this link between advancing non-proliferation and advancing disarmament. More broadly, addressing both horizontal and vertical proliferation is essential to promoting non-proliferation.
4. There remains a gap in gender and youth participation in decision-making regarding non-proliferation. More broadly, participation in non-proliferation decision-making remains narrow in scope and does not reflect the diversity of stakeholders affected and concerned by nuclear proliferation.

As is the case amongst many treaties written with a specific security environment in mind, this working group recognises that the NPT may not have initially been designed to address the gaps addressed above. Indeed, predicting these and any future hindrances to non-proliferation within the

NPT framework is highly difficult. Given the historical importance and prevalence of the NPT, there may be inertia with regards to addressing these policy gaps. Although the NPT remains the core of the non-proliferation regime, it is important to recognise the contributions of other international institutions and agreements in advancing nuclear non-proliferation. The NPT framework benefits from efforts to address proliferation through other institutions and agreements.#

Recommendations

1. **Bring in a wider array of stakeholders as *decision-makers* in existing non-proliferation institutions:**
 - a. Encourage government delegations to the NPT (as well as other non-proliferation decision-making bodies) to formally include civil society members as experts on their national delegation (as some delegations already do).
 - b. Highlight and support the essential work of grassroots movements and youth networks in building support for non-proliferation among a multitude of different stakeholders, as well as their potential to bring a wide range of ideas on advancing non-proliferation into the NPT process.
 - c. Identify ongoing non-proliferation initiatives in existing organisations that are under-resourced, both in finances and diplomatic attention (e.g., OPANAL). Elevate the centrality of these organisations and initiatives and increase funding for their work in implementing the NPT's non-proliferation objectives.
2. **Seek to anticipate the proliferation risks posed by emerging technologies:** The IAEA should examine the *specific* proliferation risks posed by *specific* emerging technologies that remain unregulated or insufficiently regulated by existing institutions, as well as the *degree* to which these emerging technologies of concern pose nuclear proliferation risks. At the same time, the IAEA should also examine how specific emerging technologies could contribute to advancing and enhancing non-proliferation, especially with regard to safeguards. It is important to not assume that new technologies only pose risks and dangers. The CTBTO's history exemplifies the contribution that emerging technologies can make to advancing non-proliferation and disarmament.
3. **Enhance negative security assurances:** recognising the nexus between non-proliferation and disarmament; nuclear weapon states, nonnuclear weapon states, and civil society should initiate track 1.5 dialogues on how to maintain the credibility of existing negative security assurances, both in light of current challenges and in the future. Negative security assurances are important commitments, but their effectiveness depends on their credibility and their credibility has come under serious scrutiny. The actors also discuss how to reach additional negative security assurances, both regionally and globally.

Disarmament

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For three years now, the Doomsday clock has been set at 100 seconds to midnight, less than 2 minutes away from a nuclear disaster. Having entered into force in 1970, the NPT inspired the creation of more modern treaties for nuclear disarmament to avert such disasters; however, the NPT itself has lagged behind. Stuck in the past yet holding value for the present and the future, multiple gaps reduce its efficacy. Some of these gaps are described below, along with recommendations for strengthening disarmament within the NPT.

Gaps in the NPT Framework

1. **Transparency:** There is a problem with transparency in nuclear-weapon states as the extent of their nuclear stockpiles is not exactly known. Knowing how many warheads have been deployed and undeployed is also important. There needs to be more progress on the dismantling of excess warheads in addition to declaring stocks of fissile materials and placing them under IAEA safeguards. However, sharing this information may be considered a security risk by some countries. A declaration or a non-binding statement of intent might help with this vagueness, but only to the extent that countries buy into it.
2. **The modernisation of weapons:** Modernisation may cause frustration for non-nuclear NPT states: it may increase the capacity of pre-existing weapons, thus, indirectly increasing their ability to cause harm. Addressing growing and changing forms of warheads and methods of modernisation is difficult within the current framework.
3. **Environmental Reparations and Assistance of Victims:** Many non-nuclear weapons states do not have the expertise or the funds to remediate environmental damages and assist victims of nuclear weapons use. This is why collaboration between nuclear and non-nuclear states is needed on these elements. This is in line with the NPT's urge for nuclear and non-nuclear states to collaborate, but it takes it further beyond collaboration on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
4. **Article VI and Accountability:** We need to find or develop ways to hold the P5 accountable to the pursuit of disarmament in good faith. More clarity is also needed about what good faith means.
5. **Two-tiered hierarchy:** To some non-nuclear states, the nuclear weapon states seem to hold all the power. This is dangerous as it may weaken or de-incentivise commitments to collaborate within the framework of the NPT. It may also discourage states from continuing

meaningful engagement within the NPT, as they may feel that their contributions do not hold weight compared to those of nuclear states.

6. **Reducing the risk of rhetoric escalation:** An example of escalating rhetoric is that Russia 'broke' normative rules and openly spoke about the use of nuclear weapons. The NPT clearly prohibits both the use of nuclear weapons and the threat of using nuclear weapons. The USSR, whose seat has been absorbed by Russia, was one of the Government Depositories of the NPT - making this an even graver occurrence.
7. **The NPT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Nuclear Weapons (TPNW):** The relationship between the two treaties needs to be handled with care given the fact that the TPNW has now entered into force, and the attitude of some nuclear weapon states to the TPNW.

Recommendations

1. **Addressing modernisation:** States are not being held accountable for modernising their weapons. This is partially due to the lack of definition when it comes to accountability, modernisation, and increase of warheads. Additional clarity around strictly capping the number of weapons and modernised weapons is needed. A clear sliding scale of accountability measures should be negotiated, developed, and specified, proportional to infractions. Multi-track diplomacy, particularly track II diplomacy and negotiations, will be prominent to ensure that states buy into this and do not withdraw from the NPT. In addition to its current role and tasks pertaining to the NPT, the IAEA should be further asked to implement this sliding scale of accountability measures and to investigate related infractions. The NPT currently lists the IAEA as a body investigating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; it does not clearly spell out the IAEA's role in case of infractions or when it comes to accountability. Budget considerations must be kept in mind for the aforementioned points, notably the allocation of more budget for the IAEA to carry out these added tasks. Modernisation must be discussed in light of arguments presented to back the need for modernisation notably in relation to maintenance, safety, and effectiveness of weaponry.
2. **Explicitly calling for irreversibility in nuclear disarmament:** Production and development of nuclear weapons should be halted immediately, accompanied by applying legal systems and launching multi-track negotiations for disarmament. Engaging with impacted communities such as hibakusha should specifically be encouraged, stressing irreversibility and prioritising humanitarian disarmament.
3. **Addressing universality through encouraging nuclear armed states to sign and ratify the NPT:** There cannot be an advancement in disarmament as long as UN member states, especially nuclear armed states, remain outside the NPT as this may challenge and

contradict multilateral, global disarmament. Through encouraging non-NPT states, particularly non-NPT nuclear armed states, to sign the NPT, the NPT's role as a common space for conversation and negotiation is strengthened further. Positive incentives in the form of monetary and technical assistance for enhancing the implementation of sustainable development, special trading statuses, and help with the peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy can be linked to the elaboration and implementation of a step by step disarmament plan that would eventually lead non-NPT states to safely dispose of their nuclear weapons and sign or ratify the NPT. This is important as no state can join the NPT without disposing of its nuclear weapons first. Moreover, since targeted sanctions have done very little in moving disarmament forward, a more positive approach tied to incentives might generate better results. Additionally, nuclear weapons states must make clearer commitments to disarmament, including non-NPT nuclear armed states, as the impetus has largely been on non-nuclear states. Confidence-building measures should likewise be developed between nuclear and non-nuclear states.

4. **Addressing interpretive flexibility in Article X language:** Lack of clarity in the language of the NPT, particularly in specific articles, leads to difficulty in universal implementation of the NPT. This may also serve as a justification for states for partial implementations based on their perceptions or interpretations of the text. Most critically, Article X makes it relatively easy for states to withdraw from the NPT; multi-track diplomacy is needed to reach an agreement around clearer language that would strengthen article X. Simultaneously, multi-track diplomacy would help member states reach an agreed upon formula based on state interests and trade-offs that would make it difficult for state parties to withdraw from the NPT.
5. **Increasing the productivity of preparatory committees through the inclusion of civil society organisations:** So far, preparatory committees have only existed once a year in 3 out of 4 years before the 5-year review conference. It would be difficult to make these committees' work continuous due to budget constraints and considerations. Nevertheless, preparatory committees' work and the preparatory phase for the review conference could be more productive, with increased inclusion of civil society organisations, including youth delegates. Indeed, civil society organisations have talent, expertise, and know-how that can scale up readiness and efficacy and make the review process more responsive in addressing nuclear and geopolitical concerns.
6. **Drafting and incorporating optional protocols and annexes to the NPT to reflect an action-oriented approach in line with evolving times and needs:** Amending the NPT is problematic, particularly as the treaty becomes closer to universality. The NPT's amendment poses risks of further watering down its language or having states withdraw from it or backtrack on their commitments. As such, drafting and incorporating optional protocols and annexes might be a more suitable compromise. These annexes or optional protocols would

clearly spell out agreed upon plans of action, assistance, and collaboration between nuclear and non-nuclear states to remedy environmental damages resulting from unintended nuclear weapons use and testing, assist victims, and specify a process of investigation. Furthermore, a committee of experts appointed by the UN should develop a combined agreed-upon comprehensive and step-by-step process for disarmament to be approved by states and annexed to the NPT. Previous disarmament action plans have either favoured a comprehensive approach or a step-by-step approach to disarmament. These would be supplemented with regular reviews of each step's implementation. This could simultaneously activate nuclear states within the NPT whilst reducing the gap between nuclear states and non-nuclear states.

Peaceful Uses

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The strategic objectives of the NPT in terms of assisting member states in the use of nuclear technology safely and securely, should extend in both peaceful and war times. The NPT does not, however, explicitly go further to define how it would protect states that use nuclear energy and the nuclear energy facilities during an armed conflict. It should be noted that the Geneva Convention has the provisions, but this should not negate the NPT from also having the same provisions considering that it is a treaty that explicitly encourages peaceful use of nuclear energy. The protections of the use of nuclear energy should not be left out to be covered by other treaties. While the treaty promotes cooperation in the field of nuclear technology, further action is required to bestow more safeguards of nuclear energy facilities in times of conflict. Peaceful use should not end up creating further security threats to a state's nuclear security or impede routine operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Thus, the purpose of this section of this working paper is to bring awareness to the gaps that are failing the progression and reliability of nuclear energy.

Gaps in the NPT Framework

1. The NPT framework does not establish measures for when an NPP becomes the target of an armed conflict and is used as a weapon. For instance, IAEA officials have expressed concerns that nuclear safety protocols at Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl NPPs have been violated as the NPPs have become pawns during the war in Ukraine. The ongoing military action makes it difficult for IAEA staff to visit the sites in order to assess their safety. The treaty should be able to remain relevant in both peace and war times so that it is able to respond to shifting priorities of member states. These could include unforeseen emergency

circumstances, for instance war, conflict and natural disasters that could impact nuclear energy plants.

2. The treaty also needs to explicitly state the role of the IAEA in terms of the response when an NPP becomes vulnerable as a result of conflict. The nonresponse or lack of a demarcated role for the IAEA could be catastrophic and threaten every principle of nuclear safety. Thus, the role of the IAEA during an ongoing conflict should be to maintain and make sure that both conflictual parties respect the physical integrity of the plant.
3. The treaty does not address the viability or reliability of nuclear energy during an armed conflict. As evidenced in Ukraine, a nuclear power plant is vulnerable to being captured by hostile forces and being used as leverage. Whilst nuclear energy is usually reliable and uninterrupted, it becomes highly unreliable and dangerous during a conflict. Some assurances and continuation of use of energy should be guaranteed during an armed conflict. Failure to have access to the NPP or energy directly translates to a violation of the right to benefit from nuclear energy peacefully.
4. There are clear barriers to change within the treaty: the provisions of the Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a review of the operation of the Treaty every five years; however, none of the review meetings have addressed the security and safety of nuclear power plants during an armed conflict. It is important for the discussion on the security and protection of NPPs during armed conflict to be addressed by the NPT. The discussion will not help strengthen the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but it would help foster confidence in the treaty's umbrella protection of NPP during armed conflict. The 2015 review conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ended without the adoption of a substantive consensus outcome. Therefore, the lack of consensus could affect the adoption of new upgrades that address the current political climate to the treaty.

Recommendations

1. There should be strong security protocols in place that protect nuclear energy facilities from being weaponized by conflicting parties in tandem with the ones that are in the Geneva Convention. It would be beneficial for the NPT to also cover the security protocols on NPPs considering it is one of the main treaties on nuclear matters. Peaceful use of nuclear energy should be siloed from geopolitical issues. The current NPT framework can make recommendations to update statutes to verify and certify preservation of facilities in terms of security, safety and application of peaceful uses. This could mean a ban or prohibition of attacking NPP or their weaponisation.
2. There should be advocacy for the protection of nuclear energy plants as non-targets during armed conflicts akin to the protection of world heritage sites during armed insurrections.

The safeguards mechanism is no longer sufficient, and additional control mechanisms must support the safety and security of the NPPs (i.e., a satellite inspection among the zone of an NPP 24/7, 365 days). Protections awarded to these sites could use the language used by the NPT in the protection of world heritage sites. Bans on attacking nuclear stations are part of Geneva conventions, but not of the NPT and there would be added depth to the NPT if it covers conduct on NPPs during armed conflict.

3. Active IAEA involvement to ensure secure and safe use of nuclear energy during armed conflict for instance the right equipment to monitor radiation levels in a conflict zone. The IAEA should be granted access to NPPs to ensure the continued integrity, viability, safety and security of the plants. Therefore, member states should honour the peaceful use initiatives and cooperate with the IAEA in order to ensure access to nuclear facilities during ongoing conflict situations.
4. Codifying cooperation between NPT, IAEA and other organisations aimed at peaceful use of nuclear energy to create and solidify a clearly established relationship between all these organisations to make them more effective and impactful. The treaty should encourage continued regional and international organisation collaborations in implementing its mandates. For instance, there should be reassurances that the Parties to the conflict shall Endeavour to avoid locating any military objectives in the vicinity of the works or installations mentioned in paragraph 1 of the Article 56 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I). The NPT should ratify this agreement and provide full support to the IAEA in case of a military conflict or hostile situation in the zone of an NPP to inspect the plant and identify any potential damages to the plant's equipment.
5. The NPT needs to explicitly address safety and security protocols, as well as the response to be followed if a power plant finds itself in the hands of a hostile party during an armed conflict. For instance, a no fly zone over the NPP could be enforced or air defence systems could be implemented. It should be noted that the current NPT framework does not have provisions for enforcement of a no-fly zone over an NPP during an armed conflict.
6. Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions deals only with the protection of nuclear electrical generating stations. This means that protection does not extend to research reactors, which constitute another large group of nuclear installations used for peaceful purposes. This is a deficiency of the Protocol, and there are several reasons why it is necessary to list the research reactors among the installations containing dangerous forces.
 - a. A considerable number of research reactors operate within the framework of universities and research institutes, which are generally much nearer to inhabited areas than nuclear power plants.

- b. The need to protect research reactors is principally justified by the existence of 223 research reactors with a combined capacity of more than 3000 MW in 53 countries throughout the globe. Most range up to 100 MW, compared with 3000 MW (i.e., 1000 MWe) for a typical power reactor

Equity, Diversity and Inclusion

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Spanning all three pillars of the NPT, equity, diversity, and inclusion (EDI) is necessary for current and future nuclear policy to meet varying and changing global security needs. The principles of EDI require more than just tokenism or increasing visibility of minorities and disadvantaged groups. It requires specific policy aimed at addressing and tearing down barriers to access, increasing opportunities for more voices, and actually implementing the changes that codify those efforts into existing treaties, policies, and systems. In the nuclear disarmament regime, EDI allows for a plethora of voices to engage with and transform the nuclear structure of the modern world. By bringing in differing perspectives and allowing all the ability to shape and change the discussion, nuclear disarmament stands a chance at being a trailblazer in how disarmament can create a safer, more equitable, and sustainable world for all. This working paper section discusses existing gaps and barriers, and then makes recommendations to improve and advance EDI within the NPT framework.

Gaps in the NPT Framework

Whilst there have been steps taken to make the NPT process more inclusive, gaps remain to be addressed. The specific areas within which policy gaps are identified by this working group follow below. For each of these, we list the potential to address them, as well as potential barriers to their implementation.

1. **Gender parity:** The NPT recognises the full and effective participation of women. Yet there are no specific mandates requiring delegations to have gender parity among their representatives. Specifically outlining these requirements can help to normalise the importance of gender parity. However, any requirements of parity within delegations would be optional as the Treaty will not be reopened, and any final documents that include suggestions are to be decided by consensus. Due to the NPT's extremely wide membership, not all States Parties may be in agreement on the role of women in nuclear disarmament. There are also differences in what states agree is the definition of gender and women, with some limiting access to LGBTQ+ individuals who may identify as non-binary or not present as female.

2. **Limited youth involvement:** Some NPT States Parties already recognise the work being done by youth and mention the importance of their involvement in various statements. Once again, the NPT has the ability to integrate broader perspectives as it has done with gender. Emphasising the full and effective participation of youth at the NPT Review Conference should be meaningful and yield results to avoid tokenism. It should be noted that adding young people to delegations would require more funding for their participation, which may already be difficult for smaller states. Further, non-binding resolutions or suggestions to the NPT do not always make an impact, meaning that such efforts could result in tokenism rather than meaningful change, and this could further compound the socio-economic disparities in the NPT caused by financial barriers to entry to the field.
3. **Geographical/Global South barriers:** Within the current NPT regime, there is equal status among all non-nuclear weapons states in the Treaty imbuing a sense of globality. Despite this fact, there is also a strong contingent of Global South states in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and New Agenda Coalition (NAC) who are already vocal at the NPT Review Conference about barriers to their participation, namely difficulties acquiring visas to travel to the United States and the costs associated with doing so. Nullifying these difficulties is not as simple as it may seem. The United Nations cannot influence visa processes and the sovereignty of each state allows them to undertake their own decisions regarding entry to foreign nationals. Suggestions have been made to consider a rotating NPT Review Conference location to equalise the barriers to participation, yet the importance of the Secretariat and its permanent location in New York City would make any attempts to move the NPT Review Conference outside of the United States difficult.
4. **Testimony:** A number of side events at the Review Conference touch on the impact of nuclear weapons testing and use, and the effects of nuclear weapons are mentioned in a number of national and joint statements. While some states may protest the more official involvement of those impacted by nuclear weapons, it is not unprecedented for them to be present and engaged at the NPT Review Conference (for example Hiroshima survivor Setsuko Thurlow at this NPT conference). Crucially, however, physically attending the Conference for those exposed to the effects of nuclear weapons may be quite difficult in terms of cost and physical ability due to disability or age. Further any emphasis on “humanitarian disarmament”, which is often used as a blanket term to discuss the effects of nuclear weapons, has become subtly equated with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) which may cause resistance from some NPT States Parties who are critical of the TPNW. There may also be resistance to expanding the voting process to allow, for instance, sovereign Indigenous nations to be involved in the NPT in a more official capacity. Finally, there may be discomfort from nuclear weapons states to hear from those affected by the use and testing of nuclear weapons and accept responsibility for their actions.

5. **Civil society:** A number of civil society groups are accredited at the United Nations and have access to the majority of plenary discussions and side events. There is also a time in the plenary's general debate set aside for civil society to give statements. Frequent calls to expand civil society's involvement are well heeded, while acknowledging the legitimate barriers they face in doing so. For example, it is at times difficult to get UN accreditation and travel to New York City, especially for smaller and less established civil society organisations. Finally, though calls for more transparency are echoed by some States Parties, it is unlikely that all States Parties will feel comfortable opening up more processes and negotiations to official civil society involvement given the importance of security.
6. **Binary gender language:** While the NPT will not be reopened for textual changes, there is a precedent of allowing factual updates to the Treaty (i.e., changing the names of states, etc.). There is also a precedent in other forums (Conference on Disarmament, General Assembly) where official documents have been updated (or in the CD's case, attempts have been made to update) that either include genderless language (addressing *the President* rather than *Mr. President*, etc) or to include gender sensitive language. However, working outside of the gender binary is not always well accepted by a number of states who would see this as far too progressive or simply untrue, and many states see this as a waste of time or purposely block the resolutions in order to keep their positions in check.
7. **In-person barriers/lack of online access:** The COVID-19 pandemic has shown the limits of digital accessibility in UN fora. At the 10th Review Conference, some side events had online components, and the plenary is live streamed, allowing for a more accessible NPT Review Conference than ever before. However, limits to online accessibility remain: streaming is largely passive and does not allow for the viewer at home to interact with speakers at the UN; some States Parties may have security concerns and may not want the events or discussions to be recorded or streamed; and, some States Parties feel it is important to keep the Review Conference entirely in person to give it the credibility and respect as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament.

Recommendations

Based on the opportunities for policy change and barriers to change discussed, this working group makes the following recommendations:

1. The NPT final document should include a factual reference to the role of women and non-binary individuals and suggest that all delegations reach gender parity by the next Review Conference.
2. The NPT final document should reaffirm the importance of youth involvement in the NPT and set up an exploratory committee through the Secretariat that will develop research and recommendations for including youth delegates at the next Review Conference.

- a. The Secretariat should work closely with UNODA's #Youth4Disarmament program to develop a delegate support program and help explore funding support for smaller states to add a youth representative to their delegations.
3. The United Nations and States Parties should consider expanding access to the NPT, including for small and developing states, delegates who are physically unable to travel, and those who cannot afford the cost of a four-week conference in New York City. This may include online options for all side events and plenary events, and a process for expediting/supporting visa requests.
 - a. The NPT States Parties should task the Secretariat with creating a recommendation report for how the NPT can be more inclusive and accessible, with a focus on online participation being meaningful, streamlined, and effective.
4. The NPT should consider adding a plenary session dedicated to hearing from those affected by nuclear weapons use, testing, and proliferation to be included in the next Review Conference and tried at the next Preparatory Committees. This may encourage States Parties to include impacted persons in their national delegations. The NPT would benefit from closer collaboration with UNDRIP as a significant portion of impacted persons are Indigenous.
5. The NPT should consider widening its attendance by increasing collaboration with civil society members, including them in national delegations, and promoting transparency on negotiations through online participation, open negotiation rooms, or daily briefings that include key documents and national positions.
 - a. The NPT States Parties should task the Secretariat with reporting the involvement and contributions of civil society at this NPT RevCon to inform their participation at the next RevCon.
7. The NPT should adopt and endorse the UN guidelines on gender inclusive language which is available for the 6 official UN languages.

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