Youth, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament:
Summary of Recommendations from Early-Career Experts to the Non-Proliferation Treaty

This working paper summary is the direct outcome of a series of events co-organised by BASIC, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROK MOFA). Immediately following a plenary event facilitating discussion and engagement amongst youth and senior leaders on the NPT, four youth working groups focussed on developing recommendations to advance the NPT’s three pillars as well as equity, inclusion and diversity amongst its stakeholders. These recommendations were then presented directly by youth leaders to senior leaders, including: President Designate to the 10th NPT Review Conference, H.E. Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen; CTBTO Executive Secretary, Dr Robert Floyd; IAEA Director General, Ambassador Rafael Grossi; Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations, Mr Thomas Markram; and IAEA External Relations Officer, Mr Nuno Luzio.

Non-Proliferation

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Disarmament

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Peaceful Uses

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Equity, Diversity and Inclusion

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Non-Proliferation

1. **Bring in a wider array of stakeholders as decision-makers in existing non-proliferation institutions:**
   a. Encourage government delegations to the NPT (as well as other non-proliferation decision-making bodies) to formally include civil society members as experts on their national delegation (as some delegations already do).
   b. Highlight and support the essential work of grassroots movements and youth networks in building support for non-proliferation among a multitude of different stakeholders, as well as their potential to bring a wide range of ideas on advancing non-proliferation into the NPT process.
   c. Identify ongoing non-proliferation initiatives in existing organisations that are under-resourced, both in finances and diplomatic attention (e.g., OPANAL). Elevate the centrality of these organisations and initiatives and increase funding for their work in implementing the NPT’s non-proliferation objectives.

2. **Seek to anticipate the proliferation risks posed by emerging technologies:** The IAEA should examine the specific proliferation risks posed by specific emerging technologies that remain unregulated or insufficiently regulated by existing institutions, as well as the degree to which these emerging technologies of concern pose nuclear proliferation risks. At the same time, the IAEA should also examine how specific emerging technologies could contribute to advancing and enhancing non-proliferation, especially with regard to safeguards. It is important to not assume that new technologies only pose risks and dangers. The CTBTO’s history exemplifies the contribution that emerging technologies can make to advancing non-proliferation and disarmament.

3. **Enhance negative security assurances:** Recognizing the nexus between non-proliferation and disarmament; nuclear weapon states, nonnuclear weapon states, and civil society should initiate track 1.5 dialogues on how to maintain the credibility of existing negative security assurances, both in light of current challenges and in the future. Negative security assurances are important commitments, but their effectiveness depends on their credibility and their credibility has come under serious scrutiny. The actors should also discuss how to reach additional negative security assurances, both regionally and globally.
Disarmament

1. **Addressing modernisation**: States are not being held accountable for modernising their weapons. This is partially due to the lack of definition when it comes to accountability, modernisation, and increase of warheads. A clear sliding scale of accountability measures should be negotiated, developed, and specified, proportional to infractions.

2. **Explicitly calling for irreversibility in nuclear disarmament**: Production and development of nuclear weapons should be halted immediately, accompanied by applying legal systems and launching multi-track negotiations for disarmament. Engaging with impacted communities such as hibakusha should specifically be encouraged, stressing irreversibility and prioritising humanitarian disarmament.

3. **Addressing universality through encouraging nuclear armed states to sign and ratify the NPT**: Positive incentives in the form of technical assistance for enhancing the implementation of sustainable development, special trading statuses, and help with the peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy should be used. All nuclear armed states must make clearer commitments to disarmament. Confidence-building measures should likewise be developed between nuclear and non-nuclear states.

4. **Addressing interpretive flexibility in Article X language**: Lack of clarity in the language of the NPT, particularly in specific articles, leads to difficulty in universal implementation of the NPT. This may also serve as a justification for states for partial implementations based on their perceptions or interpretations of the text.

5. **Increasing the productivity of preparatory committees through the inclusion of civil society organisations**: Increased inclusion of civil society organisations, including youth delegates could increase the productivity of the Preparatory Committee Processes. Civil society organisations have talent, expertise, and know-how that can scale up readiness and efficacy and make the review process more responsive in addressing nuclear and geopolitical concerns.

6. **Drafting and incorporating optional protocols and annexes to the NPT to reflect an action-oriented approach in line with evolving times and needs**: These annexes or optional protocols would clearly spell out agreed upon plans of action, assistance, and collaboration between nuclear and non-nuclear states to remedy environmental damages resulting from unintended nuclear catastrophes, assist victims, and specify a process of investigation. Furthermore, a committee of experts appointed by the UN should develop an agreed-upon step-by-step process for disarmament to be approved by states and annexed to the NPT.
Peaceful Uses

1. **Strong security protocols in place that protect nuclear energy facilities from being weaponized by conflicting parties:** these should be in tandem with the ones that are in the Geneva Convention.
   a. The current NPT framework can make recommendations to update statutes to verify and certify preservation of facilities in terms of security, safety and application of peaceful uses. This could mean a ban or prohibition of attacking nuclear power plants (NPPs) or their weaponisation.

2. **Advocacy for the protection of nuclear energy plants as non-targets during armed conflicts:** This could be similar to the protection of world heritage sites during armed insurrections.

3. **Active IAEA involvement to ensure secure and safe use of nuclear energy during armed conflict:** The IAEA should be granted access to NPPs to ensure the continued integrity, viability, safety and security of the plants.

4. **Codifying cooperation between NPT, IAEA and other organisations aimed at peaceful use of nuclear energy:** This is with the aim to create and solidify a clearly established relationship between all these organisations to make them more effective and impactful.

5. **Explicitly address safety and security protocols within the NPT:** This should include the response to be followed if a power plant finds itself in the hands of a hostile party during an armed conflict. For instance a no fly zone over the NPP could be enforced or air defence systems could be implemented. It should be noted that the current NPT framework does not have provisions for enforcement of a no fly zone over an NPP during an armed conflict.

6. **Address specifically the need to protect research reactors:** Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions deals only with the protection of nuclear electrical generating stations. This means that protection does not extend to research reactors, which constitute another large group of nuclear installations used for peaceful purposes. There are several reasons to list the research reactors among the installations containing dangerous forces.
   a. A considerable number of research reactors operate within the framework of universities and research institutes, which are generally much nearer to inhabited areas than nuclear power plants.
   b. The need to protect research reactors is principally justified by the existence of 223 research reactors with a combined capacity of more than 3000 MW in 53 countries throughout the globe. Most range up to 100 MW, compared with 3000 MW (i.e. 1000 MWe) for a typical power reactor.
Equity, Diversity and Inclusion

1. **The NPT outcome document should include a factual reference to the role of women and non-binary individuals**: As well as this, it should suggest that all delegations should have gender parity within their delegations by the next Review Conference.

2. **Reaffirm the importance of youth involvement in the NPT outcome document**: Alongside this, the NPT should set up an exploratory committee through the Secretariat that will develop research and recommendations for including youth delegates at the next Review Conference.
   a. The Secretariat should work closely with UNODA’s #Youth4Disarmament program to develop a delegate support program, and help explore funding support for smaller states to add a youth representative to their delegations.

3. **The United Nations and States Parties should consider expanding access to the NPT**: This should include considerations for small and developing states, delegates who are physically unable to travel, and those who cannot afford the cost of a four-week conference in New York City. This may include online options for all side events and plenary events, and a process for expediting/supporting visa requests.
   a. The NPT States Parties should task the Secretariat with creating a recommendation report for how the NPT can be more inclusive and accessible, with a focus on online participation being meaningful, streamlined, and effective.

4. **Adding a plenary session dedicated to hearing from those impacted by nuclear weapons use**: This may encourage States Parties to include impacted persons in their national delegations. The NPT would benefit from closer collaboration with UNDRIP as a significant portion of impacted persons are Indigenous.

5. **Increase inclusion and collaborations with civil society**: Including them in national delegations, and promoting transparency on negotiations through online participation, open negotiation rooms, or daily briefings that include key documents and national positions.
   a. The NPT States Parties should task the Secretariat with reporting the involvement and contributions of civil society at this NPT RevCon to inform their participation at the next RevCon.

6. **The NPT should adopt and endorse the UN guidelines on gender inclusive language which is available for the 6 official UN languages.**