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BASIC

Exploring the United Kingdom's Nuclear Responsibilities

Report of the BASIC-ICCS Collective Introspection Roundtable held in London, 12 October 2021

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Introduction

What are the United Kingdom's (UK) responsibilities in relation to nuclear weapons? How are these 'nuclear responsibilities' implemented in current UK policies and practices? Are there opportunities for the UK to fulfil its nuclear responsibilities more effectively? Does the UK have nuclear responsibilities towards other nuclear-armed states? These are some of the questions that sparked a lively discussion amongst a diverse set of stakeholders within the UK nuclear policy community during a one-day structured dialogue held at the British Academy in London on 12 October 2021.

Based in Carlton House Terrace, the British Academy is the UK's home for the humanities and social sciences. Its purpose is to 'deepen understanding of people, societies, and cultures, enabling everyone to learn, progress and prosper.' It is in this spirit that the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security (ICCS) at the University of Birmingham invited members of the UK nuclear policy community, including officials from the UK Government's Counter-Proliferation and Arms Control Centre (CPACC), to a dialogue focussed on 'Articulating the United Kingdom's Nuclear Responsibilities.' The purpose of the dialogue was to introduce the UK nuclear policy community to the Nuclear Responsibilities Approach¹ as a new frame for thinking, talking and writing about nuclear weapons, and to catalyse a longer-term process of collectively considering and articulating

¹ Sebastian Brixey-Williams and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Nuclear Responsibilities: A New Approach for Thinking and Talking about Nuclear Weapons*, (London: The British American Security Information Council (BASIC, November 2020). <https://basicint.org/report-nuclear-responsibilities-a-new-approach-for-thinking-and-talking-about-nuclear-weapons/>

the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons policy through this lens at the national level. Specifically, the dialogue created an opportunity:

- To better understand and collectively articulate the UK Government's nuclear responsibilities;
- To explore opportunities to fulfil the UK Government's nuclear responsibilities in alternative, and potentially more effective ways, in state policies and practices;
- To begin a dialogue on the UK Government's responsibilities to other nuclear-armed states, in particular towards Russia and China;
- To consider opportunities to generate a dialogue on reciprocal responsibilities with other nuclear-armed states, as a means to reduce risk and potentially build trust.

The dialogue was structured as a 'Collective Introspection' meeting within the three-stage dialogue model offered under the Nuclear Responsibilities Approach and set out in the Nuclear Responsibilities Toolkit.² These are designed to stimulate and facilitate a respectful exchange of views about nuclear responsibilities within a diverse group, in order to contest normative ideas, build mutual understanding, and – wherever possible – shape consensus. This dialogue was the latest in a series of meetings hosted by the Programme on Nuclear Responsibilities, an initiative co-founded by BASIC and the ICCS, including two earlier meetings in London in October 2018 and January 2020.³

Held under the Chatham House Rule, the dialogue included fourteen participants composed of civil servants from the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and members of civil society including NGOs, think tanks, and academia.⁴ In addition, there were six facilitators from the BASIC-ICCS Programme on Nuclear Responsibilities, who ensured understanding of the Nuclear Responsibilities Approach among participants, promoted adherence to the principles of nuclear responsibilities dialogues as set out in the Toolkit, preserved respect between competing perspectives, and channelled the flow of discussion towards constructive outcomes.

This report outlines how the UK's nuclear policy community, to the extent that it is represented by the participants involved in the dialogue, conceives of the UK Government's nuclear responsibilities and how these translate into its policies and practices. This report highlights convergences and divergences of perspectives across participants, focusing in particular on the policy areas where the UK Government could work to fulfil its nuclear responsibilities in different, and perhaps more effective, ways.

The report is set out in three parts. Part 1 explains the dialogue's extensive methodology, outlining the activities undertaken by the participants at each stage. Part 2 focuses on the groups' discussions and debates, and outlines how the participants perceived the UK Government's responsibilities (and associated policies and practices) in relation to nuclear weapons. This section describes convergences and divergences of perspectives across the three groups, highlighting the policy areas identified by participants as priorities for the UK Government to fulfil its nuclear responsibilities in more effective ways. Part 3 describes the discussions held in plenary towards the end of the day, which focused on the UK Government's nuclear responsibilities to other nuclear-armed states, and on the ways in which the UK's nuclear policy community could be engaged in future nuclear responsibilities dialogues.

² Sebastian Brixey-Williams, Alice Spilman, and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *The Nuclear Responsibilities Toolkit: A Practical Guide for Thinking, Talking and Writing* (London: The British American Security Information Council (BASIC, August 2021). <https://basicint.org/the-nuclear-responsibilities-toolkit-a-practical-guide-for-thinking-talking-and-writing/>

³ Brixey-Williams and Wheeler, *Nuclear Responsibilities*.

⁴ BASIC-ICCS invited a diverse and inclusive group of participants to take part in the dialogue. However, despite repeated attempts to improve the inclusivity and diversity of the guest-list through several rounds of further invitations, the final attendance was nevertheless less diverse than we would have liked. In particular, with COVID-19 numbers starting to rise again in October 2021, many invitees responded that they did not feel comfortable meeting in-person, which directly impacted participation. We elected to press ahead with an in-person dialogue because it was clear to us that the methodology would work more effectively face-to-face, but in future we would intend to improve the diversity of the group.

1. Dialogue Methodology

The UK's Collective Introspection dialogue was structured around five sessions over the course of the day, the methodology for which was adapted from the model process set out in the Nuclear Responsibilities Toolkit.⁵

In preparation for the dialogue, facilitators had asked all participants to individually fill in the Responsibilities Framework (Annex A), which is set out in the Nuclear Responsibilities Toolkit.⁶ This exercise ensured that everybody had a good understanding of the Framework, and had explored their own perceptions of the UK Government's responsibilities before coming into a group discussion.

In the first three sessions of the dialogue, fourteen participants were split into three breakout groups composed of four or five participants and two facilitators, sitting at a round table. Each group was designed to be as diverse and inclusive as possible and evenly split between government and civil society representatives, to reflect a variety of perspectives over the UK Government's nuclear policy and stimulate thought-provoking and challenging discussions. For the last two sessions, the groups reconvened in plenary.

The three sessions held in breakout groups used the Responsibilities Framework to guide dialogue participants into a focused and structured discussion on the UK Government's nuclear responsibilities. Whereas the participants had explored these questions individually before the meeting, they were now invited to explore these questions collectively, and to try to identify their convergences and divergences.

Each session was structured around the key questions posed in the different boxes of the Responsibilities Framework. In session one participants focused on the first three boxes of the Framework, which ask the following questions:

- Who or what does the United Kingdom have nuclear responsibilities to? ('entities')
- What are the United Kingdom's nuclear responsibilities? ('responsibilities')
- Where do these nuclear responsibilities come from? ('sources')

To record their answers, the facilitators asked participants to quickly note down their answers on post-it notes of different colours, with each corresponding to a particular category (entities, responsibilities, and sources). In each group, participants put the post-it notes on a big sheet of paper in the middle of each table and were invited to organise and then reorganise them if they uncovered themes, categories, or clusters of elements. The round tables and relatively informal atmosphere meant that participants were often standing up and could move around the tables freely.

In session two, facilitators asked each group to order and structure the post-it notes in a grid-based system wherein the 'entities' post-its ran down the left-hand edge of a new piece of paper, and the responsibilities and sources ran from left to right, in line with the post-its they were associated with. Responsibilities and sources that were 'agreed' were put closer to the left-hand side of the paper, whereas those that were more 'contested' (i.e. there was disagreement within the group) were placed in the right-hand side of the page. This created a visual map of where there was convergence and divergence.

During the third and last breakout group session, facilitators focused on boxes four and six of the Framework, asking the groups the following questions:

- How, and to what extent, are the nuclear responsibilities that you have identified implemented in current UK Government policies and practices?

⁵ Brixey-Williams, Spilman, and Wheeler, *The Nuclear Responsibilities Toolkit*, p.43.

⁶ Brixey-Williams, Spilman, and Wheeler, *The Nuclear Responsibilities Toolkit*, pp.17-25.

- Are there opportunities for the United Kingdom to fulfil its nuclear responsibilities more effectively?

Facilitators asked participants in each group to note down the answers on post-it notes of two different colours, one for how the UK Government is fulfilling its responsibilities in existing policies and practices and the other for what the UK Government could do differently to fulfil its responsibilities in a more effective way. Participants put the post-it notes on the same piece of paper that they used in session 2, so that each policy/practice could be related to its corresponding responsibility. Facilitators then invited participants in each group to choose from specific policies and practices for discussion.

The annexed table (Annex B) is a summary of the frameworks that each group produced throughout the day using paper and post-it notes. As a result, the table reflects the structure of the Responsibilities Framework and is organised into four columns, each corresponding to four of the five questions asked by facilitators and illustrated above. Answers to the remaining question – where do the United Kingdom’s nuclear responsibilities come from? – are listed in a dedicated annex (Annex C). For the sake of accurately portraying the language that the participants themselves used, the table reports the exact content of participants’ post-it notes.

2. UK Nuclear Responsibilities, and their Related Policies and Practices

Crucial themes and issues emerged across all three groups throughout the dialogue, and in many cases the groups identified the same particular entities and discussed similar responsibilities, policies, and practices. The responses from the groups are given in full in the annexed summary table (Annex B).

All three groups identified 'the people,' 'the international community,' and 'allies' as entities to which the UK has responsibilities, although the wording sometimes differed or implied the existence of sub-categories. 'The people' was a broad category, but included the UK's population (not only its citizens but anybody living in the state), future generations, global civilians, as well as nuclear test victims and people affected by nuclear weapons production. The 'international community' included other states, which were sometimes broken down into Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), nuclear-armed states (NAS) not recognised under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), and states dealing with ongoing legacies of nuclear weapon activities. It also included more abstract entities such as international law. 'Allies' included both NATO allies (all member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and non-NATO allies and partners, although participants did not describe in detail what was meant by non-NATO allies and did not name any specific country.

These three entities are explored below. In relation to each, the groups discussed a wide range of UK responsibilities and their related policies and practices. For the sake of simplification, BASIC-ICCS have grouped these responsibilities into different broad categories, but it should be noticed that responsibilities are in reality much more intertwined.⁷

The People

Participants identified a number of specific responsibilities that followed from recognising 'the people' as a key entity to which the UK Government owes responsibilities to. BASIC-ICCS have grouped these responsibilities into two broader categories: i) the responsibility to protect the people and; ii) the responsibility to educate the public on nuclear policy issues.

The Responsibility to Protect the People

Annex B shows the specific responsibilities identified by participants in relation to the broad responsibility to protect the people. These include: i) 'keeping the population safe,' ii) 'protecting the environment,' iii) 'ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons,' iv) 'providing security against non-state actors,' v) 'ensuring the peaceful use and access to nuclear technologies,' vi) 'understanding and minimising non-nuclear convergent risks,' vii) 'avoiding proliferation risks,' viii) 'protecting the environment and,' ix) 'ensuring that nuclear weapons are not placed in outer space.' Some participants also included 'maintaining a credible minimum deterrent (CMD)' as one of these responsibilities, although for some participants who were more critical of the UK Government's reliance on a strategy of nuclear deterrence, this is best conceived as the current *policy* by which this responsibility is fulfilled, and it could, in principle, be fulfilled differently in the future.

Participants identified several policies that the UK is currently implementing to fulfil these responsibilities, such as: i) developing a robust command-and-control system; ii) ensuring transparency on readiness and capability; iii) maintaining Continuous At-Sea Deterrence (CASD), on the assumption that this is accepted as a responsibility and not a particular policy expression of that responsibility; iv) pursuing the Global

⁷ For example, many responsibilities, policies, and practices that fall under the category of a responsibility 'to act in good faith to promote an environment conducive to disarmament' could also be categorised as responsibilities 'to engage and reassure other states, including adversaries,' and vice-versa.

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GINCT) and; v) supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

There was a general perception across the three groups that there are some different policies that the UK Government could be developing and implementing to fulfil its generic responsibility to protect the people in a more effective way. Group 1 raised the issue of protecting those who had been impacted by nuclear weapons testing, and what more the UK Government could do to recompense the victims or mitigate these harms. However, it was pointed out that the UK Government feels almost no political pressure to address these issues, making the likelihood of action slim at present.

In Group 3, participants felt that the UK Government could take better care with its messaging and communications, and in particular, explain to relevant stakeholders its nuclear policy positions and postures. Several participants felt that the UK Government could have done more to explain and contextualise the increase in the warhead cap set out in the 2021 *Integrated Review* of UK security, defence, development and foreign policy.⁸

Officials in Group 3 explained that the security environment is not what the UK Government had hoped it would be by now and that previous caps on warheads reflected hopes for an improved environment. The *Integrated Review* claims that the decision to increase the warhead cap is a response to a general worsening of the security environment, with state threats to the UK and its allies rising as other 'states are becoming increasingly assertive in how they advance their own objectives and in their willingness to undermine ours.'⁹ However, officials were emphatic that in no way did the increase in the warhead cap mean that the UK Government was operating anything other than a 'minimum' deterrent.

In this context, one important omission in the group conversations, but which could be discussed in future conversations, is the question of what *else* the UK Government is doing (especially in terms of risk reduction policies) to respond to increasing security threats in the international system, other than maintaining a credible minimum deterrent capability in support of both national and alliance purposes. There remained uncertainty among the participants about what the UK is doing – and can do – to contribute to ameliorating a deleterious security environment. The UK Government could do more to communicate better to other actors in the international system what, if any, policies and actions it is pursuing in this regard.

Another important point raised by participants is that the UK Government could consider ways to fulfil its responsibility to protect the people by undertaking more contingency planning and forward thinking in the context of emerging and disruptive technologies. Participants in Group 2 and 3 suggested that this policy can be pursued by commissioning reports, funding initiatives, and sharing expertise with think tanks and other institutions and stakeholders to develop a deeper knowledge of emerging technologies and devise effective strategies to protect the population and the planet from the threats of disruptive technologies.

The Responsibility to Educate the Public on Nuclear Policy Issues

The generic responsibility to educate publics on nuclear policy issues includes sub-responsibilities related to ensuring inclusive policy-making and keeping civil society (as well as any other relevant stakeholders) informed about critical nuclear issues. These responsibilities are listed in detail in the summary table (Annex B).

The three groups identified several policies and practices that the UK is currently implementing to fulfil such responsibilities, such as: i) conducting intelligence assessment and integrated review reports to Parliament, and ministerial, parliamentary, and privy council briefings; ii) engaging with NGOs on policy development, and sponsoring the work of think tanks in the UK; iii) engaging with the next generation in

⁸ UK Government, *Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy*, Updated 2 July 2021. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy> (accessed 23 March 2022).

⁹ UK Government, *Global Britain in a Competitive Age*.

policy-making; and iv) focusing on public outreach through various channels, including social media. Conversations between government representatives and civil society representatives indicated that enhancing education on nuclear security issues has been a key priority for the UK Government over the past eighteen months as reflected in the above-mentioned policies, although some present wanted to know more about what that had looked like in practice.

Group 3 discussed in detail what more the UK Government could do to better fulfil these responsibilities. Some participants suggested that the UK Government could do more to ensure deeper engagement with a number of stakeholders and communicate more effectively with civil society. In particular, as described in Table 4, it was suggested that the UK Government could allocate more resources to outsource ideas and develop new initiatives with different NGOs and ensure that such partners are more systematically informed about and involved in policy-making. This includes providing longer-term funding to think tanks and research projects that would allow more stability for those NGOs and greater networking and impact opportunities. Moreover, the Government could develop more effective strategies to communicate with civil society about what the government is doing in this regard. This includes being more transparent and vocal about its inclusive policy-making and partnerships with NGOs, and taking more initiatives to engage the wider public in strategic conversations.

The International Community

Participants identified a number of specific responsibilities that followed from recognising ‘the international community’ as a key entity to which the UK Government owes responsibilities to. BASIC-ICCS have grouped these responsibilities into three broad categories: i) the responsibility to protect the international community from the dangers of armed conflict; ii) the responsibility to act in good faith to promote an environment conducive to disarmament; and iii) the responsibility to engage and reassure other states, including adversaries.

i. The Responsibility to Protect the International Community from the Dangers of Armed Conflict

This responsibility encompasses the following sub-responsibilities identified by participants: i) ‘maintain international peace and security’; ii) ‘reduce the risks of conflict’; iii) ‘prevent’ and ‘counter’ nuclear proliferation; iv) ‘take collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace’ and; v) ‘offer UK technical and diplomatic skills capacity for international nuclear management’.

As shown in Annex B, the three groups point out that the UK Government is currently seeking to fulfil these responsibilities by devising risk reduction policies, supporting existing export control regimes, and promoting existing treaties and institutions such as the NPT and the IAEA.

Civil society and academic representatives in Group 2 discussed whether the UK Government has a ‘responsibility to *counter* proliferation,’ and expressed disagreement over whether the responsibility to *counter* proliferation is different from the responsibility to *prevent* proliferation. Some participants argued that counter-proliferation implies a more ‘active engagement’ and role for the United Kingdom in the international system. However, there was concern expressed by others that the use of the word ‘counter’ could be interpreted as threatening by other actors in the international system, and not everyone agreed that counter proliferation is a nuclear responsibility of the UK Government.

Group 2 and 3 felt that the UK Government could do more to fulfil its responsibility to protect the international community from the dangers of armed conflict by developing new risk reduction policies. However, there was no substantive discussion about such policies; participants felt that opportunities to promote new risk reduction policies and practices, such as setting up and sponsoring a sustained multilateral forum on nuclear risk reduction, should be further explored. Moreover, it was noted by some participants (but contested by others) in Group 1 that the UK Government could allocate an increased spend and leverage of resources to support the implementation and enforcement of sanctions against parties in non-compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. Adopted under

Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the resolution is not only legally binding but also potentially enforceable, therefore requiring states to take all necessary steps to prevent the spread and trafficking of materials that could be used to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).¹⁰

ii. The Responsibility to Act in Good Faith to Promote an Environment Conducive to Disarmament

Participants felt that although the UK Government has a general responsibility to UK citizens and all other states in the international system to work towards disarmament, it is particularly responsible for disarmament towards NPT states parties, whether Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) or Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). This also related to the UK Government's responsibility to fulfil treaty commitments.

The specific responsibilities identified by participants here included: i) 'to pursue negotiations in good faith towards disarmament (Article VI of the NPT),' ii) 'fulfil treaty commitments,' iii) 'support and facilitate a conference to achieve a Middle East WMD-free Zone (MEWMDFZ),' iv) 'exercise restraint,' v) 'minimise deterrence,' vi) 'maintain export controls,' vii) 'reinforce the taboo that erodes the value of nuclear weapons,' viii) 'to create an environment for disarmament' and; ix) 'not to use or transfer nuclear weapons to other states'.

The summary table (Annex B) outlines the range of policies that, according to participants, the UK Government is currently implementing to fulfil its responsibilities related to nuclear disarmament. This comprises policies related to limiting the UK's own nuclear capabilities by only operating a minimum nuclear deterrent posture (CMD) and minimising the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy. It also includes policies in support of international disarmament efforts, such as supporting the implementation of treaties like the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), signing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) protocols, supporting the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and being part of initiatives such as Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND).

Regrettably however, as Annex B illustrates, the groups were unable to identify many specific policies that the UK Government could implement to fulfil its responsibilities related to disarmament in a more effective way. Only some general ideas were discussed, such as the UK Government allocating more resources towards 'blue skies thinking,' 'disarmament education,' and 'roadmapping of options and pathways towards disarmament'.

iii. The Responsibility to Engage and Reassure Other States, Including Adversaries

BASIC-ICCS have interpreted the 'responsibility to engage and reassure other states' as a group of specific responsibilities related to the way in which the UK government interacts with other actors, including adversaries, in the global nuclear order.

The three groups identified a number of specific responsibilities that can be related to this group, such as: i) 'to engage with, and to listen to, the views of other actors where this is constructive,' ii) 'to engage with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and/or its adherents,' iii) 'to avoid boxing in an adversary,' iv) 'to constructively engage with processes to address legacies, avoid accidental wars, and promote nuclear risk reduction,' v) 'to be as clear and transparent as possible,' vi) 'to build trust and demonstrate sincerity,' vii) 'to be aware of positions that could constrain future commitments,' viii) 'to reflect seriously on consequences of words and deeds,' (ix) 'to understand other states' nuclear responsibilities,' x) 'to encourage all NAS to explain themselves,' xi) 'to encourage best practice in diplomacy among nuclear armed states,' xii) 'to regulate nuclear armaments' and; xiii) 'to prevent misunderstandings'.

¹⁰ Peter Crail, 'Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Risk Based Approach', *Nonproliferation Review*, 13, no. 2 (2006): 355-99, p. 357. Doi: 10.1080/10736700601012193. Retrieved from: https://www.vertic.org/media/assets/nim_docs/background%20articles/Crail_risk-based%20assessment_1540.pdf

There was contestation within Group 1 as to whether the UK Government has a responsibility to engage with, and to listen to the views of other actors in the international system. It was raised by some participants that the benefits of engagement should be weighed against its costs, which may vary according to the different actors with whom the UK Government engages. Therefore, some in the group claimed there is no such thing as the UK's overarching 'responsibility to engage.'

Group 2 contested whether the UK Government has a responsibility to engage with the TPNW and/or its adherents. The group concurred that this is an area for further discussion, especially as regards the type of engagement. It was noted that, perhaps, there should be a responsibility for the UK Government to engage with TPNW State Parties, but there are many different ways and levels of engagement available here. One government representative made a distinction between engaging with the TPNW as a Treaty process and engaging in bilateral or multilateral negotiations with individual members of the TPNW.

As shown in Annex B, the policies and practices discussed by the groups in relation to what the UK Government is currently doing to fulfil these responsibilities were mostly related to i) offering negative security assurances (NSA) and; ii) engaging with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5), and in particular with 'the P5 process'.¹¹

It was mentioned that the UK Government offers negative security assurances (NSAs) to NNWS – a policy that, as suggested by some participants, the UK could implement more effectively by tightening some of its NSA exceptions. The UK issued its NSAs to NNWS parties to the NPT in 1978 and then again in 1995, with the exception of 'the case of an invasion or any other attack on the UK, its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State'.¹²

Moreover, the UK maintained strategic ambiguity as to whether it would use nuclear weapons in response to the use or development of chemical or biological weapons that posed a threat to UK territory or its vital interests. The 2015 *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review* states that 'the UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any Non-Nuclear Weapons State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This assurance does not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations. While there is currently no direct threat to the UK or its vital interests from states developing weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, we reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat, development or proliferation of these weapons make it necessary.'¹³

On the P5 process, participants stressed that the UK Government initiated what has become the process in 2009 in relation to nuclear issues and is currently taking a leading role in promoting a conversation on nuclear doctrines across the five countries.

When discussing the policies and practices that the UK Government could develop to better fulfil the responsibility to engage and reassure, the groups discussed the possibility for the UK Government to actively promote within the P5 the issuing of a statement that reaffirms the Reagan-Gorbachev statement from their November 1985 Geneva summit that 'a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.'¹⁴

¹¹ The P5 process is a forum to 'demonstrate the NWS's commitment to their NPT obligations, facilitate confidence-building between them and lay the groundwork for progress on disarmament'. See Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS), King's College London, and the European Leadership Network (ELN), *The P5 Process: Opportunities for Success in the NPR Review Conference*, CSSS (June 2020). <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/csss/assets/the-p5-process-opportunities-for-success-in-the-npt-review-conference.pdf> (accessed 23 March 2022).

¹² Select Committee on Defence, UK Parliament, *Memorandum from the International Security Information Service (ISIS)*, 18 December 2006. <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/225/225we09.htm> (accessed 23 March 2022).

¹³ HM Government, *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015*, Chapter 4, para. 4.69, November 2015.

¹⁴ It should be noted that following this dialogue, the P5 issued a joint statement that 'a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.' See The White House, *Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing*

The statement, or some equally compelling commitment, could be endorsed by the five NPT NWS to avoid the use of nuclear weapons in the context of a multipolar world order in which the risk of use of nuclear weapons among the great powers cannot be ruled out. Participants noted that the P5 could lead the way and promote the adoption of the principle at the upcoming 2020 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.

One participant asked what the significance of the P5 issuing such a statement would be while another questioned how far Russia and China were being sincere in their public advocacy of the Reagan-Gorbachev statement. It was also suggested that an important factor hampering discussions is the prolonged global COVID-19 pandemic, which has resulted in a lack of face-to-face meetings in the last couple of years, coupled with the reluctance of some members of the P5 to meet virtually. Nevertheless, Group 1 expressed the belief that the UK Government could do more to improve talks with Russia and China at various levels, promoting better military-to-military cooperation and encouraging arms control initiatives and missile transparency.¹⁵

It was agreed that maintaining a dialogue with China is a responsibility and a priority. However, engagement with China entails a complex and intricate process in understanding how Chinese history, strategic culture and national identity guide their intentions and future plans, including nuclear modernisation. One participant suggested that the UK Government should continue to engage with China in the P5 process by showing 'responsible' behaviour (for example, by being transparent) hoping that China will follow suit.

Continuing the conversation around the policies and practices that the UK Government could develop to better fulfil the responsibility to engage and reassure, all the three groups noted that the UK Government should bolster efforts to 'better balance policies of transparency and ambiguity to make sure not to threaten other actors in the international system.' However, participants expressed different perspectives over transparency policies. While Group 3 briefly touched upon the need for the UK Government to foster a conversation on transparency on nuclear doctrines at the P5 level, some participants in Group 1 questioned whether the UK Government has a responsibility to be transparent at all. They noted that although the UK Government maintains a responsibility to be transparent to foster international engagement, transparency should be limited to maintain a certain level of ambiguity that would serve deterrence purposes and contribute to protecting the UK's security.

On the other hand, both government and civil society representatives in Group 2 agreed that transparency is both a responsibility of the UK Government and a policy area where the UK Government could do more. It was emphasised that the UK takes its policy of transparency very seriously and one participant noted that the UK is 'the most transparent of all the nuclear possessor states.' Nevertheless, it was noted that the country's current policies related to transparency lack a clear direction, a clear narrative, and a clear reason as to why transparency is important. Questions such as: 'who benefits from transparency?', or 'why is transparency so important?' should guide and orient future UK's nuclear policy-making strategies.

Identifying the beneficiaries of policies of transparency would also help to target messaging. Participants agreed that signalling transparency can help build trust and demonstrate sincerity towards other states in the international system. However, it was also noted that transparency should be limited 'up to a certain point' beyond which it can have negative consequences for the United Kingdom's own security. Too much transparency, it was claimed, can undermine security, thus a policy of transparency should be necessarily balanced against a policy of maintaining credible minimum deterrence.

Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races (3 January 2022). <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races/> (accessed 23 March 2022).

¹⁵ This dialogue was held months before the Ukraine crisis erupted. In the context of the current crisis, the measures discussed at the dialogue in relation to risk reduction remain of paramount importance and this conversation could be continued in further Collective Introspection meetings.

Allies

Although participants mentioned that the category of ‘allies’ included both NATO allies and non-NATO allies and partners, the latter entity was not discussed in any detail, and participants only focused on specific responsibilities that followed from recognising ‘NATO allies’ as a key entity to which the UK Government has nuclear responsibilities.

BASIC-ICCS have grouped these responsibilities into one broad category in Annex B: the ‘responsibility to protect allies’. This includes specific responsibilities that were proposed such as: i) the responsibility to provide a deterrent for NATO allies, ii) the responsibility to maintain collective defence, iii) the responsibility to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members (NATO) by political and military means, iv) the responsibility to demonstrate normative and political leadership and; v) to protect allies through the NATO umbrella.

However, there was strong disagreement on some of these responsibilities within the groups, along the familiar deterrence-disarmament lines. Participants in Group 1 framed this as a conflict between the UK Government’s ‘responsibility to protect allies through the NATO nuclear umbrella’ and its ‘responsibility not to use nuclear weapons’ since the former necessarily implies a willingness to use nuclear weapons.

Beside this short debate, participants did not further elaborate upon this group of responsibilities and didn’t discuss in detail the specific policies and practices through which the responsibility to protect allies could be better fulfilled. Moreover, participants did not ultimately touch upon the responsibilities that the UK Government has in relation to non-NATO partners (for example, Japan and India), nor to European Union (EU) countries that are not NATO members, or those that lie outside of both, such as Ukraine. This indicates an important omission in group conversations that could be discussed in future dialogues. Such themes are of prominent importance, especially in the light of the recent provision of military support – in the form of weapons and ammunition – to Ukraine on the part of some NATO countries (including the UK) to counter Russia’s invasion on the ground.¹⁶ This highlighted that the UK Government might have responsibilities in relation to non-NATO partners which are grounded in a moral imperative to deter aggression.

¹⁶ Simone Papale and Chiara Cervasio, ‘Ukraine, Remote Interventionism, and the Stability-Instability Paradox: the Need to Re-prioritise Nuclear Risk Reduction’, *BASIC*, 8 March 2022. <https://basicint.org/ukraine-remote-interventionism-and-the-stability-instability-paradox-the-need-to-re-prioritise-nuclear-risk-reduction/> (accessed 31 March 2022).

3. The UK's Responsibilities to Other Nuclear-Armed States

In the final two plenary sessions at the end of the day, participants discussed the UK Government's nuclear responsibilities to other nuclear-armed states. Participants also discussed ways in which the UK Government could further nuclear responsibilities dialogues across the international milieu. The discussion explored the following questions:

- What are the UK Government's nuclear responsibilities to other nuclear-armed states, and in particular to Russia and China?
- How can we better engage nuclear-armed states in nuclear responsibilities dialogues?
- What role could the P5 process play in promoting a dialogue on nuclear responsibilities as a means to reducing distrust and nuclear risks?
- How could a dialogue on nuclear responsibilities promote cooperation between NWS and nuclear-armed states outside the NPT?

The group pushed the limits of the conversation about UK responsibilities to the other nuclear-armed states. One individual posed the question as to whether the UK Government has responsibilities to Russia and China that are distinct from the other nuclear-armed states, which created some pause for thought among the group and would be worthy of further consideration. The same individual later asked whether the UK Government had any responsibilities to the DPRK, which remained unresolved.

The Imperative of Peace and Security

The first set of responsibilities that the plenary discussed was based on the obligations incurred by the UK Government as a result of its membership of the UN. It was pointed out that the UN Charter, especially Article 24, confers on the UK Government as a permanent member of the Security Council the 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security'.¹⁷ This requires the promotion and sustainment of collective measures to resolve international disputes, especially where nuclear-armed states are involved. One participant argued that, just as in a nuclear reactor, the nuclear-armed states needed to have agreed 'control rods' that could be lowered into any escalating conflict that could cool tensions.

Participants discussed whether the UK Government has a responsibility to defuse any tensions between nuclear-armed states, and to find ways to redefine the security relationship between the West and Russia. One participant felt that international law, such as the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, placed a clear responsibility on the UK Government to promote the non-use of nuclear weapons. Another participant put forward the belief that the UK Government has a responsibility to identify dangerous situations and share its technical knowledge and expertise because it has had the 'luxury' to develop knowledge in these domains, such as nuclear testing before the test ban. This underscores the belief that as a NWS and early signatory of the NPT, the UK Government bears a special responsibility in this respect.

The P5 Process

During plenary, participants discussed several responsibilities that the UK Government has within the P5 process, which included a responsibility to maintain and promote adherence to CMD across all five countries, promote an exchange around nuclear doctrines to increase mutual understanding and reduce the risk of miscalculations, and ensure improved nuclear risk management. For some, these

¹⁷ Codification Division Publications, *Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Charter of The United Nations*, Chapter V – The Security Council, Article 24. <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art24.shtml> (accessed 31 March 2022).

responsibilities emerge from the practice of nuclear deterrence itself, following the logic that ‘when we target someone, we have responsibilities to them.’

Some felt that, in the past few years, Chinese and Russian nuclear modernisations and postures have put nuclear security issues at the heart of international politics, thereby pressing the UK Government to find ways to engage in new nuclear diplomacy with the two countries. Similarly, one participant felt that the UK Government has a responsibility towards its population to avoid taking a confrontational stance (especially towards China and Russia), and to refrain from making nuclear threats, as well as to never to engage in a fighting war. Another pushed back on this last point, but expressed a strong belief that any nuclear weapons use should be firmly grounded in the Law of Armed Conflict.

The Importance of Mutual Understanding

A portion of time of the plenary was devoted to the idea that in a post-Cold War multipolar world order, the UK Government might have a responsibility to rethink and re-adapt the ideas of ‘deterrence’ and ‘nuclear risk,’ and to re-design the international order to better manage the risks of nuclear conflict. This, as some participants suggested, might imply a responsibility to engage in dialogue and better communicate with adversaries to understand their conceptions of nuclear risks and deterrence.

This discussion also raised more fundamental questions about what we know and don’t know about nuclear weapons. One participant, referencing the lack of empirical evidence behind nuclear deterrence theory, made a clear pitch that the UK Government (and indeed all states) have a ‘responsibility to respect the limits of our knowledge claims about what we know about nuclear deterrence and what we claim to know about what risk is.’

Participants also questioned whether the UK Government has a responsibility to engage in dialogue to understand the intentions of other states in the international system and recognise the latter’s interests as ‘legitimate’ where this is appropriate. However, participants stressed that this doesn’t mean that the UK Government should engage in appeasement strategies, because some states can have malign intentions and it can be dangerous to accommodate their interests. It is important to recognise the opportunities for dialogue and not to force them, as taking a ‘leap in the dark’¹⁸ can sometimes be too great a risk.

The Value of Nuclear Responsibilities Dialogues

At the end of the plenary, participants discussed ways that the UK Government could incentivise opportunities for nuclear responsibilities dialogues across the international community as a means to help nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states better understand their own and others’ policies and to address a shared concern over growing mistrust and nuclear risks.

For states that have not yet engaged with the Nuclear Responsibilities Approach, one participant argued, getting involved would be a ‘leap of faith’ and therefore the question that needs to be asked is: ‘what’s in it for them?’. Several answers were put forward on this point. First, nuclear responsibilities dialogues could be a tool for collectively brainstorming and mapping areas of movement within the NPT or beyond it. Second, nuclear responsibilities dialogue could be used as the basis of nuclear staff talks between allies, such as in NATO. Third, it might be possible to integrate nuclear responsibilities dialogue into new or existing track 2 or military-military talks. Finally, it can be seen as an opportunity to bridge the NWS-NNWS divide, as it has in earlier rounds of the BASIC-ICCS Programme on Nuclear Responsibilities.¹⁹ Indeed,

¹⁸ A ‘leap in the dark’ has been defined in the literature as leaders choosing to send a bold and dramatic signal of their peaceful intentions towards an adversary in a context where they risk being ‘rebuffed, exposed and betrayed’. See Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.234.

¹⁹ These are described in detail in Brixey-Williams and Wheeler, *Nuclear Responsibilities*, pp. 39-50. See also Sebastian Brixey-Williams, *Common but Differentiated Nuclear Responsibilities: Perspectives from Tokyo* (London: BASIC, 2019); Sebastian Brixey-Williams, *Differentiated Nuclear Responsibilities among Non-Nuclear Possessor States: Perspectives from the Hague* (London: BASIC and ICCS, 2020); Sebastian Brixey-Williams, *Nuclear Responsibilities in an Interconnected World: Perspectives from Kuala Lumpur* (London: BASIC and ICCS, 2019); Alice Spilman, *Nuclear Responsibilities in the Global Nuclear Order: Perspectives from São Paulo*, (London: BASIC and ICCS, 2020).

some participants suggested that including non-nuclear armed states in such dialogues might also incentivise more engagement from members of the P5.

Participants noted that the UK Government could further incentivise nuclear responsibilities dialogues by stressing the need to build collectively a new international nuclear order and re-shape nuclear institutions. Conversations focused around nuclear responsibilities could lead states to critically re-think the existing global norms and rules around nuclear issues and re-shape collectively new norms that are more reflective of new threats, such as those related to emerging technologies and changing power relations within the emerging multipolar global nuclear order.

Conclusions

The UK Collective Introspection dialogue brought government and civil society representatives together in a structured and facilitated in-person dialogue on the UK's nuclear responsibilities. While there are limits to what can be achieved over the course of one day, the dialogue was a crucial first step towards developing a comprehensive, inclusive, and hopefully continuous conversation amongst members of the UK nuclear policy community over the country's nuclear responsibilities and their related policy and practices.

Responsibilities are not set in stone. The changing nature of the domestic political context, as well as of the global nuclear security environment, makes it compelling for the UK nuclear policy community to have an ongoing discussion around the UK's nuclear responsibilities. The nuclear policy community is intrinsically dynamic and diverse in nature and it is a responsibility of the UK Government to ensure that officials are exposed to as wide a range of these perspectives as possible, including the next generation voices. As part of achieving this, civil society voices should be regularly consulted by government officials through as inclusive a range of channels as possible. Critical perspectives on nuclear responsibilities such as the ones that scholars, researchers, and NGO representatives provide can open up space for constructive conversations that may lead to changes in official thinking, leading potentially to new policies and practices that better fulfil some of the responsibilities identified in this report. It is just this critical thinking role for civil society that is envisaged in the Collective Introspection part of the third-party facilitated dialogical approach set out in the *Nuclear Responsibilities Toolkit*.

The Collective Introspection dialogue highlighted five crucial themes and policy areas that could orient the UK's Government nuclear policy-making, as well as future Collective Introspection dialogues.

First, there remained uncertainty among the participants about what the UK is doing – and can do – to contribute to ameliorating a deleterious security environment. Those in opposition to the UK's Trident system argued for disarmament, while those in support argued for maintaining a credible minimum deterrent capability in support of both national and alliance purposes. Across the board, it was felt that the UK Government could do more to respond to increasing security threats in the international system and fulfil the 'responsibility to protect the people' by prioritising the implementation of risk reduction measures. In particular, the UK Government could better signal to relevant stakeholders its nuclear policy positions and postures and advance multilateral conversations around nuclear transparency.

Second, participants identified many responsibilities that could fall under the 'responsibility to act in good faith to promote an environment conducive to disarmament,' but no corresponding policies and practices that the UK Government could implement to fulfil this responsibility in a different – and more effective – way. Given that this is one of the UK's core nuclear responsibilities, as it was identified across all three groups, the UK nuclear policy community should think more thoroughly about concrete policies and practices to fulfil this responsibility more effectively.

Moreover, one important omission in the group conversations, which could be discussed in future conversations, is the question of how the UK's policies and practices could address potential conflicts of responsibilities, such as those emerging between the responsibility to disarm and the responsibility to protect the people or NATO allies. For example, there was some contestation in Group 1 as to whether the UK Government has a responsibility not to use nuclear weapons – which, according to some participants,

fell under the general responsibility to act in good faith to promote an environment conducive to disarmament as outlined in Annex B. It was noted that this responsibility contradicts the *practice* of nuclear deterrence and the responsibility to protect allies through the NATO nuclear umbrella, which both imply a willingness to use nuclear weapons.

This point was raised against the backdrop of a broader discussion on the inherent tensions between the responsibility to disarm and the responsibility to provide for the security of the UK's population. The group questioned whether the UK Government has a responsibility to create an environment conducive to disarmament, but also balance this with the need to avoid taking steps that would expose the UK's own security to excessive risk in the event that disarmament expectations proved wrong. In this context, there was a lack of agreement and substantive discussion across the three groups as to which policies and practices would enable the UK Government to reconcile its responsibility to protect its population with its responsibility to disarm.

Third, conversations identified a lack of consensus around ways to fulfil the responsibility 'to engage with, and to listen to, the views of other actors where this is constructive' and 'to engage with the TPNW and/or its adherents'. As a result, participants did not delve into much discussion around how to formulate corresponding coherent policies and practices. The distinction between engaging with the TPNW as a treaty versus engaging with individual state parties to the TPNW may offer a way through this in the short term.

Fourth, the UK Government needs a more coherent policy around nuclear transparency. The Government should search for more agreement on the extent to which transparency is a nuclear responsibility for the UK, as the three groups showed different perspectives about the issue. Moreover, it was highlighted that the UK's current policies related to transparency lack a clear direction, a clear narrative, and a clear reason as to why transparency is important.

Finally, the UK Government should think about how its responsibilities to other nuclear-armed states are (or could be better) fulfilled in policies and practices. The plenary discussion was stimulating and participants managed to reflect, for the first time collectively and including government and civil society representatives, upon some of the UK Government's broad responsibilities to other nuclear armed states in the international system. However, there was a feeling that discussions could have been more structured and more focused around which responsibilities should be prioritised, how they are being fulfilled in current policies and practices, and what could be done to more effectively fulfil these responsibilities in the future.

A continuation of these discussions both inside and outside Whitehall could invite the UK nuclear policy community to think more thoroughly about these identified issues, and to evaluate concrete policies and practices that might more effectively fulfil the responsibilities outlined in this report. BASIC and the ICCS remain committed to ensuring that meaningful conversations on nuclear issues centred on mutual understanding can shape and orient future nuclear policies and practices, with the aim of reducing global nuclear risks and building a more secure world.

Author

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Annex B: The United Kingdom's Responsibilities, Policies and Practices (Synthesised Summary Table of Groups 1-3's Proposals)

1. Entities Who or what does the United Kingdom have nuclear responsibilities to?	2. Responsibilities What are the United Kingdom's nuclear responsibilities?	3. Current Policies and Practices How, and to what extent, are the nuclear responsibilities that you have identified implemented in current UK Government policies and practices?	4. Future Policies and Practices Are there opportunities for the United Kingdom to fulfil its nuclear responsibilities more effectively?
The People <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UK's population Future generations Global civilians Nuclear test victims People living next to nuclear materials 	Responsibility to protect the people <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To keep the population safe and protect the security of the state. To maintain minimum credible deterrence. To provide security against non-state actors. To ensure the safety and security of nuclear weapons. To ensure the peaceful use and access to nuclear technologies. To understand and minimise non-nuclear convergent risks. To avoid proliferation risks. To protect the environment. To ensure nuclear weapons are not placed in outer space. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop robust command and control system Ensure transparency on readiness and capability Continuous At-Sea Deterrence Global Initiative to combat Nuclear Terrorism (GINCT) Support the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Better messaging, communication, and explanation on the UK's nuclear policy positions Explain and contextualise the increase in warheads cap Develop a smarter UN strategy Accept the validity of the TNPW More contingency planning and forward thinking in the context of emerging technologies De-alert and de-arm UK nuclear weapons. *
	Responsibility to educate on nuclear policy issues		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● To draw all stakeholders into an informed discussion of critical issues. ● To ensure inclusive policy-making. ● To educate on nuclear policy issues. ● To offer relevant assistance/information. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Intelligence Assessment and Integrated Review reports to Parliament ● Ministerial, parliamentary, and privy council briefings ● Engage with NGOs on policy development ● Think tank sponsoring ● Next generation engagement ● Public outreach e.g. social media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Allocate more money to outsource ideas and develop new initiatives through think tanks ● Better engage wider public in strategic conversation ● Provide longer term funding to think tanks for more stability and better pipeline
<p>The International Community</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● International law ● Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) ● Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) ● States dealing with ongoing legacies of nuclear weapons activities ● Neighbouring states ● States in specific geographic regions ● Nuclear armed states ● NPT state parties 	<p>Responsibility to protect the international community from the dangers of armed conflicts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● To maintain international peace and security. ● To reduce the risks of conflict. ● To prevent and counter nuclear proliferation. * ● To take collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace. ● To offer UK technical and diplomatic skills capacity for international nuclear management. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Risk reduction policies ● Support the IAEA ● Support the NPT ● Export control regimes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Enforce sanctions. * ● Do more on UNSCR 1540. * ● Further research on risk reduction ● Set up sustained risk reduction forum
	<p>Responsibility to to act in good faith to promote an environment conducive to disarmament</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● To pursue negotiation in good faith towards disarmament (Article VI). ● To fulfil treaty commitments. ● To support and facilitate a conference on the Middle East WMD-free Zone (ME WMDFFZ). ● To exercise restraint. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Maintain a Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD) ● Maintain a cap on warhead numbers ● Calling for CTBT entry into force ● Pushing for Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) ● Engaging civil society on disarmament pathways ● Sign NWFZ protocols 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Further create the conditions for multilateral disarmament ● Better support for disarmament education ● Fund more blue sky thinking/road mapping of options towards disarmament

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● To minimise deterrence. ● Not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. ● To maintain export controls. ● To increase taboos that will erode the value of nuclear weapons to create an environment for disarmament. ● Not to use nuclear weapons. * 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) ● Supporting nuclear non-proliferation (especially Iran + DPRK) ● Minimise role of nuclear weapons in security strategy ● Thinking on verification ● Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) 	
	<p>Responsibility to engage and reassure other states, including adversaries</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● To engage with, and to listen to, the views of other actors where this is constructive. * ● To engage with the TPNW and/or its adherents. * ● To avoid boxing in an adversary. ● To constructively engage with processes to address legacies, avoid accidental wars, and promote nuclear risk reduction. ● To be as clear and transparent as possible. * ● To build trust and demonstrate sincerity. ● To be aware of positions that could constrain future commitments. ● To reflect seriously on consequences of words and deeds. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Give Negative Security Assurances (NSA) ● Play a leadership role in the P5 process. ● Promote P5 discussions on doctrine, including through the NPT process ● UK National report ● Recognise value and importance of common understanding in the P5 ● Engaging with China via the P5 Process: Transparency + Norms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Reconsider some Negative Security Assurances (NSA) exceptions ● Promote the Reagan-Gorbachev statement within the P5 ● Create better military-military channels with Russia ● Press China on DPRK, arms control, missile transparency. * ● Encourage other P5 members to invest in communications around nuclear issues ● Conventional Arms Control ● Be ready to engage in further arms control negotiations (i.e. delivery systems) ● More transparency on doctrines ● Identify the aims, objectives, and beneficiaries of the UK's policy of nuclear transparency. ● Take care with messaging/target messaging to signal nuclear transparency and build trust ● Engage more with China, India, and Pakistan ● Accept the validity of the TPNW. *

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To understand other states' nuclear responsibilities. • To encourage all NAS to explain themselves. • To encourage best practice in nuclear diplomacy among nuclear armed states. • To regulate nuclear armaments. • To prevent misunderstandings. 		
<p>Allies</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO allies • Non-NATO allies and partners 	<p>Responsibility to protect allies</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To provide a deterrent for NATO allies. • To protect allies through the NATO umbrella. * • To maintain collective defence. • To safeguard the freedom and security of all its members (NATO) by political and military means. • To demonstrate normative and political leadership. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Credible nuclear deterrent 	

* Yellow = Contested

Note: This table is a summary of the frameworks that each group produced throughout the day using paper and post-it notes. As a result, the table reflects the structure of the Responsibilities Framework and is organised into four columns, each corresponding to four of the five questions asked by facilitators and illustrated above. Answers to the remaining question – where do the United Kingdom's nuclear responsibilities come from? – are listed in the following annex (Annex C). For the sake of accurately portraying the language that the participants themselves used, the table report the exact content of participants' post-it notes.

Annex C: Where do the United Kingdom's Nuclear Responsibilities Come From? (Summary Table of Groups 1-3's Proposals)

This table is a summary of the answers that each groups gave to the question: 'Where do the United Kingdom's nuclear responsibilities come from?'. For the sake of accurately portraying the language that the participants themselves used, the table reports the exact content of participants' post-it notes.

SOURCES		
Where do the UK's responsibilities come from?		
Group 1	Group 2	Group 3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Various NWFZ Protocols and Treaties • Environmental law • Laws and customs, such as the jus in bello or the International Humanitarian Law • The North Atlantic Treaty • Moral and religious belief • Morality (relativity) • Moral responsibility to reduce or remove nuclear risks • Moral and humanitarian principles • Public opinion • UK Public Opinion (democracy) • Principle of survival • International social norms including taboos and values • Self-preservation • Self interest • Stop adversaries and preserve democracies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The UK-Norway Initiative • The NPT • The International Law obligations • The Outer Space Treaty • The North Atlantic Treaty • The UK government • The UK political manifesto • The UK parliament • Ethics/moral principles • Public accountability • The survival imperative • The social contract • The quest for justice and legitimacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The UN Charter • The NPT • Outer Space Treaty • Various NWFZ treaties • Health and Safety Law • Environmental Law • North Atlantic Treaty • International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism • Civil Nuclear Regulations e.g. IAEA • UK Nuclear Directive • RN Operating Regulations • International norms e.g. around nuclear testing • Precedent • Manifesto • National sense of conscience • Money • The UK's unwritten constitution - i.e. current practice • UK, 'Western' and humanitarian concerns

- Effective deterrence and avoidance of conflict
- Human condition