SELECTED KEY DOCUMENTS FROM UK STATE PAPERS ON THE NEGOTIATION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: 1967
CABINET

COMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS

International safeguards in a non-proliferation treaty

Note by the Secretaries

A copy of a letter dated 12 December, 1966 from Mr. Street of the Foreign Office to the Chairman, is attached for information. The draft Speaking Notes which are covered by the letter have been somewhat amended to take account of detailed comments by the Ministry of Technology and the Atomic Energy Authority.

(Signed) W.S. Allen
H. Davis
W.D. Glegg

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
2 January, 1967
At a recent meeting of your Committee I undertook to prepare a Foreign Office paper on the basis of an approach to the Americans to convey our reply to their July proposals about safeguards in a non-proliferation treaty.

2. You have since heard that the Russians have told the Americans that they are prepared to see a reference to safeguards in the treaty provided that it does not involve the nuclear states. This declaration would simplify things for us, since if it was accepted by the Americans there would be no need to convince them of our own difficulties or to press for the adoption of alternatives.

3. On the other hand I think it would be a mistake to decide that because of the Russian refusal we can not only refuse to accept the American proposals for transfer safeguards without discussing alternatives. It is not by any means certain that the Americans will, as a result of the Russian reaction, still think of anything that we may say, give up the attempt to get some sort ofqualified agreement from the nuclear states written into the treaty. I think their most likely response will be to continue to try to persuade the Americans that transfer safeguards would have very little effect on them, and possibly to underline this by amending their proposals to exclude transfers of irradiated material for processing in the nuclear states.

4. It therefore still seems important for us to get our suggested alternatives to the Americans as soon as possible. We could rule out any hopes of persuading them to pay any attention to our ideas once they had reached agreement with the Russians.

5. Moreover, from the political point of view, the Americans would undoubtedly interpret a blunt refusal from us, at this moment, as an attempt to hide behind the Russians. We only know of the Russian reaction because the Americans have told us of it, and we are the only third country which is being kept informed. The preservation of American confidence is important to us over the whole range of subjects which are being discussed. Even from the strict safeguards point of view the American reaction to a rejection without alternatives would probably be one of anger, which would make it more difficult for us to convince them of the reasonableness of any proposals which we might later produce.

6. In these circumstances I think that we should not only tell the Americans that we cannot accept their proposals but also, as I said at the meeting, give them adequate reasons for our position, and moreover, that if they make it clear that they are still going ahead with the attempt to convince the Russians of the need for language which would serve all parties alike, we should be prepared to discuss with them the range of possible and acceptable alternatives.

K.C. Nyeley, Sec.,
A.F.O.
BLACKBURN.
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7. The minutes of the last meeting of your Committee suggest that your proposals should be discussed at another meeting of the Committee with the aim of submitting it to the Official Committee on Atomic Energy and the U.R.S.S. I think that we all agree that the matter is urgent. It is most desirable for us to make our views known to the Americans before their bilateral negotiations with the Russians have gone very far, and if possible before they have reached a decision. Moreover, Lord Chalfont, to whom we have submitted the matter here, feels strongly that a team should go to Washington to explain our position and that we should not leave it to be put over by someone in our Embassy. The team could hardly go before Christmas unless an emergency arose, but ought to go as soon as possible thereafter. We had hoped that it might be possible to clear the enclosure to this letter by correspondence; and if so, a briefing meeting could be held immediately after Christmas. But we should have to fix dates with the Americans pretty soon.

8. I have drafted the paper in the form of speaking notes which our team would use as the basis for a reply to the Americans. The team would be instructed to base their approach initially on paras. 1-11 of the Notes. They would then ask the Americans to tell them what they intend to do in view of the most recent Russian reaction. If the Americans were to reply that they had decided not to press the matter of transfer safeguards, or to drop the idea of a safeguards article in a non-proliferation treaty as unacceptability, then the team would not pursue the matter any further.

9. If on the other hand the Americans were to say that they were continuing to try to find a transfer formula which would be acceptable to the Russians, we would then proceed to discuss the remaining paragraphs of the notes as acceptable alternatives.

10. You will also see that the notes speak of our readiness to discuss in detail our conclusions on the effect of transfer safeguards on the U.K. As I have said, I believe that if our case is to carry any conviction with the Americans, we must be prepared to present it in as much detail as possible. This means that the team must include the appropriate experts.

11. You will also see that I have suggested that the team should broach the idea of transfer safeguards on new contracts before proposing universal mandatory safeguards (Case C.2 in the SADAS's paper). This reason is that, in the light of the Russian reaction, the idea of universal mandatory safeguards stands no chance of success and is not likely to be taken seriously. For the same reason I have added the proposals in para. 15-16 of the notes, which were not discussed at length in your Committee but which might provide a better bargaining counter in current circumstances than Case C.2.

12. Finally, we discussed briefly at our meeting the need to speak to the Canadians. Our view is that we ought to speak to them at the same time as we speak to the Americans, and on the same lines. This might most conveniently be done in London.

13. I am sending copies of this letter with enclosure to Press, Michaels, Davis and Allen and would be grateful for their early comments.

(J. E. D. Street)
1. When the United States team visited London in July to discuss safeguards, we decided that we would examine the effect of the United Kingdom of a clause in a non-proliferation treaty imposing safeguards on all transfers of sources and fissile material, as well as on all the peaceful nuclear activities of the non-nuclear states. This we have now done.

2. Our conclusions, which we shall be ready to discuss in detail, are that if we were now to accept safeguards on all imports, including imports under existing unsafeguarded contracts and imports of high-enriched uranium for civil research and development programmes, this would have a most serious effect on our whole nuclear programme.

3. We think it worthwhile to rehearse the background to this debate in order to get the various possibilities into perspective. We are agreed that you cannot verify a non-proliferation treaty in the sense of ensuring that the nuclear states do not transfer nuclear weapons to the non-nuclear. We are also agreed that it would be desirable to ensure as far as possible that the non-nuclear parties to a treaty do not manufacture nuclear weapons for themselves, and that a suitable way of checking this is by means of an appropriate development of IAEA or equivalent safeguards.

4. The sacrifice by the non-nuclear states which accepted safeguards on all their activities would be a real one. If they sign the Treaty they cannot legitimately complain of the loss of the "comb option", but the commercial and financial burden would be considerable. Canada and other non-nuclear states have made it clear that this would be a real problem for them.

5. The British Government have repeatedly made clear that they favour the development of the IAEA arrangements into a fair, equitable and fully effective world-wide system controlling all peaceful nuclear programmes. They regard this policy as of particular importance in preventing proliferation.

6. In the non-proliferation context and for as long as the nuclear states continue to be permitted to manufacture nuclear weapons, safeguards on the nuclear powers are strictly irrelevant. Their only justification is in the context of the "balance of obligations" between the nuclear and non-nuclear states.

7. The fact is that the inclusion of transfer safeguards in the draft proposed by the United States would affect the United Kingdom more seriously and more immediately than any other potential signatory of a non-proliferation treaty. We understand the United States argument that, in incremental terms, they would be equally affected. But this effect would only spread slowly through the United States while the effect on us would be immediate. Our studies have shown that commercially and organisationally it is the immediate short-term effect that would be particularly harmful to us.

8. It must be remembered that, unlike all the non-nuclear states who would be subject to total safeguards by the treaty, but like the other nuclear states who would not immediately be affected, we have a really substantial civil nuclear programme. Moreover, we
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have no indigenous supplies of uranium. Quantitatively therefore we should be more seriously and immediately affected than any other party to the treaty, including the non-nuclear states.

9. But despite the magnitude of the effect on us, we seriously question whether this would be sufficient to assure the non-nuclear and civil nuclear states that the military nuclear powers as a whole were accepting a genuine equality of sacrifice, since the United States and U.S.S.R would not initially be widely affected. We therefore run the risk of satisfying nobody. The Canadians have underlined to us the point that as a result of their discussions with the United States they have agreed not to oppose the new formula, but that they have not agreed to support it.

10. From the other point of view, if we can argue that all the nuclear states will be equally affected, will this not fail to be the recently reiterated Russian demand that safeguards in a non-proliferation treaty should not apply to them. We know, for example that irradiated fuel is transferred to them by the East European countries for reprocessing; would they accept safeguards on this? If not, is the United States proposal in fact negotiable?

11. We realise the importance which the United States and the United States Congress attach to this question, and we share the view that safeguards are important for non-proliferation. But in view of the difficulties outlined above we are bound to have serious reservations about the formula which the United States have proposed.

12. The only way in which we could mitigate the serious substantive and discriminatory effect on us of safeguards on all transfers for peaceful purposes would be if it was made plain that the terms of the treaty did not make void existing contracts for unsafeguarded supplies. Moreover, as we have already agreed with the Americans in the context of our negotiations on the civil bilateral agreement, the effect of safeguards on high enriched uranium on our research and development programme would be very serious. We would therefore strongly prefer wording which would refer to the transfer of source material for civil power applications only.

13. Alternatively we are always prepared to consider the possibility of a truly universal system on the lines of Mr. Foster’s speech to the First Committee of the United Nations on 9 November, when he suggested that the time had come for each country to give serious consideration to inviting the IAEA to establish safeguards on its entire peaceful programme. This would be genuinely non-discriminatory, and would dispose of any possible complaint by the non-nuclear states.

14. The immediate imposition of mandatory universal safeguards would place an immense burden on the organisation of the IAEA which it is at present incapable of sustaining. Moreover they would be very expensive, not only for the Agency, but also for the military nuclear states who have by far the most extensive civil nuclear programmes, as well as bearing the major part of the burden of financing the IAEA. If therefore we can all accept such safeguards in principle, we ought to consider the possibility of phasing the acceptance by the military nuclear states of total safeguards for peaceful nuclear activities over a five year period, while other states would accept such safeguards immediately. This could be explained by the need to unscramble our civil and military nuclear programmes.

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15. But desirable and acceptable though this solution might be in principle, it would presumably prove impossible in practice because of Russian intransigence. In this situation another possibility which we would be very ready to discuss would be a separate declaration, outside but in parallel with the treaty, by the United States and United Kingdom and any other nuclear states which proved willing, by which we would accept for ourselves, phased over a period such as we have already suggested, the obligations which would be imposed on the non-nuclear states by the Treaty. This would certainly have a powerful effect on the negotiations and would put the Soviet Union in a difficult tactical position.

16. A third possibility might be for the United States and United Kingdom to make such a declaration outside a treaty, but conditional on a similar undertaking by the Soviet Union. This might have no more than a symbolic effect, but would presumably be preferable from the point of view of the non-nuclear states to a total absence of any such offer.
Dear Sir,

Thank you for your letter of the 15th December about the proposed approach to the Americans concerning Safeguards in a non-proliferation treaty.

Whilst appreciating the Foreign Office argument for approaching the Americans at an early date, I would be disappointed if the time scale does not allow consideration along the lines agreed at the last meeting of my Committee. Would not a special meeting of the Nuclear Materials Committee be tantamount to the briefing meeting you envisage?

If the visit is arranged, I agree with the strategy set out in Para. 8 of your letter, but I consider that it would be most undesirable to offer "Details of our Conclusions" as in Para. 2 of the speaking brief. The U.S. are bound to carry the discussions to the point of pressing us further than we may wish to go in deploying the U.K. arguments before it is clear whether the U.S. have in fact given up their attempt to press for transfer Safeguards. I think, therefore, that Para. 2 should be amended to read: "We are convinced that if we were now to accept safeguards----", This also means that I doubt the wisdom of being prepared to present out case "in as much detail as possible", as mentioned in Para. 10 of your letter. I would prefer to give only as much detail as is necessary to appreciate the nature of the problems raised and, at the same time, for the points we are putting forward to act as "lead-ins" to put questions to the Americans about the extent to which they are really prepared to accept Safeguards themselves. Thus the strategy should be such as to afford us opportunities of bringing to light such matters which, from the point of view of American self-interest, tend to diminish the attractiveness of transfer Safeguards to them. I can envisage three or four areas which might serve this purpose.

I generally agree with Para. 9 of your letter, it appears to me that we should first seek to put the U.S. in the position of defending their proposition for transfer Safeguards before deploying the arguments in Para. 12 of the speaking brief. We should point out that in principle, transfer Safeguards are a poor method of control; they do nothing effective to prevent proliferation among those countries possessing indigenous supplies of material. Indeed, any such "control", however internationally treated, is bound to weight the scales in favour of countries becoming self-sufficient and this in the longer term may make control more difficult.

We should press the U.S. to
5. We should press the U.S. to justify their proposals, remembering the possibility that they may have included them on the grounds of providing a 'balance of obligation'. On this we should be able to disabuse them; leading on to the argument given in Para. 12 of the speaking brief.

6. After Para. 13, I would suggest pausing for an American reaction: if this were favourable to Para. 12, the subsequent paragraphs in the speaking brief would be redundant.

7. If, however, the Americans persisted in their transfer proposals, we must be ready to deploy the arguments for a more positive line. viz:- we should point out that to be effective Safeguards on transfers should apply to transfer from the mines rather than to transfers across international boundaries and this would be clear to all members of the E.N.D.C. Compromise proposals operating in favour of the proposer will always be open to criticism or objection. The American proposals fall into this category.

8. Although I note your reasons for holding back on the C2 proposals, I feel that we should be prepared to deploy the argument for universal mandatory safeguards to illustrate the measure of our aversion to transfer Safeguards. Although one is conscious that this may be termed as a wrecking proposal in the context of the Russians, it may tend to gain more widespread support from non-nuclear powers than anything else and therefore, could not be dismissed lightly by the Americans. Surely, this could then act as a very strong disincentive to their continued pressure for transfer safeguards.

9. I agree with you that it might be desirable to speak to the Canadians after speaking to the Americans, but the invitation and the venue could be settled later on.

10. As for the American visit, I would avoid proposing a large team of experts because this would make it apparent to the other side that they could expect to question us and obtain a lot of detail. I do not think that it would be in our best interest to do so.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

S. P. Newbiggin
Director, A.W.B.E.

J. E. D. Street, Eqq.,
FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

cc. Press, Michaelis, Davis and Allen.
Safeguards and Non-Proliferation

Lord Chalfont has minuted on the revised ADBU Short Paper ADBU(66) 11 (Draft) of 30 December:

"This is a very important paper, the conclusions of which are closely related to decisions shortly to be taken (I hope) on future nuclear policy.

2. On the assumption that a safeguards clause in a non-proliferation treaty may shortly become a very live issue, I hope that the policy conclusions in paragraph 2(c) of the Short Paper can be endorsed by Ministers well before the EDC reconvenes. The end of January ought to be the absolute deadline.

3. So far as paragraph 2(c)(iv) is concerned, I would like to see, even in advance of further consideration of the paper, some firm proposals about how and what form the expert studies should take place. Is this matter for IAEA to undertake? or should we do a study ourselves with a view to putting proposals to the other nuclear powers and our allies?"

F. W. J. Buxton
3 January, 1967
Safeguards and Non-Proliferation

Flag A.

Lord Chalfont has directed that we should consider the conclusions of the recent A.C.D.N.U. paper on safeguards, with a view to an early endorsement by Ministers of the conclusions set out in it.

2. Briefly these conclusions are that international safeguards can make an important contribution to an anti-proliferation strategy; and that this can best be achieved by an agreement applying compulsory safeguards on the nuclear activities of all non-nuclear states and to all new contracts for the supply of nuclear materials to all states for peaceful purposes. The paper also concludes that such an agreement should specify I.A.E.A. safeguards only, and that our policy should be to seek to dissuade the United States from their current view (which we also have always accepted in practice for political reasons) that EURATOM safeguards may be regarded as the equivalent of I.A.E.A. ones. Finally the paper proposes that we should initiate expert studies of the problems raised by the expansion of the I.A.E.A. under such a safeguards agreement.

3. The position is complicated by the current discussions between the United States and the Russians about the text of a non-proliferation treaty and by the American views on a safeguards article which were conveyed to us last July, as well as by their latest position as contained in their recent Aide-Memoire. The Americans have accepted the Russian argument that any safeguards article in a non-proliferation treaty must specify I.A.E.A. safeguards only. The Russians have also demanded that nothing in the non-proliferation treaty should compel them to accept safeguards on their own nuclear programme.

4. We do not yet know how the Americans intend to deal with this last point in the light of the need to demonstrate to the non-nuclear states that a safeguards agreement would impose something like an equality or sacrifices between the nuclear and non-nuclear states. But they have told us that the choice now lies between the omission of safeguards articles from the non-proliferation treaty altogether and seeking to include
language which would take the Russian views into account. In fact the Americans have hinted to us that their continued support for the idea of a safeguards article may be largely for the record and to satisfy their own safeguards lobby that a genuine effort has been made to avoid the deletion of such a provision. If this is the case they may accept a non-proliferation treaty without a safeguards article rather than complicate the negotiations by wrangling with the Russians on the question of mandatory safeguards, and with EURATOM countries on the question of equivalence.

5. This complex of questions was discussed on 5 January by the Cabinet Sub-Committee on safeguards. It was decided that we should put our views to the Americans as soon as possible in the hope of influencing their final decision. The Committee had earlier concluded that the U.S. proposal of July last year for compulsory safeguards to be applied to all the non-nuclear states and to all transfers for peaceful purposes between all states, including the nuclear states, would impose an unacceptable burden on the United Kingdom, unless it could be mitigated by excluding transfers under existing contracts and transfers of high-enriched material for civil research and development purposes.

6. On the other hand the Committee conceded that it would be unfortunate if the non-proliferation treaty made no reference to safeguards. In the light of Russian objections any world-wide mandatory safeguards system would, in the foreseeable future, have to impose on the non-nuclear states safeguards which would probably not be accepted by the nuclear states as a whole. Such discrimination could only be justified in the context of a non-proliferation treaty. It would therefore be in our interest to persuade the Americans of the need to keep the safeguards question firmly tied to non-proliferation and if it were not possible to achieve this in full, it would be desirable to have some sort of safeguards article in the treaty, even if only hortatory in form, since it could later be tightened up by amendment.

7. Nevertheless, it would not be easy for us to press the Americans now to include mandatory safeguards on the lines set out in the A.C.D.R.U. paper, which in general follow the American proposals of last July, with the exception of the limitation to I.A.E.A. safeguards alone, and of the proposal to delay the introduction of transfer safeguards until new contracts are negotiated. The main difficulty is that if we were to urge the Americans to do this, and were thus to take the lead in proposing language which would effectively mean the end of the EURATOM safeguards system, this would create considerable difficulties for us in Europe. Two aspects of our European policy are
relevant. The first is the question of our commercial and bilateral agreements with various European countries, which have written-in EURATOM safeguards clauses. The second is the fact that at the present time it is most undesirable for us to be seen to take a leading part in attacking any of the organs of the European Community. Both of these problems may be solvable. The second however implies that although we might be able to accept a proposal which undermined EURATOM, we could not ourselves be seen to promote such a scheme at the present time.

8. It therefore seemed to the Safeguards Committee that the best line to pursue at the moment was to approach the Americans, to explain to them the difficulty which we would have in accepting their July proposals in the form in which they were originally given to us; but to urge them to include at least hortatory safeguards in their non-proliferation proposals, to keep the safeguards issue firmly in the non-proliferation context, and to open the way for mandatory amendments when the time was ripe.

9. In the light of this decision we have prepared a draft paper, which will now be further considered by the Safeguards Committee, with a view to submission to the official Atomic Energy Committee and the Nuclear Requirements for Defence Committee, and thereafter to early discussions with the Americans.

10. It remains however to consider now we can tackle Lord Chalfont’s direction that we should proceed to a clear Ministerial decision in favour of safeguards in the near future. Three problems are involved:

   a) A substantive decision in favour of safeguards on the lines set out in the A.C.D.R.U. paper.

   b) The question of the future of EURATOM and our attitude to it in the context of our negotiations with the E.E.C.

   c) The proposal that a study should be undertaken on the problems involved in expanding the I.A.E.A. to cope with the administration of a world-wide safeguards system.

11. On the first of these problems we propose to circulate to an early meeting of the Safeguards Committee an amended and shortened version of the A.C.D.R.U. paper and to ask for a decision of principle which, if it were agreed, would then be submitted to the two main Cabinet Committees and subsequently to Ministers.

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12. The second question raises difficulties for the Foreign Office in the context of our attitude to Europe and the U.N.C., and for the Ministry of Technology and the I.A.E.A. because of the possible need to re-negotiate our EURATOM contracts. We propose to bring up the latter difficulty in the amended A.O.B.O.W. paper and to ask for its consideration by the Departments concerned.

13. The question of the effect our European posture, however, leads to the conclusion, outlined above, that we cannot now take the lead in pressing for immediate mandatory I.A.E.A. safeguards. This affects the question of timing. Lord Chalfont directed that we should ask the endorsement of Ministers to this policy before the end of January, with a view to influencing the outcome of the non-proliferation negotiations before the U.N.C. reconvenes at Geneva in February. In view of the very wide U.S. interests which are involved it would not be easy to achieve this. Moreover, if we are not in a position to take the lead, we cannot move faster than our allies. It now seems unlikely that the Americans will decide to put forward any mandatory language on their own account. If therefore we cannot take the lead it would seem that our overall safeguards policy must be directed towards the longer term rather than to the immediate future.

14. The third main problem, the process survey of the capabilities of the I.A.E.A., has already discussed between Departments in Whitehall and Mr. Hope-Jones, our representative at the I.A.E.A. in Vienna. The conclusion reached was that it would be undesirable to ask the I.A.E.A. to undertake a survey of its own ability to expand, since the Agency would inevitably accept any new responsibilities that were offered to it without necessarily being in fact capable of fulfilling them. I therefore think that the first step will be for us to ask the Ministry of Technology, as the Department primarily responsible, to undertake a survey on its own account, in co-operation with other Departments, and to present this at an early date to the Cabinet Committee on Safeguards. We would then aim at an early discussion with the Americans and thereafter with our allies, the United Nations and the I.A.E.A.

C.C. Mr. Hillen
Mr. Statham
Mr. Bull
Mr. Thomson
Mr. Duxton

(J. E., K.C.B.)
Sir J. Rennie.

Safeguards Article in a Non-Proliferation Treaty

Problem

The Americans have set out in the attached Aide Memoire their proposals for a safeguards article in the non-proliferation treaty. They amount to mandatory safeguards on installations of or transfer to non-nuclear states. We are asked to comment.

Recommendation

2. I recommend that we should accept this draft article in principle, and I submit a draft Aide Memoire in reply. I would like to hand this to Mr. Spliers this afternoon.

Argument

3. This proposal, towards which the signs had been pointing for some time, is a courageous one. It provides the positive safeguards article which the Americans say is required in a non-proliferation treaty for it to be acceptable to Congress: and it satisfies the known views of the Russians. On the other hand it will be unwelcome to the rest of NATO (with the exception of the U.K. and possibly France), particularly to those who are members of EURATOM, and to a somewhat lesser extent to the non-aligned non-nuclear countries.

4. As a nuclear power the U.K. is excepted from these provisions; and they are therefore generally acceptable to us. The earlier American proposal to impose general transfer safeguards, in a form which would have caused us grave difficulty, has been abandoned. Instead we have a positive safeguards article which would result, if accepted, in an almost universal acceptance of I.A.E.A. safeguards as soon as practicable. This we can only welcome.

5. The non-nuclear states, particularly those with a potential nuclear capacity such as India, have frequently criticised the non-proliferation treaty on the grounds that it would discriminate against them. The safeguards article now proposed will aggravate this criticism. For example, the Canadians, who up till now have fully supported the new non-proliferation text, will certainly claim that it discriminates unfairly against them by allowing inspection by the nuclear powers, and the consequent danger of commercial espionage, while the nuclear powers go scot-free.
6. Criticism will be even stronger from most of the non-nuclear members of EURATOM. The original American proposal mentioned "I.A.E.A. or equivalent safeguards", thus covering EURATOM. The present insistence on I.A.E.A. safeguards alone has been largely brought about by Soviet pressure. Soviet views have recently been given currency in connexion with the Czech-Polish proposals for safeguards made at the last I.A.E.A. meeting in Vienna. As a result the subject has recently been discussed among EURATOM members. Of these only the Netherlands have come out unequivocally in favour of I.A.E.A. safeguards. The present proposal, even although it allows for harmonization procedures between I.A.E.A. and EURATOM, will almost certainly be gravely resented by the Federal Republic of Germany and other EURATOM countries. The French view is less certain in view of the exemption which France, as a nuclear power, would be entitled. But it will probably differ little from the general negative French attitude to non-proliferation; and the French will certainly take the opportunity to stir up trouble for the Americans among their partners in EURATOM.

7. Because of our current approach to the E.E.C. the question of EURATOM and I.A.E.A. presents us with a difficult problem. We have already made clear to the Americans that we shall have to handle it cautiously (see paragraph 6 of our telegram No. 76a to Washington). They sympathise, but ask that this should not prevent us from speaking in favour of the draft article to other non-aligned non-nuclear states such as India (Washington telegram No. 52a of 5 January). This we should be able to do on the assumption that we can avoid the subject of equivalence.

8. As regards the attitude we should adopt towards EURATOM members, this will best be left until we know their reactions to the U.S. Aide Memoire. We shall hope to learn these from the Americans as soon as possible. One possibility open to us will be to show that we are prepared to have consultations in accordance with Article XIII of the agreement with EURATOM if the Six so wish. In general however we must continue to adhere to the line we have taken with the Americans.

9. There are some comments of detail by Departments concerned in Whitehall (see Mr. Newley's letter of 1 February which also represents the views of Mr. Michaels and Mr. Davis). These have been included in the Aide Memoire except for the final point in paragraph 4, adoption of which would lead us into arguing against the slightly more favourable treatment proposed for EURATOM.
EURATOM. This could be embarrassing for us if it became known. Dr. Panton of the Ministry of Defence has suggested that when we hand over the Aide Memoire we should mention to the Americans that we assume that safeguards would be applied at the point of receipt of materials and not at despatch: but he does not think this of sufficient importance to raise formally at the moment.

R. Mr. Andrews

(J. E. D. Street)
3 February, 1967.

cc. Mr. Willan
Mr. Steven
Mr. Campbell

Lord Chalfont would prefer to be less categorical in support of the U.S. proposal while we remain doubtful how they will help us once sponsorship of the draft Treaty. I have pencilled some amendments in this sense. Could you let Lord Chalfont see a final draft early on Monday or the latest.

Mr. Street.

We discussed.

3 February.
Safeguards in a Non-Proliferation Treaty

Herr Schauer of the German Embassy came to see me today. He said that Herr Schnippenkoter had asked him to find out what the present view of the British Government was towards proposals for international control of civil nuclear technology in a non-proliferation treaty.

2. Basing myself on the brief prepared for the Prime Minister's visit to Bonn, I said that there were two distinct aspects of this question. First, there was the I.A.E.A.-EURATOM question, and secondly there were the doubts raised in the minds of a number of non-nuclear states about the effect on civil technology of a mandatory safeguards article in a non-proliferation treaty.

3. As regards the first, I said that we regarded the EURATOM system as equivalent to that of I.A.E.A.; we wished to enter the E.E.C. and we consequently wished also to enter EURATOM, with which we already had a treaty of co-operation.

4. As regards the second point, I understood that a number of aspects were in German minds. First, there was that of peaceful nuclear explosions. On this we were convinced that the American line was the right one; any state which exploded a peaceful device thereby became a military nuclear power. However, it was clear that, once peaceful nuclear techniques were developed and this might not be for some years yet - there would have to be some organisation, probably under international control, to ensure that the benefits of this technology were available to the non-nuclear powers, and were available cheap.

5. The second question was the suspicion that technological "fall-out" from military nuclear work would not reach non-nuclear countries. On this I said we were convinced that the amount of such fall-out was extremely small; civil and military nuclear technology were devoted to different ends and proceeded in different directions. There was also the German fear that the Russians might use German signature of the non-proliferation treaty to prevent civil nuclear technology developing in Germany as fast as it otherwise could. On this I said there was nothing in the treaty which prevented the development of civil technology; moreover, the existence of an internationally accepted safeguards...
system would in itself be a very effective answer to such Russian accusations.

6. Finally, I said there was the question of espionage. In connexion with I.A.E.A. inspection of Bradwell, I said that we had declined to accept Soviet inspectors, as we were fully entitled to under I.A.E.A. regulations, since the Russians themselves did not accept the Agency’s inspections. So long as this was the case, the Germans would equally be entitled to refuse Soviet inspectors. Herr Schauer did not mention the question of commercial espionage by the U.S., which is of course a consideration very much in the minds of our own civil nuclear technologists.

7. Lastly, I said that we supported the present U.S. formulation because it seemed to us that an international system would be a valuable guarantee to many non-nuclear states that others were not transgressing the obligations of the treaty. We would have been prepared to accept EURATOM safeguards as well as the I.A.E.A. system, but the Russian attitude to the negotiations ruled this out.

giving

8. Finally I said that we had been some thought to future developments in the safeguards field. Our objective was an international system which covered nuclear and non-nuclear states alike. This was not possible at present because of the Soviet attitude. As far as the U.K. was concerned we still had problems, of which the Germans were aware, presented by mixed military and civil plants and so on. However the imposition of a full I.A.E.A. system on non-nuclear states would take a long time to develop and it was my personal view that by the time this system came into operation, the U.S. would hope to be able to undertake a wider acceptance than at present of the I.A.E.A. system; we also hoped that the same would apply to the U.S. But I emphasised that this was my personal view and was not U.K. policy at this time; it was just an indication how the minds of some of us were moving. Replying to this point, Herr Schauer said he understood we had recently signed an agreement with the Canadians for uranium. I said that we had and that although it would not come into operation until the 1970s, we had already undertaken to the Canadian that deliveries under this contract would be safeguarded. nearer the time we would be discussing with them what kind of safeguards would be applied.

9. I concluded by telling Herr Schauer that if there were any particular further doubts which the Germans had in regard to the effect of a safeguards article in the non-proliferation treaty we should be very glad to discuss the misgivings with them.

cc Mr. Willan  
Mr. Campbell  
Mr. Buxton

(J. E. S. Street)  
13 February, 1957
Permanent Under-Secretary

Non-Proliferation and our entry into E.E.C.

Mr. Palliser spoke to me about UKDIS telegrams Nos. 9 and 10 to which we have now replied (copies attached). He feared there was a danger of our getting into contradictory positions on EURATOM and the non-proliferation treaty. On the one hand in his speeches, and in what he was saying during visits to the capitals of the Six, the Prime Minister was making much of what British entry could do to revivify EURATOM. On the other hand members of EURATOM, and in particular the Germans and the Italians, held that the non-proliferation treaty as drafted would spell the end of EURATOM. This situation could obviously be extremely damaging.

2. He asked us to consider whether we should not draft a short paper to answer the following question:

What could we do, without damaging our overall policy of securing a non-proliferation treaty, to demonstrate our concern, as a European
European power, that the interests of EURATOM should be safeguarded?

3. Such a study would of course have to answer the question whether in fact the treaty would prejudice the interests or standing of EURATOM and its members. Mr. Palliser wondered whether we had really studied this question as deeply as it deserved.

4. Generally Mr. Palliser asked us to consider whether this issue has not now assumed political aspects of a dimension which was too great to be removed merely by discussions at a technical level - no matter how distinguished the scientists involved would be.

22 February, 1967

Copies to:
Lord Hood
Sir C. O'Neill
Sir J. Rennie
Mr. O'Neill
Mr. Alexander
A.E.D.D.
W.O.C.D.

A proper deal. With this is at 28 Feb 70.
Secretary of State

Safeguards in a Non-Proliferation Treaty

If you agree generally, as I do, with Mr. Street's submission of 1 March, we must consider what to do next. I recommend two immediate steps:

(a) we should instruct Ambassadors to EURATOM countries to speak to the Governments concerned along the lines of Mr. Street's paper (Germany has already been taken care of by the visit which Sir Solly Zuckerman is paying to Bonn this week);

(b) we should tell the EURATOM Commission that, if that was agreeable to them, I would be very ready to visit them next week to discuss the problem with them.

2. There remains the proposal put by Mr. Walt Rostow to the Prime Minister that someone should visit Washington to discuss the whole problem with the Americans "from a specifically political point of view". This might well turn out to be useful, but I think that we must await the result of our /soundings

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soundings with EURATOM countries and with the EURATOM Commission. We also know that the U.S. administration is divided on the issue and it would be wise to give them time to sort out their own position.

3. You may wish to discuss these ideas with the Prime Minister this evening.

C.

(CHALFONT) v14/1

Copy to: Mr. Street
Sir J. Hennie
Private Secretary
Mr. P. R. H. Wright
Mr. Buxton
Mr. Hancock
Mr. Statham
Mr. Willan

See minute of meeting with the Prime Minister l14/1
P/1 20/10/1
The Secretary of State with Lord Chalfont attended a meeting at No. 10 with the Prime Minister. On return he told me that the decision had been that Sir Solly Zuckerman would go to Germany to explain the effect of the draft safeguards clause on the EURATOM countries, and that Lord Chalfont would follow up by a similar visit to the EURATOM Commissions. Both would make their explanations from a technical standpoint. If they ran into difficulty they would not take the American position but would take a European position.

C. M. W. Lohn.

Chin E. I.

Mr. Burt
PRVS
Sir T. Rennie.

I have now seen (in Dr. Peto’s office) the record of the Prime’s meeting, which also agreed our stand. Action via à vis Eucorim is in hand. F/A P. J.
Safeguards in the Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Secretary of State may be asked in Cabinet tomorrow about the present situation.

2. The Americans have circulated to NATO a draft article which would apply mandatory I.A.E.A. safeguards on the nuclear programmes of, and nuclear transfers to, all non-nuclear states. This proposal has aroused serious criticism among some members of EURATOM, particularly Germany and Italy, and in the EURATOM Commission itself. The fear is that the article would have the effect of disrupting the existing EURATOM organisation, would seriously inhibit the free exchange of information for civil nuclear programmes and would lay these open to commercial espionage by the nuclear powers. We are being criticised in particular on the ground that our apparent support for this American proposal, which does not affect us, shows that we are being anti-European.

3. The Russians have told the Americans that they are ready to accept an article, provided it does not affect them and provided I.A.E.A. safeguards are stipulated. They have also said that they would accept a treaty without a safeguards article at all.

4. We wish to show

a) that the fears of EURATOM countries are exaggerated;

b) that we have no wish to undermine EURATOM, which we hope to join;

c) we are ready to answer any questions on the application of the article which EURATOM countries have.

In fulfilment of the Prime Minister’s promise when he was in Bonn Sir Solly Zuckerman is going to Germany tomorrow for scientific talks with the Germans on the above lines.

5. It is proposed that Lord Chalfont should offer to visit the EURATOM Commission in order to listen to their problems, to allay their anxieties, and to show that we are wholehearted about entry into Europe, and that our wish is to strengthen EURATOM not disrupt it. He will no doubt wish to point out that this is an American draft article, not a British one.

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6. It may be that the objections of European countries to the safeguards article are such that it will have to be dropped if we are to secure a non-proliferation treaty. But it is the Americans who have to be persuaded. They are under strong pressure from Congress to include the safeguards article. The U.S. Administration is at present divided on the question, and although we may have at some stage to suggest to the Americans that in order to get a treaty they must drop the article, it would probably be better to play this rather long battle until we have ourselves discussed the matter with the Germans and EURATOM and also until American views have taken European objections fully into account. It would then be for the U.S. Administration to persuade Congress that they have tried their best to get a safeguards article into the treaty, but that it is either no safeguards article or no treaty at all.

(J. E. S. Street)
1 March, 1967

c.c. Sir J. Rennie
Mr. Hancock
Mr. Buxton
You will be aware of the criticism which has been aroused in some countries, particularly Germany and Italy, by the American proposal to include in the draft non-proliferation treaty an article imposing mandatory I.A.E.A. safeguards on all non-nuclear states. As you know, this subject came up during the Prime Minister’s visit to Bonn and he undertook to send a senior scientific adviser to Germany to talk to the Germans about the technical problems involved, and particularly about the question whether there is any technological “spin-off” from civil to military nuclear programmes. Sir Holly Stockman is leaving for Bonn tonight.

1. We have now decided that it might be useful if Lord Chalfont were to talk to the Nuclear Commission about the problems posed by a safeguards article and we have offered alternative dates next week. For the moment, however, we do not want to take any further action in NUKEM capital, since we do not wish to be seen to be promoting to those whom we hope will be our future partners in the E.C. what is after all an American and not a British draft. We shall therefore reconsider the matter when we know the results of Stockman’s visit to Bonn and Lord Chalfont’s visit to Brussels.

2. Santina, however, I think it would be useful for you to have the enclosed copy of a letter which we prepared for Stockman’s visit to Bonn. No action should be taken on it, but you may find it useful if any enquiries are put to you by the Italian Government on the subject. It will also provide a basis for you to speak from if we later decide to send instructions for approaches to be made in capitals.

3. I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Steve Civer at the Hague, Caryl Samaden in Brussels and Hallenstein in Luxembourg; and also to Andrew Stark in Bonn, Peter Hambrotham in Paris, Arthur Redman at ONB, Brussels, John Russell at OECD and Jean Bonte at NATO, Geneva.

(J. E. D. Street)

A. A. Cole, Sec., M.O.
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SAFEGUARDS AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

We have been asked by No. 10 to consider a short paper to answer the following question: “What could we do, without damaging our overall policy of securing a non-proliferation treaty, to demonstrate our concern as a European power, that the interests of EURATOM should be safeguarded?”.

2. We also have to provide general guidance for the visit to Germany this week of Sir Solly Zuckerman and his party in fulfilment of the Prime Minister’s promise at the time of his visit to Bonn. This paper is an attempt to deal with both questions.

3. The problem has arisen because of the American proposal to insert in the draft non-proliferation treaty an article which would impose mandatory international safeguards on the nuclear installations of, and nuclear transfers to, all non-nuclear countries. Because of the Russians’ insistence not to recognise EURATOM for this purpose, the American draft stipulates I.A.E.A. safeguards. The result has been that several EURATOM countries, notably Germany and Italy, as well as the EURATOM Commission, have expressed the view that acceptance of this article would mean a serious blow to, if not the end of EURATOM. They believe that the replacement of EURATOM safeguards by the I.A.E.A. system would mean that their civil nuclear facilities would be exposed to the risk of commercial espionage from inspectors who were nationals of the nuclear states.
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nuclear states. They have also expressed fear about the effect of the article on the transmission of information about civil nuclear technology, the exclusion of work on the development of peaceful explosions and the belief that they would lose for good possible benefits arising from the "spin-off" of knowledge from military programmes. The EURATOM Commission have also suggested that since one of the members (France) is a nuclear state which would not be compelled to accept I.A.E.A. safeguards under the treaty even if it signed it, this would destroy the unity of EURATOM.

4. We do not yet know what the reaction of the Americans will be to this outburst of opposition from EURATOM countries. The Americans have proposed this article partly because they believe that the non-proliferation treaty needs teeth in the form of safeguards to make it really effective and partly because they are under very strong pressure from Congress to include safeguards provisions. We have told the Americans that the article is acceptable to us, since it does not affect us; but we have pointed to the expected strong criticism from EURATOM and, for other reasons, of other non-nuclear countries, including Canada; and have told them that we cannot promote the article to the members of EURATOM. It is still possible that the Americans, in the face of this strong criticism, may decide that a treaty without a safeguards article is better than no treaty at all.
5. We therefore have three objectives:
a) to reassure EURATOM countries about the effect on their civil nuclear technology of the proposed safeguards article.
b) to remind them that our support for a non-proliferation treaty is longstanding, and that our attitude to it has not changed, and that there is nothing anti-European in our standpoint.
c) to use our wish to join EURATOM as evidence that we wish to strengthen it, not to undermine it.
d) to say that the effect of I.A.E.A. safeguards on EURATOM need not be catastrophic and that we ourselves will do everything we can to help.

6. At Annex A is a short paper summarising the questions which may be asked by the Germans during Sir S. Zuckermand’s visit, together with the proposed answers. Many of these points have already been made at the official level to the Germans and also to the Belgians. The Dutch alone in EURATOM have always supported I.A.E.A. safeguards; there are signs however that the Belgians may now oppose the article. The French appear to be taking a studiously neutral attitude.

7. H.M.I.O. have consistently supported the objective of a non-proliferation treaty for a number of years; and although the specific safeguards issue has not been discussed in detail until recently, our European friends have been aware of our support for I.A.E.A., particularly /since
since we announced in June 1965 that, as a demonstration, we were putting our large nuclear power station at Bradwell under I.A.E.A. inspection for an initial period of five years. Moreover, we have consistently made clear that our support for a non-proliferation treaty was based on our fears of proliferation outside Europe; and we have argued in the safeguards context that European countries should be reassured rather than alarmed by the creation of a general safeguards system which would ensure that non-nuclear signatories outside Europe were sticking to the terms of the treaty, and where the purpose of safeguards was to avoid diversion to military purposes. In all this, however, the last thing we wish to do is to destroy the EURATOM system which we acknowledge as fully effective. Moreover, we shall wish to join EURATOM, as the other European Communities, and we should expect that if and when we join we shall be able to make a substantial contribution to the nuclear technology of the member countries. We already have an agreement with EURATOM; but of course, if we were to join, the present degree of collaboration would be considerably intensified.

8. There is no reason why the creation of a worldwide I.A.E.A. system should permanently disrupt the EURATOM arrangements. It is true that existing agreements which prescribe EURATOM safeguards will have to be renegotiated both by us and by the members of EURATOM among themselves. But it is already becoming clear that an agreement between the two organisations will be necessary. Moreover, if the
non-proliferation treaty, when agreed, includes the safeguards article proposed by the Americans, there will be a relatively long period during which the I.A.E.A. organisation is strengthened and expanded to enable it to fulfil its control task. This will provide an opportunity for negotiations between the two organisations in the course of which agreement could be reached on harmonisation of procedures (which the I.A.E.A. would certainly have very much in mind) and for the necessary amendments to be made to those current agreements which specify EURATOM safeguards. The Russians have said that they have no wish to disrupt EURATOM and that they will accept an interim period before the I.A.E.A. system comes fully into force.

One possibility would be to work for an agreement between the two whereby EURATOM would in general work, in respect of its non-nuclear members, as the agent for I.A.E.A., provision being made for joint EURATOM/I.A.E.A. inspections as necessary. It must also be remembered that the I.A.E.A. itself is only now evolving its practice; our objective is to influence this evolution in the direction of an effective and practical system.

9. Lastly, we shall be ready to give in advance some evidence of our wish for increased collaboration with EURATOM countries if and when we are members of the European Communities. We have already proposed to the Germans that they should participate financially in expanding the gaseous diffusion plant at Capenhurst in
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return for a share in the enriched uranium to be produced, of course under safeguards; and a senior representative of the Atomic Energy Authority will be visiting Bonn shortly for discussions on this point. We should be glad to consult with any other members of EURATOM who are interested in this or any other ways in which we can be of assistance. We have no specific proposals to make at present; but we should be very ready to listen to their problems in the field of civil nuclear technology and consider how best we can help.

We should of course have no objection if member countries of EURATOM wish to deal with some of these problems through the EURATOM Commission.

10. Sir S. Zuckerman is aware that we are offering to the EURATOM Commission a visit by Lord Chalfont next week. Mr. Michaels will accompany him.

Atomic Energy & Disarmament Department.

2 March, 1967.
ANNEX A.

THE U.S. LEAPFROG PROLIFERATION TREATY:
EFFECf ON THE GERMAN CIVIL NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Possible German Questions and Answers

1. Q. Will not the loss of the right to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions put the non-nuclear state in an inferior commercial position?

A. The commercial viability of peaceful nuclear explosions has yet to be established. Even the Americans, who have been working on the problem for a long time, are by no means certain how far these explosions can be used for engineering on a reasonable cost basis and without endangering our existing commitments under the Partia! Test Ban Treaty, or under a possible comprehensive treaty. We presume in any case that there would be no possibility of finding a suitable site for such peaceful explosions within the Federal Republic.

We have been examining this problem since the Americans first brought it up. A danger which they foresaw was that a non-nuclear country with large uninhabited areas inside its borders might carry out a test of an ostensibly peaceful nuclear device, claiming that it had not manufactured a weapon, but hoping for political and commercial gain from the demonstrated ability to make a nuclear explosion. The truth is that such a test would have all the effects of a proliferation of nuclear weapons, both internally and on other states who might feel threatened by the testing.

These might then be impelled to develop a peaceful nuclear device of their own.

In fact a peaceful device is technically indistinguishable from a military explosive device, and a highly sophisticated device at that. Even though size and weight considerations may not be as important in developing peaceful explosives as in the case of warheads which have to be carried by modern delivery systems, it would nevertheless always be possible to put such a device in a suitable container and to use it as a weapon. We have therefore concluded that to foreclose the possibility of evading the purpose of the treaty and of setting off the chain reaction of proliferation, the non-nuclear states must agree to forego the development and production of peaceful devices.

Nevertheless
Nevertheless, we agree and have urged upon the
Americans that this sacrifice by the non-nuclear states
of the nuclear energy will be paralleled by a clear undertaking on the part
of those devices to the non-nuclear states and will do so cheaply.
As a result of our urging the Americans have included
peaceful devices, and we would be glad to take part in
carried into effect. We envisage a peaceful nuclear
some way with an international body such as the I.A.E.A.
which could act as a broker for the non-nuclear states in
ensuring that they were not exploited by the nuclear.
In short it is the development, production and ownership of
peaceful nuclear devices by the non-nuclear states which
must be avoided, not the benefit of these services to them.

2. Q. By the loss of the option to make nuclear weapons and
peaceful explosive devices, will the nations not deprive
themselves of information which will be useful in the
civil nuclear field?

A. While it is hard to be certain that future military
developments might not lead to some peaceful application,
“spin-off” from military research and development is so
far minimal. Nor, as a country which is both a nuclear
weapon state and which has a leading position in the peaceful
application of atomic energy are in a good position to judge
this. It is also relevant that far greater progress can be
made by any nation from concentrating on peaceful research
and development than by relying on the incidental advantage
of a military programme. This is the conclusion which the
Canadians, for example, have reached after several years
of the pamphlet. In any case, if we agree that peaceful
explosive devices are a military device and are in fact indistinguishable from
devices for any incidental information which might be useful for civil
purposes would negate the purpose of the treaty.

3. Q. Will the non-proliferation treaty not enable the
nations to object to the non-nuclear-developing
civil nuclear programmes in ways which would
also contribute indirectly to the development
of nuclear weapons?

A. It is true that up to a point basic research into
non-proliferation and installations for the production
of nuclear materials can be used to support either a military
or a civil programme. But it should be noted that the U.S.
draft non-proliferation treaty forbid s only the manufacture
of nuclear weapons. Nuclear work divided at a fairly
clearly divided stage into activities which are purely civil
and those which are unequivocally referable to a military
and those which are unequivocally referable to a military
programme. The actual manufacture of weapons takes place
programme.
in the military stream long after it has divided from
the purely civil programme. There is nothing in the
 treaty to prevent the non-nuclear states developing right
up to the point of division, provided only that they did
not themselves diverge into weapons manufacture. Mor-
over, the Federal German Government can point with force
to the fact that all its activities would be safeguarded,
and therefore that there was an international guarantee
that its peaceful nuclear activities were wholly legitimate
and could not be diverted to weapons manufacture.

4. Could not the prohibition of "assistance" in the U.S.
draft non-proliferation treaty prohibit the nuclear
states from sharing information with the non-nuclear
states on the grounds that it could contribute to a simple
programme?

A. The U.S. choice of the reference to "assistance" was
deliberate. It was intended to indicate that only the
exchange of information which did in fact assist a nuclear
weapon programme was not permitted. Once again if the
activities of the non-nuclear states concerned are safe-
guarded, we can conclusively argue that there is no
possibility of diverting nuclear information to military
purposes.

We ourselves look forward to a much freer interchange
of nuclear information since the non-proliferation treaty
has been signed. At the moment this is inhibited, not only
between the nuclear and non-nuclear states, but also
between individual non-nuclear states, because of the
fear of proliferation. Coupled with this is our hope of
joining EURATOM, which would make us full partners in the
European atomic technical community. We believe that we
have a lot to offer in this field and we intend to go on.
The non-proliferation treaty would open the way for all
of us to share the benefits of such research.

5. Might not the non-proliferation treaty prevent the
development of production and separation
facilities for fissile material and other processes
in the free disposal of material derived from our
reactors and when we have to supply to others?

A. In our view the considerations which apply to the
interchange of information are also relevant to the supply
of nuclear materials. We agree with views which have been
expressed in the German papers that there is a danger of a
commercial monopoly if only one power, even if it has no
commercial monopoly, if only one power, even if it were
commercially sensible, that there is a danger of a
commercial monopoly if only one power, even if it were
commercially sensible, it is essential to ensure that the
supply of enriched fuels for the new generation of
power reactors, including those of non-commercial
success.
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with effective safeguards would provide a firm assurance that developments by the non-nuclear states in this field would be confined to peaceful purposes only.

An important point to remember here is that there are very large economies of scale in both reprocessing plants and isotope separation plants. It is not easy to justify the development of purely national facilities of this kind on economic grounds alone.

It seems to us that the answer lies in a cooperative European effort which will give us the sort of economies of scale which are already available to the Americans. We have already suggested to the German Government that we would be glad to discuss the possibility of financial participation in the isotope separation plant at Copenahust. We appreciate that this might seem to some people at this time merely the substitution of one dependence for another. But if we hope to become part of the European community, then this would fall into place. We would be able to contribute our existing practical experience and our operating separation facilities (which at the Germans know, are being expanded) to the European technological pool. This experience is of considerable value, as the French Government could confirm in the light of their difficulties with Pierrelatte.

In this way we could build up a real European nuclear energy industry capable of giving a full service to all our customers and achieving all possible economies of scale.

6. Q. Will the proposed safeguards article provide meaningful assurance?

A. The Russians have insisted that if there is to be a safeguards article, these safeguards must be exclusively IAEA. It is not unnatural that they should reject a regional system which in their eyes would be self-policing. Moreover, we must bear in mind the fact that the real dangers of proliferation are outside Europe. Regional safeguards systems are satisfactory, so long as the members are to be trusted; this is why we support BRATON. But in areas where countries may be less trustworthy, they could provide a semblance of control which would not only threaten the stability of the treaty by increasing suspicion, but might even enhance the risk of war by permitting clandestine nuclear weapon development. The countries which would suffer from this would be those who complied with their treaty obligations.

We realise and accept the problems which this causes for BRATON, and will do our best to help to solve them.

(Notes: further comments on this question are in the steering note).

/7.
Q. Will not the discriminatory nature of the safeguards provisions in the U.S. draft give an unfair advantage to the nuclear states?

A. The nuclear states, like everybody else, would be compelled by the U.S. draft to impose safeguards on all transfers by them to any non-nuclear state, whether party to the treaty or not. In the nuclear export business therefore all states would start level.

As for the possible effect of safeguards on internal nuclear programmes we accept the need for the nuclear states to do everything possible to come into line. The problem is that the Russians have absolutely refused to accept anything which would affect them. This attitude springs not only from their perpetual fear of inspection, but also from an overlogical concentration on the fact that safeguards on the nuclear states are not in the last analysis relevant to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Only in the context of a cut-off are safeguards on the nuclear states strictly essential.

Moreover, we ourselves have certain difficulties in submitting our nuclear facilities to safeguards, since as the Germans know, our military and civil nuclear programmes are to some extent intermingled for reasons of economy. So long as we remain a nuclear state we could not open these plants to international inspectors without a real danger of revealing classified military information. Nevertheless we are prepared to work towards a fully universal system of safeguards as soon as this is can be achieved. This is our long term aim which is intimately bound up with the search for nuclear disarmament towards which the non-proliferation treaty would be the first step.

Q. Will not the proposed U.S. safeguards article open German nuclear plants to commercial espionage?

A. This is admittedly a difficult problem and we were veryinterested to read the suggestion of Dr. Weissacker about the possibility of developing devices which might reduce the need for international inspectors to penetrate into nuclear plants. We would be very glad to discuss this. Clearly the existing safeguards systems both of the I.A.E.A. and EURATOM have a long way to go before they can become either fully effective over the whole range of nuclear activities or as simple and unintrusive as they might be. It seems to us that there is a real need for research by the international agencies into these problems. Richter the I.A.E.A. has been short of money and expertise. But if it is to take over the responsibilities of a world wide safeguards authority we must all clearly give it more assistance both financial and technical to enable it to fulfil its functions.

For Adenauer
Dr. Adenauer has been stressing the danger of espionage by Russian inspectors of the I.A.E.A. We encountered this problem ourselves over Brindisi. But the provisions of the I.A.E.A. enabled us to exclude Soviet inspectors on the grounds that the Soviet Union is not prepared to accept I.A.E.A. inspectors in its own territory. Nor is it in fact necessary to give any reason for such exclusions.

9. G. Cannot the nuclear states make any progress at the present time on measures of nuclear disarmament to parallel the restrictions which they are placing on non-nuclear states to accept?

A. The measures which have been suggested by various non-nuclear states, notably the comprehensive test ban, the cut-off and freeze of N.D.U.'s are of course Western proposals. We have spent much time and money working out the technical implications in these proposals. But is lacking is the political will on the part of the Russians. If the Germans wish, we could be very happy to discuss ways of making these proposals more acceptable.
This is a good summary. There is, however, one problem not mentioned in the paper which concerns peaceful nuclear explosions. The promise by the nuclear powers of cheap peaceful nuclear explosion services in Article V of the draft treaty only applies to the non-nuclear weapon states who sign the Treaty. The Americans were unwilling to accept an amendment extending this offer to all states but they have instead offered us a formal assurance that the United Kingdom would benefit from the same terms as would be offered to non-nuclear weapon states under the Treaty. We have asked the Americans to let us have this assurance in writing, and we shall then explore the possibility of obtaining a similar assurance from the Russians.

(Fred Mulley)
21 March, 1967
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MINUTES of a Meeting of the Committee held in Conference Room 'C', Cabinet Office, S.W.1, on MONDAY, 4th SEPTEMBER 1967 at 10.30 a.m.

PRESENT:
Mr. R.F. Newby, Atomic Energy Authority (in the Chair)
Mr. V.M.B. Macklen, Ministry of Defence
Mr. M.I. Michaels, Ministry of Technology
Dr. R. Press, Cabinet Office

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:
Mr. R.C. Hope-Jones, Foreign Office
Mr. C. Hall, Foreign Office
Mr. P.J. Kelly, Ministry of Technology
Mr. J.J. Croome, Atomic Energy Authority
Mr. G. Newman, Central Electricity Generating Board

SECRETARY:
Dr. T. Swain

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1. SAFEGUARDS AND NON-PROLIFERATION

The Committee considered a note by the Secretaries (IM/67/15) covering one by the Foreign Office on safeguards and non-proliferation, which set out the latest position on the drafting of a safeguards article for inclusion in the non-proliferation treaty.

Mr. Sturch said that the paper had been prepared for information only, and illustrated how wide were the differences between the United States and Russia on the question of Article III. It was unlikely that the draft of either side would be accepted in its present form, but it seemed improbable that the United States would abandon the NPT draft completely, especially since it had only been arrived at after long discussion with the Germans. Since the paper had been prepared, the Soviets had tabled a new proposed Article III which would provide stronger safeguards to all parties and for all purposes; this would be unacceptable to us. It was apparent that both the United States and Russia were determined to move quickly to an agreed draft and there was little time for us to influence the wording of the proposed safeguards article. If we wanted to do this, we should act now. It was essential, therefore, to reach agreement on our own policy with regard to safeguards.

In discussion it was pointed out that both the United States proposals and the present safeguards system of the IAEA referred to materials rather than facilities or activities. This was satisfactory, as it would be also if safeguards were applied to facilities for civil use only in non-nuclear states. In our case, however, we would have to bargain about certain mixed facilities which we would not wish to put under safeguards. If we knew how the United States intended to apply safeguards in their own case we could define our own attitude more easily. It was apparent that safeguards could not be easily applied to facilities, and we certainly could not agree to them being applied to transformers. It appeared best, therefore, to concentrate on accepting that safeguards would be applied to materials or to activities, and it was possible that these could be combined. Although the Russian draft appeared to suit us better than that put forward by the Americans, there were difficulties in relation to EURLON which made it impossible to accept.
THE CHAIRMAN, summing up, said that as far as the alternative versions of the draft Article III were concerned, the Committee favoured the application of the United States draft. It was generally agreed that it would be better to accept the application of safeguards to materials rather than to facilities or transact both of which would be detrimental to our interests.

The Committee—

took note of D(57) 15, the points made in the discussion and the Chairman’s summing up.
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2. PROPOSALS FOR A REVISED SYSTEM OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS

THE COMMITTEE considered a note by the Secretariat (RM(67) 12 (9thiae) on proposals for a revised system of IAEA safeguards.

Mr. JANISCH said that the present paper had been revised in accordance with amendments to the original draft (RM(67) 12) received from members. There had been no change in substance or in the technical proposals outlined, but only in the presentation of the argument and it was now believed that it was in a suitable form to be handed to the United States and Europeans in due course. However, during the course of revision the sense of the definition of a "bonded area" given in paragraph 13 had been changed. It would be better if the first sentence of that paragraph read: "all material entering or leaving a plant would pass through areas (styled "bonded areas") to which the inspector would have free access, and where he would be able to record details of quantities enrichment, chemical composition, etc."

In discussion, attention was drawn to the difficulties of defining safeguards as applied to ore mining and processing to concentrate stage as outlined in paragraph 16. This might preclude South Africa, for example, shipping uranium to the United Kingdom for military purposes. There were also difficulties in relation to mines having a small output. It would be better, therefore, to delete the paragraph at this stage. It would also be necessary to define more closely what was meant by "other nuclear materials" in paragraph 4(c), and this might best be done by adding the words "as defined in IAEA safeguards". The last sentence in paragraph 19 was somewhat contentious and better deleted.

A number of other minor drafting amendments were agreed.

The CHAIRMAN, summing up, said that the Committee were agreed that the revised draft of the proposed safeguards system subject to the amendments agreed to in discussion, could be put forward to other countries, starting with the United States and the leading powers in Europe.

The Committee —
Invited the Foreign Office to arrange for the proposals to be transmitted to the Americans and Europeans in due course.

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3. DECISION OF THE IAEI, IAEA, NUCLEAR SYSTEM

THE COMMITTEE considered the note by the Secretary (NN(67) 14) covering a draft Foreign Office paper on a revision of the IAEA safeguards system to be given to the United States Authorities.

MR. HOPBS-JONES said that the object of the note (NN(67) 14) was to outline to the United States Authorities the political realities, as we saw them, of the proposed safeguards article of the non-proliferation treaty. The note pointed out that whatever the final version of the safeguards article may be, it will certainly refer to "IAE" Safeguards", and potential signatories to the treaty will want to know that this will involve, and whether such a reference will mean strict adherence to the agency’s Revised Safeguards System (1965) or whether some flexibility of that system might be allowable in the future. The note pointed out some of the defects of the IAEI 1965 system and outlined the proposals made in NN(67) 12 (Revised) for a revised system of safeguards. The real difficulty was that the IAEI 1965 system was not designed specifically in relation to a non-proliferation treaty. In fact it may well prove to be ineffective in relation to such needs. On the other hand, states could not be expected to sign a treaty which imposed on them an open-ended obligation with regard to safeguards, and any argument about the need for a completely new system may involve unacceptable delays in the signing of the treaty itself.

In discussion it was pointed out that any safeguards article must be drafted in such a way as to allow for the need for evolution in the system of safeguards which was to be applied. There must be scope for accommodating EURATOM, and the article should reflect the views of all nations including the Germans. It might be possible to meet these objectives by reforming in the safeguards article to the fact that signatories adhere to the principles of the agency Scheme whilst leaving details of procedures to be settled later. Another difficulty was the fact that the actual agreement on safeguards procedures would be arrived at by a bilateral agreement between the IAEI and the state concerned. Article III, as at present drafted, provides no machinery whereby signatory states should agree to accept the agency safeguards and this might lead to non-standard agreements being reached. Furthermore the question of the rights of the IAEI Board to modify their safeguards system could not be changed by a non-proliferation treaty. It would appear sensible if those members of the IAEI who signed such a treaty should approve any modifications of the IAEI safeguards scheme. It should not be assumed that the Russian attitude was as adamant as appeared. Recent discussions in Vienna had shown much greater flexibility in their approach, and an acceptance that certain aspects of the present agency
safeguards scheme might need some modification in the future. It appeared
likely that they would be prepared to accept a less rigorous accounting method
than that outlined in the 1965 scheme. It was essential, however, that any
suggestions were put forward as quickly as possible, and it would be useful
to hold discussions with the Americans prior to the IAEA Conference in
Vienna on the 26th of September.

In further discussion, it was pointed out that the arguments set out in
paragraph 5 of NM(67) 14 needed reorienting and strengthening. The chief
drawback of the IAEA scheme was that it submitted materials to microscopic
monitoring and therefore was unsuitable in relation to a non-proliferation
treaty. The agency scheme was not just too costly, but was too intrusive
and, in general, often ineffective to meet present needs. The reference
to substitution should be deleted, since we insisted on its inclusion in the
agency scheme originally against the wishes of the United States. Changes
also needed to be made to the outline of a possible revised system in
paragraphs 6 to 9 to bring them into line with NM(67) 12 (Revise). In
paragraph 7, the Agency could be said to need the right "to satisfy itself
that" such initial declarations were correct, rather than "to check" them,
otherwise it would run risks of commercial espionage. Some reference
might also be made to the last paragraphs of NM(67) 12 (Revise) on design
review indicating that only general flow-sheets were being covered rather than
details of plant. Some changes were also required in the last section of the
paper (paragraphs 10 to 14), especially in regard to the relationship between
the IAEA board and the signatories to the non-proliferation treaty.

The Chairman, summing up, said that the Committee generally endorsed
this paper subject to the amendments mentioned during the discussion. Efforts
should be made to open discussion with the United States authorities prior
to the Vienna meeting, and amended paragraphs could be cleared out of
Committee.

The Committee—

(1) Invited the Foreign Office, in conjunction with the Ministry
of Technology and the Atomic Energy Authority, to revise
NM(67) 14 in the light of the points made in the discussion,
and to circulate the revised draft to the Committee for
comment.

(2) Invited the Foreign Office to transmit the agreed revised
document to the United States authorities, and arrange with
them an early meeting to discuss it, preferably in London
before the 26th of September.
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4. ELABORATION OF OFFER MADE TO IAEA TO ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Committee considered a note by the Secretaries (NM(67) 11) on an elaboration of the offer made to IAEA to accept international safeguards into the United Kingdom civil nuclear activities.

The Chairman said that the note had been prepared based on NM(67) 10 and the points made in discussion at the last meeting. It had been intended that this note (NM(67) 11) would be sent to the parent committee for information, but as a result of correspondence it was now agreed that the paper should be held until more information was available on Article III of the non-proliferation treaty and on what safeguards the United States was likely to offer.

The Committee -
Took note.

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5. ARM CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

The Committee considered a note by the Foreign Office (NM(67) 13) on arm control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions.

Mr. Austin said that the Foreign Office would like the Committee's advice whether the annex to this paper (NM(67) 13) should be transmitted to the United States authorities. Some proposals had been made at Vienna for some sort of international control of peaceful nuclear explosions and the United States had agreed to circulate proposals relating to Plowshare activities. The paper gave an outline of what we as a nuclear power were prepared to do in this area, on the expectation that both the United States and Russia might put forward their own ideas.

In discussion it was pointed out that there were a number of technical errors in the paper which needed correction. It did not seem useful at this point to hand it over to the United States authorities, especially since it did not outline any new points.

The Chairman, summing up, said that the Foreign Office should prepare a memorandum for the next meeting outlining the importance of this topic.

The Committee -
Invited the Foreign Office to prepare a note outlining the importance of peaceful nuclear explosions in the context of a non-proliferation treaty for consideration at the next meeting.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
5th September 1967

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CABINET
COMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS

REVISION OF THE IXFA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

Note by the Secretaries
The attached note by the Foreign Office, revised in accordance
with the discussion at the last meeting, is circulated for information.

(Signed) T. MAIN
F. DAVIS

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
13th September 1967
REVISION OF THE I.A.E.A. SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

On 21 August the draft of a non-proliferation treaty was tabled at Geneva by the United States and Soviet co-Chairmen. Article III, the Safeguards Article, was left blank in this draft, but we must act on the assumption that the co-Chairmen will reach at any rate provisional agreement on the text of the Safeguards Article within the next few weeks, and that the text of the whole treaty will be finalised by the middle of October.

2. Whatever the final version of the Safeguards Article may be, it will certainly refer to "I.A.E.A. safeguards". Before putting themselves under an obligation to accept I.A.E.A. safeguards on all their nuclear activities, potential parties to the treaty will want to know what this will involve. They will also wish to ensure themselves that the safeguards regime through which they accept as the basis of their separate agreements with the I.A.E.A. will not be subject to subsequent alterations which are unacceptable to them; or at any rate that they will not themselves be obliged to renegotiate their agreements in order to give effect to a revised safeguards regime. We must therefore expect:

a) that even if there is no specific reference to the Agency's Revised Safeguards System (1965) in Article III there will be pressure for this identification to be written into the record at some point;

b) that at any rate some countries will argue that the present safeguards document should have the status of an annex to the treaty, which can only be amended by the same procedure as the treaty itself.

3. Though the reluctance of states to accept an entirely open-ended obligation with regard to safeguards is understandable, insistence on the present validity and future irrevocability of the 1965 System would be very dangerous, since if it was subsequently found that this system could not be applied in practice, the whole concept of international safeguards would be discredited and the stability of the treaty itself might be jeopardised. The object of the present paper is to indicate the defects of the 1965 System in relation to a non-proliferation treaty, to suggest ways in which the System might be improved, and to consider what immediate steps need to be taken in order to keep the door open for such improvements to be introduced in the near future, i.e. before the first agreements between the I.A.E.A. and parties to the non-proliferation treaty are negotiated.

Defects of the 1965 System

4. Until 1965 the application of safeguards was restricted to small research reactors and facilities. The system was then revised (with a slight relaxation in surveillance prescribed for small quantities) and extended to cover large reactors. It was again extended in 1966 to cover reprocessing plants, and extension to fuel fabrication plants is in train. Nevertheless, the system is still based on the same concepts: (1) all safeguarded nuclear materials have to be accounted for at all times, and (2) safeguards materials and the facilities where they are used are liable to physical inspection at short notice. Such a system imposes substantial burdens both on the inspectorate and the party being inspected.
5. The system, furthermore, was designed to be applied only to particular facilities as part of a country's nuclear complex as a
result of a bilateral agreement relating only to those facilities.
In no case, as yet has the I.A.E.A. system been applied to the atomic
activities of a major country where each facility can be regarded
part of a national nuclear entity.

6. In the new situation under a non-proliferation treaty, the
whole of the non-nuclear countries' atomic activities will be subject
to safeguards and we believe that a less intrusive system would be
more credible, as effective and less costly. The detailed applica-
tion of the present system would not lead to any real gain in
credibility as an effective system of control as compared with
modifications discussed later. The present system arouses dis-
quiet about commercial espionage, which to some extent is justified.
Experience to date of the application of safeguards to small research
facilities for the most part in less developed countries cannot be
regarded as any guide to the risks of commercial espionage of an
intrusive system of inspection in a large research and development
facility in an advanced nuclear country.

7. Further, the present system, if applied on a large scale, as
would have to be envisaged, would entail substantial expenditure.
The Inspector General estimates that to inspect the non-nuclear
states would require an additional 100 inspectors: inspection of the
U.K. and U.S. civil nuclear programmes would require respectively
70 and 250 additional inspectors. Substantial disputes would
certainly arise about meeting the cost of a safeguarding effort on
this scale.

8. Lastly, it is doubtful whether the I.A.E.A. could within a
short time recruit and train qualified staff on the scale that would
be required by the present system. Training programmes would have
to be undertaken while simultaneously developing procedures to
cover phases of atomic activity not hitherto covered by the system,
and concluding the requisite safeguards agreements with signatory
states.

9. While it is clearly important to retain the essence of the
present I.A.E.A. system and to utilize the work which has gone into
it, considerable simplification on the lines discussed below could be
introduced without any loss of credibility or effectiveness.
A modified system to meet the new circumstances could be worked out
without undue delay.

Outline of a Possible Revised System

10. A simpler system would be based on first, the declarations by
non-nuclear signatories of their facilities, reactor types, process-
ing methods, hold-up of materials, processing and refuelling
programmes, and second, detailed materials accounting, with
adequate cross-checks between facilities, and indeed between coun-
tries. The physical presence of Inspectors would still be required,
since remote auditing of materials accounts could not by itself
prevent diversion, but Inspectors would not need to have such ex-
tensive rights of access as they enjoy at the moment. All materials
centering on the reactor would pass through areas (styled
"bonded areas") to which the inspector would have free access and
where he would be able to record details of quantities, enrichment,
chemical composition, etc. Frequency of inspection at bonds would
depend both on throughput and the nature of the materials. Where
nuclear materials more readily usable for weapons purposes are
involved, additional intermediate bonds would be established: here
freedom of access for inspectors, but not necessarily recording of
the materials flow, would be required. Inspectors would not be
permitted to enter the process areas (styled "suspension areas")
unless they had justifiable grounds for suspecting that diversion was
taking place.

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11. Such a system leaves theoretically possible opportunities for misuse by diverting part of the plant hold-up or by manoeuvring within the agreed process losses. The former would, however, be difficult to sustain over any long period, having regard to the problems which the inspectors would be maintaining or materials flow, to the technical devices which might be installed. If a "one stop" diversion were in question, it is unlikely that this alone would be significant for weapons production.

Diversions within processing tolerances, not excluded by the present IAEA system, would be a slow means of collecting material. In order to give greater security against diversion, a limited number of checks could be introduced into the system. These, though not technically essential, would provide some cross-references.

12. The way in which such a system of materials accounting, bonded areas, suspension areas and cross-checks could be applied in practice to processing and fuel fabrication plants, to reactors, to transport from reactor to chemical reprocessing plant, to chemical reprocessing plant and to civil research and development, has already been studied. Details are not given in the present paper, but the results of this study lend strong support to the view that a system of this kind would have the following features:

(a) A degree of control effective enough to give assurance that non-nuclear signatories are not diverting nuclear material to weapons purposes;
(b) Attention concentrated upon production and usage in significant amounts of plutonium and highly enriched uranium because these are most easily divertible, and significant for weapons use, while covering other nuclear materials, as defined in the IAEA Safeguards System, to a lesser extent;
(c) Minimum need for close inspection of nuclear facilities and processes, particularly in commercially sensitive areas, and maximum use of any viable non-intrusive methods of control;
(d) Economical use of the time and numbers of inspection staff, especially those with high professional qualifications.

13. The Agency's present procedures require detailed design reviews which are capable of causing delays and interference in construction, commissioning and operation. Under the proposed simplified system the reviews would be largely superfluous. Copies of general design lay-outs or flow sheets should be made available for reference and the Agency should be free to encourage the installation of devices and arrangements of plant to facilitate inspection and so to the advantage of both parties, reduce the need for interference.

14. The proposed revision of the Agency system, apart from its inherent merit, would be expected to appeal strongly to countries such as Germany and Japan, which are particularly worried about the safeguards for commercial reprocessing provided by the present system. Second, it would be more similar to, and therefore more easily reconcilable with, the existing Surinam system.

Part Two

15. It is by no means clear to what extent the present IAEA Safeguards Document would actually have to be amended in order to permit the application of a system such as that outlined above. It can be argued that the numbers and procedures set forth in the Document are "established for the information of member states" (para. 3) and only become legally binding upon the entry into force of a Safeguards Agreement and to the extent that they are incorporated therein" (para. 4).
negotiated as a result of the treaty. For example, it should be possible to secure agreement in the Board that those of its members who are not parties to the treaty should not exercise their voting rights in these circumstances. Such an arrangement, however, would not give the right of veto even to the nuclear powers, and it is clear that further thought will need to be given to this whole question.

The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

11 September, 1967.

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I attach as requested a note for the Permanent Under-Secretary on the latest safeguards proposal.

(R. McC. Andrew)
14 September, 1967

Thank you very much - this gives the perspective felt -

Mr. W. 1675
Safeguards and Non-Proliferation

Article 3 on safeguards was left blank when the draft treaty text was tabled at Geneva on 24 August, so that the Co-Chairmen could continue discussions. The problem was basically that of fitting Euratom into any such provision. The Russians were insistent that any safeguards system must be international and that they could not accept a regional system such as Euratom, which they regarded as self-inspection. On our side a draft Article was worked out in NATO which would allow an extensive period for harmonisation between the Euratom and IAEA systems of safeguards, and it was agreed that the U.S. Co-Chairman should base himself on this draft in the discussions.

2. In view of the gap between the two sides over this Article we did not expect any early move towards agreement. It was therefore unexpected when the Soviet proposal for a compromise text was put forward on 5 September. The text is at Flag A.

3. There are some general points to be made about this text. It is generally recognised (even by the Germans and Italians) that it represents a substantial move on the part of the Russians from their previous position. It is suspected by the Italians (and in some quarters here) that this is in fact a joint U.S./Soviet draft and it is being put forward as a Soviet proposal for tactical reasons to allow the Americans to disengage from their commitment to the NATO draft. Some colour is lent to this theory by the fair wind the Americans have been giving the Soviet proposal.

4. Secondly, this is not an approved Russian text. It has been drafted in Geneva and Mr. Roschin has said he will recommend it to Moscow. This is one of the reasons being put forward by the Italians against it. Nevertheless this is a procedure which has been employed more than once in the course of the non-proliferation negotiations, and judging from past experience the Russians are unlikely to repudiate it.

5. Thirdly, the text is fairly loosely drafted, and much depends on how it is interpreted. (This again can be paralleled in Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty.) The Americans have told us how they consider the Russians intend certain points in this text to be interpreted, and these seem reasonable; but we have made the point that it will be essential to have more confirmation that the Russians will in fact interpret the Article in this favourable way.

6. The proposed compromise Article applies international safeguards to all non-nuclear states which sign the treaty. Nuclear states are exempt: therefore the Article does not apply directly to us. From this narrow point of view we
find it generally acceptable. It does not call for safeguards on transfers of fissile material which is the one provision which could affect us severely while leaving the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. unaffected by reason of their native stocks of uranium. Our one major reservation is that we should need some specific assurance that the text would be interpreted as meaning that safeguards would cease when materials were transferred to nuclear weapon states.

7. The main difficulty for us, however, arises from the implications for Euratom. We are potential members of Euratom, and in addition we need to keep our European image in view of our Common Market application. We therefore must be seen to be sensitive to the views of our European allies who are members of Euratom.

8. In this text the Russians have made two concessions towards meeting Euratom difficulties. A period of two years is allowed after ratification of the treaty for negotiating an agreement on safeguards with IAEA: and apparently if agreement is not reached by the end of the period, so the Americans claim, there will be no guillotine or sanctions applied (what does happen at the end of the period is far from clear). Secondly, negotiations can be conducted with the IAEA by states individually or with other states: the Americans say that the latter phrase is meant to allow negotiations by Euratom, to which the Russians are unable to refer specifically. The European reaction so far has been to ask how we can be sure of these interpretations.

9. The new text was discussed in the NATO Council meeting on 13 September. The Italians and Germans have not had time to prepare their views fully and it will be debated again on 20 September next week. Curiously enough the Italians once again seem to have taken the lead in opposition but apart from this preliminary debate went as favourably as could be expected. It is unfortunate that in spite of Soviet pleas for secrecy in view of the delicacy of this operation, there has already been a leak in Brussels, probably from someone in Euratom with an interest in sabotaging any agreement.

(R. McC. Andrew)
19 September, 1967

I am a bit worried by the plans for revising the I.A.E.A. Safeguards System, on which our officials have been working for the past few months, as it seems to me that a premature disclosure of these plans could wreck the Geneva negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty, which have now reached a very delicate stage.

I realise that the present I.A.E.A. Safeguards System has its shortcomings, and that it will need to evolve to meet the requirements of a non-proliferation treaty. I also recognise that a revised System which was less intrusive than the present one would be welcome to countries like Germany and Italy which do not relish the prospect of having I.A.E.A. inspectors poking their noses into their R. & D. establishments. But now that the Russians have apparently accepted that I.A.E.A. inspectors should verify Buratom's own safeguards system rather than carry out independent inspections of their own, the Germans and Italians have less reason to make a fuss about commercial espionage; and in any case I am convinced that their opposition to the treaty is basically political rather than commercial. What I am afraid of is that if they and the other countries like India which have their own separate reasons for disliking the draft treaty get to know of our plans for what must be regarded as a substantial revision of the present System, they will urge that the negotiations should be adjourned until

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Wedgwood Benn, M.P.,
Minister of Technology.
until our proposals have been considered, so that prospective parties to the treaty can know just what safeguards obligations they will be undertaking. And that would be the end of the treaty. It would also mean that we would get the political unpopularity, in the Party and abroad, of having killed or sabotaged the prospect of a non-proliferation treaty.

To the best of my knowledge, officials have had no mandate from Ministers to prepare a revised System of Agency Safeguards or to discuss their proposals with other Governments. Now that they have done so, and made proposals to discuss them next week with the Americans, these talks perhaps should be held, though I should have felt happier if they could have taken place in London or Washington rather than Vienna and happier still if they could have awaited progress at Geneva and the United Nations. But from my point of view any such discussions should be conducted in the utmost secrecy, and every precaution should be taken to ensure that there is no leak, either to the I.A.E.A. Secretariat or to members of other delegations to the General Conference. #?

If you would like to discuss the issues I am, of course, at your disposal, but if, as I hope, you agree, I shall be grateful if you would instruct your officials on these lines. I am sure that the work done by officials on this subject will prove very useful one day — but that day will only come when the non-proliferation treaty is home and dry.

I am copying this letter to Lord Penney, as he will be leading our delegation to the General Conference at Vienna.

(Fred Mulley)
Dear Hope-Jones,

I understand from Michaels that the U.S. have suggested "an inconspicuous" meeting in Vienna to discuss the points we have raised regarding the draft of Article III. I believe that you intend to be present.

Such a discussion could well be useful as a preliminary meeting to get their reactions to our points, but I doubt whether members of the Interdepartmental Committee would feel happy at accepting such a discussion, limited both by time and representation, (in view of the U.S. concern to remain inconspicuous), as an adequate substitute for discussions in London or Washington where we would suffer from fewer restriction on time and representation.

I hope, therefore, that in Vienna, in addition to getting their reactions, you will press for a further meeting in London or Washington as soon as possible, where we can deal after due consideration, with any points they raise and ensure that there is no possibility of any misunderstanding on their side of the views we are putting forward.

From the comment in Smart’s letter of the 13th September, it would appear that there is a danger that in their anxiety to get a full text on the table, the U.S. negotiators are ignoring, or possibly not aware of, the technical difficulties of applying the present I.A.E.A. procedures in the circumstances of an N.P.T. They, therefore, run the very real risk that the safeguards article will become unworkable and impotent, as pointed out in your paper.

I am copying this letter to other members of the Committee, who will, no doubt, express their views.

Yours sincerely,

E. F. Newley
Director, A.W.R.E.

Mr. R. C. Hope-Jones,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall,
LONDON, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE
18 NATION DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
37-39 RUE DE VADRE, 202 GENEVA
Telephone: 3323.85

20 September, 1967.

Dear Robin,

Anglo/American Offer on Safeguards

Alan Needle of the U.S. Delegation raised this problem with me over lunch yesterday. He said that the Minister of State had, at his meeting with Foster on 12 September expressed some doubt on whether it was really a good idea to submit our peaceful nuclear activities to I.A.E.A. safeguards. The Americans also regarded it as noteworthy that, unlike them, we had not reaffirmed our offer at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 13 September.

2. Needie asked me the reason for our misgivings. I said that I thought that there were two points, one political and the other financial. We were concerned lest the Russians should resent this offer as designed to isolate them, and I reminded him that I had first heard this argument from the U.S. Delegation (my letter of 15 March). Needie said that the U.S. Delegation had certainly taken this point into account before they made their original offer to NATO in April, but they were now quite happy about its effect on the Russians. When this offer is made in the Conference the Soviet position as the only nuclear-weapon state represented which was not willing to accept any safeguards for itself would, of course, be conspicuous; but the Soviet Delegation would be quite content to maintain the same pincer attack as they had that morning during the U.S. speech on S.E.A.M.S. Although the Americans had never discussed this question openly with the Russians, they were convinced that the latter were well aware that the U.S. offer was coming and that they recognized that this was part of the price that the U.S. was having to pay to secure the adherence of its allies to the treaty.

3. I explained the financial point briefly by drawing on Ronald Hope-Jones’ letter of 6 September to Ian Smart, and told him that this question had been fully discussed in Washington with Sam de Palma (who is now here). Needie replied that although the cost of these safeguards might well be considerable the Americans looked at it as in the context of their budget for security and defence. Compared to the vast amount of money they spent on their armed forces it was a small price to pay for a step that would make a major contribution towards securing a non-proliferation treaty. He said that he thought...
that any going back on the offer that the United Kingdom had made to NATO in April would seriously prejudice the prospect of securing the signature of some of the civil nuclear powers such as Germany, Italy and Japan. The effect of such a move on our part would be much worse than if we had never made the offer in the first place.

4. Seen from here, there is some danger that we may end by getting the worst of both worlds. If we give to our non-nuclear allies an impression of dragging our feet, they may assume that we are being pushed into this step by the Americans. We in the Delegation feel that unless we make a final decision soon whether to make our offer we run the risk of getting little credit for our sacrifice, even if we ultimately make it.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to Ian Saert in Washington and Richard Thomas at UKDe NATO.

Yours ever
Jan.

(R.I.T. Crossett)
CONFIDENTIAL

CYpher/Cat A

PrioriTy Foreign Office To Vienna.

TelNo. 372 22 September 1967 (AD)

Confidential Addressed to Vienna Telegram No 372 of 22 September Repeated for Information to Ukdis Geneva.

Following for Wearing.

Your Telegrams Nos 202 and 203: Safeguards and Non-Proliferation. The Proposed Draft is Not Unacceptable and We Appreciate that the Soviet Delegation Have Done Their Best to Avoid Controversial Wording. In Particular in Paragraph 2 They Have Avoided Saying Quote to Apply IAEA Safeguards Unquote Which Would Have Ruled Out the Possibility of Verification of Other Safeguards Systems.

On the Other Hand We Think That the Phrase Quote to Exercise Control Unquote Might Be Thought to Imply Too Extensive Powers for the Agency. Moreover, We Have Some Reservations About the Phrase Quote in Accordance with the Treaty Unquote, As This Seems Inappropriate Before the Terms of the Treaty Are Known. We Would Therefore Prefer Wording Such as Quote to Play an Appropriate Part in Ensuring the Fulfilment of the Treaty Unquote. But We Would Not Think It Necessary to Insist on These Points.

Sosfa Sent 02552/23 September.

Departmental Distribution

A.E.D.D.
S.R.D.

D.D.D.D.D. Confidential
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Note of Meeting between U.K. and U.S. representatives

Office of U.S. Delegation to I.A.E.A.
Vienna, 16.40 hrs. 25 September 1967

Present:

U.K.
Mr. M.I. Michaels
Mr. R.C. Hope-Jones
Mr. I. Cremer
Mr. H.J. Millen

U.S.
Ambassador H. Smyth
Mr. F. Scoville, A.C.D.A.
Mr. M. Kratzer (part of meeting)
Mr. Lewis
Mr. D. Zeek

Mr. Michaels said that the U.K. disliked the wording of the reference to the IAEA Safeguards System in paragraph 1 of the U.S.S.R. Draft of Article III of the N.P.T. because it might be interpreted as invoking the system in force at a particular time, thus preventing development of the system. Even if we were generally agreed that the system could evolve under an N.P.T., it seemed likely that many countries, including the U.S.S.R., would argue that evolution should cover new types of facility and the application of new safeguards techniques, but should not include the fundamental revision the U.K. believed necessary to meet the situation when

(a) the whole nuclear complexes of non-nuclear weapon states would be under safeguards;
(b) the scale of the Agency's safeguarding activities would be greatly extended;
(c) the object would be to prevent diversion of material to weapons and not to the whole range of military applications;
(d) the Agency would be required to "verify" safeguards applied under the basically different Euratom system.
Mr. Michaels stated that it was not his purpose to embark on detailed talks on changes desirable, but to ensure that the wording of Article III permitted satisfactory evolution of the safeguards system under a N.P.T. He believed that some countries, notably Germany, were of the same opinion.

2. Ambassador Swayth suggested that the new preamble, which the Germans had helped to draft, should prevent too narrow an interpretation of the reference to safeguards. The U.K. response was that the preamble was of little help, indeed by referring specifically to a type of evolution accepted as implicit in the existing system (application of new technical devices) it tended to rule out more basic changes.

3. The possibility of amending the wording of the reference to the system in the U.S.S.R. draft, perhaps by substitution of a reference to the safeguards provisions in the Statute, was touched on, but the consensus of view was that this might do more harm than good, and that the aim should be to secure a satisfactory interpretation.

4. The U.S. thought that there would be time to deal with the issue during the substantial period between the signing of a N.P.T. and the time when safeguards would be felt in the U.S. and U.K.; but the U.K. view was that, as the necessary agreement between the Agency and countries accepting safeguards in relation to the N.P.T. would be negotiated during this period, it was important that any basic changes in the system should be settled beforehand.

5. It was agreed that when the N.P.T. was put forward to the General Assembly of the U.N., the Agency should set up a Working Group to review the system in the light of the provisions of the draft N.P.T. It would be desirable to include U.R.S.S. representatives in the reviewing body.
6. Turning briefly to the substance of the changes the U.K. thought desirable, Mr. Michaelis mentioned the bonded area concept providing for close Agency surveillance of the inflow and outflow of nuclear materials at nuclear establishments, thus permitting the sensitive area of an R. and D. facility, for example, normally to be free from Agency inspection. The Germans had apparently put forward similar ideas independently at the recent IAEA meeting on safeguards techniques.

7. Mr. Lewis was doubtful about this idea: the hold-up in some plants was very long and a safeguarding body ought to be able to check that the material was in fact there and not being converted into a weapon. The German representative (Dr. Hafels) had considerably modified his views during the meeting and agreed that perimeter inspection would not be adequate. Mr. Kratzer added that under a N.P.T. follow through by the Agency would help to check that countries were not operating clandestine plants.

8. Ambassador Smith said that the U.S. had been thinking about the preparation of a model safeguards agreement to be linked with the N.P.T. He thought that, after the reorganization of the Safeguards Division, a team of negotiating lawyers should draw up a model. The U.K. agreed that a model agreement would be needed.

9. Ambassador Smith mentioned that the U.S.S.R. wished to introduce a resolution at the Conference committing the Agency to exercise control as provided for in the N.P.T. and they were anxious to secure widespread and influential backing for it. It was agreed that such a resolution would be premature as the terms of the N.P.T. had not been settled and the U.S. initiative, in suggesting that a few innocuous references should be made by the President of the Conference in the course of his closing remarks, was endorsed.

10. The U.S. mentioned that the German candidate for the auditor had been withdrawn.
I am grateful that you brought your anxieties about IAEA safeguards to my notice in your letter of 19th September, and I well realise that a delicate stage has been reached in negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty.

However, as I see it, the issues relating the N.P.T. to I.A.E.A. safeguards are: that the present I.A.E.A. safeguards system is quite unsuitable for application to the circumstances of a non-proliferation treaty - it is too intrusive and will raise difficult questions of international finance; that the text of Article III in such a treaty must, therefore, allow of the revision of the system, and this by the I.A.E.A. itself, and not by some procedure defined in the N.P.T.; that the text must also provide means of avoiding discrimination - so far as peaceful uses are concerned - between France and other European signatories, including possibly ourselves; and that we gain the confidence of the Germans, Italians and Japanese.

As potential members of the European Community, these last two points are particularly important. As a nuclear power prepared to volunteer to place our civil nuclear facilities under I.A.E.A. safeguards, we have to recognise that the French will not do so. Further, while I accept that the German and Italian attitude is partly political, they have also a real fear of commercial espionage under the procedure of the present I.A.E.A. scheme, which we share. Those who would probably most benefit from such commercial espionage would be the Americans, some of whom know this full well.

The Americans do not yet seem to have fully appreciated some of the difficulties inherent in using an autonomous body, the I.A.E.A., to implement the safeguards clause of an N.P.T. The I.A.E.A. system has been up to now an abstract concept in their negotiations.

There are a number of real issues to be resolved before there can be a definitive draft of the safeguards article. The aim of the talks with them in Vienna is to ensure that they really understand the issues involved. Our representatives in Vienna are continually meeting the Americans on many different subjects, so that no particular attention will be drawn to talks on this subject, and no-one else need be aware of them.

The Rt. Hon. Fred Mulley, M.P.
I am very glad, therefore, to hear that Ambassador Smyth has now agreed to meet our people in Vienna on Monday. Hope-Jones and Cromartie of your office will be present with Michaels from here.

Since we have told Euratom countries that the Agency system of safeguards could and should be modified for the purposes of an N.P.T., they are bound to ask for our further views. It is, I would have thought, most desirable to have had some discussion on the subject with the Americans before this demand is put to us. We may not have long to wait.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Lord Penney.

[Signature]

Tom
Mr. Andrew, A.E.D.D.

I.A.E.A. Safeguards and Non-Proliferation

Mr. Mulley does not much like the attached letter from the Minister of Technology, which he takes it was drafted by Mr. Michaels. He does not think it is true that we are seriously worried about the dangers of commercial espionage under I.A.E.A. safeguards (paragraph 3), and does not accept either the political assumptions which are made in paragraphs 2 and 3 or the views expressed about the non-proliferation treaty. Nor does he accept that we must "educate" the United States urgently on the subject of I.A.E.A. safeguards, or that it is a subject into which we should get drawn by Euratom at the present time.

2. He would therefore be grateful for a very short draft reply expressing doubts as to the assumptions about foreign relations and disarmament on which the letter is based, and saying that he hopes to discuss the matter further with Mr. Benn during the Labour Party Conference at Scarborough next week. Most Ministers will be leaving for Scarborough on Thursday; could you please therefore let us have a draft by tomorrow morning?

R. J. O'Neill
(R. J. O'Neill)
26 September, 1967

Draft reply attached.

P. Mr. Andrew

CONFIDENTIAL
I have been rather worried recently about some of the telegrams that have apparently gone out without consultation, so far as I am aware of it, on various aspects of the IAEA safeguards and N.F.T. complex. Worry, because I disagree with some of the opinions expressed and statements made and think that in this field we should at least be considered, even if later overruled.

I will not refer to all of them, but concentrate on three. The first is Te1. no. 372 to Vienna of 22 September. Now, whatever may since have transpired in Vienna, I myself feel most strongly that the last sentence of this telegram should have been omitted. I do not see how the Soviet Proposal, operative part (2) “DECLARES that the Agency would be ready to exercise control in accordance with the Treaty to ensure its fulfilment” can satisfy be accepted.

The Agency cannot know how ready it will be, if at all, until it studies an agreed treaty. It cannot exercise “control”, if that is meant literally. And it cannot ensure fulfilment. All it can do surely is to undertake to do its best to meet any requests put to it in this connexion.

The second was Tel. no. 4523 to our N.A.T.O. delegation. We were consulted about this instruction previously, and were prepared to comment - at however short the notice - but found that apparently all was somewhat changed, the actual instruction went out without consultation and was entirely different from what we had previously believed to be going. I won't go into detail here since much water has since gone under the bridge, but has been consulted we should certainly have challenged the general balance. (We are rather surprised the European departments did not.)

While the balance of Tel. no. 2305 to Bonn is perhaps more to our liking, again we had no opportunity of commenting or discussing, particularly for example para. 2(a). Frankly, we do not think that the argument deployed there is well-founded. What has hitherto happened in Vienna in minor matters, is not in our view a
safe guide on what may now happen in a major, indeed, paramount matter (so far as the Agency's work is concerned).

I realise the difficulties of your present task, and the frequent occasions when there is very little time available - although in my view this is sometimes due to our apparent desire to react to every touch of the U.S. whip with curious alacrity - but I do suggest that where the I.A.S.A. and Euratom are involved, we have a right to be consulted. Foreign policy is for the F.O., but the effects of policy upon our nuclear industry, the results of possible changes in nuclear relations with other countries and with multilateral organisations, and our views on future industrial and commercial possibilities in the field, all seem to me to justify my suggestion.

Yours sincerely,

J. Macadam, Shank
FROM THE MINISTER OF STATE

27 September, 1967

Thank you for your letter of 25 September with your views on the revision of International Atomic Energy Authority safeguards.

I agree with what you say about the need to take into account the Euratom implications of Article III (in this incidentally we seem to have been fairly successful - you may have noticed that the Germans have expressed themselves as being agreeably surprised by our European stand on this matter). But I am afraid that I cannot follow you in your deduction that the revision of the safeguards system is therefore necessary to meet fears of commercial espionage, particularly by the Americans. This reference to the Americans seems to me ungenerous now that they have offered like us to put their peaceful nuclear activities under safeguards.

I believe that the political fears of the Germans and Italians, to which you also refer, are what we really have to worry about, and any ill-timed moves on our part over reforming I.A.E.A. safeguards could add greatly to our difficulties in bringing the Euratom countries to accepting the draft treaty, including Article III.

I also think it is less than fair to say that the Americans have not appreciated the difficulties, and that we need to ensure that they understand the real issues. I believe in fact that they have given considerable thought to the issues involved.

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Wedgwood Benn, M.P.
and that they have come to the same conclusion as I have, namely, that it is essential for political reasons to get a non-proliferation treaty first (with a reasonably flexible Article III) and then we can safely exchange views on the modifications necessary and possible.

It seems that we have mentioned to the Euratom countries that in principle we consider some modification of the Agency system on safeguards will be necessary for the purposes of a non-proliferation treaty, and they may therefore ask our views. However I do not think we are committed by this into giving details of possible revisions. Certainly we should take no steps to prompt them to ask and if the question arises we shall have to consider very carefully what our reply should be. I hope you will agree that in no circumstances should an approach be made or a reply given without express Ministerial approval.

Perhaps we can have a further word about this at Scarborough.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Lord Penney.

(Fred Mulley)
From: Mr. V.H.B. Maclien.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1
Telephone: Whitehall 7022, ext. 7318

CONFIDENTIAL

28th September 1967.

Dear Ronnie,

Reference Newley’s letter to you of 20th September D/191/67. your own reply and that of Michaels, I am not very happy about several features of this exercise.

1. First, it is only by secondhand means that Defence has heard of much of the arrangements and complications surrounding the exercise.

2. Second, whatever influences were at work in it in no way meets the view of the Newley Committee. Therefore I strongly back Newley’s suggestion for a further meeting.

3. Third, there seems to be the perennial danger of seeing the Treaty as an end in itself rather than to ensure its provisions are practicable and fulfill the needs for control. If you want a Treaty at any price then drop Article III and you can have it tomorrow.

4. Fourth, you may feel that defence interests are remote and can be ignored, but by this letter I am making it clear that I do not consider we are being either properly consulted or considered. In view of the intermingling of U.K. work this can have serious consequences for our offer.

5. Fifth, it cannot have escaped your notice that many of the Euratom doubts cover points similar to those raised by IAEA experts.

6. Sixth, if the U.S. will not meet us then we should talk to our prospective Euratom partners. By so doing we could remove some of their fears and at least reassure them to the extent that they will know the U.K. will be supporting critical changes in IAEA schemes.

7. Seventh, I can only reiterate to you the dangerous pitfalls of believing that short term political issues can alter what is achievable in practical technical terms.

R.C. Hope-Jones, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.
CONFIDENTIAL

U.K. Delegation to N.A.T.O.,
PARIS.
28 September 1967.

Dear Andrew,

Anglo/U.S. Offer on Safeguards

Cromartie in Geneva sent us a copy of his letter to you of 20 September on the above subject.

2. As seen from here it seems most desirable that we should have a firm position on this as soon as possible. As you know, from our telegram No. 307 of 26 September, non-proliferation is likely to be discussed again next week, possibly as early as 2 October. If our failure to reaffirm our offer is causing suspicion among our Allies, it would certainly be useful for us to have authority to re-state our position.

incerely yours,

[Signature]

(G.E. Millard)

R. McC. Andrew, Esq.,
A.E. and D. Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.
U.K. Offer on Safeguards

The Americans have told us that they are worried by the implications of the Minister of State's talk with Mr. Foster on this subject on 12 September. They think that we may be intending to back out of our undertaking to NATO, and fear the effect that such a retreat might have on the chances of getting the non-nuclear members of the alliance to endorse the treaty. They noted that while the United States had repudiated their offer in NATO on 13 September, the U.K. had not yet followed suit.

2. We therefore need either to review or confirm our general position on the U.K. offer. Time is short. The non-nuclear members of NATO have not yet commented on our apparent relucence. But they may do so, and our NATO delegation have asked for authority to restate our position if necessary. Moreover it has always been the Americans' aim to make their offer fully public as soon as an agreed safeguards Article was tabled at the ENDC, if not before, with a view to removing some of the sting from accusations of discrimination and making the maximum tactical effect on the negotiations. We should get no credit whatever if, whatever the form of our offer, we delayed its announcement for long after the Americans had spoken.

3. The decision to offer to submit our peaceful nuclear activities in the U.K. to safeguards was taken by Ministers on 3 April (see minute of the Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy at Flag A). The offer was made confidentially to NATO later in the month in the following terms:

"At such time as international safeguards are put into effect in the non-nuclear-weapon states in implementation of a non-proliferation treaty, we will be prepared to afford an opportunity for the application of similar safeguards in the U.K., subject to exclusions for military or national security reasons only."

The wording of the offer was agreed interdepartmentally with the aim of being as forthcoming as possible while keeping the timing, extent and nature of the safeguards ultimately in the U.K.'s hands. Unlike the U.S. offer, ours referred not to I.A.E.A. but to "International Safeguards". The reference to "military or national security reasons", which is identical with the wording of the U.S. offer, would also make it possible for us to exclude Capenhurst, for example, from safeguards if we thought it might to do so.

4. We were hurried into the decision to make this offer by the fact that the Americans decided late in March (after relatively unhurried domestic consultations) to make a similar offer /of
of their own to N.A.T.O. and invited us to join them. We calculated that since one of the major complaints of our European allies was the discriminatory nature of non-proliferation safeguards, we could not afford, in trying to reduce this discrimination, to be seen to drag behind the Americans in point of time.

5. Nevertheless, there are undoubtedly difficulties and drawbacks to the proposal which perhaps were not given the fullest possible consideration because of the shortage of time. Among these are:

(i) The size of the U.S. and U.K. civil nuclear programmes is such that if they were fully subjected to I.A.E.A. safeguards the Agency’s machinery would be seriously strained, thus diverting it from the essential purpose of safeguarding the nuclear programmes of the non-nuclear-weapon states.

(ii) From the strict point of view of non-proliferation our offer is totally irrelevant, since we would remain free to develop nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, put at a tactical disadvantage by our offer, must be expected to exploit its logical absurdity to the full.

(iii) Few of the non-nuclear states are likely to regard our offer as a decisive factor. A voluntary gesture by two out of the three nuclear parties to the treaty is no substitute for a true balance of obligations.

(iv) The offer was originally designed particularly to meet German complaints that discriminatory safeguards would expose them to industrial espionage and commercial disadvantages which would not be shared by their main commercial competitors, the nuclear states. Since then, the proposed treaty text has been reviewed with the aim of reducing these effects to a minimum (e.g. by putting the emphasis on materials, rather than facilities). Moreover, now that the Russians have apparently accepted the fact that the I.A.E.A. will verify Euratom safeguards rather than impose their own, the Germans have much less cause for concern.

(v) The offer has more serious financial implications than was perhaps realised when the decision was taken. Even the countries that would like to see us accepting safeguards will be reluctant to pay their share of the substantial additional costs involved, and in these circumstances the Russians might well be able to secure a majority decision of the I.A.E.A. Board of Governors that we ourselves should meet the entire costs of applying safeguards in the U.K.

6. On the other hand the offer has certainly enabled us to ride more easily the objections of our Euratom allies to the discriminatory nature of the Treaty, and it will presumably have at any rate some effect on the willingness of the non-nuclear states to accept discriminatory safeguards. Moreover, at the time when the idea was first mooted, it was also argued as a subsidiary consideration that it might be in our interests
to ensure, if necessary by an offer of our own, that the
Americans made an offer to accept safeguards, and that this
was as complete as possible. We have always recognised that
the U.K. would have to accept safeguards sooner or later as
a result of pressure from our suppliers of nuclear material,
and this pressure would be increased if our suppliers (e.g.,
the Canadians and South Africans) were obliged to accept sa-
eguards on themselves under the treaty. Again we have of-
course already accepted that British safeguards would be
applied to us if we joined the European Community. In so
far as the industrial espionage and commercial impairment
arguments are valid (and our technical people think that the
risks are very real, though American industry discounts them
entirely), it would be to our advantage to ensure that we took
the Americans, as our greatest commercial competitors, along
with us. But perhaps the most telling argument against with-
drawing our offer at this stage is that it could lead to
accusations of bad faith by our European allies, and also to
unfavourable comparisons between us and the Americans,
who have shown no disposition to hold back.

7. Nevertheless, it might be possible without withdrawing
or necessarily amending the wording of our offer, to modify
its effect in practice. This is, in fact, the line that
has been taken by the Americans, who have stressed to us in
private that the offer remains only an offer, the implemen-
tation of which is under their own control. We might even,
without raising damaging suspicions in NATO, be able to take
the line in public that we would put our nuclear facilities
under safeguards to the extent necessary to satisfy all parties
that we were not gaining any commercial advantage from the
treaty. We could also point out that the strict application
to safeguards to the U.S. and U.K. peaceful programmes
would mean that three-quarters of the I.A.E.A. safeguarding
activity would be absorbed by this part of the exercise alone.
This would be very costly and would represent a diversion of
effort and reduction of effectiveness.

8. I have not consulted other departments in drafting this
submission. But my own (rather reluctant) view is that it
is now too late to go into reverse, that it would rock the
boat badly to show signs of hesitation at this stage, and that
the best course is probably to rely on subsequent interpreta-
tion rather than amendment of our offer. If however we are
to alter course, we shall need, in view of the
decision of the Nuclear Policy Committee, and of the possibility
that the Americans may decide to make their offer public in
the very near future, to prepare a paper for Mr. Walley to put
to Ministers straight away.

R. C. Hope-Jones
3 October, 1967.
I was sorry to learn from your letter of 26 September that you thought we were not consulting you adequately about the telegrams we have been sending off about the N.F.T. negotiations, with particular reference to Article III. I was also rather surprised, in view of the lengths to which we have, in fact, gone to clear our drafts with you. On several occasions Andrew Stuart has taken our drafts round to you by hand because of the shortness of time available, and we only send off telegrams in which you have an admitted interest without consulting you if we have to choose between clearing the draft with you and missing the boat completely. For example, you refer to our telegram no. 1523 to our NATO delegation. As you know, an earlier draft of this telegram was in fact cleared with you; but while Stuart was still handing it round, information came in which made it clear that the line we were proposing to instruct our delegation to take would be quite unacceptable both to the Americans and the Germans. In these circumstances, there was nothing for it but to start again from scratch. I dictated the revised version straight out and then had to run to the main Foreign Office building with it in order to catch Mulley as he was leaving. Unlike you, Mulley thought the balance in the telegram was right.

The time factor also made it impossible for us to consult you on our telegram no. 372 to Vienna. This came in late on Friday afternoon, and as Waring wanted "earliest practicable comments" we thought it best to get our first thoughts off before the weekend, knowing that both Michaels and I would be in Vienna on the Monday to discuss the implications at greater length. The draft was written at 6.45 p.m. on the Friday, an hour at which there are obvious difficulties in the way of full inter-departmental consultation. On the question of whether, if all delegations had thought it best to accept the original Russian wording (in order to avoid open debate about alternative wording, which would have been highly dangerous), we should have died in the last ditch to have the wording altered, we must agree to differ. As the Russians did not, I understand, proceed with their draft resolution, the question is in any case somewhat academic.

J. A. McAdam Clark, Esq.
MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY.
As regards our telegram no. 2366 to Bonn, I cannot off-hand remember the circumstances in which this was drafted, except that as we drafted it on Friday, 22 September, and wanted action taken and reported to us by Monday, 25 September, it was obviously essential to get it off straight away. Your objections to paragraph 2(d) I find difficult to understand. It is true, as you say, that approval of a Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and Euratom would be a much more important matter than the Euratom issues on which the Soviet Union have had to bow to the will of the majority in the past. But I cannot see that this is relevant. The Board will take its decisions by majority vote just the same, and the Russians undoubtedly realise this and have accepted the risk entailed. The only circumstances in which this might not be the case would be if there was some private understanding between the Americans and the Russians that the Americans would not support a draft Safeguards Agreement between Euratom and the I.A.E.A. which was unacceptable to the Russians. I asked the Americans about this in Vienna, and they assured me that there was no such understanding.

We do indeed recognise that where the I.A.E.A. and Euratom are involved you have every right to be consulted on the telegrams that we send out. At the same time, the object of the exercise is to get a non-proliferation treaty, with minimum adverse repercussions on our own nuclear industry and our relations with other countries whose cooperation is important to our own industry. I am entirely satisfied in my own mind that we have so far pursued our objective without damage to our Euratom image, and I hope that we shall be able to continue to do so. In this connexion I am not sure whether you have seen the attached copy of Bonn telegram no. 166 Saving.

(R. C. Hope-Jones).

CONFIDENTIAL
U.K. Offer on Safeguards

Mr. Mulley has seen your submission of 3 October and agrees with the conclusion in paragraph 2.

2. He feels that although we have earned little gratitude from our European allies for our offer, we certainly cannot go back on it now.

3. Mr. Mulley considers that the line for the U.K. Delegations to NATO and in Geneva to take is for them to stand pat on our April offer if they are asked about it (including the reservations we made at the time) but to refuse to be drawn any further. They could answer any questions about the implementation of our offer by saying that it will be time to talk about that when everyone has agreed to the draft non-proliferation treaty; in the meantime surely priority should be given to the treaty.

(D. J. Moss)
6 October, 1967
The advantage of this course from the point of view of European policy is self-evident. From the point of view of disarmament policy it might allow a little more time in which to urge on our prospective European partners the need to take a broader, more constructive view of world politics. It might also allow us time to get into negotiation with the Community before we have to face the decision whether or not to initial later in New York.

L. Draman

(N. Statham)
19 October, 1967

Copy to:
Sir C. O'Neill
Sir R. Jackling
Mr. Norrie
Mr. Andrew
Mr. Hall
The negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty entered a new phase on 24 August, when the United States and Soviet co-Chairmen of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (E.N.D.C.) tabled a draft text, complete except for Article III (the Safeguards Article) which was left blank. They hoped that within a few weeks they would be able to fill this blank and that in the meantime the rest of the draft would be examined in the E.N.D.C. and provisional agreement reached on a final version, so that by the time a text of Article III was finally tabled there would be little left to do.

2. These hopes have not been realised. Though the E.N.D.C. has met regularly, little real progress has been made, and the draft text has come in for a great deal of criticism, some of it constructive and some unconstructive. Constructive criticism, for example, has come from the Mexican representative, who has proposed, with a view to meeting the wide demand for a treaty that provided for a balance of obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers, that some of the pious aspirations in the preamble should be transformed into positive commitments in the body of the treaty. In particular, he has proposed that the nuclear powers should undertake definite obligations, first, to press ahead with meaningful discussion of genuine disarmament measures, and second, to ensure that the non-nuclear powers are not deprived of the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions by their renunciation of the right to conduct such explosions themselves. Though the exact wording may cause difficulty, the idea behind such proposals is sensible enough and they attract a wide measure of support from the non-aligned nations represented on the E.N.D.C. On the other hand, some representatives have indulged in purely destructive criticism; none more so, unfortunately, that the Indian representative, who seems to think ...
that non-proliferation means (or should mean) disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states as a first step and non-acquisition by the non-nuclear states as the second.

3. The only redeeming feature of the Indian reaction to the draft text is that they have not been pressing for security guarantees. Their line has been that security guarantees are no substitute for real security, which can only be based on nuclear disarmament. Other members of the E.N.D.C., however, are still concerned with security guarantees, and the Russians have recently been pressing the Americans to start discussions about how this demand can best be met. The co-Chairmen are agreed that some action will need to be taken, e.g. a U.N. resolution, possibly in conjunction with unilateral declarations by the nuclear powers, but so far Mr. Rusk has refused to focus on this problem. His view has been that it would be a tactical error to start working on Congress until there is a clear-cut need for security guarantees in order to get a non-proliferation treaty.

4. So far, the Americans and Russians have for the most part been content to sit back and listen to the debate. It was not easy for them to reach an agreed text and now that they have done so they understandably do not want to tinker with it more than is absolutely necessary. They are agreed on the need to avoid tying the treaty to other disarmament measures; on the other hand, they are anxious to show themselves as responsive as possible to non-aligned opinion.

Article III

5. While one set speech has followed another at Geneva with all too little visible result, the real centre of interest for the past six weeks has been the new Soviet compromise draft Article III, which the Americans have been trying to sell to /their
their NATO allies. (There is a good deal of
evidence that the draft was, in fact, a joint
effort and owed at least as much to the Americans
as to the Russians.) This draft represented a
substantial shift in the Soviet position. Previously,
they had always refused to recognise the existence
of Euratom as an entity in its own right, and had
insisted that the safeguards to be applied under
the treaty must be exclusively those of the IAEA
safeguards system. Their new draft made no
explicit reference to Euratom or to safeguards
systems other than that of the IAEA. There were
however ambiguities in the text which, according
to the Americans, the Russians were prepared to interpret
in a way that would permit the negotiation of a
safeguards agreement between Euratom and the Agency
of a kind which would make it possible for the Agency
to verify Euratom's safeguards system instead of
applying its own.

6. The Soviet draft has on several occasions been
discussed in the North Atlantic Council, but so far
the Americans have been unable to obtain the agree-
ment of the Council that it should be tabled in the
E.N.D.C. As with the rest of the treaty, it is
the Germans and Italians who have been giving the
most difficulty. The Germans have contended that
it is by no means clear that the text will permit
what is is apparently intended to permit, and that
they cannot accept an ambiguous text on which a
strained interpretation has to be put to give the
required result. The Italians have supported them
in this and have in addition continued to trot out
the old rígmarole about discriminatory safeguards
and commercial espionage, in spite of the confidential
offers by ourselves and the United States to put our
own civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
The Italians are not open to rational argument on
this subject, but it seems to be generally assumed
that they will give way if the Germans do.

/7. Much
7. Much will depend on their reaction to the views of the Euratom Commission, which have just been formulated. These are that all five non-nuclear states of Euratom must adopt the same position towards the provisions of the treaty, otherwise they will jeopardise the nuclear common market; that member states should seek amendments to the Soviet proposed text of Article III; but that if these amendments are not obtained or are inadequate, they should formulate a reservation at an appropriate stage in the negotiations. It is expected that a final decision on this report will be taken by the Council of Ministers of the Community on 24 October.

Difficulties for Her Majesty's Government

8. From our point of view the Soviet text of Article III is by no means ideal, partly because we have applied for membership of Euratom and so share Euratom preoccupations to some extent, but partly for other reasons. The Ministry of Technology and the UKAEA are convinced that the IAEA's present safeguards system will need extensive alteration to meet the requirements of a non-proliferation treaty, and they have been afraid that the Soviet text would have the effect of freezing the present system. One reason why they are so concerned about this is that we shall ourselves be offering to put our civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and fears have been expressed that the present system, if rigorously applied, could have adverse effects on our industry. Fortunately, these fears have now to some extent been dispelled by American assurances that everyone recognises the need for the Agency safeguards system to evolve and that the Soviet wording would not make this impossible. Subject to one or two amendments which the Americans think should prove negotiable with the Russians, we could now accept the Soviet text ourselves without real difficulty; but the same is not yet true of the Euratom countries.

/9. It
9. It has been difficult in recent weeks to strike the right balance between supporting the Americans in their attempts to get an agreed text and showing a proper regard for the difficulties of our European friends. So far we have been not unsuccessful in playing it both ways, and have been able to make one or two constructive suggestions for re-wording crucial passages in the draft. But the time is probably coming when we shall have to stand up and be counted. The First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly has altered the order of the items on its agenda in order to give the E.N.D.C. more time to conclude its work, but the E.N.D.C.'s session can hardly be continued beyond the end of the month. Though all will not necessarily be lost if the E.N.D.C. is not able to present a complete text to the General Assembly, the chances of getting a non-proliferation treaty will be greatly increased if they can do so. The Americans are therefore very anxious to join the Russians in tabling the Soviet text of Article III, with such amendments as they can negotiate, as soon as possible. Our European partners need not in fact do more than acquiesce in the tabling of a draft by the co-Chairmen on their own responsibility and without commitment by their allies. This is as far as the Germans and Italians have gone on the rest of the tabled treaty text. Even so, they may be reluctant to agree that the Soviet draft Article III should be tabled at all, as they realise that this could be regarded as tacit acceptance of the text on their part. We may therefore be faced with a situation in which the Germans and Italians refuse to agree that the Americans should table the text. Much would then depend on the attitude of Belgium and the Netherlands. If they were prepared to agree to the tabling of the text, we could clearly do so too. But if, as is much more likely, they reluctantly support their Euratom partners, we shall be in a real quandary.

/10. Even
10. Even if the Euratom countries do agree, without commitment, to the text being tabled, we shall not be out of the wood, as the co-Chairmen will then probably try to get members of the Committee who favour the draft of the whole treaty to initial it before discussion in New York. Given our public stand on non-proliferation and the attitude of Parliament, it would be most difficult for us to stand aside in these circumstances. Unfortunately, the only other "European" member of the E.N.D.C. is Italy; and the Italians, who object to other features of the draft treaty apart from the Soviet draft Article III (they are resolutely opposed to a treaty of unlimited duration) will certainly not be ready to go as far as initialing the draft in the next few weeks. There is therefore a risk that we shall want to initial a treaty of major importance which the only Euratom representative on the E.N.D.C. is not prepared to initial. This will make it very difficult for us to keep our disarmament policy and our European policy in step.

11. I have asked the Department to prepare a separate submission recommending the policy we should follow in the face of this dilemma in various situations in which it is likely to arise over the next few weeks.

Fred Mulley

(Fred Mulley)
19 October, 1967
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That the situation is likely to develop as he suggests in para 9.

Secrecy, 19/11

I think the situation in Germany and Italy is frankly rather less simple than Mr. Statham takes it to be in his minute. The fact is that in both countries there are some people who are prepared to see a non-proliferation treaty, but naturally want it to take account of the interests of Euratom, and others who for various reasons do not want a treaty to be concluded at all, or not yet. Much of the play so far has been procrastination on their part to avoid their having to resolve this fundamental conflict within their own Governments. Brosio told me last week that this was certainly the case in Italy.

2. During Dr. Kiesinger's visit I believe we must do our best to get him firmly into the former camp. He must be brought to see that if he genuinely wants to promote a détente with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, Germany cannot escape going through with the non-proliferation treaty. Of course we want to see Euratom's interests safeguarded, but the Euratom countries must tell the United States what they need in time for them to be able to negotiate on an acceptable basis with the Soviet co-Chairman. Many of their objections (never precisely framed) are not well-founded.

3. In the forthcoming discussions in the North Atlantic Council and at Geneva to agree a text for Article III, I think we should continue to speak in a generally European sense, but avoid getting out in front on any point.

/4. I

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4. I cannot agree with Mr. Statham's comments as to timing. I would like to start the process of persuading our prospective European partners to take "a broader, more constructive view of world politics" next week with Dr. Kiesinger, as recommended. If we want to give some substance to the frequent claims in the past about our initiatives in this field, now is the time to do something about it. Also, we cannot postpone the issue until negotiations on the E.E.C. are on the way, since if the dilemma is forced upon us in New York it will be before Christmas, probably in 4-5 weeks time.

5. I trust we can avoid a situation arising in which we are called on to initial a text in Geneva which is not acceptable to the Italian Government. (The best solution may be not to have any initialing at all.) If however we can be seen to have supported the European cause right up to the point of tabling, I doubt whether our initial, once the text had passed the point at which we could do anything about it, would really do us serious harm.

6. In the light of our position on non-proliferation over a long period it seems to me impossible to explain to the Party and the House that we are willing to jeopardise a non-proliferation treaty at the behest of Germany and Italy who are, after all, not being so willing to sacrifice anything on our behalf to get us into Euratom.

7. For these reasons I see much merit in making the Federal German Chancellor (and Euratom and Italy) fully aware of the problem for us if this confrontation becomes public, and leave them in no doubt that in such circumstances we must strongly back the draft Treaty. This is the course I recommend.

8. If you wish to consult your colleagues on these issues, the separate submission on the course of the negotiations may prove a suitable basis for a
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paper. I am sorry it is so long. I have seen the brief for the Kiesinger talks on this subject. It seems satisfactory but it may need some amendment, as to emphasis, in the light of your views on this submission. I have also asked for some additional material to be prepared to meet some possible new developments.

Fred Mulley

(Fred Mulley)

20 October, 1967

Copies to: Lord Chalfont
Sir C. O'Neill
Sir J. Rennie
Sir R. Jackling

Sgts.

Mr Mulley discussed this with
Lord Chalfont this morning. Lord
Chalfont agrees with the arguments
in Mr Mulley's minute.

Meanwhile Sir B. Fond has suggested that the Kiesinger brief on non-proliferation should be made more European.

Now see the amendments to the Kiesinger brief prepared in Sir R. Jackling's minute.

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Sir J. Bennis

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Problem

There has been encouraging progress on the non-proliferation treaty in the last two months. But the remaining problems could cause trouble. Specifically we must avoid any conflict between our European and disarmament policies. A number of occasions are likely to arise in the near future when we shall have to balance our policy of seeking to secure a non-proliferation treaty and the general support that exists for it in this country against the danger that can be done by differences with our prospective Common Market partners, in particular the Germans and Italians.

2. This situation is likely to arise specifically during the following occasions in the forthcoming weeks:
   (i) During the visit of the Federal German Chancellor;
   (ii) At the North Atlantic Council meeting, probably to be held on 25 October;
   (iii) In Geneva if the two Co-Chairmen table a text which is not acceptable to Germany, Italy or Euratom;
   (iv) If the Co-Chairmen table a draft Article III on Safeguards at Geneva on their own responsibility, in which the Europeans have acquiesced, and ask that the draft should be initialled before transmission to the U.N. General Assembly; but the Italians find themselves unable to initial.

Recommendation

3. I recommend that:
   (i) During Dr. Kiesinger’s visit we should adopt a robust line in urging on him the need to reach a solution of the safeguards problem in the non-proliferation treaty;
   (ii) Unless the Euratom decision is unexpectedly favourable, we should not take a prominent part in the North Atlantic Council meeting on 25 October but should rely, as we have effectively been doing so far, on bilateral approaches coupled with cautious support for the American line;

cc. Sir R. Jackling;
    Sir Con O’Neill
    Mr. Statham
    Mr. Hall
    Mr. Morgan

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(iiii) We should do our best to ensure that the U.S. does not agree to table a draft text of Article III which Germany, Italy or Burma have made clear is unacceptable;

(iv) We should if possible press the Americans in advance to defer initialising at Genova if the Italians are clearly going to be unable to do so, while urging the alternative of opening the treaty text for initialising at New York; if this solution is not possible we should be prepared to initial.

E.E.I.D. however disagree with this recommendation and are submitting a note of their views.

Background

4. The present stage of the non-proliferation negotiations is set out in the attached note. Briefly, on the all-important safeguards question we have reached the point where the Euratom Commission has put forward strong recommendations regarding Article III which are not likely to be welcome to the Russians but nevertheless seem to offer the possibility of agreement in Nato that the Americans should go ahead with their discussions with the Russians on a compromise text to be tabled by the two Co-Chairmen on their own responsibility and without commitment by their allies.

5. We do not yet know what view the member states of Euratom will adopt on these recommendations. We should know more clearly after the Council of Ministers has considered this question at Luncheon on 24 October. The Americans intend to call for a further special meeting of the North Atlantic Council as soon as a decision has been reached, presumably on 25 October.

6. We have already given instructions for further bilateral approaches to the Euratom countries concerned to urge the need for a rapid and reasonable solution of this problem. The German Chancellor's visit, once the major question of our EEC application has been dealt with, offers an opportunity to reinforce the official approach by pointing out to him the strength of support for a non-proliferation treaty in this country and the prevalent feeling that time is running out if we are to seize the chance of a treaty. There is reason to believe that if we can persuade the Germans, the Italians, in spite of their apparently stronger objections, should follow the same line.

7. If, as can be assumed, the non-nuclear members of Euratom generally adopt the Commission's recommendations on 24 October, this will give the Americans an opening to seek authority to continue negotiations on a compromise wording for Article III with the Russians at Genova. We should cautiously support this line but should not get out ahead of the Americans since this move will only be very reluctantly agreed by the Germans and Italians.

8. If the American and Russian Co-Chairmen were to go ahead and table in the face of a flat veto from the Europeans, this /would
would prejudice the chance of a treaty. The Canadians have recently advocated this course to us, but the Americans, on the other hand, have shown much more awareness of the need to carry the Burtons countries with them. I do not think we need raise this danger very high, but we should see that the Americans remain aware of the European aspects and our need to take them into account. It is of course possible that the Russians might table by themselves, but this should not pose the same dilemma as it would probably mean that they had given up immediate hope of a treaty and intended to revert to propaganda.

9. The most likely situation to arise is that the Americans will get the Europeans initially to acquiesce in the tabling of a draft at Geneva by the Co-Chairman on their own responsibility and without commitment by their allies. The Americans have said that they would then hope that members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee who favour the draft would initial it before forwarding the treaty text to the U.N. General Assembly. There is a danger that Italy, which is the only E.E.C. member in the U.N.D.C., would not be able to initial. Even if the Safeguards Article had been settled satisfactorily from their point of view, there are other Italian objections to the treaty on which they may wish to stand. Given our public attitude on non-proliferation, and that of Parliament, it would be most difficult for us to stand aside in these circumstances.

10. In this situation our first efforts should be directed towards persuading the Americans, and the Russians as well, to defer initialing the treaty until it has been presented to the General Assembly. In this wider forum our initialing would not be regarded so much as a blow at our European image, and we might even count on Belgium and the Netherlands initialing with us. If, however, we fail to get the initialing deferred in this way, which is a distinct possibility, then we shall have to declare openly our support for the treaty text in whose nego-
tiation we have played such a part, and explain our reasons frankly to our European allies. Any other course would not be understood in this country.

R. McC. Andrews

(R. McC. Andrews)
19 October, 1957.
Sir J. Bennie (away) 3/6

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Mr. Andrew's submission to you of 19 October was seen and agreed by me at an early stage when it did not contain the recommendations to which Mr. Statham objects. I did not see the version submitted to you, nor do I agree with it.

2. Apart from the points made by Mr. Statham in his minute of 19 October, with which I agree, I should add that taking "a robust line" with Dr. Kissinger and being prepared to initial the draft Treaty at Geneva if the Italians are unable to do so, could adversely affect our commercial nuclear interests in both Germany and Italy.

(G.R. Hall)
20 October 1967.

Copied to: Mr. R. Mc. Andrew
Sir R. Jackling
Sir C. O'Neill
Mr. Statham
Mr. Morgan
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MINUTES of a Meeting held in
Conference Room ‘C’, Cabinet Office, S.W.1., on
MONDAY, 23rd OCTOBER 1967 at 2.30 P.M.

PRESENT:

Mr. E.F. Newley,
Atomic Energy Authority
(Chair)

Mr. R.C. Hope-Jones,
Foreign Office

Mr. R. McC. Andrews,
Foreign Office

Mr. C. Hall,
Foreign Office

Mr. J. MacIver Clark,
Ministry of Technology

Mr. J.H. Macklin,
Ministry of Defence

Mr. A.C. Stuart,
Foreign Office

Dr. F.H. Panton,
Ministry of Defence

Mr. J.J. Croose,
Atomic Energy Authority

SECRETARY:

Dr. T. Swain
Mr. E.W.N. George

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MR. ANDREWS said there had been several developments during the last month in relation to the nuclear proliferation treaty. The United States had set out a number of proposals for changes in the Russian text of Article III on which we had made comments. The United States Disarmament Agency had taken up one of the alternative proposals we had made (that "each non-nuclear weapon State party to this treaty undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated for this purpose with the IAEA") but wanted to know whether EURATOM support would be forthcoming. The Americans appeared to us to be taking the easy way out, but it was possible that they had not fully understood the implications of the other alternatives we put before them.

Discussions with the Canadians had tended to confirm this suspicion, and our proposals had, therefore, been outlined more fully in the bilateral approaches we had made to EURATOM countries. The Americans, although initially restive, had now agreed that they should hold no further discussions with the USSR until the EURATOM response was known.

The discussions held in NATO again confirmed that our alternative proposals for Article III were not entirely understood by our partners and no positive line has emerged. It seems possible, however, that the next meeting of the NATO Council might lead to some definite agreement, since by then the attitude of the EURATOM countries should be known. The EURATOM Commission had now outlined its own proposals in relation to the non-proliferation treaty. Briefly these were that-

(i) all five non-nuclear states must adopt the same attitude in relation to the provisions of the treaty;

(ii) that the Russian draft Article III should be amended;

and

(iii) that if amendments to Article III were regarded as inadequate then a formal reservation should be entered.

The United States reaction to the Commission's report was that the idea of a "formal reservation" would not be negotiable with the Russians. The Belgians are also opposed to the idea of a formal reservation, and proposed that no country should ratify the treaty until a satisfactory IAEA-EURATOM agreement had been reached. The Germans are also against reservation, and instead have put forward a number of amendments to the Soviet draft Article III which, to our mind, are not negotiable. The full text of the German proposals has now been received and would be discussed during the present visit to this country of the German Chancellor, Dr. Kiesinger who was accompanied by Dr. Schnippenkoetter. The Italians had only outlined their views in general terms, but these were unhelpful. They had held a debate in their Senate in which our intention to offer certain of our facilities to safeguards was mentioned, but this does not seem to have aroused much comment.
In discussion it was suggested that the United States, although acknowledging that our approach to the European Economic Community precluded us from outspoken comment, were anxious to know our real views on the proposals formulated by the EURATOM countries. The difficulty facing the United Kingdom, was that our approach to safeguards provisions for the non-proliferation treaty was more in accord with the views of EURATOM countries than it was with those of the United States. It would be better, therefore, to hold out hand until the Council of Ministers of the EEC had not to decide their line on the EURATOM Commission report.

The ENDC was expected to report to the United Nations General Assembly by mid-November and, therefore, a text of the draft non-proliferation treaty, including Article III, should be tabled in about two weeks' time. Although a number of amendments had been suggested to other sections of the treaty, it was believed that these could be agreed by the Co-Chairman before the report was tabled. If the whole of the treaty had been agreed before submission to the General Assembly, it seemed unlikely that any further amendments would be allowed. There was a danger, however, that if the treaty was incomplete, or contained alternative versions of any section, the General Assembly might agree to a text which was unacceptable to any of the signatories. For this reason the United States had asked for agreed articles to be initialled by signatories. We had resisted this until we had more knowledge of the attitude of EURATOM countries, especially Germany and Italy.

The Committee--
Took note.
Dr. Schnippenkötter said that in order to explain the decisions reached at Luxembourg on 24 October he would first have to fill in the background a little. There had been difficulties in the German Cabinet over Article III, and Ministers were not willing to depart lightly from the principles established by Mr. Rusk's letter of May. The German intention was to find a wording for the Article compatible with the Euratom treaty and at the same time negotiable to the Soviet Union.

2. The six Foreign Ministers had discussed this at luncheon on 24 October, but not surprisingly no agreement had been reached at this level on such a technical subject. The only point on which they had agreed was that the five non-nuclear States of Euratom must adopt a common attitude: they then handed the details over to the experts to solve in the afternoon. The experts' meeting was also not a complete success, but agreement was reached on certain principles. It emerged from the Euratom Commission Report that the Soviet text and the Netherlands amendments thereto, and the Western draft of May, were all considered incompatible with the Euratom Treaty. If a version /was
was put forward under Article 105 on which there were legal doubts about the possibility of signatures by the members of Euratom, then this would have to be referred to the High Court of Justice and the result would be interminable wrangles. It had been agreed therefore that this course must be avoided.

3. Dr. Schnippenkötter mentioned in this connexion that there was a specific German problem in that the Federal German Republic was peculiarly liable to defamation by the Soviet Union. For this reason the Germans required a clear and unambiguous text. The reservation formula would jeopardise their position and expose them to such attacks. It was true therefore that they had more interest than the Dutch and Belgians, for instance, in a water-tight text. Mr. Hope-Jones pointed out that if the multilateral negotiations for the Euratom/I.A.E.A. Safeguards Agreement produced results unwelcome to the Soviet Union, the latter's fire would have to be directed against the Board of Governors just as much as Euratom. Dr. Schnippenkötter did not seem certain of this in view of the previous Soviet record.

4. Dr. Schnippenkötter listed the principles on which the Euratom countries were agreed:-

(a) Safeguards must be only on source and fissionable materials;

(b) Nothing should be in the text of the Article which could prevent Euratom from playing its part in the negotiations, this implied that it must be possible for Euratom itself to conclude an agreement under the Treaty;

(c) The substance of such an agreement should clearly allow for verification of Euratom safeguards;

(d) Nothing should jeopardise the existing position regarding supply of fissionable material (this was an Italian point and...
he did not quite know what they had in mind); 
(e) No guillotine.
5. He said he now recognised that there were two aspects to the guillotine,
(i) A fall-back to compulsory I.A.E.A. safeguards if agreement was not reached within the necessary period, although he realised that in practice this might be impossible, it was nevertheless envisaged in the U.S. and Soviet drafts;
(ii) The imposition of sanctions if agreement had not been reached after the décalé imposé. It had, for example, been suggested that fissile material could not be supplied to a state which had not completed an agreement within the time limit.
6. In reply to questions about what the next steps would be, Dr. Schnippenkötter said that the representatives would try for common language for amendments on 26 October. If agreement could then be reached they would ask for an early meeting of the North Atlantic Council to discuss the Euratom draft. The Commission had said that the proposed German text was compatible with the Euratom Treaty. An agreed text must be worked out. From the German point of view, the original American text had been regarded as compatible but the Commission had objected to the guillotine provision.
7. Discussion then turned to the text of the German and United Kingdom proposals. Dr. Schnippenkötter said that the German had followed the basic philosophy of the United Kingdom in replacing the reference to the acceptance of I.A.E.A. safeguards by an undertaking to reach an agreement with the I.A.E.A. This was both more realistic, since it reflected the normal process /of

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of applying safeguards through an I.A.E.A. agreement, and also
more acceptable to Euratom since it left open the possibility
of verification.

8. Mr. Hope-Jones asked whether the Germans were insistent on
running together the first sentences of paragraphs 1 and 4 of
the Soviet draft. We ourselves started from the position that,
provided we got what we wanted, it would be better to change the
Soviet draft as little as possible since this would be more
negotiable. Although he himself had originally suggested the
transfer of the substance of the first sentence of paragraph 4
of the Soviet text to paragraph 1, we now wondered whether it
might not be better to leave paragraph 4 as far as possible in
its present form, while at the same time introducing the concept
of Agreements into paragraph 1.

9. Dr. Schnippenkötter replied that the Germans were not bound
to any particular language, they wanted simply to establish
their requirements. These were first a text which did not refer
to "I.A.E.A. safeguards". This they regarded as absolutely
essential, since any reference to I.A.E.A. safeguards would rule
out verification. Second, the text must leave open the possi-
bility of all three types of agreement with the I.A.E.A.,
(a) bilateral, (b) multilateral, and (c) agreement with an
organisation (i.e. Euratom). Although the Russians had said
that their reference to the I.A.E.A. Statute in paragraph 4 was
intended to cover all three types of agreement, they had in fact
only referred specifically to the first two. Although the
Germans were prepared to accept agreed interpretations which
underlined the meaning of the text, they would not be satisfied
/
if the interpretations appeared to run counter to the actual language of the treaty. Since agreements with organisations appeared to have been deliberately excluded, and since Article XIV of the I.A.E.A. Statute ostensibly dealt with Relationship and not Safeguards Agreements, they were not satisfied that interpretations would be enough to make the Russian text acceptable.

10. Although they had proposed rather complicated language for paragraph 1 in order to rectify this defect, he himself wondered whether it might not also be possible to do without any reference to types of agreement and to refer simply to the I.A.E.A. Statute. The deletion of specific references to the first two forms of agreement might make it possible to establish all three types by means of interpretations. He emphasised, however, that he was speaking personally; that the German draft had been cleared by the Federal German Cabinet; and that he had no authority to change it on his own.

11. Mr. Hope-Jones said that although we had no knowledge of what was or was not negotiable, apart from what the Americans told us, he thought that if Dr. Schnippenkötter’s idea proved acceptable to Euratom it would greatly improve the chances of Russian agreement.

12. Dr. Schnippenkötter said that, if this was agreed, the redraft of the first sentence of paragraph 1 of the Soviet draft would then read:-

"... to have safeguards as set forth in agreements negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency as provided in the Agency's Statute. Conclusion of such agreements

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agreements shall be facilitated by members of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and other parties
to the treaty."

He also pointed out that " - to accept safeguards - " in the
Soviet draft had been changed to " - to have safeguards - " in
the German text. The reason was that they wanted verification
of Euratom safeguards, which already existed. There was no
question of accepting something new.

13. Mr. Hope-Jones then asked about the proposed German
amendments to the second and third sentences of the first para-
graph. The Americans had said that the Russians would not
accept the deletion of all reference to the I.A.E.A. Safeguards
System and would probably insist on keeping the rest of the
second and third sentences as well. We preferred deletion,
but had suggested ways in which this passage might be improved
if deletion was impossible. What did the Germans think?

14. Dr. Schnippenkötter replied that although they thought the
U.K. suggestions were an improvement on the Russian and American
proposals, the German Government were insistent on the deletion
of the third sentence, since they did not want any reference to
safeguards on facilities. And while, unlike the Dutch, they
were prepared to let the second sentence stand, the reference
to the I.A.E.A. system must be deleted, since this implied both
that the system would be frozen and also that it would have to
be applied, thus ruling out verification.

15. The German Government also required the deletion of the
words " ... or carried out by it anywhere" in the fourth sentence
of the first paragraph. For the Euratom area these words were
unnecessary,

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unnecessary, since Euratom safeguards would continue to operate under verification arrangements and would cover, for example, German installations in France. In the rest of the world, if a party to the treaty tried to set up a nuclear plant in the territory of a non-nuclear non-party, then safeguards would be automatically applied to the transferred materials and equipment by the operation of paragraph 2.

16. Mr. Hope-Jones suggested that the latter would not in fact be the case. Paragraph 2 dealt with the provision of materials and equipment to other states. But if the exporting state used the material itself in another country, then there would be no such provision and paragraph 2 would not apply.

17. Mr. Hope-Jones then turned to the German suggestion that paragraph 2 should apply to transfers for peaceful purposes to nuclear-weapon states as well as non-nuclear. We did not believe that the Russians would accept this. We also doubted whether France would in the long run, whatever they might say now. Even verification would involve some form of I.A.E.A. "checking", which would be unwelcome to the French. We would also have some difficulty about the proposal ourselves.

18. Dr. Schnippenkötter expressed some surprise that the proposal would cause any problem for the U.K. in view of our own safeguards offer. He had been assured that the French would accept it. It was important to introduce the principle of non-discrimination as far as possible.

19. It was agreed that the German proposal to insert a reference to preambular undertakings in paragraph 3 was acceptable. Finally Dr. Schnippenkötter explained that the idea of leaving /blanks
blanks in paragraph 4 instead of the proposed fixed periods during which agreements must be reached, derived from the Italians, who were worried about the guillotine.
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NON-PROLIFERATION

In our attitude to the non-proliferation treaty, and in particular to the draft Article III on safeguards which is the principal concern of Euratom and its European members, we have managed so far to perform an adequate balancing act: we have taken satisfactory account of the Euratom objections and at the same time assisted the Americans by steering our European allies towards more acceptable solutions.

2. Time is now getting short. It is generally assumed that the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee must report to the United Nations Secretary General by mid-November at the latest. This means that unless the Russians show themselves unexpectedly sympathetic towards amendments of their draft Article III which meet Euratom requirements in full, the Americans are likely to find themselves at loggerheads with the Euratom countries. Both sides would then look for our support.

3. It is difficult to foresee the exact course of the future negotiations, but the following are the main possibilities:

/(a)
(a) No agreement is reached on the text of Article III on safeguards and the non-proliferation treaty text is forwarded to the United Nations with this Article left blank. This, as we have emphasized to our European friends, could leave a dangerous gap which might well be filled by U.N. members proposing an Article III that would be unpalatable. It might also, like the Swedish draft, be unpalatable to us, but in that case it would probably be unacceptable to the Russians too. If, however, it was acceptable to us but not to Buratom, we should face a difficult decision.

(b) No agreement is reached on Article III and the Russians and Americans forward the treaty, both tabling at the same time their own version of the Article. Provided the text tabled by the Americans was acceptable to Buratom (which cannot be taken completely for granted), our course would be clear. But in these circumstances there would be little hope of final agreement.

(c) The Americans and the Russians as co-chairmen go ahead on their own and table a joint draft Article III which is quite unacceptable to the members of Buratom. The Canadians have in fact already urged this course. Such an Article III would probably be acceptable to us as a nuclear power, but we should face the same kind of decision as at (a). Fortunately, this situation is rather unlikely to arise because the Americans
Americans are now showing themselves more fully aware of the need to carry the European allies with them.

4. The Americans get the Europeans to acquiesce in the tabling of a draft Article III at Geneva by the co-chairmen on their own responsibility and without commitment by their allies. This would suit us best, but the Americans have said that they would then hope that members of the N.N.D.C. who favoured the complete draft treaty would initial it.

4. This last possibility is the one that is of most immediate concern to us, since it is most improbable that Italy (the only representative of Turaton in the N.N.D.C.) would feel able to initial the draft, and we ourselves would obviously wish to do so. Fortunately, however, there are signs that the Americans may not find initialling at Geneva practicable. For one thing, governments will presumably require some time to consider the draft, and time is running out. In addition, even such a reasonable non-aligned member as Sweden has been expressing doubts about the possibility of early approval. If initialling were to be deferred until the draft was in the hands of the U.N. General Assembly, we should not find quite as much difficulty in differing with the Italians in that wider forum.
5. The Minister of State has said in the attached minute:
   "I trust we can avoid a situation arising in which we are called on to initial a text in Geneva which is not acceptable to the Italian Government. (The best solution may be not to have any initialling at all.) If however we can be seen to have supported the European cause right up to the point of tabling, I doubt whether our initial, once the text had passed the point at which we could do anything about it, would really do us serious harm."

6. There remains our policy towards the Buraton position during the intervening period. On this the Minister of State has minuted:
   "In the forthcoming discussions in the North Atlantic Council and at Geneva to agree a text for Article III, I think we should continue to speak in a generally European sense, but avoid getting cut in front on any point."

7. This recommendation accords with the further information we now have on the German position from Dr. Kiesinger and Dr. Schippenköuter, and on the likely progress towards agreement in Buraton. It is clear that the two main /German

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ATOMIC ENERGY AND DISARMAMENT DEPARTMENT
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MINUTES of a Meeting held in
Conference Room 'C', Cabinet Office, S.W.1., on
MIDAY, 23rd OCTOBER 1967 at 2.30 p.m.

PRESENT:
Mr. E.P. Haxley,
Atomic Energy Authority
(In the Chair)
Mr. R.C. Hope-Jones,
Foreign Office
Mr. W.I. Michaels,
Ministry of Technology
Mr. R.C. Hope-Jones,
Foreign Office
Mr. W.I. Michaels,
Ministry of Technology
Mr. V.H.B. Muckle,
Ministry of Defence
Dr. H. Press,
Cabinet Office

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:
Mr. E. McC. Andrews,
Foreign Office
Mr. C. Hall,
Foreign Office
Mr. J. McAdam Clark,
Ministry of Technology
Mr. E. McC. Andrews,
Foreign Office
Mr. C. Hall,
Foreign Office
Mr. J. McAdam Clark,
Ministry of Technology
Mr. A.C. Stuart,
Foreign Office
Dr. F.H. Futon,
Ministry of Defence
Mr. J.L. Crooke,
Atomic Energy Authority

SECRETARY:
Dr. T. Sabin
Mr. K.W.N. George

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1. REPORT ON THE LATEST POSITION IN NDC

Mr. Andrews said there had been several developments during the last month in relation to the nuclear proliferation treaty. The United States had set out a number of proposals for changes in the Russian text of Article III on which we had made comments. The United States Disarmament Agency had taken up one of the alternative proposals we had made (that "each non-nuclear weapon state party to this treaty undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated for this purpose with the IAEA") but wanted to know whether EIRATOM support would be forthcoming. The Americans appeared to us to be taking the easy way out, but it was possible that they had not fully understood the implications of the other alternatives we put before them.

Discussions with the Canadians had tended to confirm this suspicion, and our proposals had, therefore, been outlined more fully in the bilateral approaches we had made to EIRATOM countries. The Americans, although initially negative, had now agreed that they should hold no further discussions with the USSR until the EIRATOM response was known. The discussions held in NATO again confirmed that our alternative proposals for Article III were not entirely understood by our partners and no positive line has emerged. It seems possible, however, that the next meeting of the NATO Council might lead to some definite agreement, since by then the attitude of the EIRATOM countries should be known. The EIRATOM Commission has now outlined its own proposals in relation to the non-proliferation treaty. Briefly these were that—

(i) all five non-nuclear states must adopt the same attitude in relation to the provisions of the treaty;

(ii) that the Russian draft Article III should be amended;

and

(iii) that if amendments to Article III were regarded as inadequate then a formal reservation should be entered.

The United States reaction to the Commission’s report was that the idea of a "formal reservation" would not be negotiable with the Russians. The Belgians are also opposed to the idea of a formal reservation, and proposed that no country should ratify the treaty until a satisfactory IAEA-EIRATOM agreement had been reached. The Germans are also against reservation, and instead have put forward a number of amendments to the Soviet draft Article III which, to our mind, are not negotiable. The full text of the German proposals has now been received and would be discussed during the present visit to this country of the German Chancellor, Dr. Kleinsteger who was accompanied by Dr. Schiessenhoetter. The Italians had only outlined their views in general terms, but these were unhelpful. They had held a debate in their Senate in which our intention to offer certain of our facilities to safeguards was mentioned, but this does not seem to have aroused much comment.

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In discussion it was suggested that the United States, although acknowledging that our approach to the European Economic Community precludes us from outspoken comment, were anxious to know our real views on the proposals formulated by the NURATOM countries. The difficulty facing the United Kingdom, was that our approach to safeguards provisions for the non-proliferation treaty was more in accord with the views of NURATOM countries than it was with those of the United States. It would be better, therefore, to hold over hand until the Council of Ministers of the EEC had not to decide their line on the NURATOM Commission report.

The EEC was expected to report to the United Nations General Assembly by mid-November and, therefore, a text of the draft non-proliferation treaty, including Article III, should be tabled in about two weeks' time. Although a number of amendments had been suggested to other sections of the treaty, it was believed that these could be agreed by the Co-Chairman before the report was tabled. If the whole of the treaty had been agreed before submission to the General Assembly, it seemed unlikely that any further amendments would be allowed. There was a danger, however, that if the treaty was incomplete, or contained alternative versions of any section, the General Assembly might agree to a text which was unacceptable to any of the signatories. For this reason the United States had asked for agreed articles to be initialled by signatories. We had resisted this until we had more knowledge of the attitude of NURATOM countries, especially Germany and Italy.

The Committee -

Took note.
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Lord Hood

NON-PROLIFERATION

Flag A
I attach the paper asked for by Mr. Maitland and Mr. Wright in their minutes of 24 October. I realise that it is not quite what was envisaged, but the request was based on the assumption that there is a continuing difference of opinion within the Office on the line we should follow. In fact this difference of opinion was resolved by Mr. Mulley’s minute of 20 October, since the arguments in this minute were accepted by Lord Chalfont.

Flag B
2. Though the paper has been slightly amended since being agreed with E.E.I.D., none of the amendments involve policy issues.

R. C. Hope-Jones
(R. C. Hope-Jones)
27 October, 1967.

cc. Mr. O’Neill;
Mr. Merland;
Sir C. O’Neill;
Sir R. Jackling;
E.E.I.D.;
S.R.D.;
Western Dept.

Now see new
paper P/A 13/67

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NON-PROLIFERATION

In our attitude to the non-proliferation treaty, and in particular to the draft Article III on safeguards which is the principal concern of Euratom and its European members, we have managed so far to perform an adequate balancing act: we have taken satisfactory account of the Euratom objections and at the same time assisted the Americans by steering our European allies towards more acceptable solutions.

2. Time is now getting short. It is generally assumed that the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee must report to the United Nations Secretary General by mid-November at the latest. This means that unless the Russians show themselves unexpectedly sympathetic towards amendments of their draft Article III which meet Euratom requirements in full, the Americans are likely to find themselves at loggerheads with the Euratom countries. Both sides would then look for our support.

3. It is difficult to foresee the exact course of the future negotiations, but the following are the main possibilities:-

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(a) No agreement is reached on the text of Article III on safeguards and the non-proliferation treaty text is forwarded to the United Nations with this Article left blank. This, as we have emphasised to our European friends, could leave a dangerous gap which might well be filled by U.N. members proposing an Article III that would be unpalatable. It might also, like the Swedish draft, be unpalatable to us, but in that case it would probably be unacceptable to the Russians too. If, however, it was acceptable to us but not to Euratom, we should face a difficult decision.

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Americans are now showing themselves more fully aware of the need to carry the European allies with them.

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/5.

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE
AT 11 a.m. ON 30 OCTOBER, 1967

Present: Rt. Hon. Fred Mulley, M.P. Mr. Alan McKnight
Mr. R. C. Hope-Jones Mr. R. J. O’Neill

Invited by Mr. Mulley to comment on the negotiations over
the Safeguards Article in the draft non-proliferation treaty,
Mr. McKnight said that, as seen from Vienna, the Soviet Union
and other Eastern European countries except Rumania were leading
the field in pressing for a strong safeguards system. India
seemed less obdurate in her opposition to safeguards than in the
past, but he thought she would still take some months to come
round. Mr. Mulley commented that he thought India was bound
to sign the treaty in the end, and Indian objections were less
to safeguards than to the ideas underlying the treaty itself.

2. On the scope for negotiating an agreement between the
International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) and Euratom, Mr.
McKnight said that the Agency considered the Euratom safeguards
system to be quite good, in particular their methods for recording
transfers of nuclear material, but Euratom should pay more
attention to the technical verification of inventories. A
complete record was maintained in Brussels of the quantities and
whereabouts of all nuclear materials within the Community. An
agreement between I.A.E.A. and Euratom would, in his opinion,
have to provide for the I.A.E.A.:-

(i) To receive full details of the Euratom system;
(ii) To be able to assure itself that the Euratom system
remained effective, e.g. by a 5 per cent. check on
notifications of transfers;
(iii) To be able to check the methods used in book audits;
(iv) To receive the written instructions given to Euratom inspectors for the physical verification of book returns. This should enable the Agency to satisfy itself of the efficacy of the Euratom system, and that it was compatible with that of the I.A.E.A. The Agency would also require—

(v) The power to ascertain by physical verification that Euratom inspections were in fact carried out. The Agency would need the right to do this on a random and sample basis.

3. Taking the problem of inspection of the Eurochemic plant as an example, the I.A.E.A. would want to be able—

(i) To put its own standard samples for analysis by the Eurochemic control team;

(ii) To follow through the process of inspection; and also

(iii) To carry out an independent verification of a proportion of the analyses carried out by Eurochemic.

This last power was necessary since if, as was likely, the normal method of safeguards control was to be through mass spectroscopy, the accuracy of the instruments used was of vital importance. There would also be political value in being able to carry out these checks in laboratories in a neutral country, e.g. Sweden or Yugoslavia. The Agency would not need to keep an inspector permanently in the Eurochemic plant (where there were four Euratom inspectors), but would wish to visit the plant some six to ten times a year. The details of how the I.A.E.A. would verify the Euratom safeguards system need not be written into the agreement between Euratom and the I.A.E.A. In practice, many of the fears expressed by Euratom would be likely to prove groundless: the British experience of the I.A.E.A. inspections at Bradwell, for example, tended, he thought, to bear this out.

4. Mr. Mulley commented that it was a question of striking the delicate balance between an agreement which Euratom felt able to accept without losing "face", and one which was also acceptable to the Soviet Union as being effective. The Soviet Government would not accept "self-inspection". Mr. Hope-Jones said he thought that for this reason the I.A.E.A./Euratom agreement would /probably
probably have to be rather more specific than Mr. McKnight had suggested. Both sides would wish to be clear from the outset what obligations they were accepting.

5. Mr. McKnight said he would wish to see provision made in any agreement for a review of its provisions after they had been in operation for twelve months. Euratom had in fact already given the United States the right to verify the Euratom safeguards system, where appropriate. The United States had however sent only low-level representatives, to meetings held as infrequently as every six months; and this agreement was now under attack in the United States as ineffective. It must be remembered however that whilst the United States Government had advocated safeguards energetically for political reasons, they had not done much work on the technical implications. For that matter, Euratom had a safeguards staff of only about 25 out of a total of more than 3,000 employees.

6. Mr. Mulley said the first requirement was to get some formulation of the obligation of signatories of the non-proliferation treaty to conclude agreements with the I.A.E.A., in order to complete the treaty. Thereafter the problem would be handed on to the Agency. Would the Agency aim to conclude standard agreements as far as possible? Mr. McKnight said certainly. The Mexican Government had asked the Agency to produce a draft safeguards agreement for use in the Latin American nuclear-free zone, and this draft could be virtually identical with the draft of the agreements to be made under the non-proliferation treaty.

7. Mr. Mulley said that the other concern of Her Majesty's Government was that the non-proliferation treaty should not "freeze" the I.A.E.A. control system. At the same time it would be most unwise to raise the question of reforming the I.A.E.A. system at present, since this would give India and other like-minded Governments an opportunity to delay the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty. Mr. McKnight said he agreed that the I.A.E.A. safeguards system should be flexible, but he had much sympathy in principle with the wish of the Soviet and other Governments.
I understand this subject was in fact discussed at the Under-Secretary's meeting this morning and it was agreed that a new and rather simpler paper should be put up to the Secretary of State on this subject.

Since then we have had a report by telephone of yesterday's meeting of the NATO Council (their reporting telegram should be in by the time you attend the meeting). It seems to have been reasonably successful for the Americans. Briefly, Mr. Cleveland acted on the instructions contained in Washington telegram No. 3392 but softened them somewhat so as not to offend Euratom. Sir B. Burrows spoke on the lines of the instructions in our telegram No. 1693 suggesting that the Americans should at least try the various possibilities on the Russians.

The result of the meeting was that the Americans got the green light to start negotiations with the Soviet co-chairman in Geneva. The stage will now therefore move to Geneva. The Americans said that they would make the maximum effort in their negotiations to protect Euratom's interests as defined in Euratom's five principles, but they did not apparently refuse to put forward elements from other texts such as, for instance, the German illustrative text. The Germans are of course in a rather weaker position since their text has not been accepted unanimously by the other four members of Euratom. In fact the only disagreement at the meeting of the Council was when the Germans claimed that the Euratom five principles were their minimum demands whereupon the Dutch said that some people's minimum was other people's maximum.

The Americans are still aiming to get an agreed text by the middle of November. Now that they can go ahead in Geneva the chances of reaching a solution are much better. All the same, time is so short that we do not anticipate that the Americans can possibly now ask for any agreed draft text to be initially by members of the E.N.D.C. We therefore need not fear now the possibility of having a confrontation with the Italians if we initial and they do not.

Sir R. Jackling asked me about the position today and said that he thought that a short paper should be prepared for the Secretary of State as soon as the reporting telegram is received by the Department from NATO.

(Rec. McC. Andrew) 31 October, 1967

R.M.C. Andrew
The United States wishes to inform its Allies of the status of the negotiations with the Soviet Union on Article III of the Non-proliferation Treaty.

1. The United States Draft of November 2. On November 2, 1967, the US co-chairman of the ENDC proposed to the Soviet co-chairman the draft Article III which is attached. At the same time, the US co-chairman gave the Soviet co-chairman the five principles set forth below as well as the text of the interpretation contained in the US Aide-Memoire of October 5, 1967.

2. The United States November Draft and the Five Euratom Member Principles. We believe this text and these interpretations protect the five principles agreed by Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands in the following manner:

   Principle 1: "Safeguards under the NPT would be applied to source and special fissionable material and not to facilities."

   The November 2 US draft deletes the third sentence of the Soviet compromise text which provided that safeguards procedures "should also extend to facilities . . ." (emphasis added). As suggested by some of our Allies, the second sentence is retained except for its reference to the IAEA safeguards system.

   Principle 2: "There should be no misunderstanding that as far as EA member states are concerned, safeguards . . ."
under NPT will be applied on the basis of an agreement to be concluded between EA and IAEA."

The first sentence of the November 2 US draft adds language stating that safeguards under NPT would be "as set forth in an agreement to be... concluded with the IAEA." It also makes clear that these safeguards would have to be "in accordance with the statute of the IAEA...". The fourth paragraph of the text would permit non-nuclear-weapon states to conclude IAEA agreements "either individually or together with other states in accordance with the statute of the IAEA."

In presenting the revised text to the Soviet Union, the US representative made clear that the US relies on the provisions of the IAEA statute dealing both with "bilateral and multilateral arrangements" for safeguards and with "relationship" agreements between IAEA and other international organizations the work of which is related to that of the IAEA. He stated: "The US is of the opinion that this language permits parties to the Treaty to negotiate and conclude an agreement with the IAEA through Euratom to carry out their safeguards obligation and that an IAEA-Euratom agreement would result from these negotiations."

Finally, the US representative told the Soviet representative that the US would state the following interpretation to the ENDC and to the IAEA Board of Governors: "The first sentence of paragraph 4 of the draft Article III permits the IAEA to enter into an agreement, concerning the safeguards obligations of the parties, with another international organization, the work of which is related to the IAEA and the membership of which includes the parties concerned."
into between the IAEA and another international organization the work of which is related to the IAEA and the membership of which includes the parties concerned."

3. "In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the IAEA should make appropriate use of existing records and safeguards, provided that under such mutually agreed arrangements the IAEA can satisfy itself that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

Principle 4: "Pending the conclusion of the agreement between Euratom and IAEA, EA member states concerned wish to stress that there should be no misunderstanding that the obligations with regard to Euratom entered into by any party to a NPT shall not be affected by provisions of Article III dealing with supply."

The United States takes this to be more directed toward future action of the US than toward the provision of Article III dealing with supply. This provision is essentially the same as the corresponding provision of the US draft approved in NAC on April 20, 1967.

Like the April 20 draft, the undertaking concerning safeguarded supply of nuclear materials to non-nuclear-weapon states does not apply until a specified period after the Treaty enters into force. This period does not begin to run until a substantial (30-40) number of non-nuclear-weapon states have ratified. These ratifications will probably require substantial time. The US, whose ratification is also necessary to entry into force, will obviously have to take into account the status of the IAEA-Euratom negotiations before ratifying. We do not expect any conflict to arise
between our NPT obligations and the supply obligations we have to Euratom and its members. We believe the time available for conclusion of an IAEA-Euratom agreement is sufficient, and we do not contemplate failure to achieve agreement in that period.

Principle 5: "Euratom member states concerned, determined to act in common, have to be sure that the position of Euratom when negotiating to arrive at a satisfactory agreement with IAEA will not be prejudiced by any eventual provision of Article III, as for example on a time period."

Like the US draft approved in NAC on April 20, 1967, the November 2 US draft contains a time period for conclusion of Euratom's negotiations with IAEA. Unlike the April 20 draft, the November 2 draft makes that period applicable to IAEA negotiations with all states, not just with Euratom members. Without some time period, we see no way to secure worldwide implementation of NPT safeguards. We believe the time period is adequate if there are good faith negotiations on both sides.

To sum up our views with respect to the five principles, we believe the November 2 US draft protects them to the greatest extent possible under the circumstances. Insofar as this protection appears inadequate to our Allies, they may follow procedures available to any sovereign state to insure that a satisfactory agreement with the IAEA is worked out.

3. Other Provisions in November 2 Draft. There are two other significant changes reflected in the November 2 draft which do not relate to the five principles but are
designed to meet the requests of certain Euratom members. The first is to add the word "control" to the last sentence of paragraph 1 so that safeguards would be applicable to nuclear material in a peaceful nuclear activity of a non-nuclear-weapon party "carried out under its control anywhere." In presenting this change, the US representative made clear again that Article III would not require the application of safeguards to the French-Belgian or French-German facilities in France.

The second such change is to add a provision to paragraph 3 referring to the preambular principle on instrumented safeguards. The last phrase of paragraph 3 would be amended to make clear that safeguards would be implemented in accordance with "the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble."

4. Soviet Response to US November 2 Draft. At first, the Soviets objected to several key points of the US draft and questioned some of the interpretations. Then, at a meeting on November 9, 1967, the Soviet co-chairman said that he would recommend to his government as a package all US proposals of November 2 provided the US agreed to a reformulation of the first sentence. He said he would forego introducing other changes only because of the need to make progress as quickly as possible. He said he would wish to make an ENDC statement to the effect that IAEA safeguards would be generally applicable as the NPT safeguards system. He added that he would not take issue with the interpretative statements planned by the US.

The reformulation of the first sentence involves the deletion of the word "negotiation," which the Soviet
Governments to control more closely the safeguards work of the Agency. Any revision of the present I.A.E.A. control system would take a long time: two years had been required to draw up the present system, and to prepare a revised system might take even longer. He did not think that the recruitment of staff to carry out the safeguards required by the non-proliferation treaty would present an unsuperable problem. The Agency's salaries were attractive for staff from all but three or four countries, and he thought it was generally accepted that the voluntary inspection which the United States and United Kingdom might accept should be introduced only gradually. The first requirement would be to inspect the non-nuclear signatories of the treaty, and it would be sufficient at the start to carry out token inspections only in Britain and the United States.
U.S. Draft Article III Submitted to
Soviet Union November 2, 1967.

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the statute of the IAEA and the agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed, or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each state party to the treaty undertakes not to provide:
   a.) Source or special fissionable material, or
   b.) Equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty shall conclude agreements with the IAEA to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other states in accordance with the statute of the IAEA. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this treaty. For states depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIOITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKDIS GENEVA
TELNO 562
7 NOVEMBER 1967 (AD)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESS TO UKDIS GENEVA TELEGRAM NUMBER 562 OF 7 NOVEMBER
AND TO WASHINGTON REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKDEL NATO,
UKDEL BRUSSELS, BONN, ROME, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE AND VIENNA.

U.S. / U.K. OFFER ON SAFEGUARDS.

WE PRESUME THAT WHEN ARTICLE III IS TABLED BY THE CO-CHAIRMEN
THE AMERICANS WILL WISH TO MAKE THEIR OWN SAFEGUARDS OFFER
PUBLIC SIMULTANEOUSLY. ALWAYS ASSUMING, AS WE DO, THAT THE
TABLED SAFEGUARDS TEXT WILL BE ONE THAT WE CAN ACCEPT, WE SHALL
WANT TO MAKE OUR OFFER AT THE SAME TIME AS THE AMERICANS.

2. OUR PRESENT INTENTION IS TO CONFINCE OURSELVES INITIALLY
TO A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT WHILE WE APPRECIATE THAT A
COMPLETELY NON-DISCRIMINATORY SAFEGUARDS ARTICLE MAY NOT BE
POSSIBLE, AND INDEED THAT THE APPLICATION TO THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON-
STATES OF SAFEGUARDS AGAINST DIVERSION TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS
NOT STRICTLY LOGICAL, NEVERTHELESS WE RECOGNISE THE JUSTIFICATION
FOR THE DEMAND THAT DISCRIMINATION SHOULD BE ELIMINATED AS FAR
AS POSSIBLE IN ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY. WE ARE THEREFORE PREPARED, IF IT WOULD HELP THE NEGOTIATION
OF THE TREATY, TO MAKE AN OFFER IN THE WORDS SET OUT IN MY TELEGRAM
NO. 971 OF 18 APRIL TO PARIS.

3. WE WOULD WISH TO AVOID QUALIFYING OR COMMENTING ON THIS
STATEMENT INITIALLY, AS ANY QUALIFICATIONS COULD ONLY HAVE THE
RESULT OF LESSENING THE IMPACT OF THE OFFER, AND COMMENT WOULD
BE UNDESIRABLE WHEN THE DETAILED APPLICATION OF OUR OFFER WAS
STILL UNSETTLED. IF, HOWEVER, WE WERE DIRECTLY QUESTIONED ABOUT
THE EXACT NATURE AND EXTENT OF OUR COMMITMENT, WE WOULD SAY THAT
WHILE OUR STATEMENT MEANT WHAT IT SAID, ITS IMPLEMENTATION WOULD
OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO DEPEND ON THE COURSE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION
NEGOTIATIONS. IF ASKED ABOUT THE TYPE OF SAFEGUARDS TO BE APPLIED
WE COULD POINT OUT THAT OUR OFFER SPOKE OF SIMILAR INTERNATIONAL
SAFEGUARDS
CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 562 TO UKDIS GENEVA

SAFEGUARDS TO THOSE ACCEPTED UNDER THE TREATY, AS PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS OF EURATOM WE WOULD NATURALLY HOPE THAT THOSE SAFEGUARDS WOULD INCLUDE A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE I.A.E.A. AND EURATOM.

4. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT SEEK, AS THEY HAVE DONE OVER THE LATIN AMERICAN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE TREATY, TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THEIR OWN RIGIDITY BY DERIDING THE UNREALITY AND INADEQUACY OF OUR OFFER, AND PARTICULARLY THE LOophOLE THAT IS PROVIDED BY QUOTE NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS UNQUOTE. TO THIS OUR REPLY WOULD BE THAT AT LEAST OUR OFFER HAS BEEN MADE. WE HAVE ACCEPTED THAT IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO GET A FULLY NON-DISCRIMINATORY TREATY, BUT WE WOULD WELCOME ANY SIMILAR OFFER FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

5. PLEASE GO OVER THESE POINTS WITH THE AMERICANS IN GENEVA AND WASHINGTON (LETTING THEM KNOW THAT WE ARE DOING THIS IN BOTH PLACES FOR REASONS OF CONVENIENCE ONLY). WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER THEIR OWN IDEAS ON TIMING OR TACTICS DIFFER FROM OURS.

B Seyfa

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P.O. A.E. & D.D.
Scientific Relations Dept.
E.E.I.D.
Sir John Rennie

Sir P. go on-both may wish to see.

Geneva telegrams nos. 229 and 230 give a rather gloomy impression of the progress of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on a Safeguards Article III, and of the prospects of early agreement between the co-chairmen leading to the tabling of such an Article and a shift of the debate to New York.

2. Sir Harold Beeley may well be right in saying that the U.S. delegation in New York are over-optimistic in hoping that the co-chairmen could finalise a text before the end of next week, and that the E.N.D.C. would then agree to close the debate at Geneva before the end of the month (New York telegram 3059). But it is not inconceivable that the U.S./U.S.S.R. discussions may already be rather further ahead than the Americans have allowed us to know in Geneva.

3. Mr. Hennes of the U.S. Embassy here has shown us on a personal and confidential basis (which should not be made known to his superiors or to Geneva) the American telegram of instructions on which Mr. Foster’s report to the Western Four on 8 November was based. This telegram made the same points as those in Geneva telegram 230, but also made it clear that there was a text, to which it implied that Mr. Roschin’s initial reaction had been not unfavourable. However, because this reaction had been unofficial and in view of the danger of leaks, the existence of a text was not to be revealed to or discussed with the Western Four.

4. It therefore seems that, as in the case of the earlier “Soviet” text, the Americans are, not unreasonably, playing this one very close to the chest, and that we may not be informed officially of any text until after final agreement has been reached.

R. C. Hope-Jones

(R. C. Hope-Jones)
9 November, 1967
CYPHER CAT / A
IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE
TO UK DEL NATO BRUSSELS
TELEGRAM NO 1771
13 NOVEMBER 1967.
SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS TELEGRAM NUMBER 1771 OF
13 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKDIS GENEVA.
NATO MEETING ON SAFEGUARDS.
WE HAD THOUGHT THAT THE AMERICANS WANTED TO AVOID FURTHER
DISCUSSION IN NATO, AND DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THEY HAVE NOW
PROPOSED THIS. WE OURSELVES HAVE NOT HAD TIME TO REACH A CONSIDERED
VIEW ON THEIR REVISED TEXT BUT WOULD NOT EXPECT THE GERMANS
AND ITALIANS TO LIKE E.G. THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1,
AS EXPLAINED BY THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES, I.E. THAT NPT
SAFEGUARDS MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS
SYSTEM. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE SHOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO
GIVE THE REVISED DRAFT OUR WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT, UNLESS
OF COURSE OUR ESTIMATE OF GERMAN/ITALIAN REACTION PROVES TOO
PESSIMISTIC.
2. THERE APPEAR TO BE TWO DISTINCT DANGERS OF CONFLICT AT
TOMORROW’S MEETING. THE FIRST IS DISAGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE U.S. AIDE MEMOIRE. THIS DANGER IS LESSENED BY THE FACT
THAT GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT HAVE HAD TIME TO CONSIDER THE TEXT.
BUT FROM THIS FLOWS THE SECOND DANGER, THAT THE EURATOM COUNTRIES
MAY DEMAND TIME TO CONSIDER THE TEXT AMONG THEMSELVES, FOLLOWED
BY FURTHER NATO DISCUSSIONS. IF THE U.N. TIMETABLE IS TO BE
MET IT WOULD BE MOST DIFFICULT TO ALLOW MORE THAN A WEEK OR SO
FOR THIS, AND THE AMERICANS MAY TAKE A FAIRLY HARD LINE ON
REQUESTS FOR MORE TIME.

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3. IF A MAJOR DISPUTE ARISES ON EITHER OF THESE TWO POINTS BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS YOU SHOULD AIM TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT. IF, AS SEEMS MORE LIKELY, THE GERMANS AND ITALIANS ARE VAGUELY DISCOURAGING AND ASK FOR TIME, YOU MAY, IF YOU THINK IT ADVISABLE TO SPEAK, TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE:
B. WE ARE STUDYING URGENTLY OTHER POINTS IN THE TEXT SUCH AS THE REFERENCE TO THE IAEA SYSTEM AND WILL LET OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS HAVE OUR COMMENTS AS SOON AS WE POSSIBLE CAN. WE HOPE THEY WILL DO THE SAME FOR US.
C. WE THINK IT IS MOST IMPORTANT, HAVING GOT THE RUSSIANS SO FAR, AND IN VIEW OF THE U.N. TIMETABLE, TO WASTE NO TIME.

4. IF OTHERS COMPLAIN THAT THE AMERICANS MISLED US LAST WEEK IN DESCRIBING THEIR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT LETTING NATO KNOW THAT THEY HAD ALREADY GIVEN THEM A TEXT, YOU SHOULD AVOID INVOLVEMENT. WE IN FACT HAD A CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL HINT FROM THE AMERICANS THAT A TEXT HAD BEEN HANDED OVER.

5. ON THE QUESTION OF OUR OWN SAFEGUARDS OFFER, WE AGREE THAT WE SHOULD GIVE NATO AS WELL AS THE EURATOM COMMISSION FORMAL ADVANCE NOTICE (MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1135 TO UKDEL BRUSSELS) BUT WOULD PREFER NOT TO DO SO AT THIS MOMENT, AS AGREEMENT ON THE TABLING OF ARTICLE III HAS NOT BEEN REACHED.

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A.E. & D.D.
E.E.I.D.
I.B. & D.
SECRET

ADDRESS TO WASHINGTON TEL NO 11949 OF 15 NOVEMBER REPTD FOR INFMN TO UKDIS GENEVA AND UKDEL NATO.

UKDIS GENEVA TEL NO 237: SAFEGUARDS AND NON-PROLIFERATION.

MOSCOW'S UNFAVOURABLE REACTION TO BOTH THE AMERICAN AND ROSHCIN'S VERSION OF THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA 1 CREATES A NEW SITUATION, BUT AS THESE VERSIONS WILL PRESUMABLY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE ATTEMPT TO ELABORATE SOME NEW FORMULA WE THINK THE AMERICANS WILL STILL WISH TO HAVE OUR COMMENTS ON THEM, WHICH ARE AS FOLLOWS.

2. WE THINK THE MAJOR POINT OF DIFFICULTY FOR EURATOM IS LIKELY TO BE THE INCLUSION OF THE REFERENCE TO THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM. WE RECOGNISE THE NEED FOR SOME SUCH REFERENCE, GIVEN THE SOVIET INSISTENCE AND ON FIRST READING THE TEXT WE THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE EVEN TO THE GERMANS AS THE PHRASE "QUOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTE OF THE IAEA AND THE AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, UNQUOTE" SEEMED TO RELATE TO THE NEGOTIATION AND CONCLUSION OF THE NECESSARY AGREEMENT. WE WERE THEREFORE SURPRISED TO SEE FROM THE AIDE-MEMOIRE THAT THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES REGARDED THIS PHRASE AS RELATING TO THE SAFEGUARDS AS SUCH, APART FROM THE FACT THAT WE WOULD NOT EXPECT THE GERMANS TO AGREE THAT THE SAFEGUARDS TO BE APPLIED TO IT SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, SINCE THIS MAKES NO PROVISION FOR VERIFICATION OF OTHER SAFEGUARDS THIS INTERPRETATION WOULD APPEAR TO REQUIRE A COMMA AFTER THE FIRST REFERENCE TO THE IAEA IN THE SENTENCE.

3. GIVEN THIS AMERICAN INTERPRETATION OF THEIR OWN DRAFT WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THEIR REJECTION OF ROSHCIN'S DRAFT. INDEED WE THINK THIS HAS SOME ADVANTAGES OVER THEIR DRAFT. ADMITTEDLY IT SAYS THAT THAT SAFEGUARDS MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, BUT IT CAN BE READ AS MEANING THAT THE SYSTEM HERE REFERRED TO IS NOT NECESSARILY THAT SET FORTH IN THE SAFEGUARDS DOCUMENT BUT WILL CONSIST FOR EACH PARTY OF THE REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN THE RELEVANT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT. HOWEVER WE RECOGNISE THAT THIS WAS PRESUMABLY NOT WHAT ROSHCIN INTENDED.

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FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 11949 TO WASHINGTON

4. EVEN IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON THE TEXT OF THIS SENTENCE, WE THINK THAT IT MAY STILL BE DIFFICULT TO GET EURATOM TO ACCEPT THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4. IF THIS PROVES TO BE THE CASE, WE SUGGEST THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE GERMAN PROPOSAL THAT IF SPECIFIC REFERENCE CANNOT BE MADE TO ALL THREE TYPES OF AGREEMENT BILATERAL MULTILATERAL AND BETWEEN ORGANISATIONS IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO DROP THE FIRST TWO AND RELY SOLELY ON A REFERENCE TO THE STATUTE. WE SEE NO REASON WHY THE RUSSIANS SHOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS.

5. PLEASE PUT THESE COMMENTS TO THE AMERICANS, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THEY ARE NOT MADE IN A CRITICAL SPIRIT AND THAT IN FACT WE THINK THE AMERICANS HAVE DONE REMARKABLY WELL IN GETTING THE RUSSIANS TO COME SO FAR TO MEET THEM. YOU SHOULD ALSO TELL THEM THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO DISCUSS THE LATEST TEXT WITH OTHER COUNTRIES UNTIL WE KNOW THE AMERICAN REACTION TO OUR COMMENTS, BUT THAT WE WOULD BE GLAD TO LEARN HOW THEY INTEND TO ANSWER THE BELGIAN POINT ABOUT THE SUPPLY OF FISSILE MATERIAL IF NEGOTIATIONS EXTEND BEYOND THE PERIOD ALLOWED IN THE TREATY.

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E.E.I.D.
J.R.D.
S.R.D.
WESTERN DEPT.
W.C.C.D.
RECORD OF MEETING BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DR. SCHNIPPENKÖTTER IN GENEVA ON 15 NOVEMBER

Those present:

The Rt. Hon. Fred Mulley, M.P.
His Excellency
His Excellency Sir Harold Beeley, K.C.M.G., C.B.E.
Mr. D.J. Moss
His Excellency Dr. S. Schnippenkötter
Dr. J. Diesel

Dr. Schnippenkötter said that the West German Cabinet would be meeting the next day to consider their attitude towards the Non-proliferation Treaty and in particular towards the latest U.S. text of Article III. He personally was not hopeful that the new text would meet the position of the Euratom countries but the decision would of course rest with the Cabinet.

2. Mr. Mulley pointed out that during the recent Belgian visit to London W. Harmsel had not seemed worried by the U.S. text except for his concern that the United States should not cut off supplies of fissile material to Euratom countries after the entry into force of a Non-proliferation Treaty but before any agreement had been reached between Euratom and the IAEA on safeguards. Mr. Mulley thought that this particular doubt could be met by the United States giving the Euratom countries a private undertaking that they would not ratify the Treaty until the Euratom/IAEA position had been settled.
3. Dr. Schnippenkötter said that the German Government did not agree with the Benelux countries who said that the non-Nuclear countries should withhold ratification of the Treaty until a satisfactory agreement on safeguards had been concluded with the IAEA. The Germans thought that this would leave them open to propaganda attacks from the Soviet Union and were therefore concerned that the Treaty text itself should be amended at this stage to take account of Euratom’s position.

4. Dr. Schnippenkötter said that he was worried about the present wording of the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the U.S. text of Article III. If there could be no reference to concluding agreements with international organisations in this paragraph it would be better to delete "individually or together with other states" completely and leave the text to be interpreted in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA which would of course cover agreements concluded with such organisations.

5. Mr. Mulley then suggested a possible amendment to the first sentence of the first paragraph of the U.S. text which would delete the words "in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency’s safeguards system" and would insert instead "IAEA" between "accept" and "safeguards". Dr. Schnippenkötter said that he would much prefer that "safeguards" should appear without "IAEA" before it, at least until we knew whether the Russians would accept the less specific formula.

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6. Mr. Mulley asked Dr. Schnippenkötter whether the West German Government had any other objections to the present U.S. text. Dr. Schnippenkötter said that he would like to see the words "Agency's safeguards system" deleted from the first sentence of paragraph 1 as he thought that this formula might be understood as meaning that only the present safeguards system could be applied and that any amendments to the system would require amendments to the Treaty. Mr. Mulley pointed out that the Americans had already said that their understanding was that this wording would not freeze the present IAEA safeguards system. Dr. Schnippenkötter then said that in the second sentence of paragraph 1 he thought that the words "Procedures for" were superfluous and that the sentence could well read "The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied...." However, if the words "Agency's safeguards system" could be deleted he personally would not place any great importance on deleting the words "Procedures for" as well. He would also like to see the vague words "nuclear energy" in the first sentence replaced by the words "source and other fissionable material".

7. Sir Harold Beeley suggested that the individual members of Euratom might conclude separate agreements with the IAEA which would endorse the terms of any Euratom/IAEA agreement on safeguards. Dr. Schnippenkötter said that in his view this was a helpful suggestion.
8. Dr. Schnippenkötter said that he wondered whether a clause could be inserted in Article III which would have the effect of excluding inspectors of those countries who do not accept safeguards on their own civil facilities from inspecting the facilities of other countries which are parties to the Treaty. (A text of the proposed German clause is attached at Appendix A.) Mr. Mulley pointed out that apart from the impossibility of negotiating such a clause with the Russians there would be the very practical difficulty that some hundreds of inspectors would be required to supervise the civil facilities in the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom and that according to the German text until all these facilities were so inspected both countries would be precluded from sending inspectors to supervise facilities in other countries. This was surely nonsense. Dr. Schnippenkötter agreed that in practical terms it would be easier merely to inspect all the non-nuclear countries. Mr. Mulley added that in any case the Russians had a logical case if they pointed out that for these such inspections were pointless since under the present terms of the Treaty they would already be empowered to manufacture nuclear weapons.

9. In conclusion Dr. Schnippenkötter touched upon the question of the duration of the Treaty. He thought it would obviously have to be longer than five years but wondered whether it need be as long as twenty. Mr. Mulley pointed out that the Russians would oppose any short duration to the Treaty.
Appendix A.

No State which does not have safeguards as set forth in agreements with the IAEA with regard to all of its own peaceful nuclear activities within its territory or under its jurisdiction shall have the right to participate in the framing of regulations governing safeguards required by this Article and in their application. No State party to this Treaty shall be obliged to admit as inspectors nationals of States which refuse such safeguards.
MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY
Millbank Tower, LONDON S.W.1
Telex: 263171 Telegrams: Mintec London Telex
Telephone: Victoria 2255

17th November, 1957

Dear Ronald,

If, as now seems possible, we may soon have to say something publicly about our "offer" to submit our civil nuclear activities to "similar" safeguards to those the non-nuclear are required to accept on all their activities, it does seem necessary to try to ensure somehow that it is clearly understood by all concerned that the exact form and extent of such an offer:

(a) is entirely within our own competence and not subject to bargaining with any others,

and (b) will depend upon the nature of the safeguards that will apply at the relevant time,

and (c) will be inevitably much restricted owing to the mixed civil military nature of many of our facilities if, contrary to our hopes, the I.A.E.A. system is not modified to make it more logically and practically useful for N.P.T. purposes.

How this should be done may require further discussion, but we should be interested to have the views of those to whom this letter is being sent, Hall, Croome, Newley, Macklen and Press.

Yours,

J. McAdam Clark

R.C. Hope-Jones, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.
SECRET

ADDRESS TO UKDEL NATO TELEGRAM NO 1964 OF 23 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKDIS GENEVA WASHINGTON Bonn Rome Brussels the Hague UKDEL Brussels.

SAFEGUARDS AND NON-PROLIFERATION.
The American Embassy here have told us that the U.S. are requesting a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 24 November to report on the co-chairmen’s discussions particularly on article III.

2. Their instructions to their delegation ignore the German aide memoire. They admit that the Soviet Union have rejected the U.S. first sentence (para 2 of my telegram no 2862 to Bonn) but somewhat blur the question of whether the Soviet Government have also rejected their own representative’s counter draft. Their apparent intention is to ask NATO what they think of both these possibilities in the light of the Russian reaction.

3. They are however adding a third, which they have described as quote the British proposal unquote and which the Minister of State did in fact discuss on a tentative basis with several Western representatives in Geneva including the Germans and Italians. The version of this which the Americans intend to use, and which is probably the most promising, would replace the first forty words of the U.S. draft with the following:- Quote each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the statute of the agency unquote.

4. The American’s motive for taking this line may be to try to outflank the Germans. The tone of whose aide memoire appears to leave little room for compromise, by enlisting the support of the other
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U.K. DEL. NATO TELEGRAM NO. 1964 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-2-

OTHER EURATOM COUNTRIES FOR FURTHER EFFORTS TO GET THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCEPT ONE OF THE THREE PROPOSALS DESCRIBED ABOVE. BUT ALTHOUGH WE AGREE WITH THE AIM OF SEEKING AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WE MUST BE CAREFUL TO AVOID BECOMING IDENTIFIED WITH ANY ANTI-GERMAN IMPLICATIONS.

5. THE LANGUAGE DISCUSSED BY THE MINISTER OF STATE WAS NOT A U.K. PROPOSAL, BUT WAS MERELY INTENDED TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE ACCEPTABLE WAYS OUT OF THE IMPASSE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, BUT THE GERMAN AIDE MEMOIRE LISTS AS ONE OF THE MAIN ADVANTAGES OF THE U.S. DRAFT THAT IT HAS GOTT RID OF THE REFERENCE TO QUOTE IAEA SAFEGUARDS UNQUOTE, AND ACCORDING TO THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BONN THE GERMANS HAVE FOLLOWED THIS UP WITH A COMMENTARY ON THE RUSSIAN RESPONSE IN WHICH THEY SAY THAT THE REINSERTION OF THESE WORDS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. IF THIS IS SO, WE CERTAINLY DO NOT WISH TO PRESS THE IDEA.

6. NEVERTHELESS IF THE U.S. PRESENTATION DOES TAKE THE LINE SUGGESTED ABOVE YOU WILL CLEARLY NEED TO SPEAK. WE WOULD ALSO, WITHOUT TRYING TO OVERPERSUADE THE EURATOM COUNTRIES, LIKE TO REVIEW FOR THEM THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF OUR SUGGESTION AS CONTRASTED WITH THE U.S. DRAFT, SINCE WE STILL THINK THAT, IF SUITABLY INTERPRETED, IT IS CAPABLE NOT ONLY OF SATISFYING THE RUSSIANS BUT ALSO OF PROVIDING ADEQUATELY FOR THE VERIFICATION OF EURATOM SAFEGUARDS.

7. YOU MAY THEREFORE IF YOU WISH TO SPEAK, DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING AS APPROPRIATE:

A. SINCE THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ON 14 NOVEMBER WE HAVE BEEN STUDYING WITH GREAT CARE THE U.S. AND SOVIET DRAFTS OF 2 AND 9 NOVEMBER. IN DOING SO WE HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE UNFORTUNATELY NEGATIVE REACTION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE ALSO JUST RECEIVED AN AIDE MEMOIRE ON THE DRAFTS FROM THE FEDERAL GERMAN GOVERNMENT WHICH WE ARE NOW STUDYING.

B. IT APPEARS TO US THAT THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM LIES IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPHS OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET DRAFTS. THE PROBLEM IS TO RECONCILE THIS PASSAGE, OR ANY OTHER LANGUAGE WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MAY NOW WISH TO PUT IN ITS PLACE, WITH THE SECOND AND THIRD EURATOM PRINCIPLES AS EXPOUNDED BY THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE ON 31 OCTOBER.

/C/

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U.K. DEL. NATO TELEGRAM NO. 1964 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

C. THERE ARE OTHER PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE TEXT TO THE FIVE PRINCIPLES, BUT IT SEEMS TO US THAT THESE ARE SOLUBLE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PRESENT TEXT. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE IS THE DIFFICULTY OF RELATING THE WORDS "QUOTE INDIVIDUALLY OR TOGETHER WITH OTHER STATES UNQUOTE" IN THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH OF THE DRAFT TO THE REQUIREMENT OF THE SECOND PRINCIPLE THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE MADE WITH EURATOM AS SUCH, BUT THIS MIGHT WELL BE SOLVED AS SUGGESTED BY THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE ON 31 OCTOBER BY DELETING THESE WORDS, WHICH SHOULD SURELY BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

D. BUT THE PROBLEM IN PARAGRAPH 1 IS OF A MORE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE FOR OUR PART, OUR MAIN DIFFICULTY WITH THE TEXTS PUT FORWARD BY THE U.S. AND SOVIET NEGOTIATORS HAS BEEN THAT THEY BOTH DEMAND THAT THE SAFEGUARDS TO BE APPLIED MUST BE QUOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM UNQUOTE. THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM AS SET OUT IN THE SAFEGUARDS DOCUMENT OF 1965 PROVIDES FOR FLEXIBILITY IN THE APPLICATION OF THE SAFEGUARDS THEREIN DESCRIBED, BUT IT SEEMS TO US DIFFICULT TO ARGUE THAT THE SYSTEM ITSELF CAN BE STRETCHED TO INCLUDE THE VERIFICATION OF A DIFFERENT EVEN THOUGH COMPATIBLE SYSTEM, AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE FACED WITH THE APPARENT SOVIET REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A TEXT WHICH DOES NOT MAKE USE OF THE ACTUAL WORDS "QUOTE IAEA SAFEGUARDS UNQUOTE." E. IT IS IN THIS SITUATION THAT WE HAVE MADE THE VERY TENTATIVE SUGGESTION OF ALTERNATIVE WORDING ON THE LINES NOW PUT FORWARD BY THE AMERICANS. THIS IS A DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEAS WHICH WE PUT TO THE COUNCIL ON 10 OCTOBER (YOUR TELEGRAM 315). WE SHOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THIS IS NOT A FIRM U.K. PROPOSAL. IT IS EVEN SOMETHING LESS THAN ILLUSTRATIVE LANGUAGE, WHAT WE WANT TO DO IS TO EXPLORE WITH OUR ALLIES WHETHER THERE IS ANYWAY OF IMPROVING THE DRAFT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PERHAPS DISPOSING OF THE RUSSIAN OBJECTIONS.

F. IN DOING SO WE HAVE STARTED FROM THE ASSUMPTION, ON WHICH WE HOPE THE AMERICANS CAN REASSURE US, THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT GONE BACK ON WHAT WE UNDERSTOOD WAS THEIR AGREEMENT THAT THE SUBSTANCE /OF

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-4-

OF THE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN EURATOM AND THE IAEA SHOULD BE THE
VERIFICATION OF EURATOM SAFEGUARDS: AND THAT THEIR REJECTION
OF THE U.S. LANGUAGE IS FOR HISTORICAL AND PRESENTATIONAL REASONS
ONLY.

G. ON THIS ASSUMPTION WE THINK IT MIGHT WELL BE ARGUED THAT THE
THIRD VARIATION OF WHICH THE AMERICANS HAVE SPOKEN MIGHT WELL HAVE
ITS ADVANTAGES FOR US, SINCE IT INVOLVES DROPPING THE WORDS "QUOTE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM "UNQUOTE ABOUT
WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED DOUBTS, IT WOULD ALSO INCIDENTALLY
DISPOSE OF THE DANGER OF FREEZING THE EXISTING IAEA SAFEGUARDS
SYSTEM, TO WHICH THE NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE REFERRED ON 14
NOVEMBER. OUR THOUGHT WAS THAT TO SPEAK OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AS
SET FORTH IN AN AGREEMENT WITH THE IAEA, WITHOUT BRINGING IN ANY
REFERENCE TO THE IAEA SYSTEM, COULD IMPLY, AT LEAST IN ENGLISH,
THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD GOVERN THE SAFEGUARDS, AND THAT THE USE
OF THE ADJECTIVE IAEA WOULD THEN MERELY DESCRIBE THE LABEL TO BE
ATTACHED TO THE AGREED SAFEGUARDS. SO LONG AS THE AGREEMENT PROVIDED
FOR VERIFIED EURATOM SAFEGUARDS IT MIGHT MATTER LITTLE WHAT IT
WAS CALLED, SINCE WE HAVE ALWAYS AGREED THAT THE LABEL MATTERS LESS
THAN THE SUBSTANCE.

H. HAVING SAID THIS HOWEVER WE SHOULD LIKE TO STRESS ONCE AGAIN
THAT THIS IS ONLY AN IDEA FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF OUR ALLIES.
WE WOULD BE VERY GLAD TO HAVE THEIR REACTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE
REACTIONS OF THE EURATOM COUNTRIES. WE SHOULD ALSO BE VERY READY TO
DISCUSS ANY OTHER POSSIBLE WAYS OF ACHIEVING AGREEMENT.

SIR B. BURROWS

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SECRETARY OF STATE

I have minuted separately on the question of American timing. I support the recommendation since we ought to try and get a little effect from it, although, because of the Americans jumping the gun on the official announcement and the fact that it is unofficially widely known following its communication to NATO in April, I think the impact here will be small.

2. The alternative would be to rush a question down today for written answer tomorrow. This would beat the Americans to it by 24 hours but, as you know, there is nothing less calculated to make an impact than a PQ answer on a Friday. I thus reject it. A statement on Friday is also not desirable.

3. In my view there is little merit in the gesture we are making. It will have little effect on persuading non-nuclear of our honourable intentions. It has considerable technical and probable financial problems for us. It irritates rather than impresses the Russians, who say with logical force that there is no point in the nuclear adopting safeguards designed to prevent fissile material supplied for civil purposes being diverted to military purposes when the Treaty will license the nuclear to go on doing just that.

4. However the decision had been taken - again following the Americans - in April last and had been communicated to our NATO allies. I decided therefore against re-opening the issue when I came into this field and suppose we must live with it, despite the problems it will create for us in the future.

5. I do not know whether you will wish to make a statement or suggest to the P.M. that he should. I am, of course, willing to do so but I the President is making the U.S. announcement and if we are to get some political advantage from it, I think a higher level than myself is desirable.

(Fred Mulley)
30 November, 1967
Sir J. Kennie
Mr. O'Nea

U.K. SAFEGUARDS OFFER

Problem

The U.S. Administration have told us (Washington telegram no. 7667) that on Saturday, 2 December, they will formally announce their offer to put the peaceful nuclear activities of the United States under safeguards, at such time as the non-nuclear-weapon states accept safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The statement may be made by Dr. Seaborg, the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, but it is very probable that it will in fact be made by President Johnson himself.

2. In April of this year Ministers decided that if the Americans made such an offer we should make a similar one and should seek to obtain the maximum political advantage from doing so. (F4(67)2)

Recommendation

(1) If President Johnson or Dr. Seaborg makes the U.S. offer as forecast, either the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary should make a Parliamentary statement in the terms of the attached draft on Monday, 4 December.

(2) We should simultaneously inform NATO, the Euratom Commission, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and Nigeria of our offer.

(3) As soon as the statement is made, we should also repeat our offer in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva and in ENDO capitals.

(iv) We should tell the Americans what we plan to do.

Background

1. The texts which have been considered for inclusion in the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the United States and Soviet Union would all apply mandatory safeguards only to the peaceful nuclear activities of the non-nuclear-weapon states. This is logical, since to require the nuclear-weapon-states to accept safeguards against the diversion of their peaceful nuclear activities to weapons purposes, while continuing to permit them to make nuclear weapons, would have no non-proliferation significance.

2. However, the non-nuclear-weapon states, particularly the Federal German Republic, have always complained of the discrimination involved,
involved, and have said that to leave the civil activities of the nuclear-weapon states uninspected would give them an unfair commercial advantage, since they would be spared the risk of commercial espionage, and the administrative and financial burden of safeguards.

3. The Soviet Union has always been impervious to these arguments, but the U.S. and U.K. agreed in April that they could in principle accept safeguards on their civil nuclear activities, by means of a separate undertaking in parallel with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We and the Americans therefore told NATO in confidence of our decision, and undertook to make the offer public at a moment chosen to have the maximum effect on the non-proliferation negotiations.

4. The U.K. offer to NATO was on the same lines as the attached draft statement. This ties the offer to the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It also, by the reference to exclusions and the use of the words "similar safeguards", reserves the U.K.'s decision on the extent of the safeguards to be applied. Finally, by referring simply to "International Safeguards" it leaves open the possibility of accepting Euratom safeguards in fulfilment of the obligation.

5. We have always hitherto agreed with the Americans that tactically the most effective moment to make our offer public would be when the Safeguards Article was tabled at Geneva. We do not know why the United States are now considering a different course. There may be domestic political reasons for this, and we have asked our Embassy in Washington to probe the American motives more closely. (J and Armament Secretery --- &c.)

But

6. /Whatever the reason, if the Americans decide to speak now, we cannot afford to withhold our own statement. To do so would deprive the U.S. and U.K. offers of much of their joint force. Moreover, a belated offer from us would seem grudging and might gain us little political advantage.

7. Although we are now ready to make our offer in general terms, we should avoid spelling out its implications, and especially its limitations, at this stage. There are two reasons for this. First, any detailed reservation of particular parts of our nuclear programme from safeguards would inevitably detract from its public impact; second, the demarcation of the line between the safeguarded and unsafeguarded areas poses peculiar problems for the U.K. These problems are not shared by the non-nuclear-weapon states, all of whose peaceful nuclear programmes would be under safeguards, or by the United States, whose civil and military programmes are largely distinct, while ours are intermingled for reasons both of economy and of size. We shall therefore need to wait until we see the shape of the safeguards to be applied under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and also the details of the U.S. safeguards offer, before we can take firm decisions on the contents of the package which we ourselves can offer for safeguarding.

8. Finance poses a further problem. Up to now the cost of I.A.E.A. safeguards has been borne on the general budget of the Agency, to which we of course contribute. But the Non-Proliferation Treaty

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Treaty will inevitably involve a massive increase in safeguarding costs, and it to this is added the even greater task of safeguarding the whole of the civil nuclear programmes of the U.S. and U.K., we may well be faced with a demand that individual countries should pay for their own safeguarding. It is only prudent to reserve our decision on the extent of our safeguarding commitment until this point is cleared up.

9. These considerations lead to the conclusion that we should keep closely at the present time to the generalised replies which are suggested as supplementary answers to the attached statement.

10. The Soviet Union have made it clear that in no circumstances will they make a similar submission of their own civil nuclear industry to safeguards. The offer will therefore be a U.S./U.K. one only. We have been somewhat concerned that the Soviet Union might react badly to what they could regard as an attempt to isolate them. However, the Americans appear to be confident that there are no grounds for such concern. It is also possible that the Soviet Union may only try to divert attention from their own failure to match the U.S./U.K. offer by pouring scorn on this offer and representing it as meaningless in view of the exclusions on "national security" grounds. This is the line that they have followed in the context of the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. To this, our answer would be that at least our offer has been made, and we would welcome a similar offer from the Soviet Union.

11. The French Government have also made it clear that they will neither make a similar offer nor sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We should as far as possible avoid discussion of this at this stage.

12. The most recent precedent dealing with joint action by the U.S. and U.K. in the disarmament field was the announcement in 1964 of a cut-back in fissile material production for weapons purposes. At that time the then Prime Minister made known the United Kingdom's position by means of a statement to the House (Hansard Col. 1097-1100 of 21 April, 1964). It would seem appropriate to follow the same procedure in this case.

13. I submit, together with the draft Statement and Supplemen-
taries, a draft memorandum from the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister for use if it is decided that it is the Prime Minister who should make the Statement to the House. In this event these background notes would also serve as a background for the Statement. All these have been agreed by the Cabinet Office, the Treasury, the Ministry of Defence and the Atomic Energy Authority, as well as by Scientific Relations Department and European Economic Integration Department.

14. The Ministry of Technology, while generally agreeing with the statement, have proposed that it should include language to the effect that H.M.G. have already informed their allies of this decision, and now welcome the similar statement made by President Johnson. The purpose of this would be to avoid giving the impression that we have been forced into making this offer by the American statement made two days previously. However, while we concede the need to avoid this impression, it would be equally

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erroneous to imply that this was really our idea and that the Americans had followed our lead. The House might also dislike the implication that our allies had been informed before Parliament.

15. The Ministry of Technology have also suggested that the statement should be expanded to say that H.M.G. were making this offer despite the fact that it would not be required of them under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This however appears to involve a statement about the contents of the Treaty which have not yet been agreed.

R. C. Hope-Jones
30 November, 1967.

I support the recommendation.

cc. Mr. Day;
Mr. O’Neill (2);
Mr. Statham;
Mr. Hall;
Parliamentary Office;
Mr. McAdam Clark, Min. of Tech.
The Prime Minister has asked for a report on the current progress towards a Non-Proliferation Treaty. I submit a report for this purpose.

2. The major part of the report deals with the difficulties over Article III on safeguards. It points out that in this vital area instead of making progress we are now in danger of slipping back. The key factor in this is the attitude of the German Government, which we believe has a decisive influence on Euratom.

3. We have proposed compromise wording for the vital first sentence of Article III, which we think could provide a solution of the problem if the Germans can be brought to accept it. First reactions have admittedly been somewhat discouraging, perhaps because the significance of our wording does not seem to have been fully understood. We have now circulated a memorandum in NATO and are taking soundings in Bonn at an official level, to ensure that they understand our case.

4. We should not necessarily abandon our own proposal if the reaction at the official level is unfavourable. I think we are approaching the point where the only chance of breaking the deadlock may lie in going over Dr. Schnippenkötter's head and urging our solution on the Germans at the highest level. When the ground has been sufficiently prepared with the Germans and other non-nuclear members of Euratom, I shall probably wish to recommend such an approach.

R. C. Hope-Jones

(R. C. Hope-Jones)

10 November, 1967.

C. Mr. Statham
Mr. Lamber
Mr. O'Neill.
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ADDRESS TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 12843 OF 1 DECEMBER AND TO UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL BRUSSELS REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BONN, ROME, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: U.K. OFFER ON SAFEGUARDS.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY MR. MULLEY ON 4 DECEMBER.

WITH PERMISSION, MR. SPEAKER, I WISH TO MAKE A STATEMENT.

AS THE HOUSE WILL KNOW, A KEY ISSUE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AT PRESENT TAKING PLACE IN GENEVA TO SECURE A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY HAS BEEN THE SAFEGUARDS TO BE APPLIED IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO DIVERSION BY THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY OF MATERIALS FROM THEIR CIVIL NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES TO NUCLEAR WEAPON PURPOSES.

IN ORDER TO ASSIST THESE NEGOTIATIONS HER MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT HAVE DECIDED THAT, AT SUCH TIME AS INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS ARE PUT INTO EFFECT IN THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF A TREATY, THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO OFFER AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SIMILAR SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM SUBJECT TO EXCLUSIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS ONLY. HER MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT WELCOME THE SIMILAR DECISION ANNOUNCED BY SQUARE BRACKET PRESIDENT JOHNSON SQUARE BRACKET ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES.

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J.I.P.G.D.

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STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE FRED MULLEY, M.P.,
IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION
ON 4 DECEMBER 1987

With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on non-proliferation.

As the House will know, a key issue in the negotiations at present taking place in Geneva to secure a non-proliferation treaty has been the safeguards to be applied in order to ensure that there is no diversion by the non-nuclear weapon signatories of the Treaty of materials from their civil nuclear programmes to nuclear weapon purposes.

In order to assist these negotiations Her Majesty’s Government have decided that, at such time as international safeguards are put into effect in the non-nuclear weapon states in implementation of the provisions of a treaty, they will be prepared to offer an opportunity for the application of similar safeguards in the United Kingdom subject to exclusions for national security reasons only. Her Majesty’s Government welcome the similar decision announced by President Johnson on behalf of the United States.
4 December, 1967

In your letter to Donald Maitland of 27 November you asked if we could let you have a note on the present state of play in the negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty.

I enclose a note which has been seen by the Foreign Secretary and which sums up the present situation. The only additional points that I should perhaps add are that the Foreign Secretary is now considering what action we should take if the reaction to our own proposal (paragraph 9 of the enclosed note) is unfavourable at official level. We may be approaching the point where the only chance of breaking the deadlock may be to take this up with the Germans, who are being difficult at the highest level. When the ground has been sufficiently prepared with the Germans and other non-nuclear members of EURATOM we may wish to recommend some such approach.

As regards the transfer of discussions from Geneva to New York you will see from paragraph 12 of the note that we hope the discussions in New York can be kept to a minimum and then referred back immediately to the ENDO. In this way we would hope to guard against the dangers that the Prime Minister has in mind.

(Sd.) D. M. Day

A. M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.,
10 Downing Street.
Germany and the Non-Proliferation Treaty

On 30 November I submitted a report for the Prime Minister on the current progress towards a Non-Proliferation Treaty. Paragraphs 5-10 of this report deals with the problem of the Safeguards Article, with particular reference to the first sentence of paragraph 1 of this Article. This sentence is not the only one in the current draft that gives the Germans difficulty, but I believe it to be the crucial one, and that if only we could get the Germans to accept our proposed wording for this sentence, the log-jam would begin to break up. The essence of our proposal is that parties to the Treaty should undertake to accept, not "Safeguards in accordance with the I.A.E.A. Safeguards System" (which makes no provision for verification of other safeguards systems), but "I.A.E.A. Safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the I.A.E.A." The merit of this formulation is that it can legitimately be regarded as covering whatever measures the I.A.E.A. may take, either by the direct application of its own system or by the verification of the Euratom safeguards, to ensure that the obligations imposed by the Treaty are fulfilled. There is also every indication that it will be welcome to the Russians, who set great store by an appropriate reference to "I.A.E.A. Safeguards". The proposal is explained in full in the paper which Sir E. Burrows circulated to NATO on 30 November.

2. I think it doubtful whether Dr. Brandt is aware of our proposal, or at any rate whether he has read the explanatory paper. Dr. Kissinger and I are concerned about other aspects of the Treaty, such as its duration and the contribution that German signature of it could make to an improvement in German/Soviet relations, but it looks as if they have the actual text to Dr. Schnippenkötter, who has taken a firm stand against any reference to I.A.E.A. Safeguards and is still trying for a text which could be interpreted as meaning that other non-nuclear states will have I.A.E.A. Safeguards, while Euratom states have their own system. In these circumstances there seems little hope of progress unless Dr. Schnippenkötter can be by-passed.

3. An opportunity for doing this will arise at the weekend, when Dr. Brandt will be at Chequers. It is likely that he will in any case mention non-proliferation, as he has just sent a message to President Johnson, recognising the U.S. safeguards offer as an important contribution to the conclusion of a Treaty, and it is to be presumed that he will shortly be sending M.N.O. a similar message. In these circumstances he is under a clear moral obligation to make some response to our initiative, and I believe that acceptance of our proposed wording (which we think meets German requirements better than any previous U.S. or Soviet wording) would be the ideal response.

[Signature]
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4. I therefore recommend that the Secretary of State should speak to Dr. Brandt over the weekend on the lines of the attached talking points and give him the attached copy of Sir E. Burrow's paper.

R. C. Hope-Jones

(R. C. Hope-Jones)
2 December, 1967

I don't have any little opportunity... I haven't written back... it's almost the same.
TALKING POINTS

I am worried by the delay in reaching agreement on the text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and am most anxious to do anything I can to break the present deadlock. Our willingness to accept I.A.E.A. safeguards on our own civil nuclear activities in order to reassure other parties to the Treaty, but particularly Germany, that we are not prescribing a medicine for them that we are not prepared to swallow ourselves, is sufficient evidence of that. In fact, we are prepared to take a stiffer dose ourselves than we expect the Germans to take, because we do not expect them to accept I.A.E.A. safeguards – only I.A.E.A. verification of Euratom safeguards.

2. The problem that is holding everything up is that of finding language which, without explicitly referring to verification of Euratom safeguards by the I.A.E.A., can nevertheless reasonably be interpreted as permitting this. We ourselves could accept any of the versions of the first sentence of the Article that have been suggested, but we understand and sympathise with German objections, both to the latest U.S. version and to Mr. Roschin’s variant of it, which are in any case unacceptable to Moscow.

/3.
3. In these circumstances I would draw your attention to our own proposal, explained in the paper we circulated to NATO last week. The essence of this is that parties to the Treaty should accept "I.A.E.A. safeguards as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the I.A.E.A." I am sure you will agree that I.A.E.A. must be permitted to take some measures, on a continuing basis, to check that Euratom safeguards are watertight. The scope and content of these measures will have to be negotiated between Euratom and the I.A.E.A., and we, for our part, will do everything in our power to ensure that I.A.E.A. demands are not excessive. But the point I want to make is that whatever measures are finally agreed on can properly be regarded as "I.A.E.A. safeguards", if this is qualified by the further phrase "as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated with the I.A.E.A." Our wording leaves the door not just ajar but wide open for verification, and we shall of course be prepared to state our interpretation in the E.N.D.C. and have it written into the record. We are pretty sure that the Russians will jump at this wording, and that they will not contest our interpretation.

4. Naturally I do not expect you to give me an immediate reply, but I do hope that you will read our paper yourself, and that the German Government will consider very seriously whether they cannot accept our formulation. There must be a compromise, and we think that this is much the best one from the German point of view.

ATOMIC ENERGY AND DISARMAMENT DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN OFFICE.