My Experience in and with Iran

- Many trips to Iran over more than a decade
- 16 hours with Ahmadinejad
- Multiple Track II's in Europe
- Met with hundreds of Iranian officials and Iranian experts including Foreign Minister, Amb. to UN, Head of Expediency Council, Senior clerics

DANGER

Iran's Challenge to the Regime
(Alleged)

What I Am Supposed to Say

- Iran racing to the bomb, others will follow suit

- Don't believe that: not inevitable will get NW Capability decision, not a bomb decision

- Challenge? 1) pressure that not push Iran to NW, 2) a path so Iran can affirmatively embrace abstinence

US Intell: Current Status

"We assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, … should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons ."

1/12

"Crash program" that began 28 years ago

Rate of Proliferation
(New NWS/decade)

Far fewer NW States than predicted
Fewer states seek NW today than ever before
NPT has been flexible (PNE's) and fault tolerant
(End of CW, Iraq, India, Pakistan, N Korea, etc.)

75% of States Interested in NW or Inherited NW Assets Remained Non-nuclear

Argentina
Australia
Belarus
Brazil
Canada
Egypt
Germany
Greece

Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Italy
Japan
Kazakhstan
Libya
Norway
Romania

S. Korea
S. Africa
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Turkey
Ukraine
Yugoslavia

TBD: Nigeria, Algeria, Spain, Belgium, Chile, Syria, Holland

Iran's Challenge to the Regime
(Actual)

- Uncomfortable issue of non-weaponized capability
- More general problem of peaceful uses of E&R
- Iran re: AP and Subsidiary Arrangements 3.1
- Divisions within IAEA
- Lead to use of force: set back nonprolif and the region
- Negative impact on US nonprolif policy
  - Brings out worst impulses in US attitudes to nonprolif
  - Politicization and shifting nonproliferation standard
  - Fuels architecture of sanctions, resolution difficult

Effective Measures?

Win–win/lose-lose

- All sides get what need, all sides give something up
- Each side gets to frame issue for domestic audience

Iran

- Iran is revolutionary but also wants approval/status
- Wants sanctions relief, out of UNSC, help with TRR
- Broad frames like cooperation, justice, disarmament

The EU3+3 and Regional Governments

- Iran rejoin full safeguards regime + supplemental
- Constraints on enrich; no 20%, stockpiling, reprocessing
- Frame: Criminal and judge

Magic Formulation: Iran enriches what it needs

Missing in standard analysis: not always about calc of countries

Gulf States Enhance Cooperation with Iran?

Iran might Welcome
Not want this to be Iran-centric issue (special/not singled out)
Wants resolution with many players but where gets recog

Possible Approaches for GCC Engagement
Formal WMDFZ-ME
Contingent nuclear free declarations (Pickering)
Enrichment free zones (natl owned) + multi-lateralization
Setting regional standards, transparency arrangements

Challenges
Structure so parties at no disadv to regional competitors
Insulate from other regional disagreements

Role for GCC Countries: WMDFZ

1. Defining scope & principles
2. Creation of institutions w/ admin & sci capability
3. Harmonization w/ existing treaties
4. Admin agreements w/ internat institutions
5. Use of related CBMs
6. Monitoring & reporting
8. Participation for parties outside region (US, EU, etc.)
9. Potential neg and pos sec assurances
10. Design of incentives for adoption, early adoption
11. Rules for adjudication of disputes & noncompliance
12. Accident/terrorist/ and other emergency response
13. Financing & off-setting costs for less wealthy
14. Disarmament, Disposal, Legacy issues

Preparations for WMDFZ create capacities that useful regardless
Precursor or informal arrangements in place prior to zone

Sample GCC Nuclear Activities

- 2006, GCC joint study on common program of nuc development
- 2006, Naif Arab University for Security Sciences organizes conferences, e.g., on nuclear security in Arab countries.
- 2009, Qatar hosts regional workshop and Management Plans
- 2010, UAE hosts IAEA seminars on Nuclear Safety Infrastructure
- 2010, IAEA GCC Milestone Workshop: Considerations Related to the Building of Nuclear Power Infrastructure
- 2011, Kuwait hosts a national workshop
- 2008, the King Abdulaziz University organizes international symposium Peaceful Application of Nuclear Technology in the GCC Countries
- Creation of Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute by the Khalifa University of Science, Technology, and Research

So far, information sharing, not joint practice

GCC: Regional standards, Transparency arrangements, Exchange

- No reason why GCC can't develop supplemental, regional practices and institutions
- Model of Argentina-Brazil coop pre-Treaty of Tlateloco
- Model of US-Russia only b/t non-weapons states
- Regularized nuc peer review visits and consultations
- Regional cooperation projects
- Volun, region-based innovations projects with IAEA
- Can be separate but complimentary to work on WMDFZ

Would need rules re transfer of E&R, but
more joint activity should = more info = more deterrence/confidence

Current Legal & Diplomatic Status

- UN Resolutions still in force
- IAEA reports increasingly harsh
- Iran offers more access but not formalized
- Iran offers greater cooperation but then backs away, saying no Additional Protocol
- Iran offers to forgo production on 20% U

A Negotiated Solution? Difficult.

1. History and mistrust
2. Nationalism, pride
3. Absence of relations leads to missed signals
4. Refuse to negotiate if weaker position, if stronger want to press advantage
5. Positive gesture by other side seen as evidence of weakness, need to continue the pressure
6. Opponents ready to attack engagement

Had success in 2003

Since: no strategy, all tactics, no theory of victory