

## Summary of International Workshop “Prospects for Russian-U.S. Arms Control”

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Moscow

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### Introduction

On May 16th, 2013 a roundtable workshop on prospects for the next round of nuclear arms control talks between Russia and the United States was jointly held by the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), Arms Control Association (ACA), the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), and the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg (IFSH), with support of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

A group of 40 officials, diplomats, and experts from Russia, the United States, and NATO countries considered each party’s objectives, political and technical opportunities, and possible areas and ideas that could help advance progress for discussions and possible negotiations on strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, as well as offensive and defensive ballistic missiles.

This summary highlights key points and issues discussed. With the exception of the opening presentations (most of which are published here, in full), the event took place under Chatham House rules and as such the paper does not attribute the views expressed to any specific individual at the meeting.

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More information on the project can be found at <http://tacticalnuclearweapons.ifsh.de/> and <http://www.basicint.org/issues/projects/natos-nuclear-posture>

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## **II. Speaker Remarks and Presentations**

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## **III. Conference Agenda and Participants**

## **I. Enhancing Strategic Stability: Options & Issues Following New START**

In discussing options and issues following New START, participants pointed to the lack of sufficient trust between Russia and the United States as the main obstacle in the way of another round of nuclear force reductions. Some participants believe that leaving these issues unresolved may spark a new arms race in Europe. At the same time, there was consensus that strategic stability in Europe shall be an inclusive endeavour with Russia as an essential partner. The responsibilities of all states under the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain to engage in nuclear disarmament talks was repeatedly raised in the discussion.

Russian participants repeatedly stressed that asymmetries in military capabilities undermine strategic stability. A precondition for a follow-on to New START should be “parity.” However, they noted that no specific parameters for this condition have been developed so far. Nevertheless, some ideas were offered that could help restore trust in the bilateral relationship. First, the United States would need to withdraw the tactical nuclear weapons it has stationed in five European NATO countries, while Russia should take “reciprocal” actions regarding its larger tactical nuclear weapons stockpile. Second, the United States should accept self-restraint on more advanced elements of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EAPP). Russian participants argued that any missile defense elements in close proximity to Russia are problematic and proposed limitations on the stationing of Aegis ships with SM-3 interceptors in Europe. Third, NATO needs to take care in rushing towards building up conventional capabilities to reassure states at the margins: Baltic Air Policing may harm confidence. Fourth, there is a perception in Moscow that Washington is not willing to genuinely cooperate on its ballistic missile defence project, and in Washington there is frustration that Russia has not responded to proposals for cooperation and has not recognized that with the cancellation of Phase IV of the U.S. European Phased Adaptive Approach, there is no U.S. missile interceptor that can threaten Russia’s offensive strategic missile forces.

Russian participants offered different solutions to tackle mistrust and build-up confidence. One option included considering a NWFZ in the Barents, Baltic and Mediterranean seas. Second, Russia and the United States need to agree to progressively downsize their nuclear weapons to the levels of other nuclear weapon states, though Russia will need associated assurances because of the widely-held notion that it depends on nuclear weapons to balance out its strategic inferiority. Third, Russia and the U.S could discuss along with fellow nuclear weapon states further limits on the utility of their nuclear weapons, and agree an approximate deadline for multilateral nuclear disarmament. In addition, Russia could propose to central and eastern European states verifiable security assurances as it did to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the trilateral statements of 1994. Another issue would be to restart the conversation on a new, flankless follow-on to the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty.

Several U.S. participants stressed the progress already achieved towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The Cold War is over and the progress achieved so far should be appreciated as a significant achievement, especially given the structural challenges in reducing arsenals. Nevertheless, many participants expressed the view that the current U.S. and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons are significantly larger than needed, and that the lack of trust between the U.S. and Russia presents a formidable obstacle to further reductions.

Participants agreed that dialogue is a prelude to building transparency and achieving further reductions. Euro-Atlantic security is built upon regimes such as the Open Skies Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and the Vienna Document. The failure to agree on the development of CFE, and the subsequent Russian suspension of its provisions decreased military transparency in Europe dramatically. Whilst the treaty numbers were becoming less relevant, the transparency and confidence measures that attended it remained important to trust. Both the United States and Russia face significant budgetary pressures, and whilst many aspects of the disarmament process are expensive in the short run, there are major financial benefits to be had for both states.

## II. Developments in Missile Defense: Exploring Options to Build Trust

It was noted that the U.S. and NATO BMD program is designed to neutralize the potential missile threat posed by Iran and DPRK. President Obama's decision to abandon Phase IV of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) was partly in response to a modified threat perception focused on the DPRK (switching focus from Europe), as well as budgetary constraints and Raytheon's inability to design a missile with the given parameters. U.S. participants claimed that the decision was independent of Russia, and Russian objections to the system will not affect its future development. Indeed, Russia's apparently inflexible position on NATO missile defense harms the prospects for cooperation, they suggested.

While the United States sees the EPAA as a limited response to a limited missile threat from Iran and North Korea, Russia sees it as inherently destabilizing to strategic deterrence. The fear is not usually focused on the particular posture planned today, but rather on the development of technology that will inexorably undermine and perhaps eventually eradicate the capability of the Russians to hold at risk U.S. targets, and that this would prove too strong a temptation for future U.S. administrations to resist.

Russian participants also stressed geographic proximity of key elements of the EPAA to Russia as problematic, claiming that U.S. leaders would not tolerate the Russians positioning their BMD close to U.S. borders. Several participants suggested that negotiations on a U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian legally-binding or political guarantee that the EPAA is not and will not be aimed at Russia would help.

Yousaf Butt's presentation (below) outlined the depth of technical obstacles to the ambitions for missile defense, concluding that most of the claims supporting its operation were wildly over-stated, and thus should not be seen as a threat to Russia. Nevertheless, this was not entirely reassuring to Russian participants, one of whom pointed to the statements of the Republican Presidential candidate in 2012 around the threat from Russia and the clear intention by many American politicians to establish an unassailable military superiority over any possible strategic challengers. One participant suggested that the U.S. budgetary changes for BMD will serve as a good indicator of how the project will evolve in the future.

There was, however, consensus that there was some merit in tackling technological and military dimensions of BMD separately from the political. Suggestions included:

1. Establishing a NATO early warning operational planning center in Russia (as proposed by Dean Wilkening).
2. Creating a Russian-NATO scientist working group to collaborate on a number of technical issues, such as the development of a boost phase BMD capability.
3. Broader cooperation on space threats, e.g. a U.S.-NATO-Russian research cooperation aimed at cataloging and tracing space debris and meteors.
4. "Exchange" of technical details of the EPAA with Russia to increase transparency. This should involve information on missile characteristics (e.g. velocity) and on the planned stationing positions of Aegis ships and their military capabilities. Some participants asked what kind of transparency information Russia could offer in response.
5. Include Russian personnel in the BMD stations in Poland and Romania.

Some participants noted that any future working BMD system could only provide security against missiles, and that states deploying asymmetric strategic responses to opponents with far greater technological capabilities would likely choose alternative more clandestine forms of delivery that would weaken or neutralize the deterrent effects, such as sea containers, ships or trucks. It was suggested that funding for BMD could be diverted to strengthening other forms of security such as coast guard forces to better counter this threat.

### III. Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons

The issue of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) is riddled with asymmetries, which makes the issue of reciprocity in talks extremely challenging. It was noted that Russian TNW are stored centrally and cannot reach the U.S., but U.S. TNW stationed in Europe are stored near their aircraft delivery systems and can reach Russia via short-range fighter-bombers (with refueling). The Russian military planners believe their TNW compensate for Russia's conventional military disadvantages vis-à-vis NATO and China. One Russian participant summarized nuclear weapons as "the only thing we have in Russia."

Several U.S. participants questioned the military utility of tactical nuclear weapons held by the United States and Russia. This led to a discussion about the justification for current TNW force levels and their locations. One Russian participant insisted that all TNW were stationed in central storage far from NATO borders and are not stationed in the Kaliningrad region. Others pointed out that the perception in some NATO states regarding the possible stationing of TNW in the Kaliningrad region, supported by satellite imagery, demonstrates just how important transparency is in this area. For its part, Russia would like to see a reaffirmation of the "3 No's" included in the 1997 Founding Act between NATO and Russia.

Russian participants were quite insistent that even if talks about TNW were to occur, any agreement would be dependent upon a package of measures including agreements on ABM and precision-guided conventional weapons. Russia would also be looking to engage in talks over the broader Euro-Atlantic security system as proposed by President Medvedev. Furthermore, they said, Russian officials would not likely disclose the size of the Russian TNW force before formal talks began. The future of the CFE Treaty is another contentious issue.

Some participants noted that President Obama remains determined to verifiably reduce the number of TNW on both sides and NATO states are being consulted about the process. It was noted that NATO International Staff presented an internal paper proposing five transparency and confidence building measures for review by the NATO High Level Group. Some NATO governments still perceive U.S. TNW in Europe as a symbol of the U.S. security guarantee, other NATO members, however, do not.

There were several proposals and existing initiatives outlined at the meeting:

1. The NPDI's papers from the last NPT Preparatory Committee was regarded by some participants as the best on the subject so far. (NPT RevCon 2015 Working Paper on "Reduced role of nuclear weapons" - NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.4 and on "Non-strategic nuclear weapons" - NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.3)
2. A dialogue on terminology and how to create the operational conditions for reductions was again proposed. One participant pointed out that the lack of agreed definitions around strategic nuclear weapons had not held back progress, the two sides had simply listed the weapons they understood to be strategic.
3. One participant suggested an initial focus on reductions in air-delivered weapons only, as both sides possess similar numbers.
4. Another option would be to establish common quotas for units of both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and to permit each side to determine its own nuclear force composition. This would trade the Russian superior number in TNW for the United States' comparatively greater strategic warhead upload capacity.

One Russian participant expressed the view that the Russian TNW arsenal, estimated at around 2,000, is too large, and could be reduced to 1000 by eliminating warheads for obsolete systems.

Participants were polarized over the need for modernization of nuclear weapons. On both sides some participants perceived it as a “normal process” that is part of maintaining an effective, working deterrent, while others characterized the B61 LEP and the F-35 fighter-bomber platform as an improvement in NATO military capabilities. Some participants suggested that Russia’s modernization of its TNW is a response to the modernization of NATO’s TNW systems.

#### **IV. Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Next Steps - Substance & Process**

While most agreed that Russia and the United States still have more strategic nuclear weapons than needed for military purposes, some participants suggested Russia had arrived at a stopping point for the moment in regard to nuclear arms control and that there was extreme reluctance to maintain momentum. Some participants noted that all states, including Russia, had agreed to the NPT 2010 action plan, which pledges further progress on strategic and tactical nuclear reductions. A potential data-sharing agreement and other confidence-building measures on ballistic missile defenses could open the way for further negotiated cuts in strategic nuclear weapons.

Four avenues for progress were discussed:

1. Negotiations on a strategic nuclear arms control treaty setting a new ceiling of around 1,000 strategic deployed nuclear weapons, along with greater transparency regarding tactical nuclear weapons. This would allow both sides to keep their strategic “triads” and maintain sufficient deterrence capabilities.

2. Negotiations on a new comprehensive treaty addressing all types of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. Each side could structure its mix of capabilities according to its wishes up to an agreed common number. Russia is not currently supportive of this idea, and believes it would create threaten strategic stability because of U.S. superiority in other capabilities, as well as not accounting for the strategic arsenals of other countries.

3. Parallel, reciprocal initiatives could be pursued, such as:

- (1) Accelerated implementation of New START obligations;
- (2) Transparency and accounting measures regarding tactical nuclear weapons; and
- (3) Parallel, reciprocal reductions of the two sides strategic deployed arsenals to levels below New START. If the two sides were to choose to reduce their strategic deployed arsenals through parallel, reciprocal actions, they could utilize the New START verification system. This latter approach, which would not require lengthy domestic treaty ratification debates, could result in faster results, some participants noted.

4. A non-binding “joint enterprise” involving other nuclear-armed states in parallel with U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control negotiations could create the conditions for moving to very low levels of nuclear weapons and eventually zero. This enterprise would involve the recognized nuclear weapon states, other states with nuclear weapons, and other leading nations. This approach would strike a compromise between the U.S. desire for further reductions and Russia’s desire to begin making the process multilateral.

#### **V. Conclusion**

On the surface, there appears to be a large gulf between Russia and the United States/NATO about how and whether to pursue further nuclear arms control initiatives after New START. At the same time, it is clear that further progress on nuclear and conventional arms control can help lead to improvements in the relationship and the security of all sides. Both sides must continue to exchange ideas, proposals, and seek mutually beneficial solutions.

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## **SOA, TNW AND BMD ISSUES**

### **Assessment of nuclear arms reduction process between Russia and the U.S.A.**

Generally speaking, it is being developed normally. But, had the two sides displayed more trust towards each other, it could have been implemented with a greater pace than today. In spite of certain success gained in downsizing the Strategic Offensive Arsenal (SOA), the two sides have never conducted official TART, or tactical nuclear arms reduction talks, because of unequal starting positions the two sides have embarked upon: while Russian has pulled back all of its TNW from three former Soviet republics to its soil about 20 years ago, the U.S.A. has not done this yet. Moreover, the U.S. TNW are being constantly modernized, and three free-fall nuclear bombs, namely B-61-7, B-61-11 and prospective B-61-12 are referred to by the Pentagon and the U.S. State Department as SOA when they are delivered by B-52H and B-2A strategic bombers.

### **START-4: Basic Principles**

A new START-4 has to be deeply rooted on the principle of equality and equal security, really taking into account strategic and tactical nuclear arms delivered by heavy strategic bombers and SSGNs having SLCMs with the range of more than 600 km - whether tipped with the SOA and BMD arms, including those fielded on Russian or the U.S. territories, or deployed in foreign countries and in the world's oceans close to their respective territories. The Barents, Baltic, Mediterranean and the Black Seas have to be turned into nuclear and missile defense weapons-free zones for extra-regional nations. The same zones have to be proclaimed near the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific shores on a reciprocal basis. A new multilateral ABM treaty has to be developed. The two sides need to limit their SOA delivery systems and warheads, as well as BMD interceptors as forward based assets.

Obviously the two sides have to take into account the setbacks of the START-3 (The Prague Treaty) while drafting START-4. Anatoly Antonov, Deputy Defense Minister and the former head of the Russian delegation at the New START talks, has admitted that the START-3, like the START-1, failed to find a solution for the long-range SLCMs, START-3 does not have any limitations on non-nuclear SOA delivery systems. Anatoly Antonov also points out that he “would like to have more [provisions] covering a “return potential”, to fix an inter-relationship between the SOA and BMD, and to make a new arrangement more qualitative and comprehensive” (Antonov A. Arms Control: History, Current States and Perspectives//Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia Publishing House. 2012 p. 52).

To attract all other nuclear-weapon states into a nuclear arms reduction negotiating process three tasks have to be fulfilled: 1) Russia and the USA have to agree to downsize their nuclear capabilities up to the limits equal to the limits of other nuclear weapon states - with the pledge of the latter not to increase them; 2) all nuclear “haves” - both de jure and de facto - must set up an approximate deadline when a nuclear-free world will be created, e.g. by 2045; 3) all nuclear-weapon states have to declare a no-first use of NW vs. each other.

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## Possible limits for the START-4

So far, the U.S.A. has not officially announced the basic parameters for the next START-4. The Russian side has not made any official statement on this matter, either. Out of three potential limits for the next START-4, U.S. experts name 1,000-1,100 strategic nuclear warheads as a maximum limit, or even figure out some lower ceilings. As a matter of principle, such limits could meet Russian interests, if Moscow and Washington approached nuclear arms with similar views. They could have debated even lower limits for their SOA, provided three outstanding obstacles that have principled strategic significance for Moscow are removed.

First obstacle: The continuation of fielding of interceptors and radars of the U.S. BMD as forward based weapons near the Russian borders against its objections, and at the same time, Washington's refusal to set up a cooperative BMDS with Russia. Washington has neglected seven specific statements on the BMD issues made by Russian leaders. Russia has not been mentioned in the U.S. EPAA, NATO BMD "road map" and rules of engagement. In its present and final forms the U.S. EPAA is the most destabilizing and provocative gimmick since the end of the Cold War. The EPAA has to be cancelled in full, with no BMD operational complexes to be constructed in Romania and Poland. The extension of the phase four of the remark in this context: Russia does not deploy its BMD assets near the U.S. shores and has stated that it would not do this on the basis of reciprocity.

Second Obstacle: Washington's refusal to withdraw all of its TNW - also as forward-based weapons-from Europe to the U.S.A., and dismantle their respective infrastructure on European soil. A substantial note to this effect: Russian does not possess its TNW on the American continent close to the USA.

Third Obstacle: The lack of readiness of the U.S.A. to reconsider its commitment to the "offensive nuclear deterrence" that provides for the delivery of the first nuclear preemptive and preventive blow, with Russia being included in the respective list. This is the main substance of the U.S. STRATCOM Operation Plan 8010-12 "Strategic Deterrence and Force Employment" updated 30th July 2012.

Due to these reasons, no CBMs can be applied to BMD and TNW weapons. Without overriding all of these three barriers, negotiating START-4 is non-expedient, either. If these obstacles are not removed:

- a) the balance between SOA and BMD weapons observed by the two sides for 40 years will be destroyed - the balance that the USSR/Russia and the U.S.A. have been strictly committed to in the framework of the 1972 AMB Treaty prior to withdrawal of Washington from it;
- b) the world community will not be able to prevent the nuclear and missile defense arms race on a global scale.

To wind up, a general observation: any further SOA and potential TNW reductions alongside with simultaneous uncontrolled build up of the BMD interceptors and their deployment all over the world on foreign territories and oceans will become a destabilizing factor in regional and global security.

While the 20th century has been called "the nuclear arms age", the current century may get the label "the missile defense arms age".

But do we really need it?

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## ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ НА МЕЖДУНАРОДНОМ СЕМИНАРЕ ПО ПРОБЛЕМАМ СНВ, ТЯО И ПРО

Москва, 16 мая 2013 года

### Оценка процесса сокращения ядерных вооружений между Россией и США

В целом он развивается нормальными темпами. Но если бы обе стороны испытывали бы друг к другу большее доверие, то он вполне мог бы продвигаться вперед с большей скоростью, чем до настоящего времени. В свое время президент США Рональд Рейган на вопрос советских журналистов: «Почему отсутствует доверие между СССР и США?» напомнил такую максиму: «Люди не доверяют друг другу, потому что вооружаются и люди вооружаются потому, что не доверяют друг другу». К сожалению, в нынешних российско-американских отношениях до сих пор отсутствует полное доверие. Не решены и до сих пор не решаются многие вопросы контроля над вооружениями. Нет договоренности по предотвращению размещения оружия в космическом пространстве, не ведутся переговоры по противоспутниковым системам, не выработан новый ДОВСЕ, нет понимания сторон в вопросе недопущения столкновений подводных лодок, находящихся в подводном положении, и так далее. Не способствует укреплению доверия между двумя нашими странами и переведенная на постоянную основу операция ВВС НАТО «Балтийское воздушное патрулирование», которая проводится уже почти 10 лет в небе Латвии, Литвы и Эстонии.

На фоне некоторых успехов в сфере сокращения СНВ, стороны никогда не вели официальные переговоры по сокращению ТЯО. Но начало таких переговоров невозможно главным образом из-за неравных стартовых позиций сторон: в то время как Россия уже вывела все свое ТЯО из трех государств бывшего СССР 20 лет назад, США до сих пор не сделали этого. Более того, американское ТЯО постоянно модернизируется, а три ядерные авиабомбы В-61-7, В-61-11 и перспективная В-61-12 рассматриваются Пентагоном и госдепартаментом США как относящиеся к СНВ, если они доставляются стратегическими бомбардировщиками В-2А и В-52Н. Переговоры по ТЯО между Россией и США не могут начаться еще и потому, что после начала Вашингтоном реализации «Европейского поэтапного адаптивного подхода» (ЕПАП) к ПРО российские тактические ядерные средства помимо компенсации превосходства стран НАТО в обычных вооружениях стали выполнять две дополнительные роли: компенсацию географического преимущества США по ТЯО (они размещены в Европе), а также компенсацию развертываемой ими системы ПРО на европейском континенте.

Поэтому не представляются возможными и целесообразными никакие переговоры по ТЯО с Соединенными Штатами, никакие меры доверия и транспарентности относительно ТЯО, проведение инспекций российских тактических ядерных средств, понижение их степени боеготовности и другие меры без решения проблемы ПРО и самой проблемы ТЯО (по меньшей мере, ее географического аспекта). Не возможен и обмен данными по ТЯО между Москвой и Вашингтоном до начала соответствующих переговоров – такого прецедента еще не было; обмен данными по СНВ и РСМД производился сторонами только в ходе соответствующих переговоров.

### Договор СНВ-4: основные принципы

Новый Договор СНВ-4 должен основываться на принципе равенства и равной безопасности сторон, реально учитывать ядерные стратегические и тактические вооружения на тяжелых стратегических бомбардировщиках, а также ПЛАРК с КРМБ (свыше 600 км) в любом снаряжении, вводить ограничения на стратегические носители высокоточных обычных вооружений, иметь жесткую увязку СНВ с ПРО – как с размещаемыми системами ПРО на национальных территориях России и США, так и развертываемыми в иностранных государствах и в Мировом океане в непосредственной близости от друг друга. В этом контексте Баренцево, Балтийское, Средиземное и Черное моря должны стать зонами, свободными от ядерного и противоракетного оружия для

внерегиональных государств. На основе взаимности аналогичные зоны должны быть провозглашены у атлантического и тихоокеанского побережья Соединенных Штатов. Следует вообще количественно ограничить не только носители и боезаряды СНВ, но ударно-боевые средства ПРО сторон, выдвигающиеся «на передовые рубежи».

Очевидно, что требуется заключить принципиально новый договор по ПРО – но уже на многосторонней основе, в котором были бы ограничены и ударно-боевые средства ПРО (ракеты-перехватчики), и зоны их размещения за пределами национальных территорий.

Обеим сторонам следует учесть недостатки Пражского Договора СНВ-3. Как признает руководитель российской делегации на переговорах с США по Договору СНВ-3, заместитель министра обороны России Анатолий Антонов, в этом договорном акте, как и в договоре СНВ-1, не нашла окончательного решения проблема КРМБ большой дальности, в нем нет запрета на СНВ в неядерном оснащении. Анатолий Антонов также выражает пожелание добиться «... большего по возвратному потенциалу, жестче зафиксировать взаимосвязь СНВ-ПРО, сделать новое соглашение более качественным и всеобъемлющим» (Антонов А. Контроль над вооружениями: история, состояние, перспективы. М: Российская политическая энциклопедия. 2012. С.52).

Чтобы вовлечь все другие ядерные государства в переговорный процесс по сокращению ядерного оружия необходимо решить три ключевые задачи:

- Россия и США должны сократить свои ядерные потенциалы до сопоставимых пределов ядерных потенциалов других ядерных государств, при условии, что последние никогда не будут наращивать их; такие сокращения могли бы быть осуществлены в ходе переговоров СНВ-5, СНВ-6 и СНВ-7;
- все ядерные государства – как юридические, так и фактические – должны определить примерный срок построения безъядерного мира, например, к 2045 году или позже, по договоренности;
- все ядерные государства должны объявить о неприменении ядерного оружия первыми против друг друга не позднее 2014-2015 годов.

Возможные параметры будущего ДСНВ-4

США пока определяют с параметрами нового Договора о сокращении СНВ (СНВ-4). Не было сделано и каких-то официальных заявлений с российской стороны. Из трех наиболее вероятных лимитов на количество боезарядов для России и США американские эксперты называют максимальные потолки до 1000-1100 единиц или даже несколько меньше. В принципе, такие параметры отвечали бы и российским интересам, если бы обе стороны подходили к ядерным вооружениям с одинаковых позиций. Они могли бы обсудить и более низкие уровни новых сокращений для СНВ, но при предварительном устранении трех основных препятствий, которые для Москвы имеют принципиальное и стратегическое значение.

Препятствие первое.

Это продолжающееся развертывание ракет-перехватчиков и радаров ПРО США как «средств передового базирования» близ рубежей России вопреки ее возражениям и при одновременном отказе Вашингтона создавать кооперативную систему ПРО. Вашингтон проигнорировал семь заявлений по ПРО, специально сделанных российскими лидерами. Россия не упомянута в ЕПАП, «дорожной карте» НАТО по ПРО и в «правилах применения силы» ударно-боевых средств ПРО альянса. В своем нынешнем и будущем виде ЕПАП США является самым дестабилизирующим и провокационным изобретением после окончания «холодной войны». ЕПАП должен быть отменен полностью, в том числе не должны сооружаться американские оперативные комплексы ПРО в

Румынии и Польше. Продление четвертой фазы ЕПАП до 2022 года, объявленное в середине марта 2012 года, не устраняет озабоченностей России. Не отвечают интересам России политические заявления Вашингтона и НАТО о ненаправленности средств ПРО США против российских СЯС и новая идея об юридических гарантиях транспарентности этой системы. Нужны твердые, юридические обязывающие гарантии вообще неприменения средств ПРО США и НАТО против Российской Федерации и, соответственно, встречные обязательства с российской стороны. Принципиально важное замечание: Россия не размещает средства ПРО у границ США и уже не раз заявляла, что не намерена делать этого, разумеется, на взаимной основе.

Препятствие второе.

Это отказ Вашингтона вывести из Европы ТЯО на свою территорию – также как «средство передового базирования» – и демонтировать его инфраструктуру на европейской земле. Существенное замечание в этой связи: Россия не имеет ТЯО на американском континенте у территории США.

Препятствие третье.

Это неготовность США пересмотреть ядерную стратегию «наступательного ядерного сдерживания», которая предусматривает нанесение первого «упреждающего и превентивного» ядерного удара. Это главное содержание обновленного плана ведения ядерной войны, одобренного Стратегическим командованием США 30 июля прошлого года («Operation Plan 8010-12. Strategic Deterrence and Force Employment»), который предусматривает нанесение первого ядерного удара по России. В этой связи представляется важным, чтобы Соединенные Штаты вернулись к призыву Рональда Рейгана, с которым он выступил 26 августа 1987 года: осуществить «переход к оборонительному ядерному сдерживанию, которое никому не угрожает».

По изложенным выше трем причинам невозможны и меры доверия применительно к ПРО и ТЯО. Без устранения этих трех препятствий переговоры по выработке ДСНВ-4 с США также представляются нецелесообразными. В случае сохранения этих препятствий:

- будет нарушен баланс между СНВ и ПРО, которого СССР/Россия и США строго придерживались в рамках Договора по ПРО в течение 40 лет до одностороннего выхода Вашингтона из него в 2002 году;
- мировое сообщество не сможет предотвратить гонку ядерных и противоракетных вооружений в глобальном масштабе.

И, наконец, замечание общего порядка: сокращение в дальнейшем ядерных вооружений стратегического и тактического назначения при одновременном бесконтрольном наращивании средств ПРО и развертывании их по всему земному шару на территориях других государств и в Мировом океане станет дестабилизирующим фактором для региональной и глобальной безопасности.

Если прошлый век получил название «век гонки ядерных вооружений», то XXI век может стать «веком гонки противоракетных вооружений».

А разве все мы нуждаемся в этом?

Российское руководство в целом положительно отреагировало на послание Барака Обамы, адресованное Владимиру Путину, которое доставил в Москву 15 апреля советник президента США по национальной безопасности (см. комментарий на эту тему: Козин В. «Письма сюда и отсюда. Что Вашингтон хочет от Москвы, что Москва хочет от Вашингтона»//Независимое военное обозрение, № 16, 2013, 17-23 мая; [http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2013-05-17/3\\_letters.html](http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2013-05-17/3_letters.html)).

Считаю, что президенты России и США должны провести специальную, отдельную встречу по обсуждению двусторонней и многосторонней повестки дня в области контроля над вооружениями уже в этом году.

## **U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Anita Friedt<sup>2</sup>**

### **OPTIONS AND ISSUES FOLLOWING NEW START**

Today, I would like to provide an update on the challenging work that President Obama laid out four years ago in Prague, when he committed the United States to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

We can all agree with President Obama's assessment that this task will not be easy and will not happen soon. But, over the last four years we have succeeded in moving closer to this goal.

In 2010, the United States concluded a Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, that describes how the United States will reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy to better address current and future security threats and strengthen the security of the United States and our Allies. The NPR clearly stated that the most immediate and extreme threat today is the prospect of nuclear terrorism. Concerted action by the United States and Russia – and indeed, by all nuclear weapon states – to reduce their nuclear arsenals can help garner global support for strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and to securing nuclear materials worldwide to make it harder for terrorists to acquire nuclear materials.

For instance, by the end of this year, we expect highly enriched uranium down-blending to be completed under the 1993 U.S.-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement. Under the Agreement, 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian weapons will have been converted into low-enriched uranium and delivered to the United States to fuel U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. Over 472 metric tons, enough for approximately 18,900 warheads, has been down-blended and sent to the United States so far. We look forward to celebrating with our Russian partners the final delivery of this historic, cooperative effort. In the United States, 374 metric tons of U.S. HEU has been declared excess to nuclear weapons; most of this will be down-blended or used as fuel in naval or research reactors.

In 2011, the United States and Russia brought into force the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its 2006 and 2010 protocols, which require each side to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium – enough in total for about 17,000 nuclear weapons – and thus permanently remove this material from military programs. Russia has been an essential partner in the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts to convert research reactors from HEU to LEU and repatriate those reactors' HEU to the country of origin. These efforts have converted or verified the shutdown of over 75 research and test reactors, and repatriated to the United States or to Russia over 3,000 kg of HEU for secure storage, down-blending and disposition. Together, these programs are significantly reducing the amount of material that terrorists could target for theft or misuse.

In addition to securing and eliminating excess nuclear material, the United States has committed not to develop new nuclear weapons or pursue new nuclear missions; we have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance

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<sup>2</sup> Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State

with their nonproliferation obligations; and we have clearly stated that it is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 68-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.

As President Obama said in Seoul in March of last year:

“[W]e can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need. I firmly believe that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies, maintain a strong deterrent against any threat, and still pursue further reductions in our nuclear arsenal.”

Let me now address what we believe our next steps beyond New START should be.

The United States continues to believe that the next step in nuclear arms reductions should be pursued on a bilateral basis with Russia. Our two countries still possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world, and the New START Treaty provides a very useful model for future arms control treaties. The implementation of New START, now in its third year, is going well. When New START is fully implemented, the United States and the Russian Federation will be limited to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads – the lowest levels since the 1950s.

The United States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons, including the pursuit of a future agreement with Russia to address all categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, non-strategic, deployed, and non-deployed.

To this end, we are engaged in a bilateral dialogue to discuss strategic stability and transparency issues on a reciprocal basis with the Russian Federation. We are hopeful our dialogue will be the prelude to discussions leading to further transparency and nuclear weapons reductions.

As part of this process, the United States is consulting with Allies to lay the groundwork for future negotiations. At the 2012 NATO Summit, Allies approved a Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). In the DDPR, the Allies reaffirmed their commitment to seek to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, while remaining a nuclear Alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist. The review found that the Alliance’s nuclear force posture meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture, and that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons may be contemplated are extremely remote.

In the DDPR, allies recalled that the number of nuclear weapons assigned to NATO has already been dramatically reduced since the end of the Cold War. Looking to the future, Allies reiterated that against that background and in the context of the broader security environment -- and taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area -- NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia.

NATO expressed its support for continued mutual efforts by the United States and Russia to promote strategic stability, enhance transparency, and further reduce their nuclear weapons. The Allies also reiterated their interest in developing and exchanging transparency and confidence-building ideas with Russia with the goal of developing detailed proposals on, and increasing mutual understanding of, NATO’s and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe.

Strategic stability, especially in Europe, is not only a function of nuclear capabilities. Conventional arms control also plays a vital role in enhancing European security, promoting trust and predictability, and developing an environment where military transparency is the norm.

There are three conventional regimes that play key roles in European security: the Open Skies Treaty, the Vienna Document (2011), and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.

While these regimes continue to provide a level of military openness and predictability in Europe, the conventional arms control regime in Europe is facing a number challenges, particularly non-implementation. Following Russia's decision to "suspend" implementation of its obligations under the CFE Treaty in 2007, the United States and its 21 NATO Allies that are party to the Treaty, in addition to Georgia and Moldova, ceased carrying out certain obligations under the CFE Treaty with regard to Russia as a legal countermeasure in 2011. Those countries have all continued to implement the Treaty vis-à-vis the other 29 CFE States Parties.

Russia has the largest conventional military arsenal in Europe. Its decision to stop implementing the CFE Treaty had a material –negative - impact on the level of military transparency in Europe. In the view of the United States, we should be aiming for greater information sharing and more openness between us in the post-Cold War era – not less. The importance of frank dialogue on this issue – and of arms control arrangements that give confidence in the military postures and plans of neighbors – is underscored today by the budget situation we all face. Arms control can help us have the confidence we need to make sensible budget choices, choices that focus on meeting real threats, not the historic tensions of the last century.

NATO Allies reaffirmed in the 2012 Chicago Summit Declaration our determination "to preserve, strengthen and modernize the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, and continue to explore ideas to this end." We must modernize conventional arms control to take account of modern military realities and current security concerns. Moving forward together, we can arrive at solutions that best serve the security interests of all.

It also is necessary, when discussing areas to broaden and deepen our cooperation and to advance our common interests, to address the question of missile defense.

The United States remains committed to missile defense cooperation with Russia. We are convinced that missile defense cooperation with Russia is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, missile defense cooperation with Russia remains a priority for the United States. To be clear, U.S. missile defense efforts are focused on defending our homeland and our allies and partners against the ballistic missile threats coming from Iran and North Korea. While some may regard these threats as nascent, these are threats that are real and growing, and we must prepare to meet them.

In meeting these threats, it is important to emphasize that U.S. missile defenses are not designed against, or capable of undermining, the Russian or Chinese strategic deterrents. Russia has insisted on legally binding guarantees that our missile defenses will not threaten its strategic deterrent. We believe that limitations on our own defenses are not the optimal way to cooperate against a common threat. The best way for Russia to see for itself that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe do not undermine its strategic deterrent would be for it to cooperate with us. With regard to China, the United States welcomes the opportunity to engage in a dialogue about missile defense and other security issues of strategic importance.

As our work together over the past four years has shown, the United States and Russia can produce significant results that benefit both countries. As I mentioned earlier, the New START Treaty is an example of this. Cooperation on missile defense would facilitate improved relations between the United States and Russia and between NATO and Russia. It has the potential to enhance the national security of both the United States and Russia and our Allies and partners, as well as build a genuine strategic partnership.

None of this will be easy, but we owe it to our people to try. The policies the United States is pursuing are tailored for the security needs and the global security threats of the 21st century. By maintaining and supporting a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal while pursuing responsible and verifiable nuclear reductions through arms control, we can together make this world a safer place.

**Dr. Yousaf Butt<sup>3</sup>**

## **POINTS ON MISSILE DEFENSE**

I will present some relevant issues regarding NATO missile defense, and possible missile defense/early-warning/scientific NATO-Russia cooperation from a technical perspective. Scientific, as opposed to political approach, has some benefits as the scientific reality is rather unambiguous so may lay a foundation on which there could be greater scope for agreement.

While cooperation is desirable, there is no necessity to make further nuclear stockpile cuts contingent upon cooperation: in the post-Cold War era unilateral cuts – while still under New START protocols for next 7 years – should be possible. Another word for “unilateral” in this context, is “leadership”.

U.S./NATO EPAA missile defense is “midcourse” missile defense where interception is attempted in space: this architecture has a weakness that it can be defeated by decoys and/or other countermeasures (because lightweight decoys and real heavy warheads move together in the vacuum of space).

Therefore, Russia should have little concern: Russian ICBMs can easily defeat the system, and quite likely already include such decoys and other countermeasures. In fact, in testimony last week, the new head of the MDA, vice-admiral Syring said quite clearly that the current system has a major difficulty to apart a real warhead from other objects. From Syring’s testimony statement: "very difficult problems of lethal object discrimination, limited inventory and cost per kill." This has been an unresolved problem for decades. The proposed solutions (LIDAR) are not pragmatic.

While the cancelling of Phase IV of the EPAA should be welcome by Russia, even the interceptors in that phase could be defeated by Russia. Russia may be concerned about future changes to the system or future administrations' politics. e.g. Romney's statement that “Russia is No. 1 geopolitical foe”.

U.S. research into offensive weapons based on SM-3 interceptor (e.g. ArcLight) may also be a concern.

U.S.-Russia cooperation could start with cooperation on early warning rather than on missile defense. Concrete cooperation could be around an early warning radar in central Russia, or scientific cooperation on early warning of asteroid impacts such as at Chelyabinsk. These may need the cooperation of the U.S. Congress also. An inadvertent consequence of successful U.S.-Russia cooperation could be perceived isolation by China. China may increase its stockpile in response, so cooperation may need to involve China also, or otherwise great care and coordinating with China must be exercised.

**Hans M. Kristensen<sup>4</sup>**

## **NON--STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL**

Let me begin by thanking the organizers of this workshop for the invitation to come the long way to Moscow to discuss next steps in nuclear arms control. I have been asked to discuss non--strategic nuclear

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<sup>4</sup> Federation of American Scientists

weapons, this odd category of nuclear weapons that still exists more than two decades after the Cold War ended. Specifically, what are the prerequisites and possibilities for next steps?

As you all know, possibilities are many if the political will and leadership exist. Without this, little will happen because the bureaucracy is inclined to focus on difficulties rather than opportunities. So in a way the question should be what our political and military leadership can be expected to do about non-strategic nuclear weapons over the next decade.

As always, the answer depends on whom you ask. There are people that are actively working to block progress for institutional or ideological reasons. They are pleased with NATO's Strategic Concept and Deterrence and Defense Posture Review and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review because they can use them to block progress. Others are working very hard to pry the door open despite bureaucratic obstacles and come up with ideas that are in the interest of Russia, the United States and NATO.

### **Interest and Prerequisites**

So what are some of the interests or prerequisites for them? Part of the challenge is that they appear to be very different. For most of the past two decades, neither side appeared to pay much attention to the other's non-strategic nuclear forces. They monitored them, yes, but they were not prominent or even determining factors. Now, suddenly they appear to be central again, but for very different reasons.

Russian officials say that non-strategic nuclear weapons are important to compensate against NATO's superior conventional forces and to safeguard the border with China. But how much is needed for those missions? The many different old types of weapons and delivery systems indicate to me that the current posture may have more to do with what's left over from the past than about what's needed for Russia's security needs today. How many aircraft carrier battle groups does the United States actually have? And has anyone actually counted how many forces China has along the border and how many non-strategic nuclear weapons it would take to repeal an attack? In addition to military missions, Russia's non-strategic weapons also seem to be used as a way to keep overall parity with U.S. strategic nuclear weapons.

NATO and the United States, for their part, do not publicly attribute much military importance to non-strategic nuclear weapons but say they are necessary to reassure allies and because Russia has more of them. But over the past four years, the political status of non-strategic nuclear weapons has suddenly increased again far beyond their military value to the point that billions of dollars are being committed to modernizing them. Yet since the United States and NATO have overwhelming conventional capabilities backed up by superior strategic nuclear forces, it is difficult to see why the non-strategic nuclear weapons matter. Their continued role may have more to do with that they are still there. Indeed, the justifications used to retain them at times seem opaque and even mystical.

Why would reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons be in the interest of Russia, the United States and NATO? First of all because they are part of the grand bargain that Russia and the United States made with non-nuclear weapon states under the non-proliferation treaty to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia still have more than twice as many non-strategic nuclear weapons than the total nuclear arsenals of all the world's other nuclear weapon states combined. Politically, Russia and the United States cannot afford not to reduce their non-strategic nuclear weapons.

As the pressure for reductions builds, both sides come up with excuses for why they can't reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia says it is weak and NATO is stronger and that China is growing bigger. The United States and NATO say Russia has more of them and that they are needed for reassurance.

I often hear Russian officials questioning why limitations on non-strategic nuclear weapons would be in Russia's interest at all. After all, the postures are too different, and compensating against NATO's conventional superiority and safeguarding against China are too important, they say. But I think Russia's interests are much broader.



It seems to me that Russia has a clear interest in ensuring that NATO's three no's are continued and nuclear forces are not creeping east via rotational deployments of nuclear-capable aircraft to Eastern European NATO countries.

To that end, Russia would seem to have a clear interest in that its own continued possession of ground-launched non-strategic nuclear weapons and deployments in Kaliningrad do not end up triggering further improvement of NATO advanced conventional forces, or hardens NATO's interest in retaining and modernizing U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

Russia also seems to have a clear interest in using arms control to limit the U.S. ability to re-deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons into the Pacific. They were withdrawn in the early 1990s but there have been increasing calls in Japan and South Korea for such a re-deployment, which would not be in Russia's interest.

Another issue for Russia to consider is what happens if the United States withdraws and destroys the remaining nuclear weapons from Europe within the next 10 years. The trend is quite clearly in that direction. Without some convincing change in its posture, Russia would look stuck in the past and singled out for critique in the international arms control community.

And in the longer run, Russia would have an interest in using arms control to establish limitations on possible Chinese non-strategic nuclear capabilities along its border.

For their part, the United States and NATO seem to have a strong interest in not extending the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. It is a left-over from the Cold War, it contradicts the pledge to reduce the numbers and role of nuclear weapons, it's fake reassurance, it steals increasingly scarce resources from much more important conventional missions, it's provides an excuse for Russia not to discuss reductions of its non-strategic nuclear weapons, and the controversial nuclear sharing arrangement contradicts the non-proliferation standards that the United States and NATO are trying to promote elsewhere. Besides, the consistent trend is that the United States and NATO are phasing out non-strategic nuclear weapons.

### **Possibilities**

So what are some of the possibilities for extending nuclear arms control to non-strategic nuclear weapons? Well, I believe they are fortunately many – provided the political will is there. For an overview, I can highly recommend the latest paper by Anne Finger and Oliver Meier, which includes a useful discussion and overview of the various ideas and proposals that have been put forward regarding reductions and confidence-building measures on non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The possibilities appear to fall in two categories: reductions and limitations on the one hand, and confidence-building measures and transparency on the other hand.

Ironically, Russia, the United States and NATO have a long history and a lot of experience with reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons. People sometimes tend to forget that in the current debate. This includes deep cuts, elimination of entire categories of weapons, and reducing the operational readiness of the remaining forces.

The Unilateral Presidential Initiatives from the early 1990s stand out as the most important and effective initiatives to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons so far. Thanks to them, Russia benefitted immensely by the United States eliminating its ground-based and naval non-strategic nuclear weapons, including for aircraft carriers and long-range land-attack cruise missiles. Moreover, over the past decade, the U.S. has reduced by more than half the number of bombs deployed in Europe.

Russia also benefitted from the United Kingdom eliminating all its non-strategic nuclear weapons and France's elimination of several weapons categories. Russia officials who question the value of limiting non-strategic nuclear weapons need to be reminded about that.

For its part, NATO has benefitted immensely by Russia reducing its inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons by 75 percent, including 60 percent of its air and missile-defense weapons, half of its air-delivered weapons, a third of its naval weapons, and nearly all of its ground-launched nuclear weapons.

The two sides can – and probably will – continue with additional unilateral reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the next decade even without a formal arms control treaty. The United States will further reduce its inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons and some NATO countries may phase out their nuclear strike mission. Russia will probably retire several of its oldest non-strategic nuclear weapons systems and reduce the number of launchers and probably continue to consolidate storage sites even further.

Unfortunately, both sides will also modernize their remaining non-strategic nuclear forces. The United States and NATO are planning an upgrade of the posture in Europe involving deployment of the new guided B61-12 standoff bomb on stealthy F-35 fighter bombers. Russia is developing the new Kalibr nuclear land-attack cruise missile and is deploying new nuclear-capable submarines, aircraft, and ground-launched missiles. These modernizations will inevitably sustain the salience of non-strategic nuclear weapons and deepen mistrust.

To begin formal limitations on non-strategic nuclear weapons, I have recommended initially focusing on air-delivered weapons because this is the only category where some degree of compatibility exists between Russia and the United States. Both countries operate air-delivered non-strategic nuclear forces that are similarly structured and roughly equal in size.

Air-delivered weapons are also some of the most “strategic” of non-strategic nuclear weapons in terms of range and capabilities. Russian Tu-22M3 Backfire-C bombers, for example, have a semi-strategic status and are often described as strategic alongside Tu-95 Bear and Tu-160 Blackjack long-range bombers.

Similarly, Russian officials often characterize U.S. B61 bombs in Europe as strategic because of their forward location and potential role against Russian strategic targets. Moreover, the new guided B61-12 standoff bomb planned for deployment from 2019 is designed for use on both strategic and non-strategic delivery platforms.

I believe both sides could take important symbolic steps to limit the current modernization. NATO and the United States should change the B61 upgrade to a bare-bone life-extension that avoids increasing the military capabilities and it should limit, for now, the launchers to existing aircraft. Russia, for its part, should avoid deployment of a nuclear version of the Kaliber land-attack cruise missile, which is not about compensating for inferior conventional forces and is the wrong response to the U.S. retirement of its nuclear land-attack cruise missiles.

Unfortunately, the two sides appear to have boxed themselves in with preconditions for reductions. Russia will not discuss reductions on non-strategic nuclear weapons until U.S. weapons and nuclear infrastructure are out of Europe. NATO says that it will not reduce further unless Russia reduces its larger inventory.

So initially, softer confidence-building measures (CBM) seem destined to serve as icebreakers to gradually develop the issues and help warm up and mature the political willingness to address non-strategic nuclear forces more directly.

For a starter, the United States and Russia could do a PNI status declaration and exchange data on and declare what they have reduced and what has been eliminated since 1991. This would help bring a conclusion to a process that was started more than two decades ago and eliminate rumors and suspicion about cheating.

Such a process could also involve declaring which facilities no longer have nuclear roles. These declared facilities could be logical candidates for initial on-site inspections and assist in developing verification procedures for future inspections of facilities with nuclear forces.

Moreover, in terms of the idea of starting with air-delivered forces, information exchanges and verification would have the advantage that they could build on the procedures already developed by the two countries for strategic bombers and in full operation under the New START Treaty.

Later, these procedures could possibly be expanded to include other P5 nuclear weapon states, such as France and China, and further down the line potentially even India and Pakistan.

There is actually also a need for both sides to be more transparent about their specific concerns about non-strategic nuclear forces.

For example, NATO and the United States need to be clearer about what they mean when they say they want Russia to “increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members.” Does this mean all nuclear weapons or only non-strategic weapons? Does this concern nuclear-capable launchers or only the warheads for them? Which locations are the problems; is it about Kaliningrad, Kola, both, or anything west of the Urals? And how close can the weapons be; is the acceptable distance similar to the distance of U.S. forward-deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe from Russia’s border?

Similarly, NATO and United States need to be clearer about what they mean when they say that “any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.” What disparity and why? Are NATO and the United States seeking parity or, if not, how much disparity is acceptable? Do they want Russia to limit the categories of non-strategic nuclear weapons or is it about the overall number of warheads or launchers?

For its part, Russia should be more specific about which of NATO’s conventional forces it is that create a requirement to keep non-strategic nuclear weapons. Is it naval forces, offensive air forces, or ground forces? Is the concern about certain capabilities such as anti-submarine warfare, aircraft carrier battle groups, cruise missiles, or precision-guided munitions? And since the United States is not going to eliminate any of these and has missions elsewhere, how much capability is acceptable for Russia?

Likewise, how much of the justification for non-strategic nuclear weapons is about NATO and how much is about China? By far most of Russia’s nuclear-capable non-strategic nuclear forces appear to be located west of the Urals, so how many weapons and of what kind does it actually take to repel a Chinese attack?

Being more specific about what the problem is would help identify areas that need to be adjusted or where to focus the efforts to bring most benefits to both sides.

Some people ask: “Why transparency? What’s in it for us?” In a way I think the point of transparency has less to do with what one gains but more to do with what one avoids by increasing transparency. Absent transparency, uncertainty, rumors, suspicion, mistrust, misunderstandings and worst-case assumptions and planning are sustained and may even increase. Transparency builds trust. Besides, transparency is part of the overall plan to reduce the numbers and role of nuclear weapons.

So I believe both sides have strong interests in extending nuclear arms control to non-strategic nuclear weapons, that there is a wide range of steps that could be pursued, and that Russia, the United States and


NATO all would benefit from doing so. But as I mentioned earlier, progress depends not on technical issues but on the political will to move forward.

**Eugene Miasnikov<sup>5</sup>**

## **STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES: GOALS AND POSSIBLE NEW ARMS CONTROL MEASURES**

It is my pleasure to address this audience today and it is my honor to represent my views on this subject. I'd like to thank the organizers for this opportunity.

The idea of reducing strategic offensive arms below the ceilings provided for in the New START treaty began to be actively discussed well before the treaty was concluded in April 2010. For a long time, the Russian expert community has realized that before a new round of negotiations is launched, [three problems need to be resolved](#): the problem of ballistic missile defenses (BMD), the problem of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) and the problem of strategic conventional offensive arms. Events that followed after the New START was signed further strengthened this understanding.



Previous two sessions of our meeting dealt with exactly two of the problems mentioned. [The problem of conventional strategic arms](#) was mentioned just briefly, but it certainly deserves a separate discussion.

The subject of this session is further reductions in the strategic arsenals. First of all I'd like to outline status quo and prevailing trends in the development of strategic forces of the U.S and Russia.

The graph shows the forecast for strategic delivery systems development for the next 18 years provided that both parties adhere to the START treaty over this period of time. The numbers were calculated in accordance with the rules provided by the START treaty currently in force. Blue curves represent U.S. strategic systems, and the red ones - Russian systems. Dotted curves show aggregate numbers for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. Solid curves show the number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. Two solid red curves shown for Russian missiles and bombers represent two extreme scenarios of strategic forces development - the most optimistic and the most pessimistic ones. I'll elaborate on this later.

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
<sup>5</sup> Eugene Miasnikov, Ph.D., Director of the [Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies](#)

At the time being there is a lively discussion in the U.S. on renovation of the nuclear triad and related issues. However, since existing delivery systems are to be preserved for at least fifteen years to come, any U.S. decision on replacement of delivery systems is unlikely to affect the blue curves any time before 2030.

According to the Pentagon's existing plans, all fourteen Trident strategic submarines will be in service till 2027 and one submarine a year will retire after that. Starting 2030, the U.S. Navy is going to get one new SSBN yearly to replace retiring submarines.

The service life of "Minuteman" ICBMs is going to end not earlier than 2030. Currently, an option to extend it at least until the mid 2070-s is under discussion. Heavy bombers will also be capable of carrying out nuclear missions, at least until the 2030-2040s.

**New ICBMs ("Topol-M" and "Yars") deployment rate in 1997-2012**



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 CENESS-ACA-BASIC-IFSH Workshop -- Moscow -- 05/16/2013

Unlike the U.S., Russia has long been replacing its nuclear triad. The process of phasing out old delivery systems (currently about 80% of total deployed delivery systems) will likely continue until the mid-2020s. At the moment, this process proceeds with a pace that is still faster than the new missiles are built.

The lower solid red curve assumes a hypothetical scenario that starting this year Russia stops deployment of new ICBMs and strategic submarines, but the Navy will still get the three SSBNs that are on final phases of production ("Yuri Dolgorukiy", "Alexander Nevskiy" and "Vladimir Monomakh"). The upper solid red curve represents a scenario when the Strategic Rocket Forces will receive 18 ICBMs yearly until 2025, and the Navy will commission one 955A Project SSBN each year (8 submarines altogether in accordance with the State Program for Armaments till 2020).

How realistic is the second scenario? The second graph shows new ICBM deployment rate starting in 1997, when the first "Topol-M" (SS-27) came in service. This graph clearly illustrates that increasing the rate of ICBM production to 18 missiles a year will be highly problematic. The rate of commissioning of one strategic submarine a year will be even more challenging given existing production rates for submarines.

Thus, if the lower solid curve is "the floor," the upper one is "the ceiling" for future deployed Russian missiles and heavy bombers. The most likely: Russia will have no more than 400 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers over the next decade.

All of this means that the next round of reductions will affect only the U.S. strategic offensive arms. We can hardly seriously discuss a possibility of concluding a new strategic arms reductions agreement for the reasons I mentioned in the beginning and also because Russia has nothing to reciprocate with.

Certainly, this situation was quite clear three years ago, when the New START was concluded. But at that time the United States was very keen on greater transparency with regard to the Russian strategic forces. The compromise reached back then can be described as follows: "unilateral reductions in exchange for greater transparency." Since the transparency issue is resolved until 2021, for as long as START will remain in force, it is hard to say what kind of a compromise can be reached now, if a new treaty is to be discussed. Some of our U.S. colleagues hope that Russia would be able to agree to cover non-strategic as

well as non-deployed nuclear warheads by arms control measures. This is unlikely to happen any time during the next few years.

However, if the issues of BMD and strategic conventional arms are somehow resolved, Russia might reconsider its attitude toward non-strategic nuclear weapons. In any event, if a compromise is reached on development of BMD and conventionally armed strategic systems, then prerequisites for discussing transparency measures for NSNW might occur. This would represent a major step forward compared to the situation where we are now.

What alternative actions could be taken in order to reduce the level of strategic offensive arms and what could be objectives of those actions?

Many options are being discussed now, and, in my view, three of them deserve more detailed consideration:

- Accelerated implementation of the START treaty;
- Parallel unilateral initiatives to reduce deployed and non-deployed strategic arms to levels below those declared in the START treaty;
- Parallel unilateral initiatives to reduce the number of non-deployed nuclear warheads (for example, by one half)

The implementation of such initiatives could help to reduce the existing imbalances between strategic forces of the U.S. and Russia. The United States could save some money that it has to spend to maintain its strategic forces, which is an important factor at the time of the budget sequestering. The same could hardly be applied to Russia. Most likely, the initiatives above will not affect the pace of new strategic arms deployment in Russia. Therefore, the economic factor might be hardly a major stimulus for Russian decision makers. And, finally, in 2015 there is going to be an NPT review conference where the U.S. and Russia will present their reports on compliance with Article VI of the NPT treaty. In this context implementation of one of the proposed options would be very timely and topical.

Russia can positively view the idea of accelerated implementation of START. It has already fulfilled its obligations with regard to two of the three START ceilings, and what remains to be done is to reduce the number of non-deployed strategic launchers. However, one needs to take into account one important factor. Accelerated implementation of START may involve some additional costs that are not in the budget yet, therefore it could be burdensome financially. This may affect not only the United States but Russia as well.

Importantly, in accordance with official data on START implementation over the last two years the number of Russian deployed delivery systems has been declining, while the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missile launchers and heavy bombers has been increasing. For financial or some other reasons, Russia is in no rush to eliminate its phased out strategic systems.

These circumstances may give rise to another danger. The START treaty is extremely flexible in terms of options for elimination. In fact, the parties to the treaty can choose an elimination procedure for themselves, and such a procedure does not have to be irreversible. When the time is short to implement the treaty obligations, there might be a temptation to simplify elimination procedures under the pretext of cost savings. As a result, these reductions may prove to be only formal, the notion of reductions itself - devalued, and instead of being an instrument for building confidence, accelerated implementation of START may have an entirely opposite effect.

## Dr. Edward Ifft

### Prospects for Russian-U.S. Arms Control: Current Situation

New START going well, as we heard:

- warhead and launcher levels are going down
- Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) 5 sessions have already been held
- DTRA Course is training inspectors

Great interest in what comes next:

- 2010 NPT Revcon: Action 5--“The NWS commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament. . .rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons.
- Oslo Conference on Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear War—attended by 127 countries; Mexico City next—treaty to make nuclear weapons illegal—interim step to NWC
- We are not naïve about UN declarations and conferences of the NNWS; all here probably agree these proposed treaties are wildly premature. Nevertheless, we need to pay attention to what the majority of countries in the world are saying and recognize that real harm could be done to the NPT Review process, and even the NPT itself, if we do not move forward, and also if we cannot show progress on the issue of creating a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East, for which our 2 countries are sponsors.

We have had good discussions today of BMD issues and non-strategic NW and these difficult issues cannot be ignored. However, most people consider strategic offensive nuclear weapons to be the main course in arms control and especially Russian-U.S. arms control.

#### Next Steps

I take it as self-evident that our two countries have far more nuclear weapons than are needed for any rational purpose. Conventional wisdom has, for a long time, been that nuclear disarmament will proceed in distinct stages:

- Russian-U.S. bilateral agreements, followed by
- P-5 agreements, followed by
- Agreements involving all states with nuclear weapons, followed finally by
- Some sort of agreement involving all states

This is the path we have been following for a long time and I believe it is the correct path—when and how to organize stages beyond the first one is one of the difficult issues we face. The U.S. 2010 NPR said the next stage should still be bilateral. The Preamble to the New START Treaty mentions moving to a multilateral stage and some in Russia apparently advocate doing that sooner rather than later. At the Carnegie Conference in Washington last month, some of us heard Chinese General Yao say that there should be 1 or 2 additional bilateral U.S.—Russia stages of reductions before China would be willing to join us. The UK and France have already made major unilateral reductions in their forces and could not reasonably be expected to go much further on their own.

With respect to our immediate bilateral problem regarding offensive nuclear weapons, we need to address 3 categories of weapons:

- Deployed SOA
- Non-deployed SOA
- Sub-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons

As I noted, our countries have already agreed to do this in the 2010 NPT Action Plan. We also will need to deal with the elimination of nuclear warheads and the disposition of the fissile material in them. This sounds like the subject of another conference. Russia, as we have heard, also wants to bring into the discussion:

- BMD, including space weapons
- Long-range conventional systems
- Nuclear weapons of other countries

These are all relevant, as is recognized in the Preamble to the New START Treaty. However, I do not think these problems need to be solved definitively to get to the next stage. As far as the next stage is concerned, I believe that the way forward could involve any of 3 approaches. It should be noted that elements of these stages could be combined and proceed in parallel.

### **New Simple Treaty**

If we are brave enough to negotiate a new treaty (which some are calling START Next), the simplest goal would be to reduce deployed strategic warheads from 1,550 to about 1,000 (let the record show that I proposed this number 4 years ago in this city and elsewhere for New START). This should be accompanied by a further small reduction in delivery vehicles and at least some greater transparency regarding total stockpiles of both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons.

There are 4 key points to be made about reducing to 1,000:

1. The verification regime for New START could verify this with little or no change.
2. Both sides could continue to keep their Triads
3. We would still be far above the levels of 3<sup>rd</sup> countries
4. Extended deterrence (of great importance to the U.S., but also relevant to Russia) could be maintained

The really difficult problems will begin to arise somewhere below 1,000, when all 4 of these points may begin to be called into question.

### **New Comprehensive Treaty**

If we are ambitious enough to attempt a more comprehensive treaty, by now everyone knows that an alternative creative idea that has arisen in the U.S. is to combine deployed strategic weapons, non-deployed strategic weapons and sub-strategic nuclear weapons into a single aggregate, with what we used to call “freedom to mix,” so that each side could structure its nuclear forces as it chose. My understanding is that Russia is not enthusiastic about this idea. I hope that our Russian colleagues will not dismiss this idea out of hand, since it does deal in a creative way with the 3 categories we have



already agreed to reduce. I suspect that objections center on giving equal weight to diverse weapons. Speaking personally, I would note that, in the past, we have dealt with these kinds of problems with some sub-limits, or assigning different weights to different systems in counting. I could see how one might argue that a bomber weapon in storage should not be assigned the same weight as a nuclear warhead actually deployed on a Russian ICBM or a U.S. Trident.

Our basic problem is asymmetries in forces, geography and threat perceptions. We have had similar problems for many years and solved them in the INF, CFE and START Treaties. A proven method for dealing with such problems is to enlarge the pie, which the aggregate idea does rather cleverly.

As an aside, everyone properly focuses on the number of warheads. However, it is important not to neglect delivery vehicles as well. For reasons I do not fully understand, also reducing delivery vehicles tends to be a difficult idea to sell in the U.S. Simply removing warheads from missiles and bombers and putting them into storage certainly reduces the threat, but it is a very soft form of disarmament and is almost an extreme form of de-alerting. It does not meet our agreed criterion that reductions should be irreversible. Thus we need to assure that there is at least some blowing up of silos and chopping up of bombers to claim real reductions.

### **Parallel Reciprocal Steps**

There is a third possible approach. If we decide that a new legally binding treaty is too ambitious at this time, the prestigious International Security Advisory Board, which advises the State Department, recently recommended 3 sensible options in the form of parallel reciprocal actions that we could take:

1. Reach the New START levels early—perhaps in time for the 2015 NPT Revcon, rather than using the full rather leisurely 7 years specified in the Treaty. This should not be difficult, since we are almost there already.
2. Make progress on nonstrategic weapons by working on definitions, transparency and verification. This could include resuming lab-to-lab cooperation on verification challenges. My friends in the U.S. weapons labs tell me that they are eager for such cooperative work, but their Russian colleagues seem reluctant.
3. Implement mutual reciprocal reductions of both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. This would be reminiscent of the early 1990s PNIs between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev and Yeltsin. If we follow this path, we should try to avoid the uncertainties that arose regarding the implementation of those agreements. Greater transparency regarding exactly what we are doing and when would greatly help minimize such uncertainty.

Of course, these reciprocal steps could be taken in parallel with formal negotiations for legally binding commitments.

### **Joint Enterprise**

Another way forward is an interesting initiative found in the latest WSJ article by the 4 Statesmen—Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn—on March 5. Their proposal is, in parallel with further Russian-U.S. negotiations, to begin a “Joint Enterprise,” in which the leading countries with nuclear expertise (not just those with nuclear weapons) would begin to “create the conditions” for moving toward very low levels and eventually zero. We should seriously explore this idea. This could facilitate reducing Russian-U.S. levels, while accommodating Russian desires to begin to make the process multilateral. It would begin to involve other members of the P-5, other states with nuclear weapons, along with leading NNWS, in the discussion, but without demanding legally binding commitments from them now.

## **What Are Strategic Weapons?**

Let me close with some thoughts on long-range, precision-guided conventional weapons, perhaps including drones, which I think is becoming a major stumbling block to progress. This is hardly a new problem. It is quite remarkable that we have negotiated successfully for more than 40 years without having an agreed definition of “strategic arms.” We solved the problem by simply listing existing types of weapons that were being constrained and listing the characteristics that would identify new types of these weapons. We did not ask the question whether we were limiting some systems that were not really strategic or whether other systems outside the treaties should have also been included. We also recognized that there could arise “new kinds” of weapons that should be dealt with.

The fundamental issue for many years has been that the U.S. associates “strategic” with “nuclear,” while Russia has a broader concept that includes the range of the delivery system and types of targets. However, neither of us is pure on this point. The U.S. agreed in both START and New START that all warheads on ballistic missiles, whether nuclear or conventional, should count the same. For its part, Russia agreed that even systems designed to carry nuclear weapons, and which had actually done so, can be excluded if converted to carry only conventional weapons. Notice the rather remarkable fact that the entire U.S. B-1 heavy bomber force has disappeared from the count in New START, along with 4 submarines that previously carried nuclear weapons. Thus perhaps this is not a question of theology after all. If the numbers of long-range, precision-guided conventional weapon systems are small, we can solve this problem.

## AGENDA OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP “Prospects for Russian-U.S. Arms Control”

*Marriott Tverskaya Hotel, Moscow, Russian Federation*

**Thursday, May 16, 2013**

### *WELCOME REMARKS AND SESSION I: Enhancing Strategic Stability: Options and Issues Following New START*

#### **Speakers:**

- Vladimir **KOZIN**, Adviser to the Director, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS); Member of the Interagency Experts' Working Group on cooperation with NATO on the BMD under the Presidential Administration, Russian Federation
- Anita **FRIEDT**, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Strategic Policy, Department of State, United States
- Ulrich **ERNST**, Deputy Head of Division, Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Federal Foreign Office, Germany

#### *Moderators:*

- Anton **KHLOPKOV**, Director, Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), Russian Federation
- Daryl **KIMBALL**, Executive Director, Arms Control Association, United States

### *SESSION II: Developments in Missile Defense: Exploring Options to Build Trust*

#### **Speakers:**

- Yousaf **BUTT**, Research Professor, Scientist-in-residence, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, United States
- Pavel **ZOLOTAREV**, Deputy Director, Institute for the USA and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN), Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian Federation
- Lukasz **KULESA**, Head, Non-proliferation and Arms Control Project, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Poland

*Moderator:* Anton **KHLOPKOV**, Director, Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), Russian Federation

#### *Key questions to discuss:*

- What are the challenges of Russian-US trust deficit in missile defense?
- Does the United States' cancellation of Phase 4 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach change the equation?
- What practical measures are possible to bridge the missile defense gap?
- What kind of cooperation and/or understanding in missile defense area between Moscow and Washington is/are realistic?

### *SESSION III: Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW): Assessing the Pre-Requisites and Possibilities for New Steps*

#### **Speakers:**

- Victor **ESIN**, Consultant to the Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), Russian Federation
- Hans **KRISTENSEN**, Director, Nuclear Information Project, Federation of American Scientists, United States
- Aaron **STEIN**, Research Associate, Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), Turkey

*Moderator:* Oliver **MEIER**, Research Associate, International Security Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Germany

#### *Key questions to discuss:*

- What are the pre-requisites and needs to address a question of NSNW in Europe reduction?
- What is the best framework for addressing NSNW? (e.g. NATO-Russia: NRC? Other/new framework; U.S.-Russia: New START follow-on talks? Separate discussions? Multilateral?)
- What might be useful and realistic first steps towards including NSNW in a future arms control accord?

### *SESSION IV: Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Next Steps – Substance and Process*

#### **Speakers:**

- Eugene **MIASNIKOV**, Director, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Russian Federation
- Edward **IFFT**, Adjunct Professor, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University, United States

*Moderator:* Daryl **KIMBALL**, Executive Director, Arms Control Association, United States

#### *Key questions to discuss:*

- Why is it in the U.S. and Russian national security interests to reduce their respective strategic nuclear stockpiles?
- What security factors will most significantly influence each country's deployed strategic force levels in the coming decade? (e.g. strategic missile interceptor deployments, nuclear force levels of third countries, tactical nuclear stockpiles, conventional strike capabilities, budgetary constraints, other?)
- What are the major pathways by which Presidents Putin and Obama could pursue further strategic nuclear reductions, including a new formal round of negotiations covering all types of nuclear warheads and delivery systems; a protocol that reduces New START ceilings; and/or parallel reciprocal actions that accelerate the pact of New START reductions and move each side below New START ceilings?
- What steps can and should be taken to draw other nuclear-armed states into the nuclear risk reduction process?

## WORKSHOP SUMMARY AND CLOSING REMARKS

- Paul **INGRAM**, Executive Director, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), United Kingdom
- Anton **KHLOPKOV**, Director, Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), Russian Federation

## RECEPTION for the participants of the International Workshop

### PARTICIPANTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP “Prospects for Russian-US Arms Control”

*Marriott Tverskaya Hotel, Moscow, Russian Federation*

*May 16, 2013*

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2. **BUTT** Yousaf, Research Professor, Scientist-in-residence, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, United States
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6. **ERMAKOV** Sergei, Senior Research Associate, Russian Institute of Strategic Research (RISS), Russian Federation
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18. **KOZIN** Vladimir, Adviser to the Director, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies; Member of the Interagency Experts' Working Group on cooperation with NATO on the BMD, Presidential Administration, Russian Federation
19. **KOZLOWSKI** Bernard, First Secretary, Embassy of Poland
20. **KRISTENSEN** Hans, Director, Nuclear Information Project, Federation of American Scientists, United States
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35. **SILBERBERG** Jules, First Secretary; Chief, Political External Unit, U.S. Embassy
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#### **INTERPRETERS**

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2. **NIKITIN** Vadim