## Anita Friedt's Remarks at Shadow NATO Summit III's Session V on NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review Tuesday, May 15, 2012, 9:00-10:30 a.m. George Washington University

The Chicago Summit is an opportunity to illustrate to Allied publics, including our own, that NATO has changed, is changing with the times, and consistently provides security against new threats at a value for Allies. Today NATO is able to conduct operations outside of Europe that were inconceivable 20 years ago.

After the last NATO Summit in Lisbon, Allies pledged to ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Building on the ideas discussed during meetings of Allied foreign ministers in Tallinn and Berlin, the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) reflects the determination to maintain modern, flexible, credible capabilities that are tailored to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century security challenges. We expect that the DDPR will identify the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense forces that NATO will need to meet the full range of threats and emerging security challenges to the Alliance.

Missile defense and nuclear weapons are not the answer to most of our security challenges. NATO relies on conventional forces to deter and defend against most contingencies—they remain the core of our deterrent power, but maintaining these forces is more expensive than ever. And as we have seen clearly in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, in Libya and elsewhere – operations that involve conventional forces put our troops' lives at risk. At Chicago, we expect Allies will set an ambitious course for our conventional forces and affirm our common commitment to maintain modern, interoperable conventional capabilities, including by finding ways to expand training and exercises, so we can strengthen our ability to operate together wherever necessary—whether that is in Alliance territory or beyond.

NATO's ability to deploy an effective fighting force makes this Alliance unique. However, its capacity to deter and respond to security challenges will only be as successful as its forces are capable, effective, interoperable, and modern.

Last year's military operation in Libya demonstrated that NATO's integrated military command structure works and that the requirements for a strong, flexible, and deployable force are as necessary today as they were during the height of the Cold War. New threats require new defense responses that are just as capable, just as immediate, and just as agile as the ones that we have had before. Even when

major operations have ended, it is essential for the Alliance to continue to exercise, plan, and maintain its forces.

In this era of fiscal austerity, Allies need to find ways to maintain the defense capabilities necessary to ensure that NATO can operate as effectively in the future as it has in the past. The current financial crisis requires creative responses on both sides of the Atlantic to find ways to make collective defense spending smarter and more efficient. We cannot allow cuts in military investment to threaten future capabilities.

The United States is modernizing its presence in Europe at the same time that our NATO Allies, and NATO itself, are engaged in similar steps. We see this as an opportunity for our European Allies to take on greater responsibility. We continue to encourage Allies to meet that agreed benchmark and to contribute politically, financially, and operationally to the strength and security of the Alliance. However, it is important to focus not only on the total level of defense spending by Allies but also on how these limited resources are allocated and for what priorities.

Given budgetary restrictions, we have made good progress toward pooling resources, including a capabilities package for Chicago that outlines the critical elements to build and maintain NATO Forces over the next decade. Two key elements of this package will be, (1) the NATO Secretary General's "smart defense" initiative, and his "connected forces" initiative. The "smart defense" initiative encourages Allies to prioritize core capabilities in the face of defense cuts, cooperate on enhancing collective capabilities, and specialize according to national strengths. His "connected forces" initiative, aims to increase interoperability, including with capable partners.

The package will also track progress on acquiring the capabilities that leaders identified in Lisbon as NATO's most pressing needs. NATO's record on implementing the commitment made in Lisbon over the last 18 months has been impressive. It includes several flagship capabilities programs. I'd like to cite three examples.

The first is missile defense. At the Lisbon Summit, NATO Allies agreed to develop a NATO missile defense capability to provide protection for NATO European territory, populations, and forces. The United States is committed to doing its part by deploying all four phases of the European Phased Adaptive

Approach; the first phase is already operational. Last month, NATO conducted the <u>first comprehensive –and successful – test of the alliance's new missile-defense capability</u>. A U.S. ship, radar and satellite, as well as interceptor batteries from Germany and the Netherlands, conducted a series of simulated engagements to test the alliance's ability to defend against missile attacks. Turkey, Poland, Romania, and Spain have agreed to host critical elements and we support calls for greater Allied contributions. As NATO moves forward with missile defense, we also remain committed to cooperating with Russia to develop capabilities that enhance protection for all of us against common threats.

A second key capability is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance OR (ISR) – the systems that provide NATO military commanders with a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground. Although Allies contributed more combat power to Libya than in previous NATO operations (almost 90 percent of all air-to-ground strike missions as compared to 10 percent in the Balkans), the Libya operation demonstrated considerable shortfalls in European ISR capabilities and required the United States to provide 70 to 80 percent of those assets. In February—after 20 years of trying, NATO defense ministers finally agreed to fund the Alliance Ground Surveillance program. The five drones that comprise this system will provide NATO decision-makers with crucial

information, including identification of potential threats, monitoring developing situations such as humanitarian crises, and distinguishing possible targets for air strikes.

A third initiative, which exemplifies the effectiveness of pooled resources, is Baltic Air Policing. The 2004 addition of a number of smaller countries to NATO required an examination of burden-sharing among Allied militaries as well as modernization programs that benefit the Alliance as a whole. In the Baltics air policing is seen as a national defense imperative by three countries without national air forces. NATO assumed responsibility to provide air policing for these countries; in turn the Baltic countries used the resources that otherwise would have been spent on airplanes to invest in capabilities, to include sending troops to Afghanistan.

Finally, I'd like to say a few words about the implications of the new U.S. defense strategy and echo some of the comments that have been made by Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Panetta. As both Secretaries have noted, Europe, the United States' partner of choice in addressing global security challenges, and the transatlantic relationship is the cornerstone of our global engagement. President Obama has said that "America has no better partner than

Europe." This clear choice is based on our proven ability to cooperate effectively with democratic, prosperous, militarily-capable allies who share our values and our interests.

The United States is fully committed to strengthening and deepening this cooperation and to maintaining a military posture in Europe that ensures our ability to meet unwavering commitments to European security and to NATO's Article Five. While we have emphasized the need for U.S. strategy to take into account the growing importance of Asia, and our defense strategy reflects that emphasis, the fact remains that the largest presence of U.S. forces overseas will still be in Europe.

Thank you all for your attention. I look forward to your questions and comments.

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