Citizens Strategic Concept (draft)

A NATO Strategy for Human and Sustainable Security

November 2010 Working Draft 2

Preamble

Heads of State will agree a Strategic Concept at the NATO Lisbon Summit on 19-20 November 2010. This Citizens Strategic Concept outlines the basic principles for equipping NATO to meet the different and diverse challenges of this 21st century. It was prepared by NATO Watch, drawing on language and ideas from numerous reports, books and policy papers, comments received from NATO Watch Associates and an earlier Citizens Declaration for Alliance Security (April 2009). It will be finalised in the light of discussions and comments received prior to and during a Shadow NATO Summit in Brussels on 15-16 November 2010 and then periodically updated.

[We will circulate the Citizens Strategic Concept widely throughout NATO Member States, Partnership and Contact Countries. We believe that the 900 million citizens within the Alliance should have a voice in shaping NATO’s future strategic direction.

We need your help.

Please go to the website www.natowatch.org and sign the Citizen’s Strategic Comment and add your comments.]

Section I: Creating a New Vision and Mission for NATO

1. The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s founding document, is given substance in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, which is constantly reviewed and periodically updated. This was last done in April 1999. The Treaty itself remains valid with its commitment to international peace, security and justice, to the freedom, common heritage and civilization of its peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Also the Washington Treaty’s main provisions endure: consultation (article 4), mutual assistance in the case of armed attack (article 5) and openness for new members (article 10).

2. The historical threads between 1949 and today are crucial for understanding why NATO has not always lived up to its founding ideals. The atomic age marked the start of the Cold War, fought hot in proxy wars from Korea to Russia’s Afghan War. Nuclear proliferation, ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, tensions with Russia and the re-emerging divisions in Europe are a continuing legacy of that period.

3. NATO today is a complex hybrid of a political-military alliance and a multilateral institution that is unrivalled in history. It has begun the transition from a Cold War Alliance focusing exclusively on territorial defence through deterrence into a pan-European instrument for crisis management and peacekeeping. But the engagement in Afghanistan has led to mounting operational difficulties and a growing loss of confidence in the very concept of that mission and in NATO’s strategic direction. It is time to look forward rather than back.

4. This Citizens Strategic Concept explains how and why citizens want to engage in a process to advance NATO’s transformation. It sets out some of the basic values and principles to inform this debate; it seeks to bring academic and independent research and theory closer to NATO practice; and to help shape a clear vision of what NATO should stand for and achieve as it strives to meet the different and diverse challenges of this 21st century. It is intended to contribute to a broad intra-Alliance debate on the role of NATO in the coming years. The elements raised that should contribute to a new vision include:

- Accountable ways of working;
- Upholding human and sustainable security;
- Being at the forefront of developing and implementing new and more effective approaches to conflict prevention and security building;
- Meeting future disaster response needs; and
- Developing a wider and more inclusive network of partners.

Moral, muscular and multilateral

Effective multilateralism means supporting a range of international treaties, norms and institutions, even when it presents difficulties for short-term national or collective NATO interests. It also means moving beyond ‘à la carte multilateralism’ to a new era of cooperation within the Alliance and by developing a wider and more inclusive network of partners as part of a broader, more comprehensive approach.

5. After the Berlin Wall collapsed and the Soviet Union disintegrated, NATO missed an unprecedented opportunity to provide leadership in building a new rules based international system. NATO will now seek to develop a vision for, and take genuine practical steps towards, an inclusive international system that would potentially be an alternative, not an addition, to the Alliance.
6. In seeking to develop a wider and more inclusive network of partners, NATO will review its existing partnership arrangements and explore the creation of other mechanisms for partnership with non-member countries and other relevant international organisations (such as the UN, EU, OSCE, G8, and the G20 and their agencies).

7. In particular, NATO will explore how it can make a stronger contribution to UN ‘Blue Helmet’ peacekeeping and (post-) conflict management tasks. This might include, for example, providing HQs in the field, strategic airlift or other forms of logistical support, as well as training and mentoring in security sector reform (as part of a post-conflict stabilisation process) or the provision of rapid reaction forces for missions of limited mandate. However, NATO will only undertake external peace support missions if there is consensus within the Alliance to do so, and within a common political framework and chain of command. Only with fully integrated missions can the myriad challenges of modern, complex, multidisciplinary peace operations be met.

**Synthesising non-offensive collective reassurance and human security**

NATO will reshape its collective defence posture around the principles of non-offensive collective reassurance and human security. The protection of all civilians and gender equality will be an integral part of all stages in NATO operations.

8. Collective defence under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty forms the backbone of the Alliance bargain. But with several of NATO’s easternmost countries seeking concrete security reassurances, pressure is rising to move beyond the ‘virtual’ military presence in some of the new NATO members. This also requires more realistic thinking as to the limitations of collective defence: military options are an inappropriate response, for example, to cyber attacks and energy disputes. How then to enhance collective defence and provide concrete security assurances to the eastern front, without further alienating Russia? Part of the answer lies in changing the terms of the debate with Russia (see Section III) and in identifying appropriate collective security options to deal with the emerging threats of cyber and energy security.

9. However, if additional NATO installations are to be included on the soil of the most recent NATO members, these need to be unambiguously defensive in nature. NATO will revise its doctrine and seek to significantly restructure the military forces of its Member States for defensive, rather than offensive operations, and to adopt a non-nuclear policy, while still retaining a credible conventional deterrent and the capacity to respond proportionally against an aggressor.

10. In reflecting the new security environment, NATO’s collective defence will also be predicated on a fundamental redefinition of what constitutes security. This will include a human security centred approach in formulating collective defence. This requires an understanding of inescapable, interdependent risk. Our security and well-being is dependent upon and cannot be divorced from both the security and well being of our neighbours and our increasingly globalised world.

11. A broad human-centric understanding of security puts people and by extension their ecological, economic, social and political circumstances at the forefront of strategic thinking. It also means providing protection against all threats to human life, whether they emanate from terrorism, ‘rogue states’, the spread of nuclear weapons, environmental degradation, energy or infrastructure insecurity, outbreaks of disease or instability arising from deep-rooted poverty and hunger. However, many of these threats are not amenable to traditional ideas of collective defence – or even extended notions of collective defence that have seen greater use in recent years with expeditionary forces in support of ‘peace enforcement’ missions. Given their cross-border nature, many of these challenges must be addressed through inclusive global economic and political partnerships, rather than military coalitions.

12. In addition to the growing disutility of military war-fighting solutions to these complex threats and risks, war is itself a dangerous risk-generating social institution to be avoided, rather than chosen. Thus, NATO will seek to address the mismatch in resources that devotes far too much funding to traditional military missions at the expense of the more diverse set of tools needed to address current and future threats (see Section III). In particular, this Strategic Concept recognises the central importance of the funding, practice and prioritisation of conflict prevention, management, resolution and transformation practices.

13. A more detailed capability guidance document (on military capabilities, transformation and planning for a human security-centric approach) will be developed during the lifetime of this Strategic Concept. The document will also explore how NATO Member States can target security assistance to improve governance, policing and justice in nations scarred by conflict to ensure they do not become failed states and havens for terrorism.

**Reconnecting with citizens**

In order to deepen and extend the shared values-base within the Alliance, NATO needs to become closer to its citizens and civil society. This means an updated, more open, transparent and accountable Alliance, appropriate to 21st century expectations.
Parliamentary accountability within NATO requires clear and adequate mechanisms, and a relaxation of secrecy rules.

14. NATO is not only the sum of its intergovernmental political and military parts, but also of the 900 million citizens living in its 28 Member States – and the more than 540 million additional citizens in states with partnership or contact agreements with the Alliance. Over 20% of the global population is directly associated with NATO. These citizens, rather than military forces, police and other means of law enforcement, are at the heart of Alliance security. NATO’s inner strength depends on the existence of a shared moral culture among its citizens and security based on shared values.

15. Throughout NATO’s history, MPs in their national parliaments when asking questions about NATO decisions have invariably been told that such decisions require collective confidentiality. When the same questions were put to the Secretary General, he invariably replied that NATO was but an alliance of governments of sovereign states, each of which are responsible to their own parliaments. This Catch 22 situation may have served a purpose during the Cold War, but is no longer appropriate.

16. Parliamentarians and citizens in NATO and partner countries are bound by secrecy rules that were drafted in a very different era – when the public had different expectations about participation in defence and foreign policy, when few of its Member States had adopted a national right-to-information law, and when the threat posed to the Western alliance was more profound and immediate. All of these circumstances have changed, but the regime that governs the handling of shared information remains unchanged in important respects. Legislators and citizens are being denied the right to participate in the formulation of policies that have a profound, direct, effect on their security.

17. The right of access to information is firmly established in international and national law as a human right. It is essential for upholding the values which NATO was created to protect, improving the quality of decision-making and providing better oversight over the use of funds. NATO will therefore introduce the following new transparency and accountability rules:

- To enable this Strategic Concept to come into effect, all national Parliaments in Member States are required to ratify it;
- The NATO Secretary General will publish an Annual Report on the implementation of this Strategic Concept;
- A new Strategic Concept will be published every five years; and
- NATO will adopt an information openness policy consistent with the access to information laws already in place in the Alliance’s 28 member countries. Such a policy will include guidelines for proactive publication of core information, a mechanism by which the public can file requests for information, and an independent review body for hearing appeals against refusals or failures to make information public within a short time-frame.

18. In addition, national parliaments in Member States are urged to sharpen their scrutiny of NATO affairs, not least by establishing a permanent standing parliamentary or congressional committee dedicated to NATO. Similarly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is urged to review its democratic mandate and explore ways of strengthening it, not least by introducing greater accountability and openness about how members are selected.

Section II: Putting the mission into action - practical implications

Decisions over use of force

NATO accepts a moral and legal obligation to exhaust all other means possible before taking up arms, and will use force only in accordance with the UN Charter. This either means authorised by the UN Security Council or in self-defence (when there is a real, imminent and severe danger and the UN Security Council is unable to act in time).

19. Military force is not an effective tool for solving political problems. The majority of citizens both within and outside the Alliance understand and share this view. Force can be justifiable in some circumstances, in domestic law and international law. The difficult issue is when, and the answer to that often turns on the particularities of each case. Under the rules of the UN Charter, military force is lawful in just two circumstances: self-defence (when an armed attack has occurred or is imminent) or where the UN Security Council authorises its use. The nexus of failing states and fears of WMD proliferation led to deeply misguided and even illegal ‘preventive wars’ of alleged self-defence.

20. NATO rejects ‘preventive war’ in principle, but recognises that ‘pre-emption’ is legal under international law in the case of an imminent attack. The NATO conceptual tool-box also contains numerous other options (both military and non-military) in achieving security objectives, including: diplomacy, conflict prevention, deterrence, containment and collective defence.
Upholding humanitarian and international laws of war

NATO will uphold the highest standards of international law, including humanitarian law, when choosing to threaten or use force, and in the application of force.

21. In seeking to promote a world in which everyone renounces violence against other peoples and their own, NATO will uphold the highest standards of international and humanitarian law. Torture, for example is illegal and self-defeating. It is a crime in both peace and war that no exceptional circumstances can permit. Those who break laws should be judged in court: terrorists and torturers alike. NATO declares its position on this unequivocally and all those engaged in interrogation within the Alliance will be properly trained. Similarly, inhumane weapons will be withdrawn from NATO’s arsenals, and a fast-tracked Alliance consideration of which weapons fit into this category will be conducted during the lifetime of this Strategic Concept.

22. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones, are transforming warfare. While such systems have legitimate civilian and military applications, their development and use also raise a number of concerns. In particular, the UN’s special rapporteur for extrajudicial executions has warned that the practice of using armed drones for counter-terrorism operations amounts to "a licence to kill without accountability".

23. The Alliance rejects ‘targeted killings’ in principle. NATO and Member States will:
- undertake a comprehensive review of the military and security roles of UAVs within the Alliance, including their legal parameters, impact on the war on terror and effects on civilian populations;
- set out Alliance doctrine on UAVs in a public document and, if appropriate, publicly identify the rules of international law that any Member State considers to provide a basis for any targeted killings (as recommended by the UN’s special rapporteur for extrajudicial executions); and
- work towards an international agreement or ‘code of conduct’ to regulate and limit the use of armed drones.

Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept

For those at risk of genocide and mass atrocities

Preventing genocide and mass atrocities is a priority for NATO and not merely an idealistic add-on to the core collective defence agenda. It is a moral and strategic imperative for the Alliance to implement the UN Responsibility to Protect (R2P) agenda and resources will be directed towards the development of a comprehensive approach to genocide prevention.

24. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is the principle that sovereign states, and the international community as a whole, have a responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes. The world’s heads of state and government unanimously accepted the concept of R2P at the UN World Summit in September 2005. The UN Security Council has also accepted the general principle (by adopting Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict).

25. While the main emphasis should be on non-military preventive measures, preventing or halting genocide may, at times, require the non-consensual use of force. In such circumstances, policymakers face major challenges in determining whether, when, and how to use military force to prevent or counter the escalation of violence to the level of genocide. There is no military ‘solution’ to genocide, but military options can be critical parts of a comprehensive solution. NATO is a capable potential actor for genocide response, with some experience and willingness to lead multinational forces in areas where violence is escalating.

26. NATO is an organisation committed under Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty to ‘promoting conditions of stability and well-being’ in international relations. In situations where the threat of humanitarian crises arises as a consequence of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and other sustained assaults on human rights, NATO will act in concert with the international community to protect populations from sources of danger.

27. Any deployment of NATO’s military assets under R2P will be in accordance with international law, which, in turn, means that the UN Security Council must authorise it. NATO will develop a comprehensive approach to genocide prevention, including improved early warning mechanisms, early action to prevent crises, timely diplomatic responses to emerging crises, greater preparedness to employ NATO military assets in UN peacekeeping operations, and action to strengthen global norms and institutions.

28. In enhancing its commitment to R2P NATO Member States will also make greater effort to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 & 1820 which address the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women. Gender based violence has been found to continue and even escalate in post conflict situations. NATO forces will seek to become more gender aware in order to protect the victims of gender-based sexual violence and to pursue and prosecute the perpetrators.
29. NATO will establish an R2P Committee to: analyse threats of genocide and mass atrocities; develop military guidance on genocide prevention and response; and incorporate guidelines into Alliance doctrine and training (through, for example, a genocide prevention standardization agreement). NATO will also provide capacity-building assistance to international partners who are willing to take measures to prevent genocide and mass atrocities.

30. The NATO Secretary General will undertake robust diplomatic efforts toward negotiating an agreement among the permanent members of the UN Security Council on non-use of the veto in cases concerning genocide or mass atrocities – as a follow on to the UN-NATO Declaration signed in September 2008.

For operations in conflict zones where NATO troops operate

NATO will move towards a human security approach, contributing to the protection of every individual human being and not focus merely on the defence of territorial borders. This means prohibiting military activities that indiscriminately impact civilians, safeguarding the economic and social infrastructures of civilian life and accurately accounting for civilian casualties arising from NATO operations.

31. NATO forces must always comply with the Geneva Conventions’ requirement that civilians be protected against attack by both the ‘enemy’ and from the Alliance itself. This is by no means easy, but military activities that indiscriminately impact civilians are rejected by NATO in principle.

32. NATO will also put resources into, and be fully open and transparent about, civilian casualties. It is in the long-term interests of the Alliance for accurate casualty recording to be undertaken in all NATO operations, including the identification of all victims and open publication of a list of those killed.

33. All human life is of equal worth, and it is not acceptable that certain and mainly local human lives become cheap in conflict situations. Unless it is absolutely necessary and it has a legal basis, NATO personnel deployed on R2P, peacekeeping or other human security missions must avoid killing, injury, and material destruction. As with the police, who risk their lives to save others but are prepared to kill in extremis, NATO forces will also strictly adhere to minimum force criteria. This does not mean that the use of force is to be avoided under all circumstances. Nothing should undermine the inherent right of self-defence. But the use of minimal and precise force does put troops at more immediate risk than using overwhelming force. The military, politicians and the general public need to appreciate this fact.

For our service personnel

NATO and Member States will prioritise better equipment, pay and conditions for service personnel as part of a renewed compact between the military and wider society.

34. Despite the collective military budget of NATO exceeding the military spending of the rest of the world, individual service men and women within NATO are frequently denied quality health care and equipment. Many soldiers buy their own boots, packs, etc., because the equipment they are given falls apart and shortages of essential equipment (such as helicopters and better protected patrol vehicles) have been regularly reported in Afghanistan.

35. The psychological and physical damage to soldiers is particularly alarming. Rates of suicide and domestic violence among service personnel and cases of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are expected to continue to rise. NATO and Member States will:

- prioritise equipment for ‘force protection’ in national and common procurement programmes;
- commit to operations only when they can be properly resourced; and
- implement a NATO Care and Support ‘Code of Conduct’ for Veterans and a Common Veterans Support Fund, which will set common benchmarks for monitoring the accessibility and standard of care for veterans and their families, and ensure high-levels of clinical care, mental health support and post-Armed Service employment opportunities throughout the Alliance.

Section III: Challenges for the mission

Delivering smart solutions to our shared security challenges

36. NATO in conjunction with other instruments of Euro-Atlantic power will be needed to protect our security for the foreseeable future. NATO and the political leaders of the Alliance will engage its citizens in a discussion about the circumstances for its use. What is the proper balance between NATO’s collective defence at home and expeditionary missions abroad? How should the Alliance deter and defeat aggression, halt genocide and share in peacekeeping? Should NATO undergo further transformation and enlargement, and if so – to what extent? What kind of relations should NATO have with its partners and, in particular, what role should NATO play when armed conflicts break out on its periphery? This Strategic Concept is only the beginning of the process to provide answers to those questions. There is much unfinished business in making NATO more agile and flexible, creative and smart about how it analyses the
new threats and how it deploys its assets against them.

Towards a NATO-Russia Strategic Concept

NATO will seek a more constructive partnership with Russia in which both parties work together to redefine common threats and strengthen mechanisms for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts.

37. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO and Russia have a unique window of opportunity to overcome the Cold War legacy of mistrust and to begin building relations free from exaggerated mutual threat perceptions and better equipped to deal with current and future crises. NATO cooperation with Russia is of the utmost importance to global security. Russia needs NATO and NATO needs Russia in order to stand up to the common threats and challenges we all face. Areas for potential cooperation include missile non-proliferation (and possibly defences), energy and cyber-security, counter-narcotics, climate change and the Arctic region.

38. The Russian government will be treated with respect and as a world power. NATO will listen closely to Russian concerns and ideas (especially regarding comprehensive security in Europe) and seek to build bridges between our citizens. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, the 2002 Rome Declaration on the NATO-Russia relationship and the NATO-Russian Council were good starts. But further engagement of Russia in joint programmes and full transparency concerning NATO’s future plans will help to enhance the partnership.

39. On the Russian side, there has to be flexibility, reciprocal transparency and good will toward NATO’s intentions. In particular, Russia has to put into practice two fundamental principles that it has already accepted in several declarations. First, that every sovereign nation has an inherent right “to belong or not to belong to international organisations, to be or not to be a party to bi-lateral or multi-lateral treaties, including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality”, as the Helsinki Final Act put it. Second, that the sovereign equality of states includes respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.

40. The main problem in the NATO-Russia relationship is the lack of transparency, confidence and mutual trust. Moscow and NATO need to develop jointly a new security agenda and a more co-operative methodology: a new NATO-Russia Strategic Concept. This strategy should set the goal of bringing Russia and NATO closer to each other in a manner which is mutually acceptable, promotes mutual security and threatens no third party. It should be based on enhanced confidence-building and transparency mechanisms, improved joint decision-making and expanded areas of practical cooperation and enhanced confidence-building and transparency mechanisms, improved joint decision-making and expanded areas of practical cooperation and enhanced confidence-building and transparency mechanisms, improved joint decision-making and expanded areas of practical cooperation at all levels. The focus should be on practical steps in order to provide the predictability the relationship needs and—if Moscow so desires—promotes eventual Russian membership of NATO.

41. Urgent priorities include ending the impasse over the CFE Treaty along with further arms control agreements and confidence building measures. These need to take into account not only the changed strategic and political circumstances, but also the accelerating qualitative processes and technological advances in military affairs, so that mutual threat perceptions are significantly reduced or eliminated. Potential joint NATO-Russia projects include:

- a joint action plan on Eurasian security;
- expanded military-to-military contacts, promoting transparency and inter-operability, as well as discussion on defence doctrines and reforms;
- an annual summit of NATO, EU, Russian, OSCE and CSTO representatives in order to address key security issues facing the region and to discuss burden-sharing; and
- a NATO–Russia Public Council to promote regular exchanges between policy-makers, experts and opinion-formers in order to enhance understanding and trust and to generate new ideas for NATO–Russia relations.

Civilian-led counter-terrorism

NATO counter-terrorism policy will focus on international cooperation to improve the intelligence base, strengthen civilian law enforcement capabilities, restrict terrorist access to funds and weapons, and reduce the root causes driving people to radical violence.

42. The ‘Global War on Terror’ set up unrealistic expectations of a military victory against non-state actors, and the apportioning of counter-terrorism resources has reflected that flawed approach. Research by the RAND Corporation into the case histories of 648 terrorist organisations that carried out attacks between 1968 and 2006 found that only 7 percent were successfully eliminated through direct military force. This is in contrast to 43 percent who dropped their violent activities after some form of political accommodation and 40 percent who were broken up successfully through some combination of local community policing, infiltration, and prosecution.

43. The Alliance’s response to terrorism will be calibrated by working to be effective against those who mean harm without eroding human rights and the rule of law. NATO acknowledges that long term
efforts to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism are an essential part of an effective and comprehensive strategy to combat and prevent terrorism.

44. NATO’s specialised counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism forces will have clearly defined doctrines, rules of deployment and engagement, and effective parliamentary oversight. The comprehensive Action Plan on Terrorism agreed between Russia and NATO is a useful starting point, but a better transatlantic dialogue on these matters is essential. The possible use of NATO air power or Special Forces to target specific terrorist training camps remains an option that will be used sparingly and in accordance with international law.

Responsibility to prevent: strengthening preventive diplomacy

The Alliance and Member States will seek to identify and support mechanisms for creating and enhancing stability and good governance. To these ends, NATO will look to counter inequality and discrimination and promote peaceful resolution of conflict.

45. Public faith in the value of interventions – either to prevent violent conflict or to rebuild peace after it has occurred – has been shaken in recent years. The fallout from international engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan has decreased popular support for the idea of NATO ‘out of area’ deployments, while on a practical level, budget cuts have started to limit the resources available to key Alliance countries that traditionally engage in such activities.

46. These developments cannot be used as an excuse to draw back into isolationism, for in an increasingly interconnected world, conflict does not only have an impact on the lives of those in areas directly affected by violence, but threatens to unravel the fabric of global security and prosperity. As such, there is a pressing need for strategies that can both address conflict risk factors before they lead to violence and save money in doing so.

47. The evidence shows that when the international community has both the capacity and the will to act, the effects on conflict can be real and positive. International activism has been working to bring conflict numbers down in recent years. Even more important however, is the fact that waiting for trouble to break out is not only more costly in terms of loss of life but also hugely more expensive than early preventive action.

48. One focus of preventative strategies should be the physical security and well being of women, which evidence suggests is directly linked to the security and stability of the state. UN Security Resolution 1325, for example, recognises the undervalued and under-utilised contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace-building, and stresses the importance of their equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security. NATO will work on and implement an Action Plan 1325 to mainstream gender perspectives and training into its Peacekeeping Operations, Peace Support Operations and Reconstruction and Rehabilitation programmes.

49. Being at the forefront of conflict prevention will involve NATO in new and fresh thinking. A key question is how to identify the conditions required to create stability and to identify what can be supported. What can NATO do to help create this stability? Stability entails more than dominating the security space. Experience in Afghanistan has led to an acknowledgement that the military is less a part of the solution than was envisaged. In which case, how can NATO contribute to good governance, beyond security sector reform measures? For example, how might NATO be involved in longer term training work or in developing security ‘centres of excellence’ in countries emerging from conflict? This is an area ripe for UN-NATO cooperation.

50. Democratic, responsive and resilient states do not get built primarily by strengthening the capacity of government departments but in the relationship between state institutions and a strong civil society. NATO cannot make peace – as witnessed in Afghanistan and Kosovo - the people involved make peace between themselves. So what can be done from the outside to enable peace? Such a discussion will be at the heart of a review of NATO’s conflict prevention role and the further development of its Comprehensive Approach to crisis management.

51. In order to strengthen the Alliance’s conflict prevention capacity, NATO and its Member States will:

- prioritise the funding of independent research that evaluates conflict prevention activities and collects evidence about their cost effectiveness and value for money, as a resource for policymakers and the media;
- introduce better systems for monitoring and evaluating member government and NATO action in this area, and to this end, NATO will create an international reporting framework for monitoring and evaluating the success of its conflict prevention activities;
- support the creation of an independent ‘conflict prevention network’ of high-profile experts with a specific mandate to identify and seek to address tensions that have the potential to tip into conflict in the short and medium term, to consult with the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict in this regard, and to act as an early...
warning system for policymakers and the media; and
- constantly monitor the effects of any Alliance presence on the internal dynamics of post-conflict societies and strive to (a) minimise any aspects that might cause harm and (b) ensure that local actors have the capacity and the resources to drive the process of peacebuilding forwards themselves.

Disaster relief and reconstruction

**NATO will consider how it could improve its capabilities to respond to the growing number of natural, complex humanitarian and human disasters, while upholding the MCDA and Oslo guidelines.**

52. The number of disasters worldwide has risen fivefold since the mid-1970s. NATO’s humanitarian support or disaster relief role is largely non-controversial: NATO helicopters have been used to deliver supplies to disaster zones and evacuate the injured; NATO command, control, and reconnaissance capabilities have been used to sustain humanitarian missions. While civilian agencies should ultimately take the lead in coordination of these activities, NATO can offer capabilities that other organisations are unable to offer.

53. Moreover, these are critical security tasks that NATO has shown it can undertake with great professionalism and success. Nonetheless, military humanitarian relief operations can be contentious in some situations and NATO always needs to be sensitive to specific contexts and the impact of its presence on other humanitarian actors. The Alliance can play a more legitimate role in disaster response provided its overall mission is clear and it is seen to be acting on the principles that it should uphold.

54. Questions also remain as to how quickly the NATO Response Force can be mobilised in response to disasters in non-NATO (or Partner) countries and the extent to which it can be converted to an organisation with a larger and less costly civilian reserve component, with appropriate skills. An expert group will be established to see if these problems can be resolved in order to transform the NRF into a premier disaster response force.

55. The aim will be for the NRF to have a mission more focused on dealing with emergencies of either human or natural origin (or more likely a combination of both). Many more of these disasters are expected in the coming years as a consequence of environmental degradation and climate change, so the mission would strengthen NATO’s purpose. NATO already has a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre and a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU). These will be expanded and more adequately resourced, and if feasible, the NRF adapted to become the emergency response tool for the EADRU. Assigning the NRF this mission would have the added benefit of avoiding more controversial preventive military missions.

Arms control and disarmament

**The Alliance and Member States will review the contribution that an active Arms Control and Disarmament policy can make to collective security. NATO will support universalisation and strengthening of multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements. A Space Security Treaty will be sought. Alliance weapons collection and destruction activities are an important contribution to collective security and will be expanded.**

56. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons, as well as the widespread proliferation of conventional weapons, will remain a real threat to the transatlantic area and beyond. NATO has conducted exercises to deal with the CBRN threat and has overseen the destruction of thousands of conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons in the Balkans. Given NATO’s skills and concrete results, and the ongoing threats that these weapons are likely to pose, the Alliance will continually seek more opportunities for weapons collection, destruction and other coordination activities.

57. NATO and Member States agree to investigate any allegations of WMD use by a Member State or the Alliance using an appropriate international compliance mechanism. In addition, NATO will explore whether the development of an independent investigatory mechanism within the Alliance would add value to existing international WMD investigatory and compliance bodies.

58. Outer space is critical for human security and economic development. Day to day life—both inside and outside the Alliance—increasingly relies on access to satellite data, and there is an integral connection between human security on Earth and the safety and security of outer space. The threats that would create irreversible harm come from Earth-based and space-based weapons, and from certain dual-use (military-civil) satellites that are specially designed to damage or destroy. For that reason NATO supports the development of a Space Security Treaty that would:

- ban the placement of weapons in space;
- prohibit the testing or use of weapons on satellites so as to damage or destroy them; and
- prohibit the testing or use of satellites as weapons themselves.

**Achieving security without Weapons of Mass Destruction**
NATO supports a world free of nuclear weapons. It is committed to reducing its own reliance on nuclear deterrence and to strengthening global arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation norms and rules.

59. Over the life-time of this Strategic Concept, NATO will take concrete measures towards the adoption of a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine. While it is unrealistic to expect that the United States, France and the United Kingdom will completely fulfil their nuclear disarmament commitments regarding their strategic nuclear weapons during this time frame, in the next Strategic Concept NATO will confirm that those national assets are no longer part of its deterrence posture and the Alliance will set out a WMD-free deterrence posture.

60. The primary counter and non-proliferation goals of Alliance policy in this period will be to encourage the steps that build confidence and create the conditions in which the international community can move with determination towards:

- Zero nuclear weapons (total elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons);
- Zero fissile materials (total elimination of the existing stockpiles, and total prohibition on the military and commercial production and reprocessing, of weapons usable radioactive materials); and
- Zero ‘nuclear breakout’ (strengthened verification and enforcement mechanisms for ensuring a nuclear weapon-free world and the running of civil nuclear reactors).

61. Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has withdrawn more than 90% of US ‘sub-strategic’ or ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and the remaining weapons no longer fulfil any military purpose. These sub-strategic weapons will be withdrawn from Europe during the life-time of this Strategic Concept. The practice of ‘nuclear task sharing’ by European NATO members will also be ended. Other more tangible measures will be introduced to strengthen alliance solidarity and the Article V commitment. NATO’s conventional weapons and the strategic nuclear weapons of Alliance members will continue to provide sufficient assurance against nuclear attack by another nuclear-armed state while global nuclear arsenals are reduced and a WMD-free deterrence strategy for NATO is developed.

62. As a confidence building measure, the decision to verifiably withdraw forward-deployed nuclear weapons to the territory of the United States encourages the Russian Federation to take reciprocal confidence building measures. To build confidence, Russia should urgently declare the size and state of readiness of its stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, and verifiably withdraw them to central sites away from the borders of their neighbours. The next round of nuclear arms control discussions between Russia and the United States should include their arsenals of non-strategic weapons, and should aim to reduce and eventually eliminate all tactical weapons in an irreversible and verifiable manner.

63. NATO and its Member States aim to strengthen disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation with the goal of prohibiting the possession of all nuclear weapons. Alliance members pledge to strengthen the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), inter alia by supporting a global agreement that nuclear weapons must not be deployed on the territory of non-nuclear weapon states. Alliance members will work vigorously toward early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.

64. To further strengthen the Alliance’s role in arms control, the Nuclear Planning Group will be expanded and renamed the Consultative Group for Nuclear Policy, Arms Control and Non-proliferation. Its primary task will be to coordinate the transition in Alliance nuclear posture (to a WMD-free deterrence posture) and Member States’ positions on all matters relating to nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. A secondary task of this group would be to determine appropriate alliance-wide responses to states that seek to withdraw from the NPT. The Group will work closely with the European Union in this area.

65. NATO will also seek to strengthen and reform the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) so that it becomes one of the key policing mechanisms for the global elimination of nuclear weapons, both in terms of the crucialdrawdown to minimum deterrent postures within the nuclear weapon states and in preventing breakout in a nuclear weapon-free world. NATO and Member States will also:

- Act consistently and without discrimination on nuclear non compliance cases identified as threats to international peace and security by the UN Security Council and verified by the IAEA.
- Act swiftly and decisively in the case of any notice of withdrawal from the NPT and apply specific pre-agreed penalties upon withdrawal;
- Implement stricter controls over trade in and shipment of nuclear technologies and materials, by inter alia requiring recipient states to be in full compliance with comprehensive safeguards agreements;
- Harmonize domestic laws and enforce these uniformly, as required under UN Security Council Resolution 1540;
- Increase funding to accelerate the pace and scope of cooperative projects to reduce the
risk of nuclear terrorism by helping to improve accounting and security at nuclear facilities both within and outside the Alliance; and

- Build on the strengths and successes of the IAEA by giving more authority to the agency to monitor and inspect nuclear facilities within the Alliance and sharing intelligence assessments of non-compliance with the UN Security Council.

Achieving security at lower levels of armaments (and at lower cost)

*The Alliance and Member States will undertake a fundamental reassessment of spending priorities, with the aim of achieving effective ‘moral, muscular multilateral’ responses proportional to the overall threat posed. Defence spending is ultimately about making full, productive use of precious human skills that NATO Member States can ill-afford to waste.*

66. With the world engulfed in the worst recession in a hundred years and global problems like climate change requiring huge preventive investments, a smarter approach to defence budgeting and procurement in the Alliance is required. The debate in NATO has been too narrowly focused on burden sharing with accusations that Europe spends too little on defence. But while some Member States may need to raise their spending or allocate their existing defence budgets more wisely, others clearly need to spend less on defence. To help facilitate these shifts, NATO Member States in addition to reaffirming the commitment to spend a minimum of 2% of GDP on defence, also endorse a recommended ceiling for defence expenditure of 3% of GDP.

67. The NATO missions set out in this Strategic Concept can be accomplished at lower cost than currently, by larger and/or more specialised armies, including increased civilian-led Crisis Response Units to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance, and somewhat smaller Air Forces and Navies – provided that NATO Member States eliminate redundant and irrelevant weapon systems.

68. This includes a progressive shrinking and eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals, a freeze on missile defence deployments and cancellation of several Cold War era, ‘big-ticket’ high-tech weapon systems. The proposed Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defences, for example, is unproven, unnecessary, requires unending additional resources and has exacerbated divisions within Europe. Diplomacy and engagement can defuse tensions with North Korea and Iran – and smarter, cheaper and more effective military solutions are available if a real threat ever emerges.

69. Several emerging or unconventional threats also demand the attention of Allies. They include terrorist strikes, cyber assaults by ‘weapons of mass disruption’, piracy and the interference with critical supply lines. They may even reach the level of attacks invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but this seems unlikely at present.

70. NATO will undertake constant analysis of such threats and their potential origins. It will also keep under review the means at the Alliance’s disposal to mitigate such threats. With regard to ‘energy security’, NATO does not intend to take on tasks of other organisations, and will limit its own contribution to where it adds value, mainly in the protection of infrastructure and transport lines.

71. In the case of ‘cyber security’ there is some confusion between cyber espionage and cyber war. Cyber espionage is the science of covertly capturing e-mail traffic, text messages, other electronic communications, and corporate data for the purpose of gathering national-security or commercial intelligence. Cyber war involves the penetration of foreign networks for the purpose of disrupting or dismantling those networks, and making them inoperable.

72. Warnings on the extent and increasing scale of the cyber threat have been surfacing for several years – although most of the threats concerns cyber espionage. While NATO will continue to highlight the problem, the response falls mainly outside its remit: within civilian law enforcement and regulatory agencies and the private sector, and with a focus on wider use of encryption. However, NATO will work with partners at the diplomatic level to deal with malicious attacks on Alliance and Member State networks.

73. Collective defence is not appropriate to many of the most dangerous threats facing the Alliance. Given their cross-border nature, many of these challenges must be addressed through inclusive global economic and political partnerships, rather than military coalitions. NATO military power has a job to do, but the Alliance no longer needs military operations that cost double what the rest of the world spends on its various military functions. The current and future fiscal environments facing NATO demand bold action of the type set out in this Strategic Concept.