

UK Parliamentary Visit to Washington, DC
to discuss prospects for multilateral nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation

8-11 September 2009

A decorative graphic consisting of several vertical bars of varying heights and shades of gray, arranged in a stylized, abstract pattern.

Report on the Visit

The visit was held under the auspices of the
ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP
ON GLOBAL SECURITY AND NON-PROLIFERATION



and facilitated by the
British American Security Information Council
(BASIC)

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Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation
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THE BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL (BASIC)

In the United Kingdom
The Grayston Centre, 28 Charles Square
London, N1 6HT
+44-(0)20-7324 4680

In the United States
110 Maryland Ave., NE, Suite 205
Washington, DC 20002
+1 202 546 8055

<http://www.basicint.org>

Context

This visit was arranged to facilitate discussions between high level British Parliamentarians, Senators and senior Administration officials on the prospects for nuclear disarmament and stronger non-proliferation. Whilst there were no agreed delegation positions, there was an underlying assumption within the cross-party delegation that there exist opportunities to be grasped through transatlantic dialogue and cooperation. This visit came at an auspicious time. There are a number of important initiatives, events and debates due in the next year that could be critical in determining international progress in reducing nuclear dangers:

- Obama to chair a special session of the Security Council on 24th September aiming to build momentum for nuclear disarmament. US and Russian negotiators considering a follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START, that will expire in early December);
- the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) due by the end of this year and to be considered by Congress in early February;
- President Obama's nuclear summit in March 2010, specifically convened to consider securing nuclear materials and battling atomic smuggling; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference May 2010; and,
- Senate wheels starting to move in relation to Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification, likely to reach the floor later in 2010.

Insights

1. Nuclear Posture Review

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is seen as being the practical expression of President Obama's vision as articulated in Prague on 5th April 2009, but equally sits alongside other defence-related reviews (such as the Ballistic Missile Review) that all exist within the context of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Nuclear weapons are seen as the President's weapons, and he has much leeway over declaratory policy and strategy. The President has made clear that his nuclear posture must support the diplomatic non-proliferation agenda, and it seems clear that the NPR will include a declaratory policy that shifts away from considering differing roles for nuclear weapons, as the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review did, and rather limit these roles. The Administration will also be sensitive to the NPR's impact on the credibility of its diplomatic agenda, acknowledging that disarmament requires a step-by-step reduction in the salience and role of nuclear weapons in a manner that does not expose security.



Members of the delegation meet with Gary Samore, WMD Coordinator of the National Security Council at the White House. From l-r round the table: Des Browne, David Hannay, Gary Samore (centre), Tony Lloyd, David Lidington and Chloe Dalton.

2. Relationship with Allies

US allies have so far been absent from the NPR debate in Washington, for fear of being seen to meddle in US politics, and because many have taken a while to really work out their position. But some in Washington have sought to use allies and their silence to allege a concern on their part about the speed and direction of Obama's disarmament agenda and its impact on the United States' capability to offer extended deterrence. Even the United Kingdom was mentioned in this regard. Somehow they have managed to twist the widespread recognition that non-proliferation requires disarmament and reframed it to imply that disarmament will lead to proliferation. The delegation was keen to counter this misperception. The Alliance-wide discussions around a new Strategic Concept, in particular involving the group of experts led by Madeleine Albright, is seen as complementing the NPR process, and will be an opportunity for allies to buy into a new nuclear posture.

Support for Obama's vision and approach on disarmament as expressed in Prague and at the Security Council Summit in New York on September 24 is much higher within allied publics than it is even in the United States. Allies need to consider now how best to:

- Ensure the voice in support of the multilateralist disarmament agenda is heard in Washington. For example, UK nuclear scientists could share the UK perspective on why the British nuclear weapons establishment is comfortable living under a verified CTBT and with a reduction in the US nuclear arsenal.
- Explicitly support the three pillars of the Prague agenda – disarmament and a reduced role for nuclear weapons in US policy in particular; a stronger non-proliferation regime centred around the NPT and access to nuclear technology; and preventing terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons-related materials, which will be the focus of President Obama's April 2010 summit meeting.
- Support the alliance and ensure it is based upon strong relationships and defence.
- Engage the public in debate about future deployment in a way that strengthens their appreciation of these linkages, and cuts through the technical detail.

3. Iran/North Korea

There was a strong consensus among the UK delegation members and the policymakers with whom they met that Iran could greatly complicate the prospects for disarmament, as well as influencing how much countries are willing to engage in disarmament in order to strengthen the consensus on non-proliferation. Efforts to stem nuclear weapons capabilities have to be robust and effective if Iran is not to derail the disarmament agenda. Prospects for the Iranian file appeared bleak, which could mean a big blow to the NPT, as Iran and others seek to block progress on non-proliferation efforts in retaliation for sanctions, etc. At the same time, Iran presents the very challenge the international community has to overcome by strengthening non-proliferation capabilities. The handling of North Korea was seen as less central to the prospects for progress on the wider agenda.

4. START Follow-on Treaty

It seemed to the delegation that whilst there will be opposition to ratification of the START follow-on agreement and some attempt to link it with the modernisation of the US nuclear arsenal, the treaty should receive the two-thirds support required from the Senate. The negotiations for deeper cuts in the US and Russian arsenals which the Administration want to pursue once the START follow-on treaty is ratified will be more contentious. The START follow-on treaty is very likely to have the votes of Senator Lugar, the ranking minority member on the Foreign Relations Committee, and of Senator McCain. Both Republicans are considered to be key leaders on arms control issues and their support will be vital toward bringing on other necessary votes. It remains to be seen how the subsequently-announced decision to abandon the plan for missile defence sites in eastern Europe will affect the Congressional equation.



From left to right: Malcolm Savidge, Shata Shetty, Tony Lloyd, MP, Anne Penketh, Dr David Lidington MP, David Hannay, Sen. Jim DeMint, Chloe Dalton, Rt Hon Des Browne, MP.

5. CTBT

Many Senators remain sceptical about, or hostile to, the CTBT. The Administration may seek help from allies, especially the United Kingdom, in explaining why they are comfortable with the CTBT regime, and that it is consistent with the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent.

In some quarters, deals are thought to be necessary if ratification of the CTBT is going to succeed, in particular over modernisation. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave his opinion on 28th October 2008 immediately prior to the Presidential election that the United States faced a choice between testing and modernisation. Many Republican Senators are likely to remind the Administration of this if and when the CTBT comes up for ratification. Moreover, a few on the Hill expressed envy towards other nuclear weapon states for their modernisation programmes. Some Senators doubted whether the CTBT had any impact at

all on constraining the actions of other countries, particularly on proliferation, as well as looking for explicit benefits for the US as a condition for ratifying the treaty. The Foreign Relations Committee will be paying close attention to the possible influence that the CTBT ratification process could have on alliance relationships. Consideration of the Treaty formally resides with the Foreign Relations Committee, so that Senator Lugar, as ranking member, would likely play a crucial leadership role for any key possible swing Senators.

There was a universal perception that the Administration will not put the treaty to a vote if it cannot count on the achievement of the 2/3rds requirement. There remains a chance that the Senate will vote on the treaty before the NPT Review Conference in May 2010, but any expectations on the timing will have to be handled carefully.

6. Timing

Because these nuclear arms control issues are likely to come to a head when START expires on 5th December and the consequent related shift in focus from the negotiations to ratification, they are likely to gain more attention on the Hill in December and January. We were reminded, however, that the Administration sees this agenda with a long-range lens, and that the May 2010 NPT Review Conference in particular is only one step and that we need to look at the long haul.

7. Positions within the delegation

The delegation made clear that it was there to listen, and to learn, but not to express a formal unified British view. However, it was striking just how much consensus there was around support for the vision and steps as set out by President Obama in his Prague speech of 5th April: the three pillars of nuclear disarmament (with a zero vision), stronger non-proliferation measures and investment, and at least for now, to ensure continued confidence in a reduced nuclear weapons infrastructure. There was promise that recognition of this consensus could lead to unified statements within Britain on this agenda.

8. Top Level Group

This delegation visit was the first discussion in public of the *Top Level Group of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation*, convened by Rt Hon Des Browne, MP, one member of the delegation. This reflects in itself the deepening consensus in British mainstream politics behind the broad multilateral disarmament agenda reflected by this delegation.

The delegation met with...

On the Hill

- **Sen. Robert Bennett** (Republican-Utah, on Energy and Natural Resources Committee (covers nuclear issues), Appropriations Committee – Defense, and Energy and Water, Subcommittees).
- **Sen. Jim DeMint** (Republican – South Carolina, on Foreign Relations Committee)
- **Sen. Jon Kyl** (Republican – Arizona, Republican Whip, Ranking Republican on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security).
- **Sen. Jeff Merkley** (Democrat-Oregon).
- Professional staff members from the **Senate Foreign Relations Committee** representing both Senators John Kerry and Richard Lugar.

In the Administration

- **Robert Einhorn**, Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control and Ambassador **Susan Burk**, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, State Department.
- **Michele Flournoy**, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Pentagon.
- **Gary Samore**, PhD, Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, National Security Council.
- **Julianne Smith**, Principal Director, Europe/NATO, Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Pentagon.
- **Ellen Tauscher**, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, State Department.
- **Brian McKeon**, Deputy National Security Advisor to the Vice President; and **Jon Wolfsthal**, Special Advisor to the Vice President for WMD and Nonproliferation Issues.

Others

- **Sen. Bob Graham**, Chairman, Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism.
- **Sen. Sam Nunn**, **Joan Rohlfing**, Senior Vice President for Programs and Operations at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and Director of the Nuclear Security Project, **Corey Hinderstein**, Director of International Programs at NTI.
- **Ambassadors Thomas Pickering**, **Thomas Graham, Jr.**, **James Leonard** and **Robert Barry**.
- **Ambassador Max Kampelman**.
- The Global Zero initiative – represented by **Bruce Blair** and **Matt Brown**.
- Other experts during a special briefing, including **John Isaacs** of the Council for a Livable World, **Ivan Oelrich** and **Hans Kristensen** of the Federation of American Scientists, **Steven Pifer** of the Brookings Institution, and **Stephen Young** of the Union of Concerned Scientists.

The Deputy British Ambassador, **Dominick Chilcott**, held a reception at his residence in honour of the delegation.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and BASIC jointly hosted a meeting addressed by the delegation. Details, along with a video of the event, are available on the Carnegie Endowment's website at:
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/>

Biographies of the delegation

Rt Hon Des Browne, MP

Former Secretary of State for Defence (2006–08) and Scotland (2007–08)



Rt Hon Des Browne, MP is chairman of the newly-created Top Level Group of British cross-party parliamentarians dedicated to multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Mr Browne served as Defence Secretary from 2006-2008, at a time when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dominated the political agenda and the decision to replace Britain's fleet of Trident submarines was taken. He was the only defence secretary to give a speech at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, at which he promised to convene a meeting of the UN Security Council Permanent Five on confidence measures ahead of the NPT review, which has just been held in London. He also held concurrently the post of Scottish Secretary for one year. He entered the Cabinet in 2005, as chief secretary to the Treasury under Gordon Brown. The Prime Minister appointed him special envoy to Sri Lanka in February 2009 and has been MP for Kilmarnock and Loudun since 1997.

"There is a remarkable degree of consensus in the UK on these issues".
- Rt Hon Des Browne, MP (Labour)*

Chloe Dalton

Special adviser on Middle Eastern Affairs to the shadow Foreign Secretary

Ms Dalton has been Special Adviser on Middle Eastern Affairs to Shadow Foreign Secretary Rt Hon William Hague, MP since early 2006. Her advisory role covers the wider Middle East, including Iran, and all matters relating to Conservative Party policy on nuclear proliferation and the reform of the NPT. She was educated at Oxford University and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

Lord Hannay of Chiswick

Former UK Ambassador to the European Union (1985–90) and to the United Nations (1990–95)



Lord Hannay of Chiswick is currently joint convener of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-proliferation, and chairs the United Nations Association-UK. Lord Hannay served as UK ambassador to the European Union (1985-90) and to the United Nations (1990-95). He was appointed British special representative for Cyprus (1996-2003) and on the UN secretary-general's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change which submitted its report in December 2004. He was created a life peer in 2001.

Dr David Lidington, MP

Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs with responsibility for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Issues.



Dr Lidington has been shadow minister for Foreign Affairs, with responsibility for nuclear non-proliferation issues, for the last two years. He earlier held a wide range of positions as a member of the shadow cabinet, before which he served as Parliamentary Private Secretary to William Hague when he was leader of the opposition. Before entering Parliament, he was Special Adviser to the then Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd. Dr Lidington sponsored a parliamentary early day motion welcoming the Nuclear Security Project launched by Kissinger, Nunn, Perry and Shultz and its endorsement by four British politicians. He is Conservative MP for Aylesbury.

“Our judgment is that it is very much in the UK national interest that the NPT Review Conference be a success”.

*- Dr David Lidington, MP (Conservative)**

Tony Lloyd, MP

Chair of the Parliamentary Labour Party (since 2006)

Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1997–99)



Tony Lloyd is Chair of the Parliamentary Labour Party, consisting of all Labour MPs and Lords. He also chairs the Parliamentary Committee where the Prime Minister and senior government ministers meet weekly with elected representatives of backbench MP's. He is the leader of the British Delegation to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Tony is Joint Convener of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation. He is formerly Minister of state, foreign and commonwealth office (1997 – 1999); leader of the British Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and one of its vice-Presidents; leader of the British Delegation to the Western European Union and one of its vice-Presidents; and a visiting Parliamentary Fellow of St Anthony's College, Oxford.

Support team

Paul Ingram, Executive Director, BASIC

Chris Lindborg, Analyst, BASIC

Anne Penketh, Program Director, BASIC

Lorna Richardson, Clerk to the All Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-proliferation

Malcolm Savidge, Council Member, BASIC

Shata Shetty, Researcher to the Top Level Group of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Kim Waller, Finance and Communications Coordinator, BASIC

Pre-briefing to the delegation on key issues

START follow-on treaty

- **What's the latest on the START follow-on negotiations?**

START, agreed in 1991, slashed each nation's strategic warhead deployments from about 10,000 to less than 6,000, and it limited each country to no more than 1,600 strategic delivery systems. The 2002 Moscow Treaty (or SORT, Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) limits both sides to reduce to less than 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads by 2012, but failed to attach any means of verification, so that confidence in each side sticking to agreements still depends upon START.

The United States achieved reductions by reducing the number of warheads each missile carries, and therefore has a significant ability to reverse this process quickly. The Russians, by contrast, face a missile fleet near the end of its life and are running to stand still – their new missiles are fewer in number and have a much smaller 'upload' potential. Even without an agreement, the Russians would not be able to field more than around 2,000 warheads by 2012, most of which would be on near obsolete delivery systems. Russia is therefore keen on limiting the number of missiles, submarines and bombers fielded by the United States that gives it an 'upload' capability. The Russians have also been attempting to link the talks with US missile defence proposals in Europe. While the Obama Administration has been cooler in its support of the project than the previous administration, the Russians remain concerned that over time this will give the United States the means to erode Russia's deterrent capability, and require them to invest further in offensive systems.

- **Why is this an Administration priority?**

1. The current START treaty expires on 5th December this year. As a result, the agreements on limits to warhead stockpiles, and the complex verification arrangements between the two countries will come to an end, unless a follow-on agreement can be negotiated. Verification is important to building trust. Losing those measures could lead to greater suspicion at a sensitive moment in the relationship between the United States and Russia.
2. Nuclear disarmament has featured in a number of speeches by the President and members of his Administration. The President sees a strong link between nuclear disarmament and strengthening measures for non-proliferation. Put another way, non-nuclear weapon states are highly unlikely to agree to the measures necessary to prevent the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons and technology around the world, particularly in a time of expanding nuclear power markets, unless those with nuclear weapons were to show greater commitment to fulfilling promises made in the past to move towards disarmament and eventually towards a world free of nuclear weapons.
3. Russia is keen on achieving more reductions, so there appears to be plenty of room for an agreement, but the urgency of the situation means that the ambitions of the negotiators will be curtailed. This also opens them up to criticism from all sides because many in Washington are fearful that the Administration will give too much away in an effort to reach agreement on a tight schedule, whilst others worry that too little will be achieved and the moment for progress pass.

- **Why is congressional approval important?**

The follow-on treaty requires ratification by the Senate. This is no formality, as many within Washington have been concerned that the Obama Administration, keen to reach agreement, may give too much away too quickly. The Russians are looking to limit US freedom of action around missile defence in particular, for example. The Treaty only deals with strategic systems – leaving the Russians with an overall larger number of warheads because they have many more shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons.

- **Is there a timetable? Could it slip because of the health care issue?**

The current treaty expires on 5th December. The treaty has a facility for a five year extension, but the Russians are opposed to a simple extension (partly because their new missiles break existing START constraints), and such would send a message that the current Obama Administration was not committed to progress.

The negotiations themselves now look unlikely to be concluded until near or even after the deadline, and it will take a few months to pass it through the ratification process even if it goes smoothly, so there likely will be a period between the expiry of the current treaty and the entry into force of the follow-on. This may or may not be important, but does open up the possibility of either party developing new systems in the meantime. The healthcare issue is not likely to be critical to this timetable, as this is a current congressional blockage, unlikely to be hot early next year... though the healthcare issue has clearly meant that Congress has been unable to engage (which also posed challenges for the delegation's visit to Washington), and the legislative timetable is likely to be further under pressure when the follow-on treaty comes up for ratification.

CTBT ratification

- **What is the CTBT and how many countries have ratified it?**

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty outlaws all nuclear testing that involves the explosion of a nuclear device, but does not outlaw simulations or other forms of testing components. It has been signed by 180 states and ratified by 148. Not only has it high symbolic and environmental value, but it has been deemed by many analysts as a central measure, both for non-proliferation (preventing new countries from testing any potential warheads and therefore undermining confidence in any new arsenals) and for disarmament (slowing development of new warheads and eventually eroding confidence in existing arsenals).

The CTBT Organisation has been building an impressive network of monitoring stations around the world enabling it to detect with high confidence any testing of a warhead above a relevant threshold. Much of the debate in Washington over the coming months will focus on the ability to detect smaller illicit tests.

- **How does it come into force?**

All 44 states listed in an annex to the Treaty have to ratify it before it comes into force. Of these North Korea, India and Pakistan have not signed, and Israel, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Iraq, China and the United States have not ratified it. The United Kingdom, under both Conservative and Labour governments, has strongly supported the CTBT since its signature in 1996.

- **Why does US Senate ratification matter?**

Several of the hold-out states have indicated that they would ratify the treaty if the United States were to do so. Whilst US ratification would by no means end the matter, it would in turn put greater pressure on any remaining states to complete the process. Failure by the United States to ratify has reduced confidence in the future of the CTBT regime and enabled other states to hide from the spotlight and avoid making the commitment. Worse, it could open up the United States to accusations that they are not committed to, and could well undermine, the wider non-proliferation regime. President Obama, in his Prague speech last April, promised to "immediately and aggressively pursue US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty".

If ratification fails or is not put, states like Iran may conclude that there is no legal bar to their proceeding with a nuclear test, increasing the risks of nuclear proliferation. Countries like India would be comforted in their view that they would not be constrained in developing new nuclear weapons.

- **Why hasn't it happened earlier as Clinton signed it?**

President Clinton signed the CTBT on 24th Sept 1996, the first state to do so. Four years earlier President George H. Bush had legally confirmed the US unilateral testing moratorium. However, the Clinton Administration was accused of paying insufficient attention to the ratification process, distracted as it was in its final years. Senators, concerned that the treaty was unverifiable and would harm the US nuclear arsenal, voted against ratification 48 to 51 with one abstention on 13th October 2009. Leading opponents of the treaty, including Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona, say that these questions remain open. The Administration needs 67 votes in the 100-member Senate for ratification, which means it will need support from some of the 40 Republicans. No Republican has yet declared formal support.

Nuclear Posture Review

- **What is it? Why is this happening now? How important is it?**

The US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is to "...establish US nuclear deterrence policy, strategy, and force posture for the next 5 to 10 years..."(2009 NPR Terms of Reference Fact Sheet, US Department of Defense, 2nd June 2009). The Obama Administration's NPR must be completed by the end of the year, according to congressional mandate. Thus, the NPR will critically influence the approach the Administration will take towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and NATO's nuclear strategy.

The Administration, led by the Defense Department, is considering the NPR currently. The extended deterrence role of US nuclear weapons plays an important role in determining all aspects of nuclear policy and deployment, and will therefore be consulting informally with allies over the next month or two. It is expected that the internal NPR process will be completed before the end of the year. The actual text will remain a classified document, but the Administration is committed to publishing an accompanying document.

Foreign Affairs Committee Report

The delegation made available copies of the latest House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report, entitled *Global Security: Non-proliferation*, published 3 June 2009.

Selection of the most recent statements on Getting to Zero

There have been a number of policy initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic that taken together have opened up the debate over how fast and how far we can go in promoting multilateral nuclear disarmament. These include:

11 June 2009: Putin Talks of Giving Up Nukes, report in *The Moscow Times*.

4 June 2009: President Obama calls for world free of nuclear weapons during tour of the Middle East in a speech delivered at Cairo University.

5 April 2009: US President calls for a world free of nuclear weapons in Prague.

17 March 2009: UK PM pushes for world reduction in nuclear weapons and offers up Trident on a future negotiating table.

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4 February 2009: David Miliband sets out six-point plan to rid world of nuclear weapons

9 January 2009: Four German statesmen declare their support for the vision of a world without nuclear weapons - Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizsäcker, Egon Bahr and Hans-Dietrich Genscher

24 October 2008: UN Secretary General recommends Five steps to a nuclear-free world, Ban Ki-moon

23 July 2008: William Hague, Shadow Foreign Secretary, 'Preventing a New Age of Nuclear Insecurity', setting out a future Conservative government's assertive approach to non-proliferation and disarmament.

15 & 16 July 2008: two key policy speeches by Presidential candidate Barack Obama supporting the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and outlining some of the necessary steps and US leadership in the enterprise.

30 June 2008: *Times* op-ed by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, Lord David Owen, Lord Douglas Hurd, and Lord George Robertson, an article titled 'Start worrying and learn to ditch the bomb'

26-27 February 2008: international NTI conference on nuclear disarmament in Oslo: Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons.

5 February: Speech by Des Browne, UK Secretary of State for Defence, to the Conference on Disarmament, "Laying the Foundations for Multilateral Disarmament."

21 January 2008: Gordon Brown, speech to the Chamber of Commerce in Delhi, India on January 21, renews the UK government's commitment to move toward a nuclear-weapon free world.

15 January 2008: The 'Hoover Group' - George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn and William Perry - publish a renewed call to action in the *Wall Street Journal*

19 December 2007: President Bush announces a reduction by 15 percent in the active US nuclear weapons arsenal, which is scheduled to be completed by 2012.

24 October 2007: Governor Schwarzenegger strongly supports the Hoover Group initiative – comparing nuclear dangers with climate change.

25 June 2007: Keynote Address by Margaret Beckett, UK Foreign Secretary to the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, 'A World Free of Nuclear Weapons?'

31 January 2007: The Nuclear Threat, Op-Ed by Mikhail Gorbachev, supporting the gang of four in *Wall Street Journal*

4 January 2007: A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, *Wall Street Journal*

24 April 2006: We Should, So We Can: Life Without the Bomb, Op-Ed by Amb. Max M. Kampelman in the *International Herald Tribune*

President Obama's speech on Nuclear Disarmament, 5 April 2009

Prague, Czech Republic - President Obama delivered the following remarks, as prepared for delivery, at Hradcany Square in Prague on Sunday. They were the principle expression of the Administration's policy in this area at the time of the delegation visit.

"Thank you for this wonderful welcome. Thank you to the people of Prague.

...

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One of those issues that I will focus on today is fundamental to our nations, and to the peace and security of the world - the future of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.

The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. No nuclear war was fought between the United States and the Soviet Union, but generations lived with the knowledge that their world could be erased in a single flash of light. Cities like Prague that had existed for centuries would have ceased to exist.

Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black markets trade in nuclear secrets and materials. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered in a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point when the center cannot hold.

This matters to all people, everywhere. One nuclear weapon exploded in one city - be it New York or Moscow, Islamabad or Mumbai, Tokyo or Tel Aviv, Paris or Prague - could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And no matter where it happens, there is no end to what the consequences may be - for our global safety, security, society, economy, and ultimately our survival.

Some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot be checked - that we are destined to live in a world where more nations and more people possess the ultimate tools of destruction. This fatalism is a deadly adversary. For if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.

Just as we stood for freedom in the 20th century, we must stand together for the right of people everywhere to live free from fear in the 21st. And as a nuclear power - as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon - the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it.

So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. This goal will not be reached quickly - perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change.

First, the United States will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons.

To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same. Make no mistake: as long as these weapons exist, we will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies - including the Czech Republic. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.

To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia this year. President Medvedev and I began this process in London, and will seek a new agreement by the end of this year that is legally binding, and sufficiently bold. This will set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor.

To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my Administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned.

And to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, the United States will seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons. If we are serious about stopping the spread of these weapons, then we should put an end to the dedicated production of weapons grade materials that create them.

Second, together, we will strengthen the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation.

The basic bargain is sound: countries with nuclear weapons will move toward disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them; and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy. To strengthen the Treaty, we should embrace several principles. We need more resources and authority to strengthen international inspections. We need real and immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the Treaty without cause.

And we should build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation. That must be the right of every nation that renounces nuclear weapons, especially developing countries embarking on peaceful programs. No approach will succeed if it is based on the denial of rights to nations that play by the rules. We must harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our efforts to combat climate change, and to advance opportunity for all people.

We go forward with no illusions. Some will break the rules, but that is why we need a structure in place that ensures that when any nation does, they will face consequences. This morning, we were reminded again why we need a new and more rigorous approach to address this threat. North Korea broke the rules once more by testing a rocket that could be used for a long range missile.

UK PARLIAMENTARY VISIT TO WASHINGTON, DC 8th – 11th SEPTEMBER 2009
TO DISCUSS MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION

This provocation underscores the need for action - not just this afternoon at the UN Security Council, but in our determination to prevent the spread of these weapons. Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons. Now is the time for a strong international response. North Korea must know that the path to security and respect will never come through threats and illegal weapons. And all nations must come together to build a stronger, global regime.

Iran has yet to build a nuclear weapon. And my Administration will seek engagement with Iran based upon mutual interests and mutual respect, and we will present a clear choice. We want Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations, politically and economically. We will support Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy with rigorous inspections. That is a path that the Islamic Republic can take. Or the government can choose increased isolation, international pressure, and a potential nuclear arms race in the region that will increase insecurity for all.

Let me be clear: Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile activity poses a real threat, not just to the United States, but to Iran's neighbors and our allies. The Czech Republic and Poland have been courageous in agreeing to host a defense against these missiles. As long as the threat from Iran persists, we intend to go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe at this time will be removed.

Finally, we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon.

This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. One terrorist with a nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said that it seeks a bomb. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe. To protect our people, we must act with a sense of purpose without delay.

Today, I am announcing a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. We will set new standards, expand our cooperation with Russia, and pursue new partnerships to lock down these sensitive materials.

We must also build on our efforts to break up black markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt this dangerous trade. Because this threat will be lasting, we should come together to turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable international institutions. And we should start by having a Global Summit on Nuclear Security that the United States will host within the next year.

I know that there are some who will question whether we can act on such a broad agenda. There are those who doubt whether true international cooperation is possible, given the inevitable differences among nations. And there are those who hear talk of a world without nuclear weapons and doubt whether it is worth setting a goal that seems impossible to achieve.

But make no mistake: we know where that road leads. When nations and peoples allow themselves to be defined by their differences, the gulf between them widens. When we fail to pursue peace, then it stays forever beyond our grasp. To denounce or shrug off a call for cooperation is an easy and cowardly thing. That is how wars begin. That is where human progress ends.

There is violence and injustice in our world that must be confronted. We must confront it not by splitting apart, but by standing together as free nations, as free people. I know that a call to arms can stir the souls of men and women more than a call to lay them down. But that is why the voices for peace and progress must be raised together.

Those are the voices that still echo through the streets of Prague. Those are the ghosts of 1968. Those were the joyful sounds of the Velvet Revolution. Those were the Czechs who helped bring down a nuclear-armed empire without firing a shot.

Human destiny will be what we make of it. Here, in Prague, let us honor our past by reaching for a better future. Let us bridge our divisions, build upon our hopes, and accept our responsibility to leave this world more prosperous and more peaceful than we found it. Thank you."

Source: The White House, www.whitehouse.gov.