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**Mustafa Kibaroglu<sup>1</sup>**

# **Turkey, NATO & and Nuclear Sharing: Prospects after NATO's Lisbon Summit**

*In the run-up to the Lisbon summit meeting of NATO on November 19-20, 2010, where the new Strategic Concept of the alliance was adopted, the status of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in five European countries, namely Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey was a significant topic of debate, and remains so afterwards. Some have suggested the speedy withdrawal of these weapons while others have endorsed their extended stay on the continent for as long as there are nuclear threats to the alliance.<sup>2</sup>*

Turkey, as a host, has long been supportive of retaining U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory for various reasons and also expected others to continue to deploy these weapons as part of the burden sharing and solidarity principles of the alliance. Turkey believes that the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe strengthens the U.S. commitment to transatlantic security, and contributes to the credibility of the extended deterrent. It therefore maintains a policy that implicitly supports deployment in Turkey, one that has remained the same for decades, and continues under the current Justice and Development Party (known as AKP, for its Turkish acronym) government. Whether it would survive significant

changes in the deployment of theater nuclear weapons in other NATO states is more doubtful.

This being the case for the allied countries in general, and from Turkey's perspective in particular, this paper will present primarily the views in the political, diplomatic, and military circles in Turkey with respect to the prolonged deployment of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish soil. It concludes that Turkey, preferably together with other NATO members, should take the initiative in asking the United States to draw them down and remove them entirely, in the interests of Turkish security and alliance cohesion.

## **Turkey's official stance toward the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil**

It is not the practice of NATO members to discuss nuclear deployments in Europe; details remain classified. Even the identity of host states is a secret, so there are inevitable tensions for any politician to admit to such deployments. But Turkey has unique sensitivities that have prevented discussion even in private of its hosting of U.S. nuclear warheads. Turkey's stance is largely unchanged since the first U.S. nuclear weapons were deployed in Turkey in February 1959.<sup>3</sup>

### *Profile of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey*

By the mid-1980s, "the United States [had] store[d] some 500 nuclear warheads in Turkey, and as many as 300 of them [were] bombs for aircraft. U.S. nuclear bombs [were] stored at four airbases—Eskisehir, Murted, Erhac, and Balikesir—for use by four Turkish Air Force units. The Turkish squadrons consisting of nuclear-certified aircraft as F-104s, F-4s, and F-100s, [were] armed with four types of bombs with yields up to a couple of hundred kilotons. The U.S. Army also [had] nuclear weapons in Turkey, [which were] allocated for support of the Turkish First and Third Armies. Custodian detachments at Cakmakli, Ortakoy, Corlu, Izmit, and Erzurum store[d] about 190 warheads for obsolete 1950s-vintage Turkish Army Honest John short-range missile launchers (four battalions) and 32 eight-inch guns."<sup>4</sup>

Turkey still hosts U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory, albeit in much smaller numbers. They are limited to one

location, the Incirlik base near Adana on the eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey.<sup>5</sup> All other nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from the bases mentioned above. Moreover, the Turkish Air Force no longer has any operational link with the remaining tactical nuclear weapons deployed at Incirlik.<sup>6</sup> F-104s have not been in service since 1994. F-4s are still in service after modernization of some 54 of them by Israeli Aerospace Industries in 1997. Yet, only the F-16 "Fighting Falcons" of the Turkish Air Force participate in NATO's nuclear strike exercises known as "Steadfast Noon," during which crews are trained in loading, unloading and employing B61 tactical nuclear weapons. The Turkish aircraft in these exercises serve as a non-nuclear air defense escort rather than a nuclear strike force.<sup>7</sup>

### *Significance of nuclear weapons for Turkey*

Even in the absence of an imminent nuclear threat to Turkey's security, the view among both civilian and military Turkish security elites does not seem to have changed since the Cold War. One explanation for the uniformity of their views lies in the prestige attributed to nuclear weapons. There are specific reasons that explain why Turkish government officials and civilian and military bureaucrats want to retain U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkey's soil, first and foremost being the perceived threat from the still uncertain international security environment. Turkish government officials' views were expressed (in not-for-attribution notes) as follows:

"Nuclear weapons continue to preserve their critical importance for the security of the [North Atlantic] alliance, yet they are

regarded more as political weapons. Our country is committed to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and thus we support every effort in that direction. ... Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that attaining such a goal will not be possible any time soon, and that more time and patience will be needed to realize this objective. Hence, so long as these weapons do still exist in other parts of the world, it is indispensable for NATO to preserve a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal that will be capable of deterring all sorts of enemies in order to ensure the security of all of its allies. ... [In NATO's new Strategic Concept] our country want[ed] to see an explicit confirmation of the commitment [of the alliance] to the preservation of an effective and credible deterrent by way of maintaining a combination of conventional and nuclear weapons capability. In addition to that, our determination for the preservation of the transatlantic link and solidarity as well as fair risk and burden sharing to continue to constitute the fundamental principles of the nuclear strategy of the alliance will persist.”<sup>8</sup>

The above quote emphasizes that while Turkey supports nuclear disarmament, in the foreseeable future it wants to maintain nuclear weapons on its soil for both security and political reasons.<sup>9</sup>

#### *Logic behind deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey*

There is, indeed, a very simple logic connecting Turkey's membership within NATO and the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory. For a long time, the Turkish political and security elite<sup>10</sup> has viewed Turkey's NATO membership as a

potent symbol of Turkey's belonging to the West and the U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey have been seen, in this respect, as a symbol of Turkey's privileged status within NATO. In this context, there is an unexpressed fear that an American decision to withdraw nuclear weapons from Turkey could weaken Turkey's position within the alliance, and hence undermine to an extent the attraction of NATO membership in the minds of many. This perspective remained prevalent in the higher echelons of the Turkish state mechanism through dozens of governments formed by various political parties coming from different ideological dispositions and diverse worldviews for half a century. It has been so even with the AKP in power since 2002, which has brought a new approach to Turkish foreign policy making by opening many of the taboo-like issues to public debate. The AKP government has taken a series of bold and courageous steps in Turkey's long-established security strategies, such as the Cyprus issue as well as the relations with Middle Eastern neighbors in particular, in accordance with the “zero conflict” doctrine, which is a brainchild of the current Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoglu. Notwithstanding its reformist attitude toward many traditional foreign policy issues of Turkey, the AKP government as well has preferred to shy away from displaying its well-known pragmatism in the area of U.S. nuclear weapons that are stationed in Turkey.

The decision to deploy nuclear weapons in Turkey was first taken at the North Atlantic Council meeting of the alliance during the Paris summit in December 1957. At that time, there was the right-wing and conservative Democratic Party (known as DP, for

its Turkish acronym) government under the Premiership of Adnan Menderes, which came to power with the first multi-party general elections in the country in 1950 and consolidated its government with the following general elections in 1955. Prime Minister Menderes was said to be lukewarm to the idea of deploying nuclear weapons in Turkey, possibly due to the possible negative consequences of such a decision for Turkey in its relations with the Soviet Union, which had expressed its opposition.<sup>11</sup> There are also views that Prime Minister Menderes had actually planned an official visit to Moscow, which was scheduled for the end of May 1960, possibly to discuss, among others, the weapons deployment issue. The military coup d'état on May 27, 1960 led to the demise of the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet on the grounds that they threatened the secular nature of the republic, and prevented any possible reconciliation with Moscow.

In the years after the coup, social, political, and economic life suffered from stiff political rivalry between the leading political parties that governed Turkey. There was serious domestic disorder, on the verge of a civil war. The economy was in shambles and there was financial crisis and hardship, preparing the ground for military intervention to overthrow elected governments on three occasions in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Each military coup overhauled the entire state bureaucracy and restructured the administrative mechanism with a view to reestablishing the constitutional order in accordance with the founding principles of the republic, by appointing new cadres of politicians as well as technocrats and practitioners to key positions.

This all ensured that politicians focused upon issues that were related to the most immediate concerns of the ruling elite, such as strengthening the economy and maintaining order in the country. Strategic matters, such as the hosting of U.S. nuclear missiles (Jupiters) or the atomic bombs stationed in several bases all over Turkey, were left to the military and maybe a handful of civilian experts who had no desire whatsoever to discuss these issues publicly, for fear of losing control. Despite Turkey's transformation into a stable democratic, open, and transparent society, politicians, diplomats and, more so, the military with few exceptions, are still reluctant to discuss the status of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey.

When civilian politicians did focus on foreign affairs, it tended to be on disputes with Greece, a NATO ally, over the issues in the Aegean Sea, including the width of the territorial waters and airspace, the delimitation of the continental shelf, re-militarization of the islands by Greece, and the exploitation of the exclusive economic zones by the parties, etc. And of course there was the "Cyprus issue," which has been undermining the relationship with the United States for decades.

But it was the experience in the lead-up to and after the March 2003 US war on Iraq followed by the U.S. occupation that damaged bilateral relations more seriously, and highlighted anti-American feelings in the Turkish population.<sup>12</sup> More recently, Turkey's promotion of the Tehran Declaration in May 2010,<sup>13</sup> and the fall-out from Turkey's dispute with Israel over the killing of nine Turkish nationals involved in challenging the Israeli blockade of Gaza

have led to many (prematurely) questioning the alignment of Turkey with the West. Nevertheless, the issue of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey has never been the subject of any serious dispute between Turkey and the United States, or the subject of any public debate by sections of Turkish society that might otherwise be quite open to criticizing the relationship with the United States.

#### *Turkish view on “first-use” strategy*

In addition to the status the Turkish elite associates with nuclear weapons, there are also the raw security calculations that conclude nuclear weapons can provide a credible deterrent. During the Cold War years, the main source of threat came from the Soviet Union, and Turkey actively endorsed the “first-use” nuclear strategy of the alliance. Turkish views about the “first-use” strategy remain the same even after the end of the Cold War. As NATO survived the end of the Cold War and enlarged, Russia has undergone drastic changes, and the imbalance in the conventional weapons systems turned in favor of NATO.<sup>14</sup> Russian military elites abandoned their “no-first-use” strategy and declared instead in 1993 three years after the end of the Cold War, that Russia would again reserve its legitimate right to resort to using nuclear weapons first in the event of aggression from a nuclear-weapons state or an ally of a nuclear-weapons state, regardless of the weapons used by the aggressor. This change in Russian attitude was concomitant with the declaration of the so-called “near abroad” doctrine. Although simple logic would suggest that, having an indisputable superiority in conventional forces, it was NATO’s turn to adopt the “no-first-use”

strategy, it was believed that a switch in NATO strategy in that direction would not bring about a concurrent change in the Russian strategy from “first-use” to again a “no-first-use.”

On the other hand, NATO had its own constraints as far as the threat of proliferation of WMD, especially in the Middle East, was concerned. NATO’s effort to adapt itself to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War security environment produced guidelines for appropriate responses to proliferation. The overarching principles that guide NATO’s envisaged defense response include, among others, to “maintain *freedom of action* and demonstration to any potential adversary that the alliance will not be coerced by the threat or use of WMD.”<sup>15</sup> A similar stance is adopted by NATO within its new Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon summit in November 2010:

“Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”<sup>16</sup>

Therefore, Turkish security elites have not seen any prospect for a switch to a “no-first-use” strategy. Although dramatic changes have taken place in the security environment of Turkey, credibility of the nuclear posture and, hence, deterrence of NATO compounded with the implicit “first use” strategy of the alliance continues to be of utmost importance for Turkish security elites.<sup>17</sup>



## *Reconciling “first-use” strategy with “zero conflict” doctrine*

Turkish leaders attempt to reconcile this with their policy of nonproliferation in the region by pointing to the historical legacy of these weapons, and the need for patience. There is clearly a level of discomfort in the government over the inconsistency between these deployments in Turkey and the calls for nuclear disarmament and stronger non-proliferation measures. President Abdullah Gul was recently challenged on this and reportedly said that the U.S. NATO weapons “constitute a very different category” than “producing one’s own nuclear weapons.”<sup>18</sup> Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu echoed this belief more recently, citing Turkey’s threat perception emanating from the uncertain strategic security environment as the most fundamental reason for Turkey retaining these weapons, but also lamenting that, “we have been doomed with this [nuclear] legacy.” He continued by declaring clearly Turkey’s desire for a nuclear-weapons-free world and a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East, but that “the need for transition cannot be used by others to create new imbalances.”<sup>19</sup>

Ambassador Tacan Ildem, director-general of international security in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was reported to express the government’s policy clearly at a Foreign Policy Institute workshop on the new Strategic Concept in June 2010. Speaking favorably about President Obama’s vision for a world free of nuclear weapons, he also highlighted the commitment of NATO member states to move together on the issue, notwithstanding the clear desire of some states to see strategic systems withdrawn from their own

territories. He said the U.S. nuclear posture review made “clear reference to the fact that even the U.S. will not make decisions unilaterally”. He indicated that the Turks had already considered the possibility of consolidation in fewer countries and were decidedly hostile to the idea:

“Among the guiding principles, there is one [about] fair risk and burden sharing. So if three allies say no then I will put the question to you whether it will be fair risk a burden sharing to keep those systems in a nation’s soil.”<sup>20</sup>

In communication more recently, Ambassador Ildem has also cited a commonly held view amongst NATO officials that “despite deep cuts in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, there [was] no convincing evidence that such a progress toward total nuclear disarmament has prevented emergence of new proliferators in the world.”<sup>21</sup>

These views reflect others expressed by officials anonymously in private. Turkey expects NATO to preserve a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal as part of its deterrent capability, and values the strengthening this is seen to bring to the transatlantic link and alliance solidarity, reflecting what they perceive to be fair risk and burden sharing.<sup>22</sup>

### **Pressures grow to reconsider the policy**

It is clear that Turkish officials have no desire yet to request the U.S. to take back its nuclear weapons in the near future, but they could experience greater pressures in the future to change their policy.

### *No credible military use of tactical nuclear weapons*

While there are regular exercises that practice the delivery of NATO's nuclear weapons, there is a widespread belief that they have no significant military value as there is no feasible scenario within which the necessary agreement would be reached to use these weapons. This is particularly so in the case of Turkey's politics. Before and during the November 2010 summit to consider the new Strategic Concept, there was a heated debate over missile defense and whether Iran would be explicitly singled out as the principle reason for deployments. While the United States was adamant in including such a reference (partly to assuage Russia), the Turks were equally adamant in resisting such naming. In the end, the Turkish view predominated. Could it therefore be possible that Turkey would consider involvement in any active nuclear threats against Iran, particularly in any preemptive scenario? The possibility runs counter to Turkey's recent diplomacy toward Iran, as well as Syria. In the latter case, Turkey has signed dozens of protocols during the joint ministerial cabinet meetings held in Damascus in December 2009 followed by the High Level Strategic Council meetings held between the two countries. Other neighbors in the region are even less likely targets of nuclear threats.

### *Extended deterrence can be achieved without nuclear weapons on Turkey's soil*

Some argue that withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe (or Turkey) would weaken the credibility of NATO's extended deterrent capability. In an age of intensified relations between NATO and Russia, as a

result of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act<sup>23</sup> and the establishment in 2002 of the NATO-Russia Council,<sup>24</sup> it is difficult to envisage scenarios where U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would have any significant role in deterring Russia over and above the deterrent value provided by strategic nuclear weapons, or, more importantly, conventional capabilities. Moreover, the symbolism of extended deterrence by local deployment may still be achieved by means of temporary deployment of U.S. nuclear submarines carrying nuclear missiles in the eastern Mediterranean and also by way of port visits to allied countries like Turkey and Greece.<sup>25</sup> Hence, it must be acknowledged that "extended deterrence" of NATO is far too comprehensive a concept to depend simply on a small number of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in only a handful of allied countries.

### *Turkey's approach toward a NWFZ/ME*

Turkish political and military authorities have time and again emphasized the need to realize the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East (NWFZ/ME) at an early date when making statements about the existing nuclear capabilities of Israel as well as the significant achievements observed in the nuclear program of Iran.<sup>26</sup> While realization of the dream is yet a long way off, the creation of a NWFZ/ME is a major and crucial objective with an impact extending far beyond tackling the threat of nuclear weapon proliferation in the region; indeed, it would be a panacea for most of the security problems that exist in the region. Some have said that if Turkish statements are to have any meaning at all, Turkey will have to consider its own

contribution to the project by freeing its own territory from nuclear weapons that belong to the United States.<sup>27</sup> There is a certain degree of rationality in this criticism coming from regional security experts, especially those in Iran, in whose view, for Turkey to be consistent with its own rhetoric, U.S. nuclear weapons must be sent back.

In this context, one particular concern of American political and military elite must be noted here.

Among the views that have been expressed by a number of influential figures in the political, military, and scholarly circles in the United States with regard to possible reactions of Turkey to Iran's weaponization of its nuclear capabilities, some have proposed that Turkey would consider developing its own nuclear weapons should the United States withdraw its nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey.<sup>28</sup> While there is no question that Turkey's security will be negatively affected by Iran's nuclear bomb, such an eventuality will not in itself be a cause for Turkey to follow suit and to go down the same path, at least for the foreseeable future for three reasons: first, Turkey is a NATO member and would still benefit from extended deterrence; second, Turkey would throw away its chances for future membership in the EU, a crucial foreign policy objective; and third, Turkey has a long state tradition of observing its obligations and commitments under international treaties and conventions, and thus would not like to be treated as a "rogue state."<sup>29</sup> Maintaining U.S. free-fall bombs in Turkey on the basis that it prevents proliferation, as some suggest, is misguided.

### *Turkish air force no longer has a nuclear strike mission*

The Turkish air force no longer has a role in the nuclear strike missions of the alliance. During the Cold War period and in its immediate aftermath, Turkish air force units continued to take part in the nuclear strike exercises carried out by a number of allied countries. Over the last several years, however, Turkish military aircraft have participated in these exercises as non-nuclear air defense escort units rather than a nuclear strike force.<sup>30</sup> Hence, the Turkish military's involvement in the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons is minimal, raising questions over Turkey's role in the decision-making procedures pertaining to the status and the mission of these weapons, which may turn out to be a highly problematic issue in the future.

### *Threat of terrorism*

U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey are stationed in the Incirlik base near Adana in southern Turkey, neighboring Syria, and need strong protection against any unauthorized access. Moreover, just because of the mere presence of these weapons, the base itself may be the target of terrorist groups. There are observations as well as recommendations to this effect that have been made by the U.S. Air Force, which are documented in the "Blue Ribbon Review" on nuclear weapons policies and procedures published in February 2008. The review recommends investigating "potential consolidation of resources to minimize variances and to reduce vulnerabilities at overseas locations" upon the observation that "host nation security at overseas nuclear-capable units varies from country to



country in terms of personnel, facility, and equipment.”<sup>31</sup> Hence, the risks are clearly acknowledged by the United States, and that must also concern Turkish authorities.

## **Conclusion**

Against this background, there is a good argument that Turkey should request that the United States drawdown nuclear weapons that are deployed on its territory. However, Turkish governments have so far

been cool to this idea and have taken no concrete steps that would suggest otherwise. The U.S. nuclear weapons may in any case be sent back sooner than most people might expect, and a proactive decision by Turkey could prove beneficial by setting a very valuable and meaningful precedent for the countries in its neighborhood. Turkey’s profile, which is increasing in the Middle Eastern public domain as well as among the political and military authorities, may help enhance its image in the region. Now is the time to make bold decisions.

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## **ENDNOTES**

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<sup>1</sup> The author teaches courses on arms control and disarmament at the department of international relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey (kibar@bilkent.edu.tr). He is also the academic advisor of the NATO Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara (acad@coedat.nato.int). Additional information and writings can be found at: [www.mustafakibaroglu.com](http://www.mustafakibaroglu.com).

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<sup>2</sup> For academic articles reflecting the diverging opinions on this matter see, for example, Scott Sagan (ed.), *Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Debate* (American Academy of Arts & Sciences, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2010). Also see, Bruno Tertrais (ed.), *Perspectives on Extended Deterrence* (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Coll. Research and Documents No: 03, Paris, France, 2010).

<sup>3</sup> Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin and William Burr, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook; Deployments by Country, 1951-1977," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 55, November 1999, pp. 66-67.

<sup>4</sup> William M. Arkin, "Washington Report: Playing Chicken in Turkey," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 41, No 9, October 1985, pp. 4-5.

<sup>5</sup> Hans M. Kristensen, *US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning*, Washington, D.C., Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005, p. 9.

<sup>6</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Isn't it Time to Say Farewell to US Nukes in Turkey?" *European Security*, Vol. 14, No. 4, December 2005, pp. 443-457.

<sup>7</sup> E-mail exchange with a retired top military commander from the Turkish Air Forces, April 23, 2010, Ankara. See Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 40, Issue 5, June 2010, pp. 8-13.

<sup>8</sup> Written notes on the 2010 U.S. NPR (in Turkish), given to the author by officials from various branches of the government, July 2010, Ankara. Name of the note taker withheld by request.

<sup>9</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Acceptance and Anxiety: Turkey (Mostly) Embraces Obama's Nuclear Posture," *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 18, No. 1, March 2011, pp. 201-217.

<sup>10</sup> The phrase "security elite" will denote throughout this chapter the civilian and military officials from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and the General Secretariat of National Security Council, as well as the scholarly people who contribute in various forms in the policy-making process in issues pertaining to national and international security.

<sup>11</sup> Author's ad hoc conversations with retired diplomats and military experts on various occasions.

<sup>12</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu and Tarik Oguzlu, "Turkey and the United States in the 21st Century: Friends or Foes?" *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. 20, No. 4, Winter 2008, pp. 367-382.

<sup>13</sup> In the Tehran declaration, Iran, Brazil and Turkey agree on the proposal for a swap deal involving the exchange of Iranian low-enriched uranium in return for fuel for a nuclear research reactor in Tehran. The deal, designed as a confidence-building measure to break the deadlock in the dispute around Iran's nuclear program, eventually faltered because of U.S. opposition to it. See Mustafa Kibaroglu, "The Iranian quagmire: How to move forward; Position: Resuscitate the nuclear swap deal," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 66, No. 6, November/December 2010, pp. 102-108.

<sup>14</sup> Although a clear cut comparison, in retrospect, between the conventional weapons arsenals of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries was hardly possible, it was generally estimated that the Warsaw Pact had a "1.5 to 1" or at best "2 to 1" superiority over NATO. However, the imbalance between NATO and Russia was said to amount to a "3 to 1" level in favor of NATO in the post-Cold War era. Conversations with Turkish military experts and with Dr. Nikolai Sokov from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, February 1997.

<sup>15</sup> Ashton B. Carter and David B. Omand, "Countering the Proliferation Risks: Adapting the Alliance to the New Security Environment," *NATO Review*, No. 5, September 1996, pp. 10-15.

<sup>16</sup> *Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, Lisbon, November 2010, paragraph 17, p. 4, available at [www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf).

<sup>17</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey," in Harald Müller (Ed.), *Europe and Nuclear Disarmament* (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), European Interuniversity Press, Brussels, 1998), pp. 161-193.

<sup>18</sup> Sedat Ergin, "Gul, Turkiye'deki atom bombalarini hesap disi tutuyor," (Gul, atomic bombs in Turkey are out of question) *Hurriyet*, 14 April 2010.

<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=14413239&tarih=2010-04-14>.

<sup>19</sup> In response to a question asked by the author during a panel that Foreign Minister Davutoglu attended together with his Australian counterpart Kevin Rudd on February 1, 2011 in Ankara. Quoted in Mehmet Yegin, "Turkish FM Ahmet Davutoglu: "We Want a Nuclear Free World and a Nuclear Free Middle East," <http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/duyuru.asp?id=320>.

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<sup>20</sup> Views expressed by Ambassador Tacan Ildem during a one-day workshop convened in Ankara by the Foreign Policy Institute, June 4, 2010. For proceedings of the meeting, see "NATO's New Strategic Concept Conference, June 2010, Ankara," *Dis Politika/Foreign Policy*, Vol. 36, Autumn 2010, pp. 9–12.

<sup>21</sup> Views expressed by Ambassador Tacan Ildem during an interview with the author at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2, 2011, Ankara.

<sup>22</sup> Views on the 2010 U.S. NPR (in Turkish) presented to the author in written form upon his request by officials from various branches of the government, July 2010, Ankara. Name(s) of the person(s) who provided these views are withheld by request.

<sup>23</sup> The "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russia Federation" was signed in Paris on May 27 1997 by the heads of states and governments of the North Atlantic Alliance, the secretary-general of NATO and the president of the Russian Federation. The Founding Act is the expression of an enduring commitment, undertaken at the highest political level, to work together to build a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. It creates the framework for a new security partnership and for building a stable, peaceful, and undivided Europe. It commits the alliance and Russia to forging a closer relationship, not only in their own interests, but also in the wider interests of all other states in the Euro-Atlantic region. See [www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030303.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030303.htm).

<sup>24</sup>The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) is a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action. Within the NRC, the individual NATO member states and Russia work as equal partners on a wide spectrum of security issues of common interest. See [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_50091.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50091.htm).

<sup>25</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey and Shared Responsibilities," in Scott Sagan (ed.), *Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament* (American Academy of Arts & Sciences, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2010), pp. 24-27.

<sup>26</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu and Baris Caglar "Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey," *Middle East Policy*, Middle East Policy Council, Vol. XV, No. 4, Winter 2008, , Washington, D.C., pp. 59-80.

<sup>27</sup> Amr Moussa, Secretary-General of the Arab League, expressed such an opinion to the author during the Global Zero Convention held in Paris on February 2, 2010. Similar views were expressed to the author by other experts from the region such as Dr. Mahmoud Vaezi, Director of the Center for Strategic Research in Tehran, back on December 25, 2004 during the author's research trip to Iran.

<sup>28</sup> George Schultz, former U.S. Secretary of State in the George Bush administration, expressed such an opinion to the author during a workshop organized by CISAC at Stanford University in Palo Alto, California on September 16, 2010.

<sup>29</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu and Baris Caglar, *Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey*, *ibid*.

<sup>30</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Reassessing the Role of US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 40, Issue 5, June 2010, pp. 8-13.

<sup>31</sup> U.S. Air Force, *Blue Ribbon Review, Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures, Executive Summary*, Released February 12, 2008, p. 9., [www.airforce-magazine.com](http://www.airforce-magazine.com).