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Treading Water in 2010



The Nuclear Weapon States
and Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2010 Papers – 2

Treading Water in 2010: The Nuclear Weapon States and Nuclear Disarmament

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The Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)¹ have come under increasing pressure the past few years to do more than tread water and merely keep the NPT afloat. The forthcoming NPT Review Conference (RevCon) in May is widely seen as the critical moment for progress, with high expectations of the NWS, expectations raised by the renewed attention to nuclear disarmament since 2007 and the poor result of the last NPT RevCon of 2005. The President of the United States, no less, has adopted the campaign for a “world without nuclear weapons” as his own, as have other NWS leaders. All member states are obligated under Article 6 of the NPT to:

“... undertake(s) to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

Moreover, each NWS position sends signals to the vast majority of the NPT regime, which includes 184 non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) about the utility of these weapons for international security and diplomatic prestige. A reduction in the salience of nuclear weapons, along with significant

¹ China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are recognized within the NPT as states that tested a nuclear warhead prior to 1 January 1968.

disarmament toward zero, could diminish the risk of rampant nuclear proliferation in the future.

But moves by the NWS toward disarmament require confidence in their security, and they will not go to zero if they perceive that current NNWS will seek nuclear arsenals. So stronger non-proliferation measures, and credible commitments by NNWS of their intentions to remain non-nuclear, builds the confidence necessary for disarmament. Below is an overview of NWS nuclear postures and policies, followed by their general approaches to the NPT and what their movements on nuclear disarmament would look like. BASIC is publishing a separate paper on the NNWS.

Shifts in Doctrine and Posture

Reducing nuclear posture includes lowering numbers, narrowing the reasons for their possession, restricting plans and the capabilities for their future development and potential use, reducing their operational status, while working toward increased transparency and the reasonable verifiability of these steps. All of the NWS except for China (whose numbers of warheads are already relatively low) have been reducing their nuclear arsenals during the past two decades. The willingness to make these reductions has largely been a result of changing perceptions about threats and power after the Cold War, as well as the perceived decline in the military utility of nuclear weapons. Possibly, although to a much lesser extent, international pressure and moral aversion to nuclear weapons have also contributed to this reduction.

The challenge of nuclear weapons reductions is unique for each NWS: they have different strategic and regional security interests, their nuclear and conventional arsenals are of different sizes and composition, and they have varied historical memories and domestic political debates that

inform their expectations for the future. The chart below shows that Russia and the United States have stockpiles that tower over the other three NWS. Twenty years out from the end of the Cold War, these two powers still have many thousands of nuclear weapons either deployed or in reserve.

The newly-agreed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty follow-on (or “New START”), which still requires ratification by Russia and the United States, would set limits for both sides down to 1,550 operationally-deployed warheads assigned to “800 deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons,” and “700 for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons.”² (As of the publication of this report, the verification regime details were still due to be released.) Like the current 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), the new treaty does not address those warheads held in contingency reserve, reflecting an on-going Cold War-approach that may weaken confidence elsewhere in the willingness of NWS to contemplate substantial disarmament. Negotiations over the most recent treaty were

dogged by Russian concerns over verification rules, telemetry data on missile tests, U.S. missile defense developments and strategic offensive conventional weapons. The disagreements were instructive of how reducing nuclear arsenals is not a challenge that can be addressed in isolation from considering fundamental strategic concerns, overall military arsenals, and historical mistrust.

Although leaders will often claim that their arms are not aimed at any particular opponent, Russia and the United States still look first and foremost to each other’s nuclear arsenals when calibrating their postures, with China occasionally cited as another reason why Russia and the United States choose to move slowly in reducing their own nuclear postures, as does France. Like all NWS, the United Kingdom and France retain their nuclear arsenals as a matter of contingency, and their continued possession also seems to reflect historical pride that is steeped in military strength and past empire. Their nuclear weapons are sometimes valued as possible bargaining chips for future negotiations. Furthermore, their decisions are made even more complicated by the three to four states possessing nuclear weapons that reside

NPT Nuclear Weapon States: Nuclear Warhead Inventories¹

State	Strategic Operational Warheads	Non-Strategic Operational Warheads	Total Operational Warheads	Total Warhead Inventory (Operational, and in reserve or awaiting dismantlement)
Russia	2,600	~2,000	~4,600	~12,000
United States	2,130	~500	~2,630	~9,400
France	300	N/A	~300	~300
China	180	?	~180	~240
United Kingdom	<160	N/A	<160	~180-210

(Chart based upon a compilation of sources, mostly from “Status of World Nuclear Forces 2009.” Updated regularly on the site of The Ploughshares Fund, by Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists and Robert Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council, <http://www.ploughshares.org/news-analysis/world-nuclear-stockpile-report>; and also sources shown below, including *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* and the Center for Defense Information. These figures are estimations and may also vary because of rounding.)

This chart does not include the four nuclear weapons countries outside of the NPT, which include Israel (thought to have about 80 warheads, though it has not confirmed possession), Pakistan (est. 70-90 warheads), India (est. 60-80 warheads), and North Korea (which may have nuclear warheads, possibly up to nine).¹ North Korea was a member of the NPT, but left in 2003.¹

outside of the regime.

Russia

Russia retains the largest number of nuclear warheads—a legacy of the Cold War arms race with the United States. Many of these warheads are probably ready to launch on short notice. Like the United States, Russia maintains a triad of forces (warheads assigned to weapons on land, air and sea) and is unlikely to change this mix anytime in the near future.

The main mission of Russia’s nuclear arsenal is the “prevention of nuclear military conflict or any other military conflict.”³ There is some disagreement among analysts about the impact of the new military doctrine⁴ on the role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s national security policy when compared to the previous Russian Military Doctrine of 2000. Nikolai Sokov of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute believes the overall role has been reduced.⁵ For example, the new doctrine includes the stipulation that Russia should use nuclear weapons only if the country’s “very existence ... is under threat,”⁶ rather than the previous condition, “in situations where Russia’s national security is under threat.” In another possible shift, Russia may increase its reliance on strategic conventional forces, like the United States, and seek to replace some nuclear with conventional warheads on high-

³ Nikolai Sokov, “The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle,” *CNS Feature Stories*, 5 February 2010, http://cns.miis.edu/stories/100205_russian_nuclear_doctrine.htm

⁴ The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on 5 February 2010, available online in English via The School of Russian and Asian Studies, http://www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010

⁵ Sokov, 5 February 2010.

⁶ Sokov, 5 February 2010.

precision strategic delivery vehicles.⁷ On the other hand, Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation has argued that Russia will continue to increase its reliance on nuclear weapons in an effort to retain super-power like status against the United States, and to impress constituencies at home while comparative economies restrict its ability to compete with U.S. conventional dominance.⁸

Russia’s Operational Nuclear Arsenal⁹

Delivery System	# Launchers	# Warheads
<i>Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles</i>	331	~1,090
<i>Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles</i>	160	~576
<i>Bombers</i>	75	~838
<i>Nonstrategic/Defensive (Includes ABM/Air Defense, Land-based Air - bombers/fighters, and Naval)</i>		~2,000
Total Operational		~4,600

(About 7,300 warheads are thought to be in reserve or await dismantlement.¹⁰)

The latest doctrine explicitly retains the option of first-strike, warning that Russia might use nuclear weapons not only in response to a potential nuclear attack, but also in response to attacks that include other types of “weapons of mass destruction,” or even conventional weapons.¹¹ Russia has advanced plans to build new nuclear

⁷ Sokov, 5 February 2010.

⁸ Ariel Cohen, “Obama’s Approach to Arms Control Misreads Russian Nuclear Strategy,” The Heritage Foundation WebMemo, 12 April 2010, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/04/Obama-Approach-to-Arms-Control-Misreads-Russian-Nuclear-Strategy>

⁹ Norris and Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Russian nuclear forces, 2010.”

¹⁰ Norris and Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Russian nuclear forces, 2010.”

¹¹ Sokov, 5 February 2010.

submarines and missiles to carry nuclear warheads.¹² On the other hand, Russia ratified the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2000, which may be interpreted as a signal that it will not test nuclear warheads with new capabilities. The 2010 military review pointed to NATO enlargement as a serious threat.¹³ In addition, Moscow has repeatedly expressed consternation with Washington and its allies over U.S.-led missile defense developments for fear that the systems might reduce the credibility of Russia's nuclear deterrent. Russia lies in a notoriously tough geostrategic position, but barring Russia's perception of any new and strong threats, these concerns suggest that more cooperation with, and confidence building measures coming from, the United States and the rest of NATO could help Russia to further reduce its dependence upon a large and opaque nuclear arsenal.

United States

The United States also still retains thousands of strategic warheads that are assigned to air, land or sea-based delivery vehicles and are ready to launch on short notice. The configuration and number of strategic nuclear weapons suggests that the United States, probably similar to Russia, still prepares for the possibility of a scenario in which it could launch a first strike—particularly aimed at any opponent's forces and military structures¹⁴—then be able to

¹² Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Russian nuclear forces, 2010," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February 2010, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 74–81, <http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/4337066824700113/fulltext.pdf>

¹³ Volha Charnysh, "Russian Nuclear Threshold Not Lowered," *Arms Control Today*, March 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_03/RussiaNuclear

¹⁴ Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, "From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear

incur a retaliatory nuclear strike and still expect to have enough surviving nuclear weapons to launch at least a second round of attacks.

Given the retention of thousands of warheads assigned to a strategic triad, this basic approach appears not to have changed under the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).¹⁵ The 2010 NPR stipulates that the "fundamental role" of U.S. nuclear weapons is to "deter nuclear attack on the United States, [its] allies, and partners" and affirms that the highest priority in U.S. security policy is the prevention of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. This new posture commits to reducing the number of warheads associated with ICBMs to a single warhead each during the tenure of the New START agreement, which suggests a move toward a more stable posture. As the NPR confirms, however, the new treaty refrained from constraining missile defenses or prompt global strike capabilities.¹⁶

The Obama Administration wanted its NPR to serve as a landmark shift in reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security. The review, which was released as an unclassified report, emphasizes

Weapons," Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council, Occasional Paper #7, April 2009, p. 8, <http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/doctrine/targeting.pdf>

¹⁵ The 2010 NPR is unclassified and available online: U.S. Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review Report," April 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>

¹⁶ Special Briefing on New Nuclear Posture Review from the Pentagon, Presenter: PDUSD for Policy Jim Miller; JCS Vice Chairman Marine Corp General James Cartwright; Administrator National Nuclear Security Administration Thomas D'Agostino; Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher, 6 April 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4600>

multilateral approaches and specifically calls for increasing dialogue with China and Russia over their strategic intentions. The NPR pledges that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against NNWS, which is a change from the previous posture that allowed for a nuclear response to a biological or chemical strike. This does not apply to countries that violate their commitments under the NPT, have withdrawn from it or simply have not been members. The NPR also makes a point of saying that this policy could change again depending on emerging biological weapons threats. The report also devoted a section to reassuring allies about U.S. commitments to extended deterrence, noting the continuity of nuclear deterrence but also increasing efforts in missile defense and conventional weapons.

In an effort to alleviate concerns that the United States will pursue a program like the Reliable Replacement Warhead, the NPR report says that the United States "will not develop new nuclear warheads" and that programs designed to maintain existing nuclear systems will "use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs" and "will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities."¹⁷ However, the United States could still pursue a replacement warhead with presidential authorization and congressional approval.¹⁸

¹⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review Report," April 2010, p. 39.

¹⁸ Special Briefing on New Nuclear Posture Review from the Pentagon, 6 April 2010.

United States' Operational Nuclear Arsenal¹⁹

Delivery System	# Launchers	# Warheads
<i>Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles</i>	450	~550
<i>Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles</i>	288	~1,152
<i>Bombers</i>	113	~500
<i>Nonstrategic (Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile/B-61)</i>		~500
Total Operational		~2,630-2,702

(About 2,500 warheads are in reserve and 4,200 warheads await dismantlement.²⁰)

In addition to strategic warheads, the United States continues to hold about 500 tactical nuclear weapons, with about 200 B-61 air-delivered gravity bombs deployed in Europe and many of the remaining ones as sea-launched cruise missiles assigned for coverage primarily of the Northeast Asian theater, which are to be retired as reaffirmed under the new NPR.²¹ The United States is the only country to currently have its nuclear weapons based in other countries, thought to be Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and Turkey. NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements have been seen by some NPT members as breaking the spirit of the treaty.²²

¹⁹ Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: U.S. nuclear forces, 2009," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 2009, Vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 59–69,

<http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/f64x2k3716wq9613/fulltext.pdf>; and "World Nuclear Stockpile Report," last updated 12 January 2010.

²⁰ Norris and Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: U.S. nuclear forces, 2009."

²¹ Norris and Kristensen, "U.S. nuclear forces, 2009."

²² For more background on NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, see "Mind the Gap: Healing the rift over U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe," January 2010, pp. 6-7, <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/BASIC-MindtheGapNATOnuclear.pdf>

France

The French White Paper on defence and national security of 2008 provides the most recent substantial look into French nuclear policy. The first such document since 1994, it reiterates the importance of an independent nuclear deterrent for French national security while noting that French nuclear posture will “...remain one of strict sufficiency,”²³ a phrase that President Nicolas Sarkozy explains as keeping the French “arsenal at the lowest possible level compatible with the strategic context.”²⁴ During his landmark speech of March 2008 in Cherbourg, President Sarkozy conveyed the French justification for retaining nuclear weapons, pointing to countries with growing nuclear arsenals (which could include China, India and Pakistan), noting the potential threat from Iran, and also arguing for contingency planning:

*“The imagination of our potential aggressors is boundless when it comes to exploiting the vulnerabilities of Western societies. And tomorrow, technological breakthroughs may create new threats. ...That is why we are so attached to our nuclear deterrent. It is strictly defensive. The use of nuclear weapons would clearly be conceivable only in extreme circumstances of legitimate defense...”*²⁵

²³ “The French White Paper on defence and national security,” 2008, p. 11. English version made available via the French Embassy in Washington, DC, http://ambafrance-us.org/IMG/pdf/Livre_blanco_Press_kit_english_version.pdf

²⁴ Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic, Presentation of Le Terrible in Cherbourg, 21 March 2008, made available online by the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0803/doc09.htm>

²⁵ Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic, 21 March 2008.

France’s Operational Nuclear Arsenal²⁶

Delivery System	# Launchers	# Warheads
<i>Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles</i>	48	~240
<i>Carrier-based aircraft</i>	10	~10 (now thought to be in land-based storage) ²⁷
<i>Land-based aircraft</i>	50	~50
Total Operational	~108	~300

President Sarkozy’s proposals for progress on disarmament, which accompanied his announcements on the French arsenal, included plans for reducing French warheads from 348 to below 300, which he affirmed was “half of the maximum number of warheads” that France possessed during the Cold War.²⁸ He also announced that France has no other weapons than these warheads that are in its operational stockpile (although it has been estimated that France may have a small spare stockpile).²⁹

As part of the review, France is to keep air- and sea-based nuclear platforms. France has new nuclear attack submarines, aircraft and ballistic missiles, and the replacement of warheads with updated versions coming online within the next ten

²⁶ Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: French nuclear forces, 2008,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September/October 2008, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 52-54, <http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/k01h5q0wg50353k5/fulltext.pdf>

²⁷ Hans Kristensen, “French Aircraft Carrier Sails Without Nukes,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 4 August 2008, <http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/08/degaulle.php>

²⁸ Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic, 21 March 2008.

²⁹ Norris and Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: French nuclear forces, 2008,” September/October 2008, p. 54, n4.

years.³⁰ The new warheads were apparently an outcome of France's last nuclear tests, which were conducted in 1996. France ratified the CTBT in 1998.

France keeps at least one nuclear submarine on patrol at all times, whereas before 1990 France kept at least two on patrol.³¹ France has refused to rule out the option of using nuclear weapons first.³² Taking into account France's recent investments in its nuclear arsenal, coupled with the unilateral reduction in its warheads, it would seem that France will be unlikely to make any significant reductions in the near future, nor will it feel a great pressure to do so given that Russia and the United States still have far more of these weapons. The domestic debate in France over nuclear weapons posture has always been a great deal more muted than that in other European states, largely for historical reasons of national identity.

China

China's National Defense in 2008 states that China "pursues a self-defensive nuclear strategy," and that its nuclear weapons doctrine rests on a no-first-use pledge, a pledge that China has espoused since it first tested nuclear weapons in 1964. It is the only NWS to have such a pledge in place today.

China exists in strategic competition with India, but its principal strategic concerns are broader and indicate the kind of contingency-based justification that is reflective of the other NWS powers. China's

³⁰ Kingston Reif, "Nuclear weapons: The modernization myth," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 8 December 2009, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/nuclear-weapons-the-modernization-myth>

³¹ Norris and Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: French nuclear forces, 2008."

³² Harold A. Feiveson and Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons," Viewpoint, *The Nonproliferation Review*, Summer 2003, <http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/102feiv.pdf>

most recent national defense strategy points to the following threats:

*"Some major powers are realigning their security and military strategies, increasing their defense investment, speeding up the transformation of armed forces, and developing advanced military technology, weapons and equipment. Strategic nuclear forces, military astronautics, missile defense systems, and global and battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance have become top priorities in their efforts to strengthen armed forces. Some developing countries are also actively seeking to acquire advanced weapons and equipment to increase their military power. All countries are attaching more importance to supporting diplomatic struggles with military means. As a result, arms races in some regions are heating up, posing grave challenges to the international arms control and nonproliferation regime."*³³

The report makes clear China's irritation with the United States over its support for Taiwan. China is worried about the unpredictability of the situation in the Middle East and South Asia, but is also concerned about unfettered U.S. strategic dominance and flexibility, and the U.S. presence in Central Asia.

³³ "China's National Defense in 2008," January 2009, available on the Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, GOV.cn, http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227_3.htm

China's Operational Nuclear Arsenal³⁴

Delivery System	# Launchers	# Warheads
<i>Land-based Ballistic Missiles</i>	~121	~121
<i>Sea-based (new nuclear-capable submarines coming online)</i>	0	0
<i>Land-based aircraft</i>	~20	~55
Total Operational	~141	~176

(An additional 65 warheads may be in storage.³⁵)

Unlike the other NWS in recent years, China has increased its arsenal, possibly by as much as 25 percent since 2005, according to U.S. Defense Department (DOD) estimates.³⁶ However, with around 200 warheads, its arsenal is far behind the ones of Russia and the United States. It is difficult to discern whether the increase is a direct response to changes in their sense of military threat, strategic aspiration, judgment over the future U.S. technical ability to intercept their missiles, or if the increase is merely a long-sought adjustment that was made possible by the incredibly rapid growth of its economy as of late. China has historically focused its nuclear arsenal on land-based missiles and aircraft, and has been deploying new nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. China's older nuclear submarine (Xia-class), which apparently never went on full patrol, is no longer operational.³⁷ However, China has begun launching its new Jin-class nuclear-capable submarines. The U.S. DOD estimates have suggested that China may be aiming to produce up

³⁴ Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: Chinese nuclear forces, 2008," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 2008, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 42-44, 45.

³⁵ Norris and Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: Chinese nuclear forces, 2008."

³⁶ Norris and Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: Chinese nuclear forces, 2008."

³⁷ Norris and Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: Chinese nuclear forces, 2008."

to five of these new submarines (although only two or three have been detected in satellite images),³⁸ the first of which DOD predicts will reach operational capability by 2010, and provide China with "its first credible sea-based nuclear strike capability."³⁹

In keeping with its policy of "quantitative ambiguity,"⁴⁰ China has rebuffed calls for greater transparency among NWS, likely because its nuclear stockpile is a small fraction of the Russian and U.S. arsenals, and fears of vulnerability to first strike attack. Although China complies with the CTBT's stipulations—having conducted no nuclear tests since signing the treaty in 1996—it insists that the United States ratify the treaty first. China would thus seem unlikely to consider even trimming down its own arsenal until after Russia and the United States drastically reduce theirs, and strategic relationships significantly improve in southern and eastern Asia.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has the smallest nuclear arsenal of the NWS—with all of its operational warheads assigned to its four nuclear submarines. The United Kingdom maintains one submarine on patrol at all times, under its practice of "Continuous at Sea Deterrence" (CASD). However,

³⁸ Norris and Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: Chinese nuclear forces, 2008."

³⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009," Annual Report to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 48, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf

⁴⁰ For an informative look at the issue of Chinese nuclear transparency, see Hui Zhang, "A Discussion of China's Nuclear Transparency Options," conference paper, presented at the 42nd annual meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Northbrook, Illinois, July 2001, available from: <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/inmm01-chinatrans.pdf>.

its U.S.-supplied strategic ballistic missiles, Trident IIs, are not targeted at any country, and could take several days to prepare for launch.⁴¹ Like France, Russia, and the United States, the United Kingdom keeps open the option of using nuclear weapons first.

The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World, released in 2008, points to an uncertain and possibly dangerous future, but does not see an immediate threat:

“for the foreseeable future, no state or alliance will have both the intent and the capability to threaten the United Kingdom militarily, either with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, or with conventional forces.”⁴²

The British government maintains, however, that the conditions for complete nuclear disarmament do not yet exist. The United Kingdom would forego nuclear weapons only after other states with nuclear warheads complete significant reductions in their existing nuclear stockpiles and after the international community collectively agrees not to proliferate nuclear weapons or related technology:

“While we are strongly committed to multilateral nuclear disarmament and to the global elimination of nuclear weapons, we cannot rule out a threat to

⁴¹ “United Kingdom Nuclear Forces,” Center for Defense Information, last updated 9 July 2008.

http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=2970&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=32&from_page=index.cfm#_edn3.

⁴² *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World*, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister, by command of Her Majesty, March 2008, p. 15, http://interactive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/security/national_security_strategy.pdf

the United Kingdom involving nuclear weapons re-emerging over the next 50 years.”⁴³

United Kingdom’s Operational Nuclear Arsenal⁴⁴

Delivery System	# Launchers	# Warheads
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (D-5 Trident II)	>50	<160
Total Operational	>50	<160

(An additional 20-50 warheads may be in storage.⁴⁵)

The United Kingdom ratified the CTBT in 1998 and the lack of perceived threat has encouraged the country to reduce its arsenal in recent years, going from 200 down to below 160 warheads. With the current Vanguard-class submarines possibly set to leave service in the 2020s,⁴⁶ the United Kingdom has experienced some debate over whether and how the country should invest in a replacement for its Trident system and whether it would be possible to lower the current CASD requirement from four to three submarines, if replacement is chosen at all.

Approach to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon)

All NWS have reiterated their support for upholding the three pillars of the NPT: nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. They have called for continuing multilateral negotiations over the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, the former of which left the NPT in 2003 and is thought to possess enough fissile material for up to nine nuclear

⁴³ *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World*, March 2008, p. 44.

⁴⁴ “United Kingdom Nuclear Forces.”

⁴⁵ “United Kingdom Nuclear Forces.”

⁴⁶ *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World*, March 2008, p. 44.

weapons, and with the later program increasingly causing international concern.

Specifically considering the NWS's commitments to reduce their own nuclear arsenals, during the 2000 RevCon, they agreed to the so-called "13 Steps"⁴⁷ toward nuclear disarmament, which in shortened form, says that all Member States should: ratify the CTBT; uphold the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament measures; hold the NWS to reduce their nuclear postures and work toward eliminating their nuclear arsenals; work within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials and to place excess fissile materials under IAEA control; reaffirm the goal of "general and complete disarmament;" and further develop procedures for verifying a nuclear weapons-free world.⁴⁸ Moreover, the G8, which includes all NWS except for China, declared their support for "creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT,"⁴⁹ during their summit of July 2008.

The NWS are also the five permanent members (the so-called "P5") of the U.N. Security Council,

⁴⁷ Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), May 2000,

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/2000FD.pdf>

⁴⁸ 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Final Document, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), New York, 2000,

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/2000FD.pdf>; and, "The Promises of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Summary by Reaching Critical Will, n.d.,

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/13point.html>

⁴⁹ L'Aquila Statement on Non-Proliferation, G8 Summit, 8 July 2009,

http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/2_LAquila_Statent_on_Non_proliferation.pdf

and as such, on 24 September 2009, they voted in support of Resolution 1887, which: "Resolv[ed] to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all."

Of course, the NWS states' approach to nuclear disarmament under the NPT has varied depending on what the states' leaders have perceived to be in their own national interests—perceptions that have sometimes differed internally and between changes in leadership. The gap is wide between what the leaders feel comfortable in doing with their own arsenals, the measures they want other countries to take, as well as the long-term goals and ideals to which some of them probably do genuinely aspire. Below is an overview of recent NWS-stated positions ahead of the 2010 RevCon.

Russia

In addition to committing recently to strategic warhead reductions with the United States, the Russians have supported a number of other initiatives that they believe would improve disarmament efforts. They have called on other countries to help bring the CTBT into force (which still requires ratification by China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States), and for the "elaboration of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty" that would be verifiable. Russian leaders support the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, and proposed a plan for taking this initiative forward through a dialogue for developing a Middle Eastern zone free of nuclear weapons, and also other "weapons of

mass destruction.”⁵⁰ They also call upon countries to agree on consolidating nuclear weapons to their own national territories, which may be interpreted as a particular request to the United States to withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons from bases in Europe.⁵¹ Russia has formally accepted negative security assurances⁵² for the members of the nuclear weapon free zones of the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), and Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco),⁵³ but does not support discussions of a draft protocol banning the use of weapons against NNWS, instead arguing for such discussions to occur within the context of the CD.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ For background on developments around a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, see Anne Penketh, “Peeling the Onion: Towards a Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone,” *BASIC Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2010 Papers – 1*, 18 March 2010, <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/BASIC-PeelingtheOnion.pdf>

⁵¹ Statement by HE Amb. Anatoly Antonov, head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, 28 April 2010, available online via the website of Reaching Critical Will, <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/statements/RussiaApril28.pdf>

⁵² Russia has signed but not ratified a protocol that offers negative security assurances to Africa under the Treaty of Pelindaba. Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapons States,” 4-15 May 2009, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom09/statements/7MayNDNSA_Russia.pdf

⁵³ NTI: Russia - Nuclear Disarmament, n.d., http://www.nti.org/db/disarmament/country_russia.html

⁵⁴ Michael Spies, “Towards 2010 and Beyond - Proposals, Positions and Prospects: Issues facing the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” *Disarmament*

Russian policymakers have also intertwined their calls for nuclear disarmament with making clear their concerns on the militarization of outer space, the development of destabilizing ballistic missile defenses (particularly at lower warhead numbers), U.S. strategic conventional systems as a replacement for nuclear systems (notably through Prompt Global Strike), and the ‘upload’ capacity of the U.S. nuclear force (its capability of rapid reconstitution using existing delivery vehicles and stored nuclear warheads).⁵⁵

United States

Having made a key component of his foreign policy the nuclear weapons-free world agenda, President Obama and officials from his administration have repeatedly said that they will lower the U.S. nuclear posture, pursuing not only numerical reductions (as mentioned above, with Russia under the New START), but also committing not to develop new kinds of warheads, such as a Reliable Replacement Warhead.⁵⁶ In the run up to the 2010 NPT RevCon, they have also made a point of saying that the current administration is “preparing to seek the consent of the U.S. Senate to ratify the

Diplomacy, Issue No. 90, Spring 2009, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd90/90nptms.htm>

⁵⁵ Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on cluster I issues (nuclear disarmament), Practical Steps of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Disarmament, New York, 4-15 May 2009, available online via Reaching Critical Will, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom09/statements/6MayC1_Russia.pdf

⁵⁶ Josh Rogin, “Tauscher: Sorry, Republicans: no return of the Reliable Replacement Warhead,” *Foreign Policy Magazine’s The Cable*, 15 September 2009, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/15/tauscher_sorry_republicans_no_return_of_the_reliable_replacement_warhead

CTBT,”⁵⁷ and will continue the moratorium on nuclear test explosions, a position that was reaffirmed in the Administration’s recently-released posture review of April 2010. The current Administration has committed to working for a verifiable FMCT through the CD, and continuing the U.S. moratorium on fissile material production for nuclear weapons.⁵⁸ The United States has also made pronouncements in the past that it would observe negative security assurances against countries in U.S.-recognized nuclear-weapons free zones. The new nuclear posture stipulates that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against NNWS in the NPT that are in compliance with their Treaty obligations. The NPR warns that this policy could change again depending on emerging biological weapons threats.

During the preparatory meetings to the 2010 RevCon, the United States also reaffirmed its general support for the Middle East Resolution of 1995, though its support for specific proposals in the forthcoming RevCon remain unclear – they are still unlikely to support anything that is actively opposed by Israel.⁵⁹ On another policy that has

⁵⁷ Amb. Susan F. Burk, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, “The NPT and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security,” presentation at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference Center for Energy and Security Studies, 5 March 2010,

<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/138974.htm>

⁵⁸ Statement by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, U.S.A., Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference delivered 7 May 2009, available online via Reaching Critical Will,

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom09/statements/5May_US.pdf

⁵⁹ Statement by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, U.S.A., Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Specific Issue – Regional Issues including with respect to

proven to be controversial during NPT meetings in the past is the issue of U.S. nuclear weapons based on other national territories, which are the B-61s thought to be in the NATO members of Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The NPR text stipulated that NATO as a whole would need to decide on the future of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe. The NPR does suggest that discussions over this part of the arsenal might be done in conjunction with engaging Russia over its tactical nuclear weapons—a point that President Obama reiterated during the signing of the New START Treaty in Prague on 8 April 2010. The NPR also calls for increased dialogue with NWS Russia and China in particular over their strategic postures and intentions.

France

France has generally been the most skeptical of the NWS in the recent diplomatic trend of support for the vision of global nuclear disarmament. Keen to point to the dangers of raising expectations beyond what it is possible to deliver, they have sought to weaken any hints of international commitment to complete nuclear disarmament at this stage, and instead have sought to focus attention on the steps.

In March 2008, President Sarkozy put forward an action plan for NPT Member States to address ahead of the 2010 RevCon. This proposal included:

- 1) Universal ratification of the CTBT, beginning with the two NWS that have not ratified the treaty;

the Middle East and Implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution, 8 May 2009, available online via Reaching Critical Will,

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom09/statements/8MayME_US.pdf

- 2) Transparent dismantlement of all nuclear testing sites (a measure that France has already taken);
- 3) Immediately beginning negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty forbidding the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons;
- 4) Establishing an immediate moratorium on production of fissile materials (France has implemented its own moratorium on fissile material production since 1996 and has dismantled nuclear weapons fissile material production facilities); and,
- 5) Elaborating transparency measures for the NWS.

The plan includes three other points on delivery vehicles and other weapons in general that are intended to complement nuclear disarmament:

- 6) Beginning negotiations on a treaty banning short and intermediate range surface-to-surface missiles;
- 7) Adhering to and implementing the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCCOC); and,
- 8) Mobilizing on all other fields of disarmament.⁶⁰

China

In a Working Paper to the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee, Chinese leaders laid out what they believed would be the most critical steps that the NWS should undertake "to promote nuclear disarmament, reduce the danger of nuclear war

⁶⁰ Statement by HE Mr. Jean-Francois Dobbelle, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament, Plenary Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 27 March 2008, available on the website of Reaching Critical Will, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speche_s08/1session/Mar27France.pdf

and diminish the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy."⁶¹

- "Abandoning the policies of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons and lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons;
- Honoring their commitments not to target their nuclear weapons against any countries, nor to list any countries as targets of nuclear strikes;
- Undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances; to refrain unconditionally from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; and to conclude relevant international legal instruments to support this position;
- Supporting the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and other weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zones in accordance with regional conditions on a basis of voluntary consultation and agreement;
- Not developing easy-to-use low-yield nuclear weapons;
- Withdrawing and repatriating all nuclear weapons currently deployed outside the territories of the NWS;
- Abandoning 'nuclear umbrella' and 'nuclear sharing' policies and practices; and,
- Taking all necessary steps to avoid accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons."⁶²

⁶¹ "Nuclear disarmament and reduction of the danger of nuclear war," Working paper submitted by China, Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.46, 7 May 2007, on the website of Reaching Critical Will, <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom07/workingpapers/46.pdf>

⁶² Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 7 May 2007.

The list clearly reflects its own established “no-first-use” policy. Chinese leaders have iterated that the CD—as opposed to the NPT Review Conference—is the venue to negotiate a legal instrument banning the use of weapons against NNWS, although they would consider a protocol to the NPT RevCon.⁶³ The list also reveals Chinese consternation with past U.S. considerations of developing nuclear “bunker busters” (thus the reference to “low-yield weapons”), and the United States’ practice of deploying nuclear weapons on the territories of other countries and “nuclear sharing” arrangements with NATO members. This list is notable for not mentioning the CTBT, a fissile material control regime, or verification and transparency, although Chinese representatives have in the past offered verbal support for the entry into force of the CTBT and negotiation on a fissile material treaty.⁶⁴

United Kingdom

During the past few years, British leaders have stridently called for working toward a “world without nuclear weapons,” and have laid out specific suggestions, including the Prime Minister’s NPT RevCon-focused “Road to 2010” report, which detailed proposals on civil nuclear power, disarmament and non-proliferation, fissile material security, and the developmental role of the IAEA.⁶⁵ The Foreign Secretary previously proposed a six

⁶³ Spies, Spring 2009.

⁶⁴ Statement by HE Mr. CHENG Jingye, Head of the Chinese Delegation to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, 28 April 2008, <http://www.un.org/NPT2010/SecondSession/delegates%20statements/China.pdf>

⁶⁵ Right Hon. Gordon Brown, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Speech on nuclear energy and proliferation, London, 17 March 2009, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page18631>.

point plan meant to address the conditions for creating a nuclear weapons-free world, including:

- bringing the CTBT into force by encouraging ratification by the other required states;
- tougher measures to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries or terrorists;
- working with the IAEA to reduce the risk of nuclear programs being used for nuclear weapons;
- commencing new negotiations between Russia and the United States for much deeper reductions in their arsenals, and keeping other existing arsenals from increasing;
- starting negotiations on an FMCT, without preconditions; and,
- beginning a “strategic dialogue” among the NWS to bring about the conditions for nuclear disarmament and to prevent the reconstitution of nuclear arsenals.⁶⁶

The United Kingdom has hosted a conference of the NWS nuclear laboratories on confidence-building, voluntary transparency and verification measures on nuclear disarmament and has been partnering with NNWS Norway on verification measures. Moreover, the British have maintained a moratorium on the production of fissile materials since 1995 and placed excess stocks under international safeguards.

⁶⁶ U.K. Cluster I Statement to the 2009 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee by Amb. John Duncan, Ambassador for Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament, New York, 6 May 2009, available online via Reaching Critical Will, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom09/statements/6MayC1_UK.pdf; and “David Miliband sets out six-point plan to rid world of nuclear weapons,” Press Association via *The Guardian*, 4 February 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/feb/04/miliband-nuclear-weapons>

During the Preparatory Committee meetings, British leaders declared that the United Kingdom would stand ready to include its own arsenal, the smallest of the NWS, in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, “when it will be useful to do so.”⁶⁷ Also during the meetings, they declared support for the creation of nuclear weapons-free zones and added that the preferred way for the United Kingdom to offer negative security assurances (guarantee that they would not use nuclear weapons against NNWS) would be through the Protocols annexed to the NWFZ treaties that the United Kingdom has already signed.⁶⁸

What about the Non-NPT Nuclear Weapon States?

Those powers that possess nuclear weapons and are outside of the regime have a major impact on its future. These key countries include: India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. Recently the resistance of Israel to discuss seriously the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, and the preferential treatment in nuclear cooperation afforded to India, are sources of severe tension within the Treaty process. Furthermore, deeper regional strategic relationships call into question the viability of a Treaty that holds back its members, with non-members gaining the benefits of the regime while continuing to retain and develop nuclear postures.

Many disarmament measures supported by the NWS will require the cooperation of countries that

are not parties to the NPT. It is widely acknowledged that it will require sensitivity and patience to draw into the broader non-proliferation process the four nuclear countries that are not members. Prospects for their joining the Treaty in the near future are extremely slim, and none of them appear influenced by calls for their disarmament while the two leading NPT NWS retain far larger arsenals. Nevertheless, these non-NPT countries also bear responsibility for engaging on the disarmament and nonproliferation agenda – especially to keep more countries from joining their ranks. For instance, their cooperation will be required for stronger non-proliferation measures, verification processes, the CTBT to enter into force, for the creation of a global fissile material control regime, and for talks leading to the establishment of regional nuclear weapon-free zones.

What would movement on nuclear disarmament by NWS look like?

Although the NWS’s renewed verbal commitments to nuclear disarmament over the past several years have helped to increase momentum going into the 2010 NPT RevCon, everyone recognizes that these require concrete commitments to strengthen the regime. There are many disarmament proposals that are long-standing and well-known. Many require the participation of all countries in building confidence for working toward a secure world without nuclear weapons. The following measures take into account NWS threat perceptions and postures, and incorporate the patterns of emphasis that the NWS leaders have used when articulating their visions for nuclear disarmament, and indeed, some have already taken these steps. Wider NWS implementation of proposals such as these would increase their credibility and thereby increase international support for strengthening the non-proliferation regime:

⁶⁷ U.K. Cluster I Statement to the 2009 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee.

⁶⁸ U.K. Cluster I Statement to the 2009 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee. Although British leaders have noted their support for the idea of the NWFZ in Central Asia, they have not signed it because of disagreements over the text and have called for a review.

- 1) Ratify the New START. Russia and the United States need to ratify the treaty just signed in Prague for it to take effect. Their arsenals are too large and the expectations too high among all other countries for this to fail. It is unfortunate that the 2010 RevCon will proceed without any clear indication of likelihood for approval by the Duma and Senate because doubts will harm confidence in disarmament.
- 2) Commit to abandon the development of new nuclear warheads. Developing new warheads or missions, even while reducing current arsenals, suggests a commitment to the future importance of nuclear weapons to defense policies and reinforces doubts about commitments toward Article 6 and the vision of global disarmament.
- 3) Commit to no-first-use. Credible no-first-use policies, along with transparency in doctrines that reinforce such postures, can build confidence between NWS and demonstrate a reduction in the salience of nuclear weapons within broader military doctrines.
- 4) Ratify the CTBT. CTBT ratification has become for many the principal yardstick in the first instance of states' commitment to disarmament. There has been significant political and financial investment in the CTBT and associated instruments. As long some NWS are not prepared to permanently forswear testing when they have highly developed nuclear systems, other parties will continue to doubt their disarmament commitments.
- 5) Reassess tactical nuclear weapons. NATO is to assess its nuclear doctrine as part of the review of its Strategic Concept, part of which will be a reconsideration of nuclear sharing arrangements within Europe. Ending these and repatriating the warheads stationed

abroad could open up valuable new negotiating strands and address a big vulnerability in the diplomatic positions of NATO members. Russia could also recognize the strategic limits to its possession of tactical nuclear weapons, address the transparency of its far larger arsenal, and consider reductions and elimination.

Clearly these are only a few of the many vital steps that may be taken toward strengthening the regime. As mentioned previously, numerous proposals have been circulated for improving non-proliferation and disarmament prospects around the NPT.⁶⁹ The Japanese and Australian governments have offered one of the more modest but pragmatic proposals going into the 2010 RevCon. Partially titled: "A New Package of Practical Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Measures,"⁷⁰ it includes 16 substantive points, a few of which call on the NWS to: pursue further nuclear reductions in affirmation of their Article 6 commitments while emphasizing transparency, verification, and irreversibility with these reductions; further lower the role of nuclear

⁶⁹ These proposals are too numerous to mention here. A couple of useful guides on this issue include: "Major Proposals to Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: A Resource Guide for the 2010 Review Conference," Cole Harvey with the ACA Research Staff, Arms Control Association, March 2010, <http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/Proposals%20to%20Strengthen%20NPT.pdf>; and, "Towards 2010 and Beyond - Proposals, Positions and Prospects: Issues facing the 2010 NPT Review Conference," Michael Spies, in *Disarmament Diplomacy*, a publication of The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 90, Spring 2009, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd90/90nptms.htm>

⁷⁰ Full title: "A New Package of Practical Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Measures for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," 24 March 2010, available on the website of the Australian Government Minister for Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2010/fa_s100324.html

weapons in, and increase the transparency of their strategic postures; offer stronger negative security assurances, and reduce the operational status of their nuclear weapons. The “package” also calls for the wider commencement of negotiations on an FMCT⁷¹ and urges countries that have not done so to sign and/or ratify the CTBT, so that it may enter into force.

Whether considering only a few of these steps at a time or trying to approach the problem through package-type arrangements, ignoring underlying security concerns of NWS and NNWS alike could serve to eventually undermine the regime. Military leaders naturally hold onto as many options as possible and plan for every possible scenario. Yet improving security requires political leaders to acknowledge that sometimes those practices of holding onto overwhelming force and retaining endless options can raise threat perceptions in ways that reduce the possibilities for cooperative action—action that could lead to mutually beneficial security arrangements. Ultimately, doing more than treading water may require governments to directly challenge the demands of internal constituencies and to take advantage of new political opportunities for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

⁷¹ Christopher Ford proposes that at least initial arrangements for fissile material controls focus on the five NWS, and also the three major nuclear weapons countries (India, Israel, and Pakistan) outside of the NPT: “Five Plus Three: How to Have a Meaningful and Helpful Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty,” *Arms Control Today*, March 2009, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_03/Ford

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