The very quiet failure of this year’s Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee to agree any final document and the daunting challenge of the treaty Review Conference next year mean frustration is growing about the pace of progress by the nuclear-weapons states to disarm—so slow it feels like we are going backward.
2014
Multilateral Frustrations Generate Challenges for Disarmament Diplomacy
This week the Conference on Disarmament begins its second session of the year in Geneva, on the back of the two weeks of multilateralism in New York City at the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty’s third Preparatory Committee Meeting (PrepCom).
How Do We Change the Global Nuclear Order?
Whenever diplomats get together to address the really big global issues of our time, the already daunting challenges of co-ordination are made more complex by their governments’ competing policy commitments—to economic growth (simplistically conceived), special-interest groups, “national security” and prestige.
Can the P5 process deliver on disarmament?
The five NPT-recognised nuclear weapon states (NWS) meet in Beijing for the so-called (though misnamed) ‘P5 process’ this week, prior to the NPT Preparatory Committee in New York that starts at the end of the month. China is the last of the five to host the process, kicked off by the British in September 2009 after a speech at the Conference on Disarmament by the UK Defence Secretary, Des Browne, in February 2008.
The Scottish referendum: a chance to challenge our nuclear assumptions?
With just under six months to go until the referendum on Scottish independence, there is still little clarity about how any independence agreement would shape up in practice. A myriad of issues remains on the table, ranging from the everyday – Will there be border control? How will the postal system function? Which television stations will be available? – right up to the most complex strategic questions over currency and economic independence, membership of international organisations, and the future of the UK and Scotland’s defense policies.
Nuclear security: continued breakthrough or stalled progress?
On October 11, 2001, a month following the catastrophic events of 9/11, a CIA report concluded that Al-Qaeda infiltrates planned to detonate a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb at the heart of New York City. Though later deemed as a false alarm, the motivation to conduct a nuclear attack by non-state actors, combined with the widespread availability of fissile material often stored under subpar conditions,
“World leaders fear Ukraine crisis will harm nuclear cooperation”
BASIC Executive Director Paul Ingram provided comment on the new challenges posed by the Ukraine crisis for those who want to push forward on nuclear arms control measures.
Russian Reactors Risk Ukraine Spillover Into Iran Nuclear Talks
BASIC's executive director, Paul Ingram, is quoted in this article by Jonathan Tirone, Ladane Nasseri and Indira A.R. Lakshmanan on 20 March 2014 about Russia's influence on the P5+1 negotiations with Iran in April. Ingram states: “The split could be exacerbated if Iran signs a deal for new reactors during negotiations…A plan that would require enrichment capacity is part of Iran’s narrative. The Russians could be looking to develop and use leverage to build a relationship beyond nuclear into a bigger strategic relationship.”