BASIC SPECIAL REPORT
BASIC Special Report 2004.1
· January 2004
Unravelling the Known Unknowns:
Why no Weapons of Mass Destruction have been found in Iraq
By David Isenberg and Ian Davis
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Executive Summary
Introduction
In April 2003, BASIC published a Special Briefing to
review the evidence of Iraq's possession of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), code for nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC)
weapons. We provisionally concluded that Iraq's possession of NBC
weapons was likely to be nowhere near as extensive as US and UK
officials claimed before going to war. On the eve of the
publication of the Hutton inquiry report into the circumstances
surrounding the death of UK government scientist David Kelly, this
BASIC Report provides a timely update and summary of the evidence
that has been accumulated by the US inspectors in Iraq and from
other public sources over the past eight months.
The conclusion is inescapable: there is nothing to be
found. This means that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair made
a WMD mountain out of what, at best, was a molehill. As a recent
detailed report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
concludes, "Administration officials systematically misrepresented
the threat from Iraq's WMD and ballistic missile
programs."
Why did the US and UK governments exaggerate the threat? Or were
they themselves misled by available pre-war intelligence on Iraq's
WMD capability?
Part I reviews the pre- and post-war evidence of Iraq's WMD
capability, and specifically identifies five examples of ways in
which US and UK authorities got it wrong.
Part II reviews the flaws and ambiguities in both US and British
pre-war intelligence analysis on Iraq's WMD capability, with
particular reference to the use of Iraqi defectors and other
misleading 'indigenous' human intelligence.
Part III draws some conclusions and makes some recommendations.
The main conclusion is that the failure to find banned
weapons in Iraq suggests very strongly that the UN weapons
inspectors succeeded in their mandate, and that the Iraqi
government complied with its obligations.
Iraq's WMD Capability
There is no doubt that Iraqi armed forces had chemical and
biological weapons and in the past tried to produce nuclear
weapons. The seven plus years of UN inspections after the 1991 Gulf
War clearly established the existence of weapons programs in all
three areas. But it was also well known that Iraq's NBC programs
suffered significant disruptions and setbacks as a result of the
1991 war. And contrary to many public statements by British and
American officials and political leaders, UN inspectors had made
progress in narrowing down the uncertainties.
Nuclear weapon capability
At the time of the first Gulf War in 1991, Iraq was thought to
be only a few years away from producing enough highly-enriched
uranium for a nuclear weapon.
International Atomic Energy Agendy (IAEA) inspectors later
supervised the destruction of most of the nuclear weapon program
facilities and removed all weapons-grade material from Iraq. In its
January 2003 report to the UN Security Council, for example, the
IAEA clearly indicated that there was no evidence that Iraq was
producing nuclear weapons.
However, rumours persisted that Iraq may have secretly
reconstructed some nuclear capabilities. These rumours were fueled
in particular by two false allegations from British and US
officials. First, that Iraq was trying to procure uranium from
Niger, and second, that Iraq was trying to procure aluminium tubes
for use as part of centrifuges to enrich uranium to weapons grade
level.
What we now know is that the CIA's failure to pass on the
details of what it knew helped keep the uranium-purchase story
alive until shortly before the war in Iraq began, when the UN's
chief nuclear inspector told the Security Council that the
documents were forgeries. It also seems clear that US and British
intelligence agencies concealed information from each other and
reached contradictory conclusions about the disputed
claims.
Biological weapon capability
At the beginning of the 1990s, Iraq's biological weapons program
included a broad and growing range of agents and delivery systems.
UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) repeatedly reported that Iraq had
failed to provide a full and correct account of its biological
weapons program and UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) later expressed a number of specific concerns.
Both the US and UK authorities made wide-ranging pre-war claims
about these "unaccounted for" stockpiles of biological weapons, as
well as the likelihood of an extensive network of covert research
and production facilities. Evidence that many of these agents have
short shelf lives was ignored.
Post-war evidence to verify such claims is extremely weak, and
centres on two mobile trailers found in northern Iraq (which it is
now known were to produce hydrogen for artillery balloons), a vial
of botulinum and some speculative findings regarding possible
research facilities for other agents.
Chemical weapon capability
During the 1980s, Iraq developed one of the most extensive
chemical weapons capabilities in the developing world, producing
over 200,000 chemical weapon munitions (half of which were used
during the war with Iran). After the first Gulf War, UNSCOM
destroyed more than 480,000 litres of chemical agents and 1.8
million litres of chemical precursors in Iraq. However, rough
estimates by UNMOVIC concluded that Iraq may have retained 80
tonnes of mustard gas, unknown quantities of weaponized VX nerve
agent, and stocks of tabun, sarin and cyclosarin. Again, US and UK
authorities made much of the thousands of possible chemical
munitions unaccounted for in their pre-war assessments.
Despite searches at a number of suspected sites, no active
chemical weapons have been found. Instead, it seems almost certain
that most stocks were destroyed by inspectors in the mid-1990s and
that any remaining weapons have deteriorated beyond effective
use.
It is obvious that pre-war descriptions of the threat
diverge significantly from what has actually been discovered in the
nine months since the war. For example, when Secretary of State
Colin Powell's report to the UN Security Council is compared to
David Kay's interim report, no single clear and unambiguous
confirmation of any of the former's claims can be found in the
latter.
The Ambiguities and Flaws in US and British Pre-War
Intelligence Analysis on Iraq's WMD Capability
Intelligence analysis has been described as an art as well as a
science. Formulation of judgments can be a delicate and complex
process, especially when it comes to science and technology issues.
However, there are numerous examples in which the intelligence
collection process inexplicably ignored, downplayed or exaggerated
pre-war information on Iraq's WMD capability.
US Pre-War Intelligence
Neither the released portions of the US National Intelligence
Assessment (NIE) nor the full report substantiate the
administration's view that Iraq represented an immediate threat to
the US or the region. It contained no photographs of weapons sites,
no substantiation of many allegations, no "proof" that would be of
use to inspectors. Why was the NIE so inaccurate, and so
selectively quoted by the Bush administration?
The misuse of intelligence does not fall solely within the realm
of the executive branch. The legislative branch chose to look the
other way and not ask tough questions. That being said, the Bush
administration clearly ignored evidence that conflicted with its
view that Iraq had NBC weaponry. One tactic was to bypass the
government's customary procedures for vetting intelligence. The
Pentagon also set up an Office of Special Plans (OSP), conceived by
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to find evidence of
illicit weapons and links to Al Qaeda. In addition, a separate,
unnamed Pentagon intelligence unit operated out of the office of
Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and a former
aide to Richard Perle at the Pentagon in the 1980s. The purpose of
the unit was also to scour reports from the CIA, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other
agencies to find nuggets of information linking Iraq, Al Qaeda,
terrorism, and the existence of Iraqi WMD.
British Pre-War Intelligence
Similar flaws can be found in the British intelligence
assessment process, especially in relation to the dossier released
on September 24, 2002. Public evidence to the Hutton inquiry has
already revealed a number of discrepancies in the role of the
intelligence agencies, while documentary evidence provided to the
inquiry has also demonstrated that senior figures inside Downing
Street knew the evidence about Iraqi WMD was weak. An e-mail sent
to John Scarlett, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee,
from Jonathan Powell, Blair's chief of staff, shortly before the
dossier was published, said, "The document does nothing to
demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat, from Saddam. .
. . We will need to make it clear in launching the document that we
do not claim that we have evidence that he is an imminent threat."
But this is exactly what the final version of the dossier
claimed.
Aside from the misuse of intelligence, it appears that the
British government also resorted to outright propaganda. In late
December 2003 the British government confirmed that MI6 had run an
operation to gain public support for sanctions and the use of
military force in Iraq. It had organised Operation Mass Appeal, a
campaign to plant stories in the media about Saddam Hussein's
WMD.
Iraqi defectors and other misleading indigenous human
intelligence
Information from Iraqi defectors was of dubious value. Officials
in Washington have confirmed that former Iraqi officials who had
defected and were handed over to the CIA by the Iraqi National
Congress (INC) provided them with information on Iraq's WMD
program. Other intercepted intelligence appears to have been
manipulated to exaggerate the case against the Iraqi regime.
After the fall of Baghdad, it was expected that captured Iraqi
scientists would lead coalition forces to hidden caches of
unconventional weapons. However, Iraqi scientists and technicians
who have been detained say that Iraq destroyed all of its banned
munitions years ago, and nothing more was produced.
The intelligence and political discrepancies described above are
matters of great consequence, not only regarding the decision to go
to war, but as regards the handling of current and future
proliferation crises. Although the complete picture has yet to
emerge, enough is now known to present some partial conclusions and
recommendations for future US and UK non-proliferation policies and
practices.
Conclusions and Recommendations
There are four potential explanations for the failure to find
banned weapons in Iraq:
- the weapons were destroyed or moved out of Iraq prior to
invasion;
- the weapons were destroyed in coalition bombing or subsequent
looting;
- the weapons exist but have not yet been found; or
- the weapons were destroyed even earlier, perhaps in the early
or mid-1990s (i.e. the UN weapons inspectors succeeded in their
mandate).
Were the missing weapons destroyed or moved out of Iraq prior
to the invasion?
This is an unlikely explanation for the general failure to find
illicit weapons that had been identified so confidently prior to
the war. The logistical problems of transporting or destroying
large stocks of chemical and biological weapons just days before
the US-led invasion are likely to have precluded this as a
realistic option.
Were the weapons destroyed in the bombing campaign or stolen by
looters?
Scores of suspect sites, industrial complexes and offices were
stripped of valuable documents and equipment. Again, although it is
very possible that much evidence for Chemical and Biological
Weapons (CBW) would be degraded by looting or military action, it
could not possibly be the case that all conclusive evidence would
be destroyed.
Isn't it a question of needing more time to find the
weapons?
Tony Blair and some US inspectors are continuing to argue that
more time is needed, and Pentagon officials have said that the
search process could take up to a year to complete. That is rather
ironic, considering that UNMOVIC said before the war began that it
could wrap up inspections in a few months.
The Prime Minister has even hinted that some of the evidence has
already been accumulated. In a television interview at a
Russia-European Union summit at the end of May 2003, Tony Blair
said that he had already seen plenty of information that his
critics had not, but would in due course. If Downing Street
has as yet unpublished evidence of Iraqi WMD, as claimed by the
Prime Minister at the end of May 2003, this should be published
without delay.
The US Administration, on the other hand, is now emphasizing the
need to find a paper trail and testimony that points to the Hussein
regime's capability and intent to develop NBC weapons, as opposed
to a readily usable stockpile of weapons. This new rationale was
cited again in the President's January 20, 2004 State of the Union
address.
US officials continue to argue that they were right to assume,
based on older evidence and more recent circumstantial material,
that Iraq was maintaining its unconventional weapons programs. But
developing weapons is not the same as possessing weapons. Bush and
his advisers did not argue that the US was compelled to go to war -
rather than support more intrusive inspections - because Hussein
had ongoing weapons programs; they claimed the US had to invade
because it was imminently threatened by actual weapons.
The suggestions that Iraq may have concentrated on
dual-use programs in recent years - putting chemical and biological
production equipment within commercial facilities so that it would
not be discovered but could be used "on demand" or "just in time" -
seem plausible enough, but are hardly the imminent threat to the
US, UK and the rest of the world that justified the decision to go
to war.
Were the missing weapons destroyed many years ago?
Claims that Iraq destroyed all of its illicit chemical and
biological weapons in the 1990s - an explanation that failed to
convince the UN inspectors and British and American intelligence
officials prior to the invasion - are now being given greater
credence. It is increasingly likely that Iraqi officials were
telling the truth. Iraqi Brig. Gen. Alaa Saeed, one of Iraq's most
senior weapons scientists, insisted that the combined blitz of
allied bombing and intense UN inspections in the 1990s effectively
destroyed Hussein's chemical, biological and nuclear programs. UN
sanctions, he said, stopped Baghdad from importing the raw
materials, equipment and spare parts needed to secretly
reconstitute the illegal programs, even after UN inspectors left
the country in 1998.
The recent report by the US think tank, The Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, also found that the international
inspections effort generally had it right. And according to
Demetrius Perricos, acting chairman of the UNMOVIC since Hans
Blix's retirement, most of the weapons-related equipment and
research that has been publicly documented by the US-led inspection
team in Iraq was known to the UN before the US-led invasion.
Was the Iraqi WMD threat overstated by Britain and the United
States?
Despite unparalleled searching, nothing has turned up and the
evidence is overwhelming that Iraq did not have banned weapons at
the time that the US and Britain invaded Iraq. The brutality of
Saddam Hussein's regime was not an adequate justification for war,
and the US and British authorities did not seriously try to make it
one until long after the war began and all the false justifications
began to fall apart. Clearly, therefore, the statements made by
officials immediately before the war that suggested a far more
advanced and extensive program need to be reassessed.
However, final conclusions as to whether the primary fault lies
with US and British intelligence on Iraqi's WMD program, or with
the part played by senior figures in the US and British
administrations in interpreting and disseminating that evidence,
will need to be deferred until further information becomes
available. The case against President Bush already seems pretty
clear cut, especially given the recent testimony by former Treasury
secretary Paul H. O'Neill that the debate over military action
against Iraq began as soon as the President took office.
What are the implications of these intelligence and political
failings and what are the policy lessons for future challenges
involving suspected WMD proliferation?
Acknowledge past mistakes
Tony Blair and George Bush must acknowledge that they were
wrong about Iraq's WMD and show that they are taking sweeping
action to rectify the concerns that led to this miscalculation.
There must also be sufficient political space for political leaders
to acknowledge their mistakes. One of the most corrupting aspects
of politics in both the US and UK is the continuing search for
hidden agendas, and the lack of trust that is afforded to
politicians.
Learn the right lessons
Despite the continuing instability in Iraq and Afghanistan,
both interventions are being lauded by US and British
administration officials as political and military successes. The
hard line stance is said to be improving the security situation in
other parts of the world. Such claims are wildly overstated and
mean that important lessons are lost. For example, Libya's welcome
return back into the international community lies in the patient
diplomatic initiative set in motion long before President Bush
began his pursuit of Saddam. The invasion of Iraq appears to have
exacerbated the terrorist threat, reversed peace and democracy in
parts of the Middle East and undermined the transatlantic alliance,
the UN and international law.
Review the role of intelligence
The demands on intelligence gathering and assessment are
enormous and the consequences of getting it wrong can be dire. One
of the issues that undoubtedly affected intelligence assessments in
Iraq was the prior failure of US and British intelligence to spot
the strategic ambitions of Al Qaeda, and the attack on 9/11 in
particular. The picture that was painted by the US and British
intelligence agencies, especially after political pressure was
brought to bear, clearly involved "worst case" thinking.
The failure to find any banned weapons means that it will be
harder to trust intelligence reports about North Korean, Iranian or
other "rogue state" threats. Already, in the crisis over North
Korea's nuclear ambitions, China has rejected US intelligence that
North Korea has a secret program to enrich uranium for use in
weapons.
Threats to our security - such as those from NBC proliferation
and catastrophic forms of terrorism - are now much more diffuse and
debatable. Since most of these threats are developed in secret,
there is a strong case for maintaining secret specific intelligence
on them. This is not only to provide early warning, but to open up
the possibilities for diplomatic and other policy responses short
of military action. But it is vital that future non-proliferation
and counter-proliferation strategies are based on carefully
collected and analysed open evidence rather than on prejudice or
political expediency.
There will always be a requirement to turn "raw" intelligence
data into a document or information for public consumption, and in
one sense all intelligence assessments are doctored to some extent
for public consumption. It is also self-evident that in editing and
shaping raw intelligence data there will be a tendency to present
the case in the best possible light for the government of the day.
In the case of Iraq, the requirement to persuade clearly took
precedence over the requirement to be objective. In future,
therefore, public information that draws on intelligence data
should have more health warnings and should clearly set out the
context for and motives behind publication.
Bring the spooks out of the shadows
In Britain at least, the intelligence agencies need greater
visibility and accountability. If the existing Intelligence and
Security Committee is not up to this task, then a new small
oversight committee should be established to vet the procedures of
intelligence gathering and assessment, and to be responsible for
publication of unclassified intelligence reports and related
materials. It will also be important to explore new ways of sharing
the raw intelligence data with a broader cross-section of MPs.
Politicians also need more detail in order to judge appropriate
policy responses. They particularly need more context as to why
something is going on. In the UK at present, almost all policy - as
evidenced by the most recent Defence, Foreign and Development White
Papers - assumes an established nexus between WMD proliferation,
state failure and terrorism. However, all the available evidence
suggests that most "states of concern" are actually diminishing
their active support for terrorism, perhaps partly in response to
the threat of US military force. Only Sudan and the former Taliban
regime in Afghanistan are known to have materially aided Al Qaeda.
In terms of transferring WMD materials to non-state actors, the
biggest risk lies in theft or diversion of the huge stockpiles in
the existing nuclear states.
Re-examine the doctrine of pre-emption
Over reliance on intelligence makes the doctrine of
pre-emption a flawed and dangerous instrument of foreign policy.
Greater caution has to be exercised in thinking around pre-emptive
warfare, and better thinking is needed about its consequences.
Moreover, if pre-emption became widely acceptable, it could lead
to other countries fearing an assault attacking their rivals first,
pre-empting the pre-emptor and escalating a conflict that might
have been resolved without force. Or a nation under a sudden attack
might choose to deploy chemical, biological or nuclear weapons it
otherwise might not use. The very act of one country pre-emptively
attacking another carries troubling echoes of vigilante justice
when much of the world is working toward common understandings
about the legal use of force.
Return UN Inspectors to Iraq
International inspections and monitoring actually worked
effectively in Iraq. The return of the UN inspectors would confer
some much needed legitimacy to the post-conflict search for
weapons, and also help to re-engage the wider international
community in the reconstruction of a post-Saddam Iraq. UNMOVIC
should also be given the task of on-going monitoring in Iraq once
the 'coalition' military forces have left.
Create a permanent international cadre of inspectors
The British and US governments should also put their weight
behind establishing a broader mandate within UNMOVIC as suggested
by Hans Blix. Over the years, UNMOVIC has acquired much experience
in the verification and inspection of biological weapons and
missiles as well as chemical weapons, but only in Iraq. It has
scientific cadres that are trained and could be mobilized to
provide the Security Council and other concerned actors with a
capability for ad hoc inspections and monitoring, elsewhere.
Support multilateral and international law-based solutions to
WMD proliferation
Non-proliferation and arms control remain essential elements
in the fight against the further proliferation of WMD.
International arms control regimes must, however, be reinforced and
adapted to current developments, both technological and political.
We have reached a pivotal moment in inter-state relations with a
real opportunity to shape a new world order based on the rule of
law. The US and UK should be working to write those rules and get
them implemented. Sometimes it will be necessary to take direct
action, including in extreme circumstances military action, to stop
the rules being broken. But such action should only be undertaken
within the rules of international law, and preferably, with the
authorisation of the UN Security Council.
Think about WMD closer to home
WMD threat reduction should begin at home. It is not just a
'rogue' state problem. Existing nuclear-armed states (including the
US and UK) should reaffirm their intention to implement the 13
disarmament steps agreed to in 2000 under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US Senate's decision in May
2003 to at least partially rescind a ten-year ban on funding
research and development of new 'low-yield' nuclear weapons, was
unnecessary and destabilising. Efforts to expand threat reduction
programmes, such as the G-8 Global Partnership Against Weapons of
Mass Destruction, and principles to new regions and countries, such
as North Korea, the Middle East and South Asia also need to be
urgently explored.
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