PRESS RELEASE
24 October 1997
US Senator Jesse
Helms aggravates NATO-Russian relations
In a letter to US Secretary of State,
Madeleine Albright (17 September 1997), Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Jesse Helms offered to help secure Senate
ratification of NATO enlargement provided the Clinton Administration
works with him to address a series of "serious concerns about
the way the Administration has approached NATO enlargement thus
far". Accordingly, Helms has listed 10 steps the administration
must take before submitting NATO enlargement to the Senate. While
the Senator is on the mark with his concern that the White House has
not yet been able to give "a clear, strategic, military
rationale for NATO enlargement, and believes that if no rationale
exists, "other less expensive and more appropriate forums for
such ventures (such as the European Union and Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe)", his conditions, may have
profound and destabilizing consequences. Russia’s relations with
the West will suffer, and progress on arms control in Europe will
deteriorate. Furthermore, the Senator’s insistence that the
Administration "explicitly rejects all efforts to tie NATO
decisions to UN Security Council approval", neglects the fact
that the Alliance has always explicitly observed, and been subject
to, the authority of the UN as a guarantor of international peace
and security.
To illustrate these points, the
following table compares Senator Helm’s 10 conditions with the
relevant text of the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed by the 16
current NATO member heads of state and Boris Yeltsin in May 1997.
The groundbreaking progress made between former Cold War adversaries
within the context of the Founding Act faces a set back at a time
when efforts to implement positive developments are now attainable.
|
NATO-RUSSIA
FOUNDING ACT
|
STATEMENTS BY
SENATOR JESSE HELMS
|
| NATO
and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They
share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier
confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual
trust and cooperation. |
A
central strategic rationale for expanding NATO must be to
hedge against the possible return of a nationalist of
imperialist Russia.
The administration has turned
NATO expansion into an exercise in the appeasement of Russia.
|
|
NATO-RUSSIA
FOUNDING ACT
|
TEN
CONDITIONS ON WHICH HELM’S SUPPORT IS BASED. NATO MUST
|
| |
Outline
a clear, complete strategic security rationale for NATO
expansion. |
| The
member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention,
no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the
territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of
NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee
any future need to do so. This subsumes the fact that NATO has
decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to
establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of
those members, whether through the construction of new nuclear
storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage
facilities...
NATO reiterates that in the
current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance
will carry out its collective defence and other missions by
ensuring the necessary inter-operability, integration, and
capability for reinforcement rather than by additional
permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.
|
Agree
that no limitations will be placed on the numbers of NATO
troops or types of weapons to be deployed on territory of new
member states (including tactical nuclear weapons) - there
must be no second class citizens in NATO.
Explicitly reject Russian
efforts to establish a ‘nuclear-weapons-free-zone’ in
Central Europe.
|
| This
Act does not affect, and cannot be regarded as affecting, the
primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for
maintaining international peace and security. (A virtual
reiteration of Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1949).
Any actions undertaken by NATO
or Russia, together or separately, must be consistent with the
United Nations Charter and the OSCE's governing principles.
|
Explicitly
reject all efforts to tie NATO decisions to UN Security
Council approval. |
| In
building their relationship, NATO and Russia... will consult
and strive to cooperate to the broadest possible degree in the
following areas:
....exchange of information and
consultation on strategy, defence policy, the military
doctrines of NATO and Russia, and budgets and infrastructure
development programmes;
....arms control;
....pursuing possible
armaments-related cooperation through association of Russia
with NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors;...
|
Establish
a clear delineation of NATO deliberations that are off-limits
to Russia (including but not limited to arms control, further
Alliance expansion, procurement and strategic doctrine).
Reject Russian efforts to
require NATO aid for Russian arms sales to former Warsaw Pact
militaries joining the Alliance, as a quid pro quo for NATO
expansion - NATO must not become a back channel for new
foreign aid to Russia.
|
| |
Provide
an immediate seat at the NATO table for countries invited to
join the Alliance. |
| The
member States of NATO and Russia will use and improve existing
arms control regimes and confidence-building measures to
create security relations based on peaceful cooperation.
The member States of NATO and
Russia will work together in Vienna with the other States
Parties to adapt the CFE Treaty to enhance its viability and
effectiveness, taking into account Europe's changing security
environment and the legitimate security interests of all OSCE
participating States.
|
Reject
any further Russian efforts to link concessions in
arms-control negotiations (including the antiquated ABM treaty
and the CFE treaty) to NATO expansion. |
| In
building their relationship, NATO and Russia... will consult
and strive to cooperate to the broadest possible degree in the
following areas:
....possible cooperation in
Theatre Missile Defence;...
|
Develop
a plan for a NATO ballistic missile defence system to defend
Europe. |
| |
Get
clear advance agreement on an equitable distribution of the
cost of expansion, to make certain American taxpayers don’t
get stuck with the lion’s share of the bill. |
Prepared by Lucy Amis,
with Alistair Millar and Tasos Kokkinides.
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