BASIC PAPERS

APRIL 2000 • NUMBER 31 • ISSN 1353-0402

Anarchy in Action:
Western Policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction

By Daniel Plesch

The year 2000 will see much debate on nuclear weapons. New objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament will be debated in New York in April and May 2000 at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. The US and Russia will discuss arms reductions and ‘anti-missile-missiles.’ Conservatives in the US regard possible arms control progress in these areas as undermining US security.[1]

However, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policy is of vital importance to international security. Western policy makers highly value their own nuclear weapons but seek to prevent other countries from procuring them. The question of linking non-proliferation with disarmament is one which governments should review. Is the “Do as we say, not as we do” strategy sustainable?

The structure of global non-proliferation and arms control is impressive, but the political foundations that underpin the structures are being destroyed. Nuclear proliferation has accelerated since the end of the Cold War, with the actions of India, Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Pakistan. With increased focus on creating a national missile defense (NMD) system, the United States is no longer a reliable leader in the area of international legal controls on nuclear and other armaments. Its actions reinforce a steadily strengthening view against relying on mutual nuclear deterrence in national strategy.

In recent months there has been much ‘sabre-rattling’ with nuclear weapons. Last winter, then-President Boris Yeltsin used Russia’s nuclear status as a warning to the West to keep its distance as Russian forces rolled into Chechnya, and in February the US and China exchanged scarcely veiled threats over Taiwan.[2] All the while, India and Pakistan continued their rivalry.

It is necessary to rebuild the foundations of non-proliferation and disarmament policy. Open global negotiations at the UN on a verifiable multilateral ban on nuclear weapons should involve India, Pakistan and Israel and create a new and positive momentum. The NPT conference will discuss a new five-year agenda of benchmarks and objectives. It should include the opening of such negotiations, the full implementation of START III, and a discussion in the UN Security Council of nuclear weapons doctrines.

Another avenue for advancing a nuclear policy shift has opened as NATO discusses a new arms control strategy. This process is designed to stem proliferation through arms control and deserves as much political support as military counter-proliferation measures. US support for NMD is itself a radical change in nuclear policy, requiring a thorough review by NATO of its own nuclear strategy. If mutual deterrence is no longer to be at the heart of the strategy, what are the implications? Does negotiated threat elimination offer benefits that a combination of offensive and defensive systems does not?

Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policy is of vital importance to international security. This assumption is based upon the idea that the more states possess nuclear weapons, the more likely nuclear war becomes, and that such a war would either directly or indirectly have disastrous results for the world in general as well for those states directly involved.

Modern proliferation policy was created in the 1960s.  At its heart is the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Based on a resolution sponsored by Ireland in the UN General Assembly, negotiation of the NPT resulted from an initiative by the United States. This initiative in turn arose from an internal review of US policy towards nuclear proliferation. The US at that time rejected the view that extensive proliferation was acceptable and also rejected the idea of creating a considerable number of client nuclear powers. The result has been a policy of “Do as we say, but not as we do.” For the West, nuclear weapons are regarded as a source of instability when in the possession of other states, but a source of stability when in the possession of Western states and their allies.

The structure of global non-proliferation and arms control is impressive. The NPT is supported by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs).[3] Each NWFZ is further strengthened by its own treaty and set of protocols tying it into the broader non-proliferation regime. Bilateral reductions of the Russian and US arsenals have been brought about under the aegis of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) talks and this process is projected to continue for years. In addition, there are global conventions banning biological and chemical weapons, and a new verification protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) is being negotiated.[4] Many nuclear weapons states also participate in data-exchange and information-sharing arrangements. Four groups regulate the transfer of sensitive technologies: the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.[5]  Oceans and outer space have been denuclearized by the Seabed Treaty and Outer Space Treaty. A burgeoning list of regional and technical security regimes and secretariats contribute to the maintenance of strategic stability.

Accelerating nuclear proliferation since the end of the cold war is destroying the political foundations that underpin the structures of non-proliferation. In the 1970s and 1980s there was little change in the number of states having or believed to have nuclear weapons. In the last decade two non-NPT states have acquired nuclear weapons capability: India and Pakistan. The Indian government maintains that prolonged and failed attempts to engage the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) in disarmament talks led to its decision to pursue nuclear weapons testing. Western policy makers dismiss this, and often state that their nuclear policies do not encourage proliferators. However, the similarity of Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrines to NATO policy provides additional contrary evidence. Little action has been taken by the West or the broader international community to change these states’ policies. This stance fits the long-term pattern of US-led policy, which is to oppose proliferation until it happens and then reach an accommodation with the proliferator after the fact. Indian and Pakistani actions have neither resulted in new disarmament initiatives that include them, nor in significant penalties being imposed against them.

These two states sought to acquire nuclear status after the NPT was made permanent in 1995, an action which they felt allowed NWS to keep their arsenals indefinitely.  India in particular had long declined to accept permanent ‘second class status’. Their decisions also came after the CTBT imposed upon them the responsibility of signing the Treaty for it to enter into force, resulting in extra pressure on their political processes. They regard the CTBT as discriminatory since the existing NWS are pursuing new methods of testing including computer modeling and simulation, above ground tests, and laser fusion to continue the development of new weapons. These methods are not available to India and Pakistan, or only to a limited degree. Israel is the other nuclear armed state outside the NPT, and no attempt has been made by the NWS to bring Israel into international regimes.

Two NPT members, Iraq and North Korea, have made partially successful attempts to become nuclear powers; Iran is widely believed to be pursuing a similar path. The NPT has played an important role in providing the basis for constraining them. The experience with Iraq has strengthened the view of some that Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) proliferation cannot be controlled, and that there is no international will to do so. The early spectacular successes of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) were based upon an unprecedented consensus in international affairs at the end of the Cold War. The early UNSCOM experience remains an example of the tangible security benefits that result from a political investment in achieving international consensus.

Western policy makers give a broad positive value to their own nuclear weapons. The US bases its sense of security on them, as reinforced in the Defense Secretary’s annual report for 2000: “Nuclear forces and missile defenses are critical elements of US national security and will remain so into the future […] serving as a hedge against an uncertain future and as a guarantee of US commitments to its allies.”[6]

The 1999 NATO Summit made clear that nuclear weapons were not merely for use in response to a nuclear attack on the Alliance. Its Strategic Concept stated: “Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus they remain essential to preserve peace. […] They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option.” [7] [Emphasis added] NATO also described the Alliance’s strategic nuclear forces as “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies,” and noted: “Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and North Atlantic members of the Alliance.”[8] It is often asserted that without nuclear weapons the UK would no longer be able to claim any special reason for holding onto its permanent seat on the UN Security Council.[9]

Western states actively prevent other countries from procuring nuclear weapons. Every country except Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan has now joined the NPT.[10] Its value to non-nuclear states was recently described by John Holum, State Department Senior Advisor for Arms Control and International Security, as being the prevention of regional nuclear arms races.[11] The vast majority of the world’s states, as represented by the Non-Aligned Movement and the New Agenda Coalition, take the view that the NPT is mainly a very different sort of bargain. [12] In their opinion, they have agreed never to obtain nuclear arms providing that the states with nuclear weapons agree to carry out nuclear disarmament, as stipulated in Article VI of the NPT and the Principles and Objectives of the 1995 Review Conference. The NWS repeat their commitment to nuclear disarmament but generally regard it as an ultimate goal.  They have not agreed to begin discussions on how to achieve it, arguing that interim steps must be achieved first. The question of linkage of non-proliferation with disarmament is one which governments should review. Is the “Do as we say, not as we do” strategy sustainable? 

Over several decades the application of political power has helped sustain the Western policy of denying access to nuclear weapons to new states. There have been failures – France, China, India, and Pakistan were all pressured by the US not to go nuclear. A series of arrangements designed to control exports of dual use nuclear and chemical items has been created. For example, they prohibit missile transfers to specified states whilst permitting them among Western allies. These kinds of discriminatory arrangements are resented by non-Western states, and this resentment contributes to demands for the NWS to fulfill their NPT Article VI obligations to negotiate nuclear disarmament.

A key element of preventing proliferation in US policy has also been to offer to use its nuclear weapons on behalf of allies such as Japan, South Korea and its partners in NATO, partly to persuade them that they need not develop their own nuclear weapons. In the cases of Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, this ‘nuclear umbrella’ allows them to use US nuclear weapons in wartime.[13] This ‘sharing’ of nuclear weapons is an arrangement to which South Africa and many other states have taken exception.[14]

China, France and Russia, the other acknowledged nuclear powers, have also participated in an arms control process of denying others access to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to varying degrees. They are parties to the BWC, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the NPT and the CTBT. Russia has bilateral agreements with the US on nuclear arms reductions and to prohibit a national ‘anti-missile-missiles’ system through the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. However, where national interest was thought to require it, the existing nuclear powers have played a role in creating others.  The US assisted the UK and France after they had shown they could develop their own weapons. France assisted Israel and Iraq, China is thought to have assisted Pakistan, and Russia is assumed to have given limited assistance to India. Non-proliferation goals were, in these cases, simply ignored.

The United States is no longer a reliable leader in the area of international legal controls on nuclear and other armaments. The rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate and the wider desire to withdraw from the ABM Treaty are not aberrations in US politics. Neither the US President nor his Secretaries of State or Defense exerted themselves to ratify the CTBT. The political leaders in Congress and the Administration who supported the Treaty while it was being negotiated are no longer in office.

The Clinton Administration has shown little interest in pursuing strategic arms control with Russia. Whereas President Bush had concluded the START II Treaty before START I had been ratified, the present Administration and Congress have been content to wait on the lengthy ratification processes for the first two treaties before moving to START III. This Administration did not continue the process of reciprocal unilateral arsenal reductions pioneered by President Bush. It can only be hoped that this is changing. There is some political momentum behind the idea of mutual ‘de-alerting’ of strategic forces.

The growing rejection of arms control prevented US adherence to the anti-personnel landmines treaty and the International Criminal Court, created damaging amendments to the ratification of the CWC, and is currently leading the US to reject an effective verification protocol to the BWC. The ‘anti-arms control view’ in the US assumes that Russia has violated the BWC and the START Treaty, that Iraq and North Korea have shown the uselessness of non-proliferation regimes, and that controls only place limits. There is some truth in these views. However, arms control does not have to be perfect to be useful. Military force is a limited and sometimes counter-productive policy tool but these limitations do not result in abandoning military force altogether. [15]

There is a steadily strengthening view in the US against relying on mutual nuclear deterrence in national strategy. The idea that Americans must not be threatened with any kind of missile has led the Administration to consider deployment of NMD within five years and many within the Republican Party to reject the ABM Treaty out of hand.[16] It is important to note that the rejection of mutual deterrence does not indicate any desire by US policy makers to attack any other state, merely that the US should not be inhibited in politico-military action that it may be wish to take.

It should also be noted that there is considerable evidence that ‘rogue’ missile threats have been grossly exaggerated.[17] France and the UK, the other NATO nuclear powers, simply do not accept that there is any credible threat. Geoff Hoon, the UK Defence Minister, recently told the House of Lords: “Our current assessment is that there is no significant ballistic missile threat to the UK at present, but developments continue to be monitored closely.”[18]  French Defence Minister Alain Richard noted recently: “Ballistic proliferation is a concern for us as it is for you, even though the domestic debate here is far more intense on this issue and even if we do not draw the same conclusions from similar threat analyses.”[19] Governments may wish to examine the nature of these threats and consider whether exaggerating threats only serves to strengthen the hand of potential adversaries.

The rationale for missile defences against ‘rogue states’ rejects the idea that they should be permitted to threaten the US. The acceptance of such threats was the basis of the deterrence idea of ‘Mutual Assured Destruction.’ US policy makers reject the idea of being deterred by ‘lesser’ states such as Iraq or Libya. It is also thought that where an opponent is deemed irrational, a deterrence which relies on rationality and insight into one’s opponent’s mind-set is not a reliable tool. Some, such as General George Lee Butler, Commander-in-Chief of US Strategic Command from 1992-1994, believe that deterrence was always a false basis for policy throughout the Cold War, and was “a conversation we had with ourselves”.[20] The word ‘deterrence’ became an unassailable brand name that could sanctify any policy.

Less clearly stated by NMD proponents is the rejection of mutual deterrence with respect to Russia and China. The combination of ready nuclear missiles and missile defences in the US arsenal may provide a counter-force or first strike capability. Limited missile defences in this case have only to manage a few forces which may survive after they have been attacked with precision conventional weapons and nuclear weapons. Today, land-based mobile missiles alone constitute a Russian assured ‘second-strike’ deterrent and under START II they will be confined to single warheads.

The US position in the present START III and ABM discussions with Russia provides a useful insight. So far, the US refuses to go below a floor of 2,000-2,500 ready long-range warheads, although Russia prefers a level of 1,500 or even fewer. Thus the US is prepared to see Russia retain twice as many warheads as it wishes to. One reason is that the US has little confidence that Russia will be able to field such a force. The other is that the US Single Integrated Operational Plan requires some 2,000 warheads to target all Russian nuclear forces and key national capabilities. China has a force of around 20 long-range missiles and is so far only slowly increasing them. Against China, US missiles and defences offer an even more powerful combination. There have been some reports that US nuclear weapons are also needed to target ‘rogue states;’ however, even if there were any credible targets, the numbers involved are tiny.[21] 

Policy discussion about the value of nuclear weapons in mutual deterrence or counter-force rarely examines how they might be used. The failure to think through nuclear targeting may result in the West basing its policy on an instrument which in the end is unusable.[22] US Generals Butler, Charles Horner, and Colin Powell, who were responsible for nuclear planning in the Gulf War, all found no way they could be used effectively, and yet the Gulf War is routinely cited by those who had no such responsibility as being the type of occasion when nuclear weapons are useful.

States must move to rebuild the foundations of non-proliferation and disarmament policy. A business as usual approach to non-proliferation policy has been ineffective, and unchanged policy is unlikely to be any more effective. Further nuclear proliferation in Asia and the increasing deployment of missile defences are the likely next phases of a familiar action-reaction cycle. The military axiom that defensive capabilities always develop more slowly than offensive ones will only fuel this new arms race.

It may be argued that missile defences will not work, will create an arms race and are too expensive. These arguments are less and less influential in Washington. Similarly, Western leaders believe that there is no political cost if they do not act more swiftly to fulfill disarmament obligations.

The lack of support for the International Atomic Energy Agency’s new safeguards regime and the Indian and Pakistani actions are not regarded by US policy makers as resulting from lack of action on disarmament by the nuclear weapon states. On the issue of   ‘anti-missile-missiles’ it can be argued that eliminating the threat through arms control and disarmament is a far better option than last-ditch defence or relying on an ineffective defence and an unusable response. On one critical point disarmament advocates and missile defence advocates agree: Mutual Assured Destruction is not a rational policy. Ronald Reagan compared it to Russian roulette. Governments may also wish to reassess the value of the idea of mutual deterrence.

Governments should consider whether to support measures that would change or scrap the ABM Treaty. In the spring of 2000, many states urged Moscow to make a decision on START II and ABM adjustments.  However, the issue of missile defences should not be left to the Russians and Americans alone to decide; events across Asia, from the Middle East to China, will be impacted by this new military technology as well.

A full review of non-proliferation policy should also consider the impact of the rise of humanitarian intervention as a principle overriding state sovereignty.  If the application of the principle is seen to be arbitrary and without legal authority, it may lead to states fearing that they may be attacked and increase the demand for WMD. While such concerns may seem remote to Western analysts, perceptions are different in countries which have experienced only half a century of freedom from colonialism after a century or more under one empire or another.

The disarmament approach may not be the only solution but it is clearly the Cinderella of international policy at the present time. If disarmament policies are thought to have any significant chance of improving national and international security, they need immediate and strong reinforcement.

Non-proliferation and disarmament policy is being discussed in a number of international negotiations. Western states should reassess their own nuclear doctrines and state that they will only use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack on themselves.

The world’s foremost disarmament negotiating body is the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. The vast majority of states support opening multilateral talks aimed at agreeing a Convention banning nuclear weapons worldwide. Support for commencing such talks now would not require any action by the nuclear weapons states affecting their forces since a nuclear disarmament convention will take many years to negotiate. Many states have argued that the lack of progress in disarmament incites proliferation and reduces international political will to act against it. The opening of nuclear disarmament talks would provide a useful test of this proposition. There is nothing to lose and much to gain from starting the process. 

A final agreement may involve a succession of stages. The verification regime and the need for action against states breaking out of the Treaty are but two of the issues which need to be explored. Bringing India, Israel and Pakistan into a dialogue with the other nuclear powers on banning nuclear arms would help reduce tension and particularly act as a safety-valve in South Asia. Holding such a dialogue in the UN’s CD would involve a broad range of non-nuclear states and not give the ‘newcomers’ any special status.

The Conference on Disarmament is attempting to begin talks on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The Treaty under consideration at present is far too limited in scope either to be effective or to receive sufficient political support. It must include all types of fissile material in all states. However, the present logjam should not be permitted to delay progress in other areas.

The NPT conference will discuss a new five year agenda of benchmarks and objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament. Governments should examine the commitments made in 1995 to the Enhanced Review Process, the Principles and Objectives, and the statement on the Middle East. New NPT benchmarks and Objectives already favoured by many states include:

1. Accepting as authoritative the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning Article VI, adopted unanimously, which states that: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control;

2. Urging that the Russian Federation and the United States bring the START II Treaty into force without delay,  to commence negotiations on START III with a view to its completion by 2005, and to work with the P5 towards a statement at the Review Conference that these negotiations are an important step on the road to implementation of Article VI obligations;

3. Seeking a UN Security Council discussion of the nuclear weapons doctrine of its permanent members; and,

4. Reaffirming the central role of the CTBT as a disarmament treaty by stating that research and development on qualitative nuclear warhead improvements will not be undertaken, either alone or in partnership with other nuclear weapon states.

NATO has begun a comprehensive policy review of confidence and security building measures, verification, arms control and disarmament. NATO members should consider proposing a range of measures, additional to those already mentioned, including:

1. Beginning a formal review of nuclear strategy. The US unilateral consideration of moving away from mutual deterrence towards relying on offensive and defensive missiles fundamentally alters the Alliance’s nuclear strategy. If mutual deterrence is not to be acceptable, perhaps threat elimination through arms control should be examined at least as seriously as defences. In addition, the concerns of the international community over the compatibility of NATO strategy with Negative Security Assurances and Articles I and II of the NPT need to be addressed.

2. Affirming that NATO will never be the first to use a nuclear weapon in any circumstances, that the Alliance will cease to prepare the wartime transfer of nuclear weapons to its non-nuclear members and nuclear weapons are no longer needed to link Europe and North America since this link is based upon shared values. Facilitating NATO-Russia negotiations on eliminating remaining tactical nuclear weapons since these weapons are a source of considerable concern to both parties.

3. Discussing measures to fully implement the NPT as described above. The Alliance successfully led the way in 1993 in calling for the NPT to be made permanent in 1995. It has a collective responsibility to implement the agreements that made the 1995 decision possible. A common Alliance position on implementing the NPT is needed.

4. Preventing the Alliance from being split by the United States over the issue of missile defences. The Alliance should not endorse changes to the ABM Treaty or become engaged in the use of facilities in European member states for strategic missile defence.

5. Evaluating why the Alliance is less engaged in arms control of all kinds at present than during the Cold War. Little is currently taking place in the NATO internal discussion on arms control. Governments may also wish to consider why there is so much more momentum to the military aspects of countering proliferation.

Daniel Plesch is Director of BASIC.

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Endnotes

[1] Kim R. Holmes and Thomas Moore, Beware The Clinton Trap on Missile Defense, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1239, 14 December 1998; Baker Spring, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: In Arms Control's Worst Tradition,  Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1332, 7 October 1999.

[2] The official Chinese military newspaper, Liberation Army Daily, stated that US intervention in a conflict between China and Taiwan would result in “serious damage” to US security interests in Asia and warned that China “is a country that has certain abilities of launching strategic counterattack and the capacity of launching a long-distance strike.” US Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe responded that China would face “incalculable consequences” if it used force against Taiwan. “Pentagon Issues Warning to China; US Officials Criticize Beijing's Broadening of Reasons to Use Force Against Taiwan,” Washington Post, 23 February 2000, p. A16 

[3] There are four NWFZs: Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), South-East Asia (Treaty of Bangkok) and South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga); proposals for others in Central Asia, Central Europe and the Middle East are pending. For more details see http://www.fas.org/nuke/control.

[4] The BWC was opened for signature in 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993.

[5] For more information on these treaties, see http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/index.html.

[6]  Secretary of Defense: Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2000, p.69

[7] NATO Strategic Concept, Paragraphs 46, 62

[8] NATO Strategic Concept, Paragraphs 42, 63

[9] Nicolas J. Wheeler, “The Dual Imperative of Britain's Nuclear Deterrent: the Soviet Threat, Alliance Politics and Arms Control”, in UK Arms Control in the 1990's, ed. Mark Hoffman (New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), p. 36; and Stephen Pullinger, “A Role for UK Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War?” ISIS Briefing No. 41, January 1994, p. 2.

[10] However, Cuba is part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime as a result of its membership of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the South American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty.

[11] “Holum on Non-Proliferation and Arms Control,” Worldnet Program: US Department of State Office of Broadcast Services, 12 January 2000.

[12] The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a loose coalition of around 110 states, mostly from Africa, Asia and Latin America, who pursued an official policy of neutrality during the Cold War and who continue to take joint positions in international fora. The New Agenda Coalition is a group of eight states (Brazil, Mexico, Sweden, Ireland, Slovenia, New Zealand, South Africa and Egypt) which united in June 1998 around renewed calls for a nuclear-weapons free world.

[13] In the past, Canada, France and the UK have also participated in NATO nuclear sharing arrangements.

[14]  At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, seven out of eight draft  proposals for language highlighted the lack of common interpretation of Articles I and II and stated that the Conference was “convinced that such acts [NATO nuclear sharing] run counter to the spirit and letter of the Treaty.” [NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/1,9bis] . For a detailed treatment of nuclear sharing issues, see NATO Nuclear Sharing and the NPT, PENN Research Report, March 2000.

[15] For example, the US strike on Osama bin Laden accidentally delivered highly classified technologies to Pakistan in the form of unexploded Tomahawks.  US doctrine does not consider this form of technology transfer, although it may outweigh the benefits of the strike itself.

[16] See, for example, Letter from Senator Jesse Helms to Senator Byron L. Dorgan, 26 July 1999.

[17] Joseph Cirincione, “Assessing the Ballistic Missile Threat,” Testimony to the US Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Committee on Governmental Affairs, 9 February  2000.

[18] UK Defence Minister Geoff Hoon, House of Commons Written Questions 24 January 2000, column 55W.

[19] French Defence Minister Alain Richard, French Defence, NATO and Europe, speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 February 2000.

[20] Speech at the National Press Club’s Newsmakers Luncheon, 2 February 1998.

[21] Steven Mufson, “Russia: Cut Arsenals to 1,500 Warheads; US Resists, Prefers 2,000 to 2,500 Units,” Washington Post, 28 January 2000, p. A17.

[22] Paul Nitze, “A Threat Mostly to Ourselves,”  New York Times, 28 October 1999. Nitze, Ronald Reagan’s strategic arms negotiator, now thinks that nuclear use is no longer credible and supports US unilateral nuclear disarmament.