BASIC PAPERS

APRIL 1998 • NUMBER 25 • ISSN 1353-0402

The Struggle Continues:
Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique 

By Alex Vines 

Executive Summary
The failure of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) to effect meaningful disarmament during peacekeeping operations has had serious consequences for both Mozambique and its neighbouring South Africa. While completely disarming all individuals would have been an impossible task, the mission failed even to accomplish the more modest goal of destroying the weapons it had collected and earmarked for decommissioning. As a result, since the conflict ended, weapons have continued to circulate and armed crime has risen sharply.

ONUMOZ's failure stemmed in large part from its weak mandate regarding disarmament. The operation's mandate failed to provide a clear definition of what disarmament should entail or the criteria for its success. In addition, it failed to address the distinctions between disarmament and demobilisation. The United Nations also failed to provide ONUMOZ with the necessary resources to deal with disarmament and to ensure that weapons were properly collected and decommissioned.

Post-UN disarmament in Mozambique has been more successful, a reflection of growing confidence in peace at the local level as well as in senior policy-making circles. Since 1995, disarmament in Mozambique has taken off and the rusting weapons caches are no longer a serious threat to internal security. However, fresh weapons coming through the Maputo port and elsewhere now pose the main security threat. Ironically, South Africa has suffered the most from the peace dividend, as it has been the leading destination for light weapons flowing out of Mozambique. Recently, joint police operations and a change in market demand for guns in South Africa have brought about a decline in the weapons trade from Mozambique.

Introduction
Light weapons have long been viewed as an insignificant fringe of the conventional weapons trade. But with the end of the Cold War, sales of major weapons have declined, and the trade in light weapons, including small arms, has increased substantially. There is little control over these transfers, with separatist groups, criminal syndicates and beleaguered governments all purchasing significant amounts of weaponry.¹

One of the key defining characteristics of a light weapon is that it does not require any form of infrastructure to support or facilitate its use. Unlike other weapons systems, light weapons can be used with minimal training and expertise. Light weapons also benefit from a low rate of obsolescence, which means that they remain useful over a long period. These weapons also appeal to smugglers because, much like drugs, they combine high value with low density, thus offering large profit margins in return.

The manufacture and international trade of these weapons remains highly decentralised, with ever cheaper products available on the market. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the absence of any effective export controls has added to the flood of weapons. In addition, large quantities of surplus weapons left over from past conflicts are making their way to new conflict zones through a growing network of semi-official and secret weapons pipelines.²

Peacekeeping operations often provide an opportunity to decommission and destroy light weapons left over after a conflict ends, but in most cases, this is either overlooked or carried out only half-heartedly.³ UN peacekeeping operations in Mozambique in 1992-94 were no exception.⁴ Although the conflict ended, the networks controlling light weapons supplies simply found new customers, using existing caches and networks to traffic weapons to neighbouring states, especially South Africa.

Sources of Light Weapons
Light weapons were the most commonly used arms in the Mozambique conflict. Russia supplied the majority of weapons to the ruling Frente de Liberata‡ao de Mo‡ambique (Frelimo), and China also provided some weaponry. In early 1992, as part of the planning process for demobilisation, Russia provided details of what it had shipped to Mozambique. However, these details remain confidential. In 1995, INTERPOL reported that some 1.5 million AK-47s had been distributed to the civilian population during the course of the war in Mozambique. The government distributed tens of thousands of AK-47s to civilian militia units in 1982. Few of these were ever returned.⁵

The opposition Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana (Renamo) received weapons from Rhodesia and later from South Africa. Kenya provided ammunition in the late 1980s, and Portuguese, German, American and Gulf sources also provided weaponry. Much of Renamo's weaponry consisted of re-circulated Chinese and Russian light weapons. Renamo also relied heavily in the last years of the war on weapons captured from government forces.

Disarmament Begins
On 4 October 1992, a cease-fire was agreed in Rome, finally ending the 16-year civil war in Mozambique which had cost some 100,000 civilian lives and ruined much of the country's economy. The cease-fire signalled the start of a UN-supervised peace process, which culminated in Mozambique's first ever multi-party elections on 27-29 October 1994. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) applied lessons learned from the flawed Angolan peace process, including that elections should be held only after both sides are demobilised and that peacekeeping operations should not be conducted on the cheap.⁶

Disarmament was implicit in ONUMOZ's mandate as part of demobilisation. A demobilised soldier was defined as an individual who "subsequent to E-Day was demobilised at the decision of the relevant command, and handed over the weapons, ammunition, equipment, uniform and documentation in his possession".⁷ Weapons brought into the Assembly Areas (AAs) were temporarily stored there. Security was lax, with only two padlocks securing the structure, for which the Camp Commander held one key and the UN military officer at the AA the other. However, this proved to be sufficient, since the soldiers had surrendered only low quality weapons and had hidden better weapons elsewhere. As Joao Baptista, a Frelimo soldier from Massingir AA explained:

We knew that guns make good business. So we kept the best for ourselves. I have sold some to dealers from Joni and I keep others for the future. The secret is to keep them in good condition. Frelimo was never going to pay us for the years we were made to fight. We have to look after ourselves.⁸

Eduardo Adao, a Renamo soldier from Changanine AA, held a similar view, noting that, "Guns can mean food. We do not want to be hungry. Before the elections we saw that we were being betrayed by politicians. Why give up the guns to weaken us further? We handed in the bad ones. Business is good with a gun."⁹

Amongst many of ONUMOZ's Civpol and infantry units, there was also little will to confront the disarmament issue. As one peacekeeper from Urubat, the Uruguayan unit patrolling National Highway 1, said, "Active disarming is dangerous. That is not why we are here. We are here to watch and if they give us their weapons then fine. ONUMOZ's mandate is not to send back bodybags to Montevideo".¹⁰

A Zambian military official from Zambat was equally philosophical, saying:

We see wandering groups with guns frequently. We record this but can't do much. The quartering areas are closed and nobody wants to know about this stuff. Same with arms caches. We get reports of where these are. Some are in no-go zones. They know, and we know that these are out of bounds. The ones we get to are the old weapons. The ones that they no longer want. In that sense we offer a free clearance service.¹¹

Major Sten-Erik Edenhag, the Swedish UN team leader at Nhamacala, a Renamo assembly area in central Mozambique, shared a similar view, arguing that, "I don't care about [hidden weapons]. Come election day, I will have removed thousands of rifles that otherwise would be still out there".¹²

Concerns Over Weapons Caches
The situation was complicated by the fact that both parties also deliberately ordered that weapons be hidden. Consequently, not every soldier arrived at an AA with a weapon as had been envisaged. The number of weapons collected from paramilitary troops was also low and the munitions submitted were of poor quality for similar reasons.

Though the General Peace Accord stipulated that "all collective and individual weapons... should be stored in warehouses under the United Nations' control", both sides initially refused. In 1994, responding to growing unrest in the AAs among combatants waiting to be demobilised, both sides reluctantly agreed that ONUMOZ could transport military equipment in excess of 200 arms from each AA to one of three Regional Arms Depots (RADs), in Nampula, Chimoio and Matola for safe-keeping (see Table 1). The first such transfer took place on 15 March 1994, and the process continued until the end of 1994, overseen by ONUMOZ infantry.¹³

In 1994, United Nations Supervision and Control Commission (CSC) chairman Colonel Segala reported to the CSC that soldiers had admitted to hiding weapons outside the assembly areas. He warned that, "The presence of weapons dispersed around the country is a matter of particular concern, and can seriously imperil public security now and especially after the elections once the United Nations has left Mozambique".¹⁴

The circumspect nature of ONUMOZ's mandate largely prevented the peacekeeping forces from tackling arms caches outside the assembly areas. However, the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF) approved a mechanism to ascertain the existence of undeclared depots and caches. This "verification process" was to take place after demobilisation and before 20 October 1994. But because of delays in demobilising, the process did not begin until 30 August. Ultimately, it made only limited progress, as both sides showed little interest, and there was insufficient time for comprehensive checking.

After the closure of the assembly areas, the CCF arranged to visit sites, including arms caches, listed by the two sides as having been in military use. Arms were either to be destroyed or taken under UN control for transfer to the new army. The teams visited 744 sites of arms caches before the mandate expired. But it was never easy. On one occasion in October, when UN teams went to check three arms dumps under Renamo control, they were given the wrong co-ordinates for one cache, the local leader could not find the second, and the commander in charge failed to turn up at the third.¹⁵ The United Nations was unable to visit many other sites because of time constraints or failure to gain access. Nevertheless, the CCF did manage to visit a number of undeclared sites belonging to both sides. In the first five weeks of verification, the CCF found 130 reported arms caches, including truckloads of arms.

ONUMOZ officials pushed on several occasions for access to large weapons caches, especially in the final build-up to the elections. This included attempted access to a large arsenal maintained in the Interior Ministry in central Maputo. Such violations were never exposed publicly and usually resulted in compromise. In the case of the Interior Ministry, UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello negotiated for the cache to be declared and it remained in government control. These actions were also politically motivated to build-up Renamo's confidence prior to the elections.

Ajello's aide Eric Lubin admitted that, "Ajello was a politician. He knew that neither side wanted to hand in their guns. He had seen the fight over mine-clearance and had decided that pushing this issue would only delay the peace process further. The priority was elections. Once they had passed successfully, disarmament could be safely pursued in the closing months of the mandate".¹⁶ When later asked why he had not prioritised disarmament, Ajello replied that ONUMOZ had wanted to destroy a much larger number of weapons but this had not been allowed by the government.¹⁷

Few Weapons Destroyed
On 19 September 1994, Colonel Segala reported that the military equipment registered during cantonment and verification was now "posing a military as well as political problem", as the large quantities "presented a potential for internal and external instability".²⁰ During an official CCF meeting on 11 November, it was agreed that all weapons collected by ONUMOZ and under CCF control would be transferred to the new army. As a result, 180,000 weapons went to the new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM) and 24,000 other weapons were destroyed.

All in all, very few of the arms and ammunition recovered and registered were destroyed. A small amount of unstable munitions was destroyed in situ. Weapons and equipment placed in the RADs were categorised as operational, repairable or beyond repair. Only material deemed to be beyond repair was destroyed. Although the United Nations assessed various options to destroy additional weapons in metal foundries, the idea was eventually rejected as too expensive. In 1993, the United Nations also turned down an ONUMOZ request for an additional US$52.5 million to ensure more comprehensive disarmament throughout Mozambique. Confirming the dangers of not destroying these weapons, Lazero Mathe, director of FADM's equipment unit admitted that the weapons identified for destruction that were put into the three regional warehouses by ONUMOZ were "not accounted for".²¹

Post-Election Disarmament
Only after the successful conclusion of the elections on 27-29 October and heightened international pressure was the issue of arms caches made a priority. In October, the United States presented the Mozambican government with a hard-hitting "non-paper" threatening to "re-evaluate our future development assistance program in Mozambique" unless the government assisted in five key areas, including access to regional arms depots.²²

Encouraged by this and other instances of international pressure, ONUMOZ became more actively engaged in clearing and destroying weapons caches. Stung by criticism that he had not acted against arms caches earlier, UN Special Representative Ajello also embarked upon a high profile trip in search of arms caches in November 1994.²³ By the end of ONUMOZ's mandate in Mozambique, the CCF had verified 744 locations (603 declared and 141 undeclared). It had examined 498 government sites and 246 Renamo sites, but had run out of time to complete its examination of Renamo's declared and undeclared sites.

In his final report of 5 December, Colonel Segala confirmed the commission's inability to complete verification of Renamo bases and arms caches. Renamo had halted verification on 22 September, permitting only a limited resumption after 10 October. Of Renamo's 287 officially declared locations, only 116, or 40 percent of the total were visited. By contrast, the commission had visited 99 percent of the government's declared locations. The United Nations offered to maintain a small unit in Mozambique past the end of ONUMOZ's mandate in order to complete its weapons verification work, but the government declined the offer.²⁴

Re-integration of Former Combatants
Unlike the demobilisation operation which ended in late August, the social and economic re-integration of demobilised combatants is an open-ended process which will last for several years. A Refugee Studies Programme (RSP) pilot study focused on the experiences of ex-combatants in Zambezia province.²⁵ Based on a sample of 2,700 combatants, it found that the average age of conscription was 20 and that most individuals had spent an average of ten years in military service. It also highlighted the low level of training received in the army which has made ex-soldiers a very poorly skilled group.

A major obstacle to the social and economic re-integration of ex-combatants has been the country's weak economy. Only a few jobs are offered in formal employment in Zambezia province, mostly by economic agents who are themselves under-capitalised and who have reservations about investing in a not-yet stabilised community, particularly in terms of security. Compounding this problem is the fact that employers, including the government and its local departments, tend to look at ex-combatants as potentially violent people who would be likely to disrupt the workplace.

A misconception amongst international donors has been that small-scale agriculture could facilitate the re-integration of ex-combatants in Mozambique. For several decades, small-scale agriculture has not had the capacity to by itself guarantee the subsistence of the rural family. The RSP study found that the average number of dependants of a demobilised soldier in Zambezia to be 7.5, thus forming an average family size of eight to nine persons.

As a result, this income had to be supplemented by various types of waged labour. The result was that ex-combatants were not dispersed through small-scale agriculture. They were leaving their families in the fields and looking for income-earning alternatives, particularly in informal commerce in the cities. In addition, the weakness of small-scale agriculture was exacerbated by other problems such as lack of roads and rural shops, land shortages and landmines.

A second study by the RSP showed that there was little evidence linking former soldiers with armed crime in Maputo.²⁶ Some ex-combatants may have been involved in petty crime, such as in the informal market of Estrela Vermelha, where many of the products on offer have been stolen, or in local drug dealing in places such as Bairro Militar. However, many of the claims made by ex-soldiers about their links to serious crime were bluffs designed to extract government concessions. Overall, ex-soldiers are re-integrating quickly. There is an extremely high marriage rate and their wives are often the money earners.²⁷ In Maputo it is already difficult to distinguish former combatants from other groups, or to suggest they are any more prone to engage in crime.

Armed Crime
It is urban crime, especially in Maputo, that has risen sharply, although police figures for armed crime in 1996 suggest it may have peaked. The police recorded 2,370 crimes against property, of which 658 were robbery, 135 of these armed, a slight reduction from 1995.²⁸ The guns used in armed crime appear to be mostly new, with handguns increasingly becoming the preferred weapon.

Most Mozambicans appear to regard armed crime as an occupational hazard and still remember the war years. Travelling on some main roads outside cities at night remains a calculated risk and driving a four-wheel drive vehicle can make you a particularly attractive target. There are waves of armed crime, much of it linked to South African crime syndicates and tied to local corruption.

Much of the crime appears to be motivated by economic need. Alfredo, a potential highwayman from Gaza province, is nineteen. He explained why he got involved in crime:

There is no work for me. I have few skills except using a gun and it's easy money. The occasional action makes money. I used to be Frelimo, then joined Renamo, then joined Frelimo. I have played war for both. Now I work for myself and my group. As long as we move around, we get few problems. We can pay for information about police activity. Prices have gone up since those South Africans got involved. Our secret is to be careful. We try not to kill people, but accidents can happen during confusion.²⁹

Another young man involved in armed crime, who paid his way out of jail in 1995, explained that for the young it was one of the few ways to make ends meet. Joao, who is 31, explained:

What is there for people like me to do? A gun gives me a job! My family struggle on the land and they can't feed me. I need to help them. The police use guns all the time to make money. So can I! Everything around here is about money. Eh, without it you have nothing. So I make money with a gun.³⁰

Weapons Move from War to Crime
The level of violence in this type of crime is directly related to the kind of weapons that can be easily obtained on the market. The problem cannot be underestimated. Lionel van Dyke, director of the Zimbabwean-based Mine-Tech security firm pointed out that arms caches are a much bigger threat than landmines, saying:

We are finding arms caches all the time. Even in the middle of towns. I am amazed that the UN didn't have these shown to it or hadn't destroyed them if they did. The weapons and ammunition around here are a time bomb. Not necessarily for renewed war, but there are plenty of guns to keep and thousands of rounds of ammunition to keep criminals and poachers in business for decades.³¹

Mine-Tech found that in central Mozambique, where it is clearing mines as part of the Cahora-Bassa power-line rehabilitation scheme, the numbers of armed groups seen by its men was on the increase in 1996. The same was true of incidents involving the re-laying of landmines and attacks on the roads. Some of these actions were targeted at stopping renewed state administration because local people were involved in drugs and contraband trading, and thus wanted to keep such areas closed.

Table 2. Mozambique Crime Statistics, July 1993-July 1997

Source: Mozambique Police, Maputo.

Controlling Weapons and Violence
Mozambican Police figures show a yearly increase in violent attacks (see Table 2). The proliferation of small arms was recognised by the government as a problem. In April 1995, then Home Affairs Minister Manual Antonio announced a master plan to deal with the large quantity of illegal weapons circulating in Mozambique. The plan included stepping up patrols along Mozambique's main roads, re-establishing police district commands and increasing co-operation between the Republic of Mozambique Police (RPM) and police forces in neighbouring countries.

In the first three months of 1995, police apprehended thirty armed gangs and uncovered sixty-nine arms caches. Between January and July 1995, the police reported seizing over 6,000 guns and 24,000 rounds of ammunition. A total of 1,070 arms came from Sofala, followed by Zambezia province with 1,047. The government claims that between November 1995 and November 1996, its police discovered fifty arms caches, collecting more than 1,000 guns and hundreds of mines and grenades (see Table 3). In the same period they reportedly neutralised 214 bands of robbers and recovered 105 cows and 337 cars.³² In September 1997, the Mozambican police announced that they had uncovered and destroyed 11,734 firearms of different calibres since 1985.³³ Reports of newly discovered arms caches continue to be a weekly occurrence in the Mozambican press.

In response to banditry along main roads, the Mozambican authorities also formed special police units. One such unit, known as "Lightning Battalion", was deployed on 2 June 1995 along highway 215 (Maputo-South Africa) after armed men with AK-47s killed South African tourist Chris Joubert. Another South African was injured on the following day in the same area. Four gangs consisting of sixteen criminals operating along the road were arrested in the following weeks. Thirteen AK-47s, four pistols and three other semi-automatic weapons were captured in the operation.

Lightning Battalion was created because the regular armed forces, FADM, refused to take on internal policing responsibilities - a response to the new joint army's crisis of identity. The Rapid Intervention police also argued that their role was predominantly urban-based policing. One reason for the reluctance of regular units to involve themselves in such activities is that a significant proportion of armed banditry is carried out by current or former soldiers, often known to serving officials. One FADM soldier, who did not want to be named, revealed that, "We make money by selling guns from the arsenals. Some of our people also engage in banditry to get extras. It's a way to survive. I don't agree with it; its a continuation of bad habits from FAM [the old government army]".³⁴

Violent crime dramatically declined immediately following the appointment of a new Home Affairs and Police Minister, Almerino Manhenje, in 1996. Manhenje's appointment was not a government initiative. Rather, a combination of donor unease, a local media campaign and pressure from local people forced a reluctant President Chissano to replace Manuel Antonio. On his appointment, Manhenje quickly ordered police action against known crime gangs. A new unarmed, but better trained police unit was also mobilised.

Neutralising arms caches was also the first issue on the agenda in a meeting between President Chissano and the Renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama, on 5 February 1996 and again in a meeting on 21 December 1996. Both men were concerned about the dangers of bands of men carrying weapons outside their control. They decided to set up a working group, with members appointed by the government and Renamo, to deal with the dismantling of arms caches. This fell short of an earlier demand by Renamo to set up a tripartite commission between the South African and Mozambican police forces and former Renamo military officers. The issue subsequently become one of political contention, with Renamo wanting an increased profile for itself through a Commission and the government arguing for a working group, a label designed as a stamp of its authority over Renamo.

Table 3. Mozambican Police Seizures of Weapons in 1996

Key: b=crates, ng=amount not given

Source: Author interview with Mozambique Police, 1997.

Police Role in Question
Despite their apparent success in uncovering weapons and armed gangs, popular confidence in the police is low. In large part, the figures above were used to paper over a crisis in poor policing in much of Mozambique. 102 policemen were expelled in 1995 for activities against police ethics. Between January and October 1997, police expelled another 137. A total of 290 policemen faced disciplinary hearings in the same period.³⁵ Policemen have regularly disregarded the law and constitution, and groups such as Human Rights Watch receive a constant stream of reports of police maltreatment of detainees, especially in Maputo. There have also been reports that members of the Lightning Battalion have beaten up suspects.³⁶

In addition, police and military officials are often the main sources of gun-running, making action against them more difficult. In his November 1996 report on crime to parliament, Attorney-General Sinai Nhatitima made devastating accusations against the police. Nhatitima said that many of the guns used by criminals came from the police. "Guns are stolen or 'disappear' from the arsenals and are lent out, rented or sold to be used in criminal activities," he accused. Artur Canana, the governor of Manica province, admitted that weapons fuelling the illegal arms trade have been sold out of police stations. "There is nothing we can do about indiscipline of certain officers, which is making the problem worse", he said.³⁷

It is increasingly evident that there are other senior officials who turn a knowing blind eye to the arms trade or are actively involved in it. The exposure in 1996 of a arms and contraband pipeline run by Portuguese businessmen through Nacala port appears to have links with senior officials.³⁸

Another obstacle to dealing effectively with armed crime and weapons caches is the continued ambiguity over the respective roles of the various parties involved in the control efforts: the army, the police and the various elite units formed in response to the problems. Interfaced with this is a political struggle between different individuals such as the civilian Minister of Defence Aguiar Mazula and the chief of staff of FADM Lt-Gen. Lagos Lidimo. The battles in the National Assembly in 1997 over the approval of new laws for the defence forces were a visible part of this struggle.

Community Pitches in on Disarmament
Prior to destroying arms caches in 1995, Mine-Tech personnel found that weapons, especially small arms and mines, had been removed by unknown individuals. By 1997, this trend had diminished and local people were leading Mine-Tech to more virgin caches. Another mine-clearance firm, Special Clearance Services (SCS), is also involved in the destruction of weapons and ordnance. In 1996 and 1997, SCS noticed an increasing trend of local communities putting weapons on the road for their clearance teams to destroy. They believe that these communities were practising local-level disarmament, not trusting the local police but preferring to see these weapons destroyed by foreign firms.³⁹

Ignacio Save, a farmer from Manjacaze in Gaza province explained that the destruction of arms caches has been an important symbolic and social step for the communities.⁴⁰ "The destruction of these weapons is important for us. It symbolises the end of war and we know these guns can not be used again. It reminds us that things are better and helps us forget the past", he said.

Despite these encouraging signs of progress, the continued high level of violence has continued to cause setbacks in the process. A crime wave in Maputo in September and October 1996, in which several expatriates were killed, sent the donor community into hysteria. Switzerland threatened to freeze its US$30 million aid package if the government did not show a firmer commitment in the fight against crime.⁴¹ Germany and Spain also took a strong position. By early 1997, the situation around Maputo had greatly improved, although in other districts there continued to be some serious problems. Rising violence in areas of Mozambique along the Zimbabwe border, reportedly had a spill-over effect. Armed robberies in Zimbabwe's eastern Manicaland province along the Mozambican border in the last quarter of 1995 reportedly increased 30 percent.⁴² However, the Mozambican authorities also complain of an increase of Zimbabwean-based criminals coming into Mozambique.

In response to the violence, foreigners and the Mozambican elite have invested in private security systems and guards. In a recent study on the re-integration of Maputo ex-combatants, 24 percent of the 476 interviewed had found employment as security guards.⁴³ They were provided with training, together with weapons, vehicles, radio-communications and several types of weapons.

Guns for Hoes and Food
Mozambique's Christian Council (CCM), the umbrella body for the main Protestant churches, is trying to reduce violent crime by collecting illegal guns while allowing the owner to remain anonymous. The "Guns into Hoes" programme was introduced in 1991 during the peace process. However, despite support from both the CCM and the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference for a similar programme, the project was blocked by President Chissano in April 1992.⁴⁴ After further delays, it finally got off the ground on 20 October 1995. By January 1997, the programme had collected 874 firearms, 79 other weapons (e.g. knives), and over 20,000 armaments ranging from bullets to bazooka shells (see Table 4).⁴⁵ In the first five months of the programme, an average of 115 weapons were handed into the CCM monthly. This now has declined to between 15 and 20 per month. Some of these weapons were destroyed and made into anti-militaristic sculptures displayed at Maputo's International Trade Fair, FACIM, in August 1996.⁴⁶

The programme was scheduled to last two years and had an initial budget of US$1.2 million provided by Germany and Japan. Most of the money was to provide incentives for people to come forward and hand in their weapons. Bicycles, sewing machines and agricultural hand-tools were offered in return. Anyone who provided information leading to the discovery of a significant cache might receive a reward such as a tractor.

But the program was short of money and people complained that they had not been rewarded for handing in weapons. The programme was also limited to an area in the far south around Maputo city. However, in October 1997, the programme received a boost with a grant of $125,000 from the Swedish Development Agency, SIDA. The CCM hopes to use this money to expand its programme to the Gaza and Inhambane provinces.

There are additional complications in the programme, such as the case of Delphina Armando Cossa in Maputo, who received a sewing machine in exchange for her brother's pistol. The CCM discovered several bicycles already given out by the Council for other weapons. Using more than one family member, the brother has been slowly turning in a store of weapons without attracting attention to himself.⁴⁷

In mid-May 1995, the Associacao dos Desmobilizados de Guerra (AMODEG) contacted the CCM to assist with providing good quality beans and flour in exchange for guns from demobilised soldiers. The presumption was that ex-soldiers had access to a number of guns and ammunition and that offering food might encourage them to exchange some of their weapons in times of food shortages rather than using them to commit crime to survive.⁴⁸

Table 4. Mozambique: CCM Arms into Ploughshares Project

Source: Conselho Cristao Mocambicana, 8 January 1997.

The South Africa Connection
The destination of many of the firearms leaving Mozambique is South Africa. The influx of illegal firearms is stimulated by political conflict, growing crime and a sustained, perceived need for self-protection.⁴⁹ Criminal gangs have armed themselves to intimidate and control certain areas and are increasingly using light weapons in criminal activities linked to financial gain. It is estimated that in 1995 crime cost the South African economy R31.3 billion, or 5.6 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP). Since 1989, South African murders have increased by 61 percent, armed robberies by 119 percent and rapes by 80 percent.⁵⁰

South Africa is itself a main source for the illegal small arms market. In mid-1996, 1,933,222 citizens owned 3,503,573 licensed firearms in South Africa, over a 60 percent increase over the 1986 total of 2,492,633 licensed firearms.⁵¹ In 1996 the demand for licenses for firearms from the authorities averaged 20,000 new requests per month, a clear response to increasing levels of violent crime.

Crime networks have become well established and the same networks are often used for smuggling firearms, drugs, vehicles, ivory, rhino horn, gem stones and precious metals. Mandrax, much of it originating in Pakistan, is imported through Mozambique and Zambia and traded on to South Africa and to a lesser extent to Mexico and Holland. When arresting four members of a suspected million dollar Bulgarian car-theft syndicate in March 1997, police were astonished to find papers stating that 10,000 AK-47 assault rifles would be delivered with "the grenade-chargers missing".⁵²

Particular gangs specialise in providing and distributing firearms. Some groups are comprehensive, being involved in the trafficking of whatever is in demand. South African Police reported that in 1995, seven organised crime syndicates which primarily participate in either drug trafficking, stock-theft, housebreaking or diamond and gold related offences, were also involved in the illegal firearm trade. In early 1996, the Firearm Investigation Unit of the South African Police Service was aware of and was monitoring the activities of more than 2,800 suspects known to be involved in the illegal firearm trade. The Minister of Safety and Security Sydney Mufamaddi told Parliament in June 1996 that there were 481 known crime syndicates operating in South Africa, of which 112 were involved in vehicle and weapons smuggling.⁵³

There is little doubt that the availability of firearms has increased violent crime. However, the precise number of illegal weapons circulating in South Africa is not known, with estimated figures ranging from 400,000 to 8,000,000. The number of weapons seized by the police is low; they estimate that they seize at most ten percent of all weapons that enter the country illegally. The South African police seized 11,660 firearms during 1993 compared to 14,460 firearms in 1994. In 1995 the figure was over 15,000. In the first six months of 1997 they seized 71 AK-47s, 155 rifles, 515 hand weapons (pistols) and 181 home-made guns.

Pistols Outselling AK-47s
The South African media frequently reports that AK-47s are used in armed crime, playing on images of communist onslaught encouraged during the apartheid years.⁵⁴ In fact 1997 police figures show pistols and revolvers are actually the most popular tools of armed crime in South Africa, including in the taxi wars. South African Police statistics show that in the majority of crimes such as armed robbery, housebreaking and car theft, a pistol is preferred to an assault rifle.

In March 1997, an illegal arms dealer in central Johannesburg offered a selection of small arms, including AK-47s, R-4s and Stechkin, Scorpion, Makarov and Tokarev pistols. "When I started this business, I bought up a whole lot of AKs from suppliers in Mozambique. But there is little demand for them. I have good stocks, and can offer you a good price, R200 each. I need to move stock, otherwise I'll be out of business. I need cash to buy pistols. That's what people want; I'm always short on stocks", he complained.⁵⁵

The simple reason for such a preference is that pistols and revolvers are much easier to conceal. One exception is attacks on security companies, which attract gang-type attacks, many of them armed with AK-47s and using armour piercing bullets and rocket-propelled grenades.

The pattern of light weapons transfers from Mozambique to South Africa as well as the statistics on the kinds of weapons being handed in or recovered appears to mirror the market demand in South Africa. Operation Rachel sweeps (see below) have captured far fewer pistols and the same pattern is true of what has been handed into the CCM in Maputo. Mozambique police also confirm that new Stechkin, Scorpion, Makarov and Tokarev pistols are being transferred through Maputo port to South Africa. These originate from Bulgaria, Albania and Russia. They only transit Mozambique although there is some evidence that they are stockpiled with Mandrax and other contraband passing through Maputo.

Although automatic weapons are not used extensively in armed crime, there does appear to be a market for them in South Africa. In his recent study of small arms proliferation in southern Africa, Glenn Oosthuysen warned that such weapons are possibly being stockpiled by political groups in places such as KwaZulu-Natal pending an upswing of violence.⁵⁶ Dealers also appear to be stockpiling weaponry and former Renamo bases in southern Mozambique and secret locations in the Kruger park are being used as depots for the arms trade from where the guns are then transported to the Ingwavuma-area in KwaZulu-Natal.⁵⁷

Co-operative Efforts to Stop Trafficking
During President Chissano's visit to South Africa in March 1995, the two countries signed a formal security agreement. Under this agreement, the South African Firearms Investigation Unit and the Mozambican police force would operate jointly against arms traffickers and others in southern Mozambique. The agreement also provided for a regular exchange of information and access to detainees for interrogation in whichever country they are detained. Following a meeting between South African Security Minister Sydney Mufamadi and Mozambican Interior Minister Almerino Manhenje in June 1997, both countries agreed to increase their police co-operation to include Mozambican police access to a South African detective academy.⁵⁸

In 1995, the first two joint Mozambican-South African police operations resulted in the destruction of forty-five arms caches in southern Mozambique. In the first Operation Rachel in July 1995, Mozambican and South African police officers jointly destroyed over 270 firearms and a large quantity of ammunition in front of the press. Much of this weaponry had been hidden around Maputo province.

Operation Rachel-II netted a further 273 firearms, 148 of them AK-47s. Most of these were either destroyed in situ or in front of television cameras near Maputo on 6 September 1995.⁵⁹ A total of 2211 AK-47s and more than a million rounds of ammunition were destroyed by these joint operations.⁶⁰

In January 1997, a joint operation near Xai Xai in the Gaza province uncovered an arms cache containing 100 hand grenades, 40 mortars, more than 100 rifles, 100 machine guns and 2,000 rounds of ammunition.⁶¹ A further operation, Operation Rachel-III, took place between 21 July and 11 August, 1997, mainly in Gaza, Inhambane and Sofala provinces. During this operation more than 5,500 machine guns, sub-machine guns and automatic rifles (1,177 of them AK-47s) were located and destroyed. Seventy-eight pistols, 518 antipersonnel landmines, four antitank mines and three million rounds of ammunition of various calibres were also located and destroyed.⁶² Further operations are planned and intelligence has already located some 70 caches of weapons in Cabo Delgado province.

However, Operation Rachel has in fact had limited success. The co-operation by the Mozambican authorities has been mixed and there has been a series of scandals involving tipping off arms traffickers prior to raids and involvement of both South African officials and their Mozambican counterparts with these traffickers. This has resulted in some purges of the teams and it will remain to be seen how the northern Mozambique operations perform.

Security co-operation between South Africa and Mozambique could expand further. Mozambican Defence Minister Aguiar Mazula and his South African counterpart Joe Modise signed a Letter of Intent on 4 February 1996. It authorised the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to enter Mozambican territory "in zones of difficult access for Mozambican police and security forces" and allowed SANDF units to enter Mozambique on "hot pursuit" operations against armed groups already engaged in South Africa. A joint commission of defence ministries on frontier problems may be extended to include joint exercises.⁶³

Conclusion
Today, Mozambique's challenge is to control the flow of new illegal weapons in southern Africa and to ferret out the links between senior officials and crime syndicates. Recent experience shows that when there is sufficient political will to deal with these issues, there are tangible results. The Mozambican government's banning of antipersonnel mines in February 1997 and signing the Ottawa landmine ban treaty in December 1997 is one example; the replacement of Home Affairs and Police Minister Manuel Antonio with Almerino Manhenje in November 1996 is another.

If the government fails to act against the weapons trade in Mozambique and does not support continued serious disarmament, it will likely have significant implications for democracy and civil liberties. Stockpiled guns and ammunition can be accessed by groups tempted to use violence to obtain their goals; crime syndicates are prone to supply weapons to whoever pays. Mozambique's recent history shows how quickly armed individuals can cause a social, economic and humanitarian crisis.

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Endnotes

1. M. Klare, "The Global Trade in Light Weapons and the International System in the Post-Cold War Era" in J. Boutwell and M. Klare and L. Reed (eds.), Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995) pp. 31-43.

2. M. Berdal, "Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars. Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflicts", Adelphi Paper 303, August 1996.

3. See also, A-F Musah et al., "Africa: The Challenge of Light Weapons Destruction During Peacekeeping Operations", BASIC Paper no. 23, British American Security Information Council, December 1997 and A. Chloros et al., "Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Light Weapons Destruction in Central America", BASIC Paper no. 24, British American Security Information Council, December 1997.

4. S. Hill, "Disarmament in Mozambique: Learning the Lessons of Experience", Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1, April 1996, pp. 127-145.

5. A. Vines, Renamo. From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? (Oxford: James Currey, 1996).

6. A. Vines, "Angola and Mozambique. The Aftermath of Conflict", Conflict Studies 280, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, May/June 1995.

7. "General Peace Accord for Mozambique", reproduced in The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995) p.116.

8. Author interview, Maputo, March 1995.

9. Author interview, Maputo, April 1995.

10. Author interview, Xai Xai, September 1994.

11. Author interview, Xai Xai, September 1994.

12. J. Wurst, "Mozambique Disarms", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 50, No. 5, September/October 1994, pp. 36-39.

13. E. Breman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996) p.73.

14. UN Cease-Fire Commission, "Report of CCF Chairman to CSC Meeting on 18 July, 1994", CSC/MIN/033, annex 1.

15. M. Hamlyn, "Poll raises Mozambican fears", The Times (London), 21 October 1994.

16. Author interview, Paris, February 1995.

17. R. Synge, Mozambique. UN Peacekeeping in Action (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1997) p.110.

18. A. Vines and J-P. Borges Coelho, "Trinta Anos de Guerras e Minas em Mocambique", in Arquivo Historico (ed.), Mocambique: Desminagem e Desenvolvimento (Maputo: Arquivo Historico de Mocambique, 1995) pp. 11-49.

19. See Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997) pp. 62-99.

20. UN Supervision and Control Commission, "Minutes of CSC meeting of September 19, 1994", CSC/MIN/042.

21. South Africa Press Association (SAPA), 24 July 1996.

22. See Human Rights Watch, "Mozambique" in Human Rights Watch World Report 1995 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), p.32.

23. B. Phillips, "Renamo's 'phantoms' of the bush worry UN", Daily Telegraph (London), 18 November 1994.

24. R. Synge, Mozambique. UN Peacekeeping in Action (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1997) p.111.

25. J-P. Borges Coelho and A. Vines, Pilot Study on Demobilization and Re-integration of Ex-combatants in Mozambique (Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, 1995).

26. J-P. Borges Coelho, The Re-integration of Ex-combatants in Maputo (Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, 1997).

27. C. Dolan and J. Schafer, The Re-integration of Ex-Combatants in Mozambique. Manica and Zambezia Provinces (Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, 1997).

28. Noticias (Maputo), 4 March 1997.

29. Author interview, Maputo, March 1995.

30. Author interview, Maputo, March 1995.

31. Author interview with Lionel van Dyke, Harare, April 1996.

32. S. Daley, "In Mozambique, Guns for Ploughs and Bicycles", New York Times, 2 March 1997.

33. Noticias (Maputo), 15 September 1997.

34. Author interview, Maputo, March 1995.

35. Radio Mozambique, Maputo, in Portuguese 1730 gmt, 3 October 1997.

36. This unit was subsequently deployed in 1996 on other routes, such as the Mapuo-Beira road and the Ponta do Ouro-Maputo roads.

37. C. Bishop, "Arms for Africa. Deadly trade poses threat to stability", Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 27 August 1995.

38. Author interview with Jakkie Potgieter, senior researcher, Institute for Security Studies, Eskom Conference Centre, Midrand, 3 July 1997.

39. Author interview with Bernie Auditorie, director of SCS, Maputo, 27 February 1997. See also SCS, "Company Profile", no date.

40. Author interview, Manjacaze, 7 April 1997.

41. M. Massingue, "Mozambique. Riding on a Crime Wave", Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly (Harare), November 1996.

42. Zimbabwean police source, Harare, April 1996.

43. At least seven companies were mentioned, namely Delta, Proteg, Alfa, Sosep, Securitas, Tivonele and Bassopa.

44. Even a small Protestant church "Arms into Ploughshares" project in 1991 in Malawi sponsored partly from the British High Commission in Lilongwe to deal with the increasing number of guns coming into Malawi from Mozambique had to be stopped because the Mozambique government found that its troops in garrisons like Malanje were selling their weapons. Author interview with Dennis Osborne, ex-British High Commissioner, Lilongwe, December 1991.

45. Author interview with Boaventura Zita, CCM, Maputo, 4 March 1997.

46. ELO Ecumenico, no. 32, August 1996.

47. S. Daley, "In Mozambique, Guns for Ploughshares and Bicycles", New York Times, 2 March 1997.

48. Noticias (Maputo), 26 May 1995.

49. See J. Cock, "A Sociological Account of Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa", in J. Singh (ed.), Light Weapons and International Security (New Delhi: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, 1995).

50. G. Oosthuysen, Small Arms Proliferation and Control in Southern Africa (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1996) p.10.

51. D. Besdziek, "Into the Breech: Reversing the Proliferation of Firearms in South Africa", African Security Review, vol. 5, no. 6, 1996.

52. The Star & SA Times International (London), 12 March 1997.

53. The Sowetan (Soweto), 20 June 1996.

54. J. Cock, "A Sociological Account of Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa" in J. Singh (ed.), Light Weapons and International Security (New Delhi: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, 1995) p.110.

55. Author interview, Johannesburg, 7 March 1997.

56. G. Oosthuysen, Small Arms Proliferation and Control in Southern Africa (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1996) p.14.

57. An example of this was a huge weapons cache found by police in the Kruger National Park on 16 July 1997. The cache was about five kilometres from the park's border with Mozambique. It contained 105 AK-47 assault rifles, 1700 rounds of Tokorev 7.62mm ammunition and two RPG7 projectiles. The weaponry, all of Russian origin, apparently emanated from Mozambique. SAPA news agency, 16 July 1997.

58. SAPA news agency, 10 June 1997.

59. The total captured was: 685 AK-47 rifles, 154 sub-machine guns, 255 rifles, 47 mortar tubes, 29 RPG-7s, 2 anti-aircraft heavy machine guns, 170 mortar bombs, 84 anti-personnel mines, 5 pistols and 23,415 rounds of ammunition.

60. M. Naude, "Control of Illegal Weapons Across Borders: Practical Examples", paper presented at First International Conference on Comparative Regional Security, Institute for Security Studies, Midrand, 1-3 July 1997.

61. SAPA news agency, 10 June 1997.

62. News media statement by the Divisional Commissioners National Detective Service and the Division Crime Prevention and Response, "Joint Operation: South Africa Police Service and Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM): Arms Caches in Mozambique (Operation Rachel III)", Pretoria, 11 August 1997. Other weapons found and destroyed were 336 hand-grenades; 153 detonators; 3726 mortar bombs; 79 Rocket and Mortar launchers/tubes; 2340 projectiles (including 158 RPG-7); 13 Cannons; 3674 magazines of ammunition.

63. Domingo (Maputo), 11 February 1996.

This paper was written by Alex Vines while on sabbatical as a MacArthur NGO Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London. He is a research associate at the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch. An earlier version of this paper appeared in the Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 24, no. 1, March 1998.

Edited by Susannah L. Dyer, Consultant.

The author would like to thank the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Department of War Studies, King's College and the British American Security Information Council for supporting this research.

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