BASIC PAPERS

JUNE 1997 • NUMBER 21 • ISSN 1353-0402

Anarchy in Albania: 
Collapse of European Collective Security?

 By Marcella Favretto, with Tasos Kokkinides

NATO has been actively engaged during the conflict in neighboring Bosnia, but the Alliance is absent from the latest crisis in Albania. The reluctance of NATO to contribute towards bringing stability to this corner of Europe meant that it was left to individual nations, with Italy taking the lead, to form a coalition of states willing to contribute troops.

Over the past few years Albania has received substantial political, economic and military support from NATO countries. It was one of the first countries to participate in the NATO Partnership for Peace program, and it was the first country to ask for NATO membership. The disintegration of Albania exposes the limitations of NATO's Partnership for Peace program in projecting stability towards countries who will not be included in NATO expansion. The unwillingness of NATO to restore order in Albania raises doubts about NATO's ability to deal with the new security problems, due to economic, political and ethnic unrest, that have appeared with the end of the Cold War.

The Albanian crisis has been a good test for the ability of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to address the new forms of instability in post Cold War Europe. In a short time the OSCE has established its presence in Albania in order to guide this country toward political stability and to promote national reconciliation. The OSCE has been tasked with providing advice and assistance in election preparation and monitoring. Franz Vranitzky, Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, has been playing an important role in mediating between the Albanian political forces. He provides the coordinating framework within which other international organisations, such as the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU), are acting to help with democratization and the delivery of the humanitarian aid.

The multinational operation code-named ALBA, conducted by a coalition of states led by Italy, received authorization from the UN Security Council to help create a secure environment for the operation of international organizations providing civilian and humanitarian assistance.

This paper argues that operation ALBA provides four main causes for concern:

1. It establishes a dangerous precedent for future peacekeeping operations in Europe where intervention is left to ad-hoc coalitions of countries, usually neighbours affected by the outcome of the crisis, often with vital national interests to promote.
   
   

2. There may be a lack of effective coordination between various bodies, namely the countries providing troops, the EU, the non-governmental organizations providing and distributing humanitarian aid and the OSCE. [see Appendix, p. 7]
   
   

3. Operation ALBA may find itself in circumstances where the typical conditions for peacekeeping operations - impartiality, the consent of the parties involved in the conflict and the prohibition of force except in the case of self-defense - fall short.
   
   

4. The chaotic and anarchic situation in Albania creates problems for European security organisations, which have difficulties meeting high expectations in their peacekeeping operations. NATO, WEU and OSCE have a mandate for peace support operations that has remained unutilised since the beginning of the Albanian crisis. In particular, NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), designed for peace-support operations outside NATO's traditional area, and the Euro-Corps, which may be deployed for missions of keeping and restoring peace, have remained idle in the Albanian crisis.

Recommendations

• The OSCE should become more actively involved in the multinational operation in Albania. In particular, the UN should extend the mandate of operation ALBA on condition that the OSCE and its representatives, including the overall co-ordinator, Franz Vranitzky, participate in the planning and political oversight of ALBA.
  
  

• The OSCE should build on its decision¹ to explore ways and means of monitoring and collecting the weapons that have pervaded Albanian civil society. Resources should be made available to the OSCE to ensure comprehensive weapons collection and destruction programs. Peacekeeping forces should be mandated to implement a gun 'buy back' program which should operate on a 'no questions asked' basis. Weapons looted from the Albanian police and military should be securely stored and guarded by peacekeepers.
  
  

• NATO and EU countries should encourage the OSCE to establish a mechanism for planning and assuming command and control over future peacekeeping operations. In particular, NATO should comply with the commitment taken in 1992 at Helsinki that "the CSCE may benefit from resources and possible experience and expertise of existing organizations such as the EC, NATO and the WEU, and could therefore request them to make their resources available in order to support it in carrying out peacekeeping activities".²
  
  

• NATO's failure to prevent conflict in Albania and project stability in the region indicates the need for comprehensive packages of conflict prevention measures. Other organisations, such as the OSCE, the EU and the Council of Europe would be more appropriate in projecting stability in eastern and south-eastern Europe.

Ad Hoc Peacekeeping: Back to Spheres of Influence?
The crisis in Albania and the inaction of the major western powers have demonstrated that security in Europe is divisible. Although the OSCE States declared at the Paris Summit in 1990 that security is indivisible and that the security of each of their countries is inextricably linked to the security of all the CSCE (now OSCE) States,³ in Albania it has become clear that when the national interests of the major powers are not at stake, it is left to a coalition of neighbouring states, having particular interests in a region, to take action. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Danish Foreign Minister Helveg Petersen, applauded the role that "interested countries" were playing in the Albanian operation, indicating that this was a model for future European security initiatives.⁴ Operation ALBA might come to epitomise the way European powers are going to deal with small crises on Europe's peripheries in the future. Specifically, leaving them to coalitions of willing interested states without much reference to security organisations provided with peace-support mandates, or UN-standards for peacekeeping including impartiality. Peacekeepers could be deployed into countries for reasons of self-interest rather than regional stability.

Despite the danger that the Albanian crisis could spread to neighbouring Kosovo or Macedonia, the United States, Germany and Britain, who are actively involved in Bosnia, have not deployed any troops in Albania and have left the task to their southern European allies. The United States, despite supporting NATO as the main institution for stability and security in Europe rejected any Alliance involvement in Albania.⁵ Similarly, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared that the Albanian crisis was essentially an internal matter and it was not clear what foreign troops could do there.⁶ In March 1997, Albania was said to be part of "the great European family"⁷ but the EU foreign ministers ruled out Albania's call for military intervention.⁸ France's participation in operation ALBA has more to do with its desire to enhance joint European action in security and foreign policy.

UN Resolution 1101 states that the mission must be conducted in a 'neutral' and 'impartial' way. Impartiality and neutrality are fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping operations. The UN has traditionally been reluctant to use forces from neighboring powers or from states with special interests for its peacekeeping operations. However, over the past few years, this guiding principle has proved difficult to maintain in Europe. In the former Yugoslavia, Italian, German, Greek and Turkish troops intervened as blue helmets and Russia is supporting its national interests by playing a main role in peacekeeping operations in Georgia. The Albanian case confirms this trend.

Participating countries in operation ALBA, and in particular Italy and Greece, can hardly be considered 'disinterested' actors. On the contrary, the two neighboring countries have vested interests in Albania. Since the end of the Cold War successive Italian governments have given explicit political and economic support to President Berisha's regime. Italy is the principle trade partner of Albania and its primary investor, with 400 Italian companies employing more than 30,000 Albanians.⁹ In addition, Italy is faced with the problem of refugees. Since the Albanian crisis began, thousands of refugees have fled to Italy, and the Italian government is anxious to stop the influx.

Greece is also an interested party, due in part to the minority population of Greek origin in southern Albania. Although Greek troops have not been deployed in this area, the Greek minority is a serious reason for considering the presence of Greece in Albania not entirely impartial. Greece is also concerned about the flow of refugees crossing the southern border of Albania. Italy and Greece are both suspected to have intervened in order to stop refugees flowing to their countries.

Lack of Effective Coordination
The Steering Committee, based in Rome, provides the political control of operation ALBA. It consists of representatives from contributing countries as well as the military commander of the operation. So far, the following countries have contributed to the force: Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey. Representatives from the OSCE, EU, WEU and the United Nations are participating in the Steering Committee only as observers.

The challenge for the Steering Committee is coordinating the military with the civilian and humanitarian parts of the mission. The OSCE has established an OSCE presence in Albania which will "provide the coordinating framework within which other international organizations can play their part in their respective areas of competence, in support of a coherent international strategy, and in facilitating improvements in the protection of human rights and basic elements of civil society". Vranitzky is coordinating the delivery of EU aid and OSCE activity in the field of democratisation and preparation of elections and monitoring.

UN Security Council Resolution 1101 confines itself "to encourage the Member States participating in the multinational protection force to cooperate closely with the OSCE, the European Union and all international organizations involved in rendering humanitarian assistance in Albania". It neither sets any obligation to report systematically and frequently to the OSCE nor any more constraining coordination framework. The Steering Committee confines itself to sending, at least every two weeks, a general report to the UN Security Council. The Italian government insists that "an excellent collaboration has been set up between the multinational protection force and the missions of international organizations" involved in Albania. However, it is not clear how a good coordination between the two operations, civilian and military, might be ensured. The OSCE is invited to the Steering Committee meetings only to observe and the Steering Committee is not required to provide the OSCE with regular information.

In Albania, the OSCE is tasked with assisting the preparation and the conduct of the elections on June 29th, in accordance with standards of transparency, fairness, freedom of movement and access to the media. As it was stated at the Preparatory Meeting on Albania on May 26th "the Multinational Protection Force, within the framework of its mandate, will assist Albania in ensuring a safe environment during the electoral process, in accordance with the OSCE election monitoring concept". Albanian elections are going to be held in a climate of violence and insecurity. The disarmament of the Albanian population will not be achieved before the date of the vote. The Italian-led multinational force will be involved in crucial tasks, such as guaranteeing secure conditions for the electoral process, and creating a neutral political environment free of violence and intimidation. The question can be raised as to how these tasks can be effectively carried out without the existence of an adequate coordination mechanism between the civilian and the military components of the mission. There will also be a strong need for a good interaction between the two components of the mission if the OSCE decides to take on the task of monitoring the collection of weapons, as was suggested by the OSCE Permanent Council Decision of 27 March 1997.

Since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations have become complex. There is an increasing number of support roles for the military aimed at facilitating operations of other mission components. Military forces are expected to ensure a secure environment for non military operations, such as the distribution of humanitarian aid, electoral monitoring and refugee repatriation. The experience of previous operations, such as those in Somalia, Angola, Bosnia and Cambodia, have shown the difficulty of juxtaposing military and civilian operations, which are interrelated and mutually supportive, and the problems arising in command, control and coordination. These past experiences have demonstrated that, to ensure a good interaction between the military and civilian components of a mission, there is a need to establish a formal liaison structure with an integrated joint procedure for planning, information exchange and mutual support.

In Albania, the maintenance of a secure environment during the electoral process will be crucial to ensuring fair elections. The birth of a legitimate government, accepted by the entire Albanian people, including the southern committees run by the rebels, is the first step to get Albania out of the crisis. The rationale behind the intervention in Albania is the return of the political stability. Insufficient and defective coordination between the military operations and the OSCE's electoral activities would compromise this rationale.

From Peacekeeping to Peace-Enforcement?
Operation ALBA is not under the direct control of any international organization (UN, OSCE, NATO). Operation ALBA is legitimised through the UN Resolution and the participating nations report back to the UN through the Steering Committee. However, neither the UN Secretariat's Department of Peacekeeping Operations nor NATO nor OSCE are involved.

Operation ALBA has been authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter by a Resolution of the UN Security Council. The aims of the mission, as stated in the mandate, are "to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance and to help create a secure environment for the missions of international organizations in Albania, including those providing humanitarian assistance". The use of military personnel to establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance was typical of the peacekeeping operations in Somalia and in Bosnia. In both cases, however, delivery of assistance was not perceived as 'impartial' by the warring factions, and military forces ended up becoming a part of the conflict.

Impartiality is a fundamental element in any peacekeeping operation. Consent of the conflicting parties relies on the perception of peacekeepers' impartiality. However, operation ALBA is of questionable impartiality. President Berisha strongly sought the deployment of a multinational force which, by stabilizsing the situation and freezing the status quo, would strengthen Berisha's hold on power.

President Berisha flirted with the idea, but in the end avoided a violent clash with the rebels who are keeping political and military control of the main Albanian towns in the south. He accepted the formation of the Reconciliation National Government led by Bashkim Fino, representative of the Socialist party, and the holding of new elections. However, the political situation remains highly unstable with real risks of escalation. Southern Committees reject the authority of President Berisha and demand his resignation. President Berisha declared he intends to use force to oust the rebel 'Salvation Committee' in the southern town of Vlore before the elections. There is the danger that the multinational force might be caught up in an armed conflict between President Berisha and the rebels if the situation degenerates.

The multinational protection force is operating in a highly anarchic environment where the population is almost entirely armed. In February 1997 Albanian citizens raided weapons storage sites looting 800,000 hand-guns from police and military stores.

It will be a difficult task to ensure fair elections in June in such conditions. The French Defense Minister Charles Millon, declared that the multinational force "will be able to use its arms if it is threatened or if it sees that law and order are threatened". Admiral Venturoni, Commander of the operation, declared that "the force will not go into Albania as the blue helmets went into Bosnia, where they were constrained to stand by during grave acts of violence without intervening because the rules of engagement did not permit it". Beniamino Andreatta , Italian Defence Minister, argued that "the force would use its weapons not only in self-defence, but also to facilitate completion of the mission in its entirety".

Because of the robust rules of engagement, the danger is that the multinational force might resort to military responses on the ground, such as firing if rebels try to block roads and hold up aid convoys. The use of force by the peacekeepers may undermine the perception of their impartiality. Operation ALBA could run the risk of being perceived as an additional belligerent party and could become a target for retaliation. By losing its impartiality, the multinational force would also lose the consent of the rebel committees. Operation ALBA, created as a peacekeeping operation, could find itself in conditions typical of peace-enforcement missions.

Putting the multinational protection force under the direct control of an international organisation would give a legitimising umbrella to an operation which is taking place in a highly unpredictable environment with real risks of uncontrolled escalation.

Bigger Role for the OSCE
The case of Albania is indicative of the need for a strengthened and revitalised OSCE, especially if it is to become the primary peacekeeping organisation in Europe. The OSCE should explore ways and means to assume the leading role in the multinational operation in Albania, in order to:

1. ensure a larger involvement by the international community in the operation in Albania
   

2. guarantee an effective coordination between the humanitarian and military components of the mission
   

3. provide a legitimising umbrella to the mission

Since the end of the Cold War the OSCE has taken important steps to develop its peacekeeping capabilities in order to contribute to peace and stability in an undivided Europe. NATO has also declared on more than one occasion its readiness to make its resources available to the OSCE for peacekeeping activities. These declarations have been empty.

In 1992, then CSCE participating states decided to have "a more effective role in conflict prevention and resolution, complemented, when necessary, by peacekeeping operations".¹⁰ Chapter III of the Helsinki Document specifies the framework in which the peacekeeping operations are expected to be carried out, including the chain of command, financial arrangements, and cooperation with other organisations. The document states that "the CSCE may benefit from resources and possible experience and expertise of existing organisations such as the EC, NATO and the WEU, and could therefore request them to make their resources available in order to support it in carrying out peace-keeping activities".¹¹

At Helsinki, in 1992, participating states declared their understanding that then CSCE was a regional agreement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the UN.¹² This enables the OSCE to carry out operations authorized by the UN Security Council.

In June 1992, at the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, NATO ministers agreed that "the Alliance has the capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and increased responsibilities for crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this regard, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise".¹³ The Russia-NATO Founding Act, agreed in May 1997, commits NATO and Russia "to make joint decisions and taking joint action on a case-by-case basis ... including peacekeeping operations under the authority of the United Nations Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE".¹⁴

At the 1994 OSCE Budapest Summit Meeting participating states made the first attempt at peacekeeping. They agreed to provide "a multinational CSCE peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh following agreement among the parties for cessation of the armed conflict.¹⁵ Although, to date, no OSCE peacekeeping force has been deployed to the region, the OSCE has developed a mechanism, the High Level Planning Group in Vienna, for the command and control of such operation. The crisis in Albania provides a good opportunity for enhancing the OSCE peacekeeping capabilities by extending the mandate of the existing mechanism to other flash-points across Europe.

The UN should extend the mandate of operation ALBA on condition that the OSCE gets closely involved in the development and implementation of the operation. There is a strong case for establishing a clear chain of command within the OSCE over the civilian and military components of the operation.

The OSCE, as the only pan-European security organization, has a key role in European peace and stability. The strengthening of its peacekeeping capabilities is the only way to help the OSCE to take on the task of ensuring "a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state"¹⁶ in Europe.

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Endnotes

1. OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 160, 27 March 1997.
   

2. The Challenges of Change, Helsinki CSCE Summit Declaration, 10 July 1992, chapter III, para.52.
   

3. Joint Declaration of the Paris CSCE Summit, 19-21 November 1990.
   

4. OSCE Newsletter, vol.4 NO.4 April 1997.
   

5. US Department of State spokesman Nicholas Burns, Statement on Albania, 7 April 1997.
   

6. Reuters, 12 March 1997.
   

7. Ambassador D'Ansembourg quoted in Albanian Telegraphic Agency, 18 March 1997. Ambassador D'Ansembourg led the EU and OSCE joint delegation, with fact-finding tasks, in Tirana (17-18 March 1997).
   

8. Reuters, 17 March 1997.
   

9. La Repubblica, Italy,14 April 1997.
   

10. The Challenges of Change, Helsinki CSCE Summit Declaration, 10 July 1992, chapter III, para.1.
    

11. The Challenges of Change, Helsinki CSCE Summit Declaration, 10 July 1992, chapter III, para.52.
    

12. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter deals with regional arrangements (articles 52, 53 and 54). Article 52, para.2 reads as follows: "The members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall value every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council".
    

13. Communiqu‚ of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, 4 June 1992, para.11.
    

14. Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997, para. 28.

15. Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Area, Budapest Summit Declaration, 6 December 1994, chapter II, para.4.
    

16. Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997, para.8.