BASIC PAPERS

JUNE 1995 • NUMBER 11 • ISSN 1353-0402

Partnerships for Peace:  Drifting into Secrecy 

By Tasos Kokkinides

Executive Summary
Despite initial hesitation Partnership for Peace (PfP) has been endorsed by 26 central and eastern European (CEE) states. In the first year of operation, partner countries have benefited from military cooperation with NATO on a variety of activities and have begun the process of westernizing their defence structures.

Although NATO promised that the PfP agreements which govern this cooperation would be transparent, this has not turned out to be the case.

This paper argues that the lack of transparency may undermine stability in CEE. This, coupled with the individual approach to NATO membership which is the essence of PfP, may promote competition between partner countries instead of cooperation. In addition, the PfP goal of establishing inter-operability of military structures and equipment may open the door for future western wepons transfers to selected PfP countries. Such a development, in the context of semi-secrecy, may heighten tensions between recipients and non-recipients and boost the popularity of nationalist forces in the excluded countries.

It could only benefit the process of confidence-building in CEE if NATO pursues its commitment to transparency and agrees to make all PfP documentation publicly available. If NATO maintains the present policy, a whole series of semi-secret agreements will be constructed with CEE. Since the initial PfP documents are not being made public, it is most unlikely that further and more detailed documents will be.

Recommendations

• It is essential that NATO, perhaps through NACC, acts promptly to establish full openness in its relations with CEE by making PfP documents public. Failure to do so will add a new, unnecessary and entirely avoidable complication to the task of ensuring stability in Europe.
  
  
• NATO countries should refrain from providing military hardware to CEE countries. Although there is clearly a need for non-lethal equipment which could improve the communications, command, control and intelligence (C3I) and air-defence of the CEE armed forces, the absence of a credible threat to the security of the CEE countries ought to convince NATO countries that the transfer of offensive military hardware could only be counter-productive.

From Transparency To Semi-Secrecy
NATO is engaged, along with other institutions, in the serious process of restructuring European security. This is a task which, in the interests of promoting high confidence and stability in Europe, should be conducted with maximum transparency. NATO is aware of the need for transparency, and, in the PfP, NATO committed to it:

"The Individual programs will be transparent to all partners, but none will have the right to interfere with any other's program". Gebhardt von Moltke, NATO Assistant Secretary General for political affairs.¹

However, this is not what happens in practice. NATO told BASIC that the decision to make these documents available to other partner countries rests with each individual government.

NATO has also made elements of transparency an integral part of the PfP programme:

...we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries ... ²

Although NATO is willing to assist the process of democratization and openness in CEE countries, it is reluctant to have the mechanism it has established for doing this open to scrutiny. There is some irony in conducting under "restricted" or "confidential" status a programme which includes in its aims increasing transparency and improving democratic control of the military. All European countries, with the US and Canada, participate in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which obliges member states to promote transparency in their defence as an important element of confidence building. The "restricted" or "confidetial" classification of PfP documents contradicts this principle. In practice, this means that parliamentarians in NATO and PfP countries, having no easy access to these documents, are forced to make decisions on the future of European security without relevant information.

Taking their lead from NATO, partner countries are reluctant to release the documents. Some diplomats have argued that the cost of document distribution is the main reason for keeping the classification of PfP documents either as "restricted or confidential". Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Estonia, countries which have agreed on their IPP with NATO have either refused or have failed to respond to requests to release either of the two documents.

BASIC has written to all countries that have agreed IPPs -- with the exception of Russia which agreed its IPP at the NACC ministerial meeting in Noordwijk, The Netherlands, on 31 May 1995 -- requesting copies of the documents. The responses have been widely different. The Finnish government, for example, while asserting that the IPP is not a public document and that it is meant for official use only, has released the PD stating, that by answering [BASIC's] request the government made policy . In complete contrast, the Polish government decided to send the IPP but not the PD. The official explanation was that according to [the] bilateral NATO-Poland agreement [the PD] is not allowed to be published or...[become] public information .

Hungary is the only country which has published the 1994 IPP. In addition, BASIC has been given access to five more IPPs: those of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Sweden; and six PDs: those of Russia, Moldova, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Finland. The current practice, where countries such as Hungary operate openly and other nations policies remain opaque, is incongruous at best.

Although "Coordination of PfP activities" is a specific topic of cooperation in every IPP, the variety of responses regarding the release of PfP documents suggests that coordination of policy regarding the transparency of documents has not been achieved yet. The Czech government responding to BASIC acknowledged that there is no common agreed policy of the PfP participants in this field . This may be the consequence of PfP's emphasis on self-differentiation between partner countries which makes partner to partner cooperation difficult, as discussed in the next section.

Although it is difficult to assess the overall record of the PfP programme in its first year of operation, preliminary analysis of the released documents raises two important issues:

• PfP, by emphasizing the individual approach to NATO membership, may inadvertently promote competition between partner countries and undermine regional cooperation in CEE;
  
  
• PfP provides a potential framework for Western weapons sales to CEE in the context of promoting inter-operability between NATO and partner armed forces.

Emphasis on Self-Differentiation May Undermine Regional Cooperation
PfP, unlike NACC, is based on self-differentiation among states. The late Les Aspin, then US Secretary of Defence, explained:

Distinctions between countries are going to be drawn on the basis of their own efforts -- what we call `self-differentiation . That means that anybody can join, but it is self-selecting. Some will only do the minimum.... Others will be more active.... Some might even devote their whole military to this NATO connection. The more a country does, the more relevant its defences become to NATO and membership . ³

Self-selection, or self-differentiation, as pursued through the PfP programme provides NATO with a formula for dealing with the Russian question. NATO and PfP officials argue that the PfP programme leaves the door open for possible future Russian membership of the Alliance, but that the onus is on Russia to determine the extent and pace of cooperation with NATO. As Andrzej Karkoszka, Director of the National Security department at the Polish Ministry of National Defence remarked, " this self-differentiation rule...forces a decision upon Russia herself whether she wants or not and, when she does, how closely or in what fashion to cooperate with NATO. No one but Russia herself can isolate her from the rest of Europe". ⁴

After a long delay, Russia has agreed on its IPP. Despite the statement of the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, that [w]e continue to believe that [NATO expansion] does not meet either the interests of Russia's national security or the interests of European security as a whole, CEE countries hailed Moscow's decision to finally become an active PfP member.⁵ Although it is too early to assume that this development will anchor Russia to the West, it will nevertheless help to ease tensions between NATO and Russia and promote cooperation instead of confrontation.

However, the danger is that CEE countries will become even more reluctant to make their PfP agreements transparent. Russia, despite joining PfP, has a strong preference for the multilateral approach of NACC. At NACC, Russia has certain political weight and the transparency of the programmes of cooperation between participants allows Moscow to have a say.

The second NATO-Russia bilateral agreement entitled Areas for Pursuance of a Broad, Enhanced NATO/Russia Dialogue and Cooperation, may be perceived as allowing Russian intrusion into the CEE-NATO relationship. The emphasis on dialogue, instead of the standard NATO commitment to consult other CEE countries, reflects Russia s weight and responsibility as a major European, international and nuclear power . The areement promotes NATO-Russia dialogue by sharing of information on issues regarding politico-security related matters...political consultations on issues of common concern [and] cooperation in a range of security related areas including...in the peacekeeping field .⁶ Despite NATO assurances, many fear that Moscow would interfere and perhaps veto some IPP activities.

The sometimes obsessive suspicion of Russian motives, may lead CEE states to believe that keeping the PfP documents out of Russia's sight would avert the possibility of their interference. However, reducing transparency even further, would create obstacles to regional political and military cooperation between CEE countries. On the contrary, publishing all PfP documents on agreement provides the best defence against unwelcome pressure from any quarter.

The political structure of consultations within the PfP framework is based on the 16+1 format. Individual partner countries negotiate with the NATO 16 the details of their participation in PfP. The idea is that each CEE country selects the areas of cooperation it would like to pursue and earmarks the necessary resources to carry out the agreed programmes. NATO insists that although the Alliance has the final say in deciding the feasibility of cooperative proposals, it is up to each partner country to decide the pace and extent of its involvement. However, the preliminary analysis of the PfP documents indicates that this is not the whole picture. In some circumstances, the NATO-partner relationship conforms more to the format of Partner proposes and NATO disposes . The Hungarian PD, for example, proposes that a Hungarian representative participates in meetings of the permanent representatives of the North Atlantic Council . This request would have improved the political consultation between Hungary and NATO, but it appears that Hungary asked too much. The IPP does not mention Hungarian participation at the North Atlantic Council.

The 16+1 format reinforces the individual approach to NATO membership and in doing so it may undermine regional political cooperation and encourage instead competition between states. This does not correspond with the measures taken in other international fora. The recent signing of the Stability Pact and the work currently under way in the OSCE are pulling in the opposite direction from the PfP.

A concrete example of decreasing regional cooperation is provided by from the Visegrad Four. Since the PfP initiative there has been a marked loosening of cooperation between these states. The Czech Republic refused to participate in Visegrad ministerial meetings on three occasions in 1994 and has rejected any suggestion to institutionalize the Visegrad Four grouping.⁷

The individual approach tends to be favoured by the Czech Republic and Poland in particular, as they are closer to NATO accession. This was highlighted during Clinton s visit to Prague, following the January 1994 NATO summit when the PfP initiative was officially endorsed. Poland accused the Czech Republic of hijacking the visit by failing to coordinate adequately with the Visegrad Four group. President Havel's response was: Czech policy correctly emphasizes we are independent countries that must each act for itself and follow its own interest .⁸

Some states want to maintain regional cooperation. The Hungarian Defence Minister, Gyoergy Keleti, reaffirmed Hungary's desire for increased cooperation not only between the Visegrad Four, but with Romania as well. Although he stated that Hungary is not "striving for joint accession of the Visegrad Four", he argued that the gist of PfP in this region is that we should cooperate in the interest of accession .⁹

Slovakia goes even further than this, advocating that Visegrad countries should enter NATO as a bloc and not individually. The Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk, in an interview with The Washington Times on 28 March, said that the partial, individual approach can end in undesirable results . He also launched an attack on the Czech position of going it alone saying that:

...there is some kind of game to gain political prestige...The Czech Republic...[is] saying that the Visegrad group is just a place for some economic cooperation, and that political-military questions or the security questions are the issues that each country should pursue individually. Within this framework there is no space to discuss the unified approach to membership .¹⁰

In its PD, Slovakia states that it would welcome the organization of some activities within the Partnership program at the subregional level, especially with the participation of the states of the Visegrad Group .

Although no CIS state has asked for NATO membership, closer political and military cooperation between individual CIS states and the Alliance could undermine the evolving CIS security structure. Not surprisingly, with the exception of Russia, no CIS state has yet agreed on an IPP. Russia's agreement on its IPP may give the green light for the CIS states to do the same. Moscow maintains, however, that the obligations of the nine CIS member-states which have signed the CIS Collective Security Treaty (Tashkent Treaty) is at variance with the PfP framework. Moscow argues that it will be difficult for the collective interests of these states to be realized in a partnership, since the intention is to implement that partnership on a strictly individual basis with each separate partner, and since the programme will ultimately be determined by NATO itself. PfP may ruin the attempt to create any kind of strategic cooperation within the CIS framework.

PfP Facilitates Western Weapons Transfers
One of PfP's stated objectives is the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance .¹¹ One important aspect of this task is to achieve compatibility and inter-operability between the weapons systems of NATO and partner countries. Because of the lack of adequate financial resources for modernizing their weapon systems, CEE countries have asked for Western help. Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania are the most vocal in asking for "hand-me-downs" from NATO countries.

Polish Minister of Defence Piotr Kolodziejczyk said:

...we hope that PfP will be useful in making it possible for Polish and NATO forces to fit together like `Lego building blocks .... It is obvious that our equipment is mostly obsolescent -- perhaps one generation behind -- but this can be rectified provided time and money are available.... The process [of modernization] will require large investments, and firs and foremost, Western technological support .¹²

NATO countries have begun the process of differentia-ting between CEE countries. The increasing desire of the US Congress, for example, to support free or US-funded transfers of excess military equipment to selected countries of CEE may undermine stability in the region. The US NATO Participation Act 1994 specifies that the President may provide "hand-me-downs" to the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland. This initiative is reminiscent of the NATO "cascade" policy, according to which large amounts of second-hand offensive military equipment, including thousands of tanks, heavy artillery and armoured combat vehicles, were transferred to Greece and Turkey. The continued animosity between the two NATO Allies which endangers the security of the entire region does not seem to have convinced the US and NATO to rethink the policy of weapons transfers.

In a parallel development in February 1995 the Clinton administration decided to permit sales of "state-of-the-art" military equipment to ten former Warsaw pact countries.¹³ Although those countries are unable to afford to buy sophisticated American equipment, the official barrier to such purchases has been removed. The New York Times remarked that the American interests ostensibly served by arming the central Europeans include increased access and influence, having others pick up a share of defense costs and interoperability ...with NATO forces . The editorial went on to suggest that: The United States should be limiting, not promoting, the sale of arms, particularly in countries that do not need them and cannot afford them .¹⁴

More recently, Polish acting Defence Minister Milewski confirmed that F-16 fighter aircraft are on the list of Poland's most immediate armament needs. The drawing of such a list of priorities will help to break a deadlock in cooperation between arms industries of Poland and the US. The list also embraces telecommunications equipment, short- and medium-range surface-to-air missiles, and anti-tank systems. Milewski added that Poland could not afford the purchase of armament elements and systems either now or in the future so we are deeply interested in the joint production of anything we need. ¹⁵ Co-production and licensed production ventures are increasingly the way the West is doing business with Asia, and is in turn leading to the creation of a number of powerful national defence industries in that region. Once a country has acquired technology by co-production, it is extremely difficult to control its further production and export of either the technology or the final weapons system. It would be deeply unfortunate if, via cooperation with NATO, the arms industries of central and eastern Europe were revitalised.

This possibility has not been lost on Russia. Andranik Migranyan, a member of Boris Yeltsin's Presidential Council, argues that the central European countries and former Soviet republics, in joining the PfP and eventually NATO, will push Russia out of their markets as an arms supplier, dealing a serious blow to our military-industrial complex .¹⁶

Conclusion
The PfP programme could contribute to increased security and stability in CEE by enabling participating states to benefit from the expertise of NATO states, which have for forty years run a military establishment that is accountable to civil authority. However, an important ingredient of security is transparency. NATO and the partner countries can dramatically improve confidence in the region by publishing their agreements. Until the Partnership programme takes place in a more public fashion, it will be hostage to accusations from competing states about favouritism, and will likely contribute to a breakdown in some bilateral relationships.

PfP implementation is already raising important issues such as the impact of the differentiation policy and the consequences of possible weapons transfers. If these and other issues are to be properly understood and resolved the agreements that give rise to them must be made available without exception.

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Endnotes

1. "How the Partnership works and where it's designed to lead", Gebhard von Moltke, International Herald Tribune, 24 June 1994.
2. PfP Invitation Document issued by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Brussels, 10-11 January 1994.
3. "US sees self-selection by east on joining NATO", International Herald Tribune, 10 January 1994.
4. 1995 NATO Symposium, "NATO Expansion: Opinions and Options, The view from Poland", Washington, 24-25 April 1995.
5. Draft statement by Andrei Kozyrev at NATO Council, Noordwijk, 31 May 1995.
6. Summary of Conclusions of Discussions between the North Atlantic Council and Foreign Minister of Russia Andrei Kozyrev, Noordwijk, 31 May 1995.
7. Czechs and Hungarians agree to differ over regional ties, Open Media Research Institute (OMRI), 28 February 1995.
8. "Poles accuse Czechs of hijacking prestige visit", Adam LeBor, Times, 12 January 1994.
9. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 February 1995.
10. Washington Times, 28 March 1995 and OMRI 30 March 1995.
11. PfP Framework Document issued by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Brussels, 10-11 January 1994.
12. "Poland-A Future NATO Ally", Piotr Kolodziejczyk, NATO Review, October 1994.
13. "US allows arms sales to ten in ex-east bloc", Washington Post, 18 February 1995.
14. "The arms bazaar expands eastward", New York Times, 9 March 1995.
15. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 February 1995.
16. "PfP: No Russia is too big for this exercise", Andranik Migranyan, International Herald Tribune, 24 June 1994.