BASIC PAPERS

MARCH 1995 • NUMBER 10 • ISSN 1353-0402

U.S. Policy Leading into the NPT Conference 

Executive Summary
In the final weeks before the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, the Clinton Administration has focused itself on one goal: the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. The Administration believes that past and current U.S. policies justify the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty, and that this option will prevail at the NPT Conference. Critics of U.S. policy contend that debate within the Administration has led to a minimalist approach, creating policies that may not have done enough either to ensure the indefinite extension of the NPT or to ensure its stronger implementation.

Internal debate within the Clinton Administration has frequently led it to take a cautious policy line. This tendency can be seen in the Nuclear Policy Review, in the controversy surrounding the 10-year opt-out proposal, and in the U.S. contention that no more needs to be done to attain the goal of indefinite extension of the NPT. The question remains whether that contention will prove correct. The Administration could take several additional steps that would greatly increase the likelihood of indefinite extension, but appears convinced that it needs to take no further measures. The most widely expected potential move is a statement on security assurances from the five declared nuclear powers.

This paper explains the current U.S. position as the NPT Review and Extension Conference approaches, and gives an overview of some of the internal debate that has taken place within the Clinton Administration on these issues.

Current U.S. Policy
Clinton Administration officials working on the NPT make two points:

• The United States has done all that is required to justify the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT; and

• The United States expects a majority of countries to vote in favor of that option.

A majority of the approximately 176 countries party to the treaty must vote for either indefinite extension, extension for a fixed period, or for fixed periods. Around 70 countries have publicly declared their support for indefinite extension, ten have indicated they will oppose it, and the rest have not stated a final position.(1) Administration officials state that a majority of countries have already indicated privately to the Administration that they will vote for indefinite extension. Once that majority becomes clear, the Administration expects a snowball effect to develop: many countries will view indefinite extension as inevitable and vote that way as well. This snowball effect will give the United States the substantial majority it hopes to have by the end of the Conference, when the extension vote is expected to take place.

The Administration makes its case for indefinite extension by pointing to its record, including:

• Agreement on the START I and II Treaties, which substantially reduce Russian and U.S. strategic arsenals;
  
  
• Agreement on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminates an entire class of nuclear missiles;
  
  
• Commitment to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiation, including the recent dropping of the 10-year opt-out proposal;
  
  
• Call for a global ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons;
  
  
• Unilateral withdrawal of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons from its arsenal;
  
  
• Withdrawal of 200 tons of fissile material from the nuclear weapons stockpile.

Before the Conference convenes, two additional steps may be taken. First, the five declared nuclear powers may make a statement on positive and negative security assurances, an option the five are actively discussing. One obstacle is China's opposition to any statement weaker than its own absolute declaration of a no-first-use policy. The result may be individual statements or a statement from the remaining four - France, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom - duplicating the pledge the latter three made to Ukraine on its accession to the NPT.(2) Those assurances, however, went little beyond the long-maintained conditional declarations already issued by the nuclear powers. In the United States' case, its current assurances were originally put forth over a decade ago, well before the end of the Cold War.

Second, the U.S. Senate is expected to ratify the START II Treaty. Senator Jesse Helms, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has indicated he supports ratification. Senator Richard Lugar, another treaty supporter, will direct the ratification process. With their support, ratification in the U.S. may occur before the NPT Conference starts, despite concern over Russia's slow implementation of START I and worry about the fate of START II in the Duma (or Russian parliament). Every indication points to the conclusion that the U.S. is now clearly focused on promoting its goal of indefinite extension. Vice President Al Gore, with his strong background in foreign policy issues, will head the U.S. delegation to the NPT Conference. Daily meetings at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency involving 35 people from six different agencies review the status of the campaign to win votes. The Administration reports that it raises the issue in every meeting it has with other countries.

Privately, some Administration officials report concern over only one remaining issue: the procedure for voting on the extension decision. The Fourth Preparatory Committee meeting could not reach agreement on this issue. To attempt to resolve it, delegates agreed to two days of intersessional negotiations on 14-15 April, immediately before the Conference opens. Administration officials state, off the record, that the parties are close to reaching agreement on a procedure. The proposed system would list every extension proposal on one ballot, and each party would vote for its preferred option. If one option obtains a majority, it wins. It is unclear, however, exactly how voting would proceed if no option obtains a majority on the first ballot.

Criticisms of U.S. Policy
Many countries have criticized the United States for its failure to take additional steps that would increase the likelihood of indefinite extension of the NPT. Specific concerns include:

• Failure to commit to reductions in its nuclear arsenal beyond those called for under the START II Treaty;
  
  
• Failure to get agreement among the nuclear powers on stronger positive and negative security assurances, and to strengthen U.S. assurances;
  
  
• Failure to achieve substantial progress on the CTB, resulting in part from a U.S. strategy that attempted to maintain unity among the five declared nuclear powers;
  
  
• Reluctance to restate publicly the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

While the U.S. cannot unilaterally get agreement on security assurances or on a CTB, some countries criticize the United States for not bringing enough pressure to bear on its nuclear allies.

Additionally, countries have criticized the United States for failing to deal effectively with the growing quarrel between Egypt and Israel over the latter's undeclared nuclear arsenal. In particular, countries would like to see the United States pressure Israel to take some steps to meet Egypt'sobjections.

Another question is whether U.S. faith in the snowball effect is misplaced. If objections to indefinite extension are stronger than the U.S. believes, the NPT could be weakened. While the goal of a majority vote for indefinite extension may be achieved, a significant number of states may abstain from voting, in deference to the objections raised by some countries, particularly leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement. If this occurs, it could substantially undermine member states' support for the NPT and check the momentum towards its universality. It could also make progress on other non-proliferation goals, like improving the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards program, more difficult.

Finally, some difficult decisions may have simply been postponed until after the NPT Conference. For example, unnamed Pentagon sources indicate that the Department of Defense may now be pushing for a 100-ton plus threshold on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,(3) and may even support a 300-ton level. Because a CTBT is one of the principal objectives of the non-nuclear-weapon states, a proposal like this, creating in essence a threshold test ban, could severely damage the NPT regime. A 300-ton threshold would actually exceed the yield of the W54 warhead, which for over a decade was part of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Struggle on the Inside
The Clinton Administration has been racked with internal debate over its own policies. The influence of these debates can be seen in the cautious and sometimes obstructionist policies the United States has pursued.

Following President Clinton's election, the United States government undertook a fundamental re-examination of its nuclear policies. Called the Nuclear Posture Review, the study was intended to provide a blueprint for U.S. policy in the new post-Cold War era. The review was set within the context of START II, and future force structures are still open to debate. However, the NPR proposed no dramatic changes. There was no call for further reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, for U.S.-Russian negotiations toward that end, or for any substantial reform in U.S. nuclear strategy. The conservative result was a consequence of the conflict between the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the one hand and ACDA and the National Security Council on the other.

In order to get the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for its CTB policies, the Clinton Administration introduced the controversial proposal calling for the 10-year opt-out clause. This proposal resulted from statements by the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons laboratories that without additional nuclear tests the safety of nuclear weapons could not be completely assured for more than ten years. Despite objections from ACDA and the Department of Energy itself, the 10-year opt-out proposal was introduced. It met with near universal condemnation. Despite this opposition, the U.S. maintained the proposal for months.

Finally, as pressure for progress before the NPT Conference mounted, the Clinton Administration began to reconsider its position. On Thursday 26 January, Deputy Directors of the agencies concerned met to discuss the issue, but reached no conclusion. The next day, Secretaries met, including Secretary of Defense William Perry, Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher. They too could reach no decision. Finally, on Saturday, 28 January, a meeting was held with President Clinton. Despite objections from the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President decided for the United States to withdraw the proposal, to call for a treaty in 1995, to indicate that France and China were slowing the negotiations, and to call for negotiators to meet continuously until a treaty was achieved.

The most recent U.S. initiative, made during a Presidential speech on 1 March, again reflects the on-going interagency debate. In the speech, President Clinton stated that the United States was withdrawing 200 tons of fissile material from the nuclear stockpiles. The withdrawal means the material will not be available for weapons-building. Because the portion of the material that is actually weapons-grade is classified, it is difficult to determine the overall significance of this generally commendable action.

President Clinton also "strongly reaffirmed" the commitments of the nuclear weapons states under the NPT "to pursue nuclear arms control and disarmament . . ."(4) Sources have indicated, however, that the original draft of the speech called for Clinton to restate the goal of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Those words were removed after objections from Department of Defense officials. Other reports also indicate that the Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected a proposal, put forth by the National Security Council and supported by ACDA, to call for reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal to 2,500 weapons, or 1,000 below the maximum allowed under the START II Treaty. Reportedly, the JCS felt there was no need for such a pledge, and that events since the Nuclear Posture Review did not warrant any change from the NPR's minimal recommendations.(5)

The interagency process has also been affected by debate over the fate of several agencies. Secretary Christopher proposed merging ACDA and other international agencies into the State Department. After Vice President Gore lobbied against the idea, President Clinton rejected it. However, the idea was later picked up by Senator Helms. He endorsed Christopher's proposal and will introduce a bill to require the merger. This debate, at this crucial time, forces ACDA to focus on defending itself from attack and detracts from its efforts to promote the U.S. position.

The Department of Energy has also been the target of attack. Although it at least has temporarily weathered efforts to abolish it, the Department has had its budget sharply cut. However, many members of Congress, primarily Republicans, still support abolishing the Department, and it too has been forced to devote valuable resources to defending itself.

Conclusion
The Clinton Administration believes that it is has done all that it needs to do to justify its goal of indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. It has stated that it believes it will have the votes to attain that goal. However, there are several substantive steps the Administration has not taken that would do much to strengthen its case. One direct step would be to commit to further reductions in its nuclear arsenal.

To this point, interagency debate has led to the cautious "minimalist" approach the Administration has taken and will take into the Conference. Because of that debate, any substantive initiatives the Administration might make before or during the Conference will require President Clinton to make the decision.

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Endnotes

1. Campaign for the NPT, "Vote Count for the Indefinite Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty," 23 March 1995.
2. "Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," at the Budapest Summit of the CSCE, 5 December 1994.
3. "Clinton Administration Divided over Policy on Future Nuclear Testing," Inside the Pentagon, Vol. 11, No. 9, 2 March 1995, pp. 1.
4. Address by President Clinton at the Nixon Center, 1 March 1995.
5. "JCS Rejects White House Initiative to Reduce to 2,500 Nuclear Weapons," Inside the Pentagon, Vol. 11, No. 11, 16 March 1995, pp. 1.