Pressure
for enhanced IAEA inspections grows:
Update on Response to Iran’s Nuclear Programme.
by
Lynne O’Sullivan
IAEA
Report
Dr. ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, led the IAEA
inspection team in Iran in February 2003 to investigate claims
that Iran had violated its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
commitments. Dr. ElBaradei had previously met with the Board in
March 2003 to report his ongoing communication with the Iranian
government regarding its nuclear programme. Subsequently, the
inspection team commenced “extensive verification
activities”[i]
in Iran. The results of the investigations were in Iran was
contained in Dr. ElBaradei’s report to the IAEA Board of
Directors on 16 June.
In
his introductory statement, Dr. ElBaradei summarised the main
findings of the investigation in Iran to date.
He concluded that Iran has neglected its responsibility
to report certain nuclear materials and activities.
He stressed that the IAEA is continuing efforts to ensure
that the nuclear material in Iran could be identified, declared
and placed under international safeguards.
Dr. ElBaradei listed some aspects of the Iranian nuclear
programme that require further examination including the
“research and development work relevant to [Iran’s] uranium
conversion and enrichment programme and its programme for the
use of heavy water”.[ii]
Dr.
ElBaradei outlined the investigative processes the IAEA team is
utilising in Iran: technical discussion, inspection of specific
sites and environmental sample analysis.
He briefly referred to the existence of a site that
required further examination. The inspection team has not yet
been granted full access to this site by the Iranian government
and has been unable to take environmental samples.
He acknowledged the allegations that there were
“enrichment activities”[iii]
within the site but this cannot be confirmed without additional
samples.
Dr.
ElBaradei stated, “corrective actions are being taken in
cooperation with the Iranian authorities”.[iv]
However, he also urged Iran to bring an Addition Protocol
into operation so that the IAEA could confirm its peaceful
nuclear aspirations and stated that the investigation into the
Iranian nuclear programme would continue.
US
Fears
The next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors is scheduled for
September 2003.
Many international state actors, most notably the Bush
administration, will be seeking a definitive response before
then to encourage Iran to sign the Additional Protocols
stipulated by the IAEA.
The United States is eager for IAEA inspectors to have
complete access to all nuclear sites and ascertain if the
activities at these sites are in keeping with Iran’s NPT
commitments. The fear remains that Iran is pursuing a
clandestine nuclear weapons programme without the knowledge of
IAEA investigators.
This is possible, given that Iran has already made
advances in nuclear technology without the international
community being aware of it.
The
United States is seeking multilateral cooperation on this issue
and seems to be encouraging an IAEA response that recognizes US
concerns with the Iranian programme and credibly addresses those
concerns.
Although it is already the organisation’s largest
donor, the United States aims to increase the IAEA’s budget by
twenty-five per cent by donating an extra $30m.[v]
This would allow the IAEA to strengthen its monitoring of
nuclear activities in Iran and be more effective in ensuring NPT
compliance.
EU
Response
The IAEA was one of the main topics of discussion at the EU
foreign ministers meeting on 16 June.
The outcome of this meeting was an unprecedented
agreement on a common policy on weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The “Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation
of WMD” document was issued in conjunction with an “Action
Plan” to facilitate its implementation.[vi]
These common policy documents are significant as they declare
the possible use of “coercive measures” to prevent the
proliferation of WMD.
These measures would only be utilised after diplomatic
and economic measures have been exhausted and would be carried
out multilaterally under the auspices of the United Nations.
Prevention of proliferation will be initially addressed through
non-military channels, including political dialogue and
multilateral treaties.
The documents also state that economic sanctions,
blockades and export controls can be imposed before the use of
force is considered. These two policy documents reaffirm the
EU’s commitment to international institutions and stipulate
that the use of force must only be taken “in accordance with
the United Nations Charter”.
Nevertheless, the EU’s commitment to consider joint
military action represents a departure from previous European
policies.
In
a Radio 4 interview on 17 June, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw
outlined the UK’s policy towards Iran.
He stated that the British government would continue to
pursue “constructive and conditional engagement”[vii]
with the Iranian government. But in a rapidly developing story
the stakes were raised the next day, with reports that Britain is pressing Europe to give Iran a two-month ultimatum
to comply with demands to halt its nuclear programme. The
proposed sanction would be the loss of a valuable trade deal
with the EU.[viii]
While Britain appears to be trying to avoid another
damaging rift between Europe and America, Although
in its policy with regard to Iraq, the British Government is the
United States’ greatest European supporter in the US-led
‘coalition of the willing’, it has not reacted to the
situation in Iran as strongly as the Bush administration.
It is likely that the British Government will adhere to
the strategy defined by the EU and only consider military
options once all other alternatives have been exhausted.
Opinion
among European governments regarding Iraq was divided and the EU
was unable to issue a cohesive policy response. The EU’s
inability to present a policy alternative to the US-led war in
Iraq may have encouraged member states to go the extra mile to
formulate a collective strategy in addressing WMD proliferation.
The EU has also advocated increased funding for the IAEA
to facilitate more intrusive inspections.
Although the foreign ministers did not specifically refer
to the Iranian situation, the unfolding circumstances doubtless
influenced their discussions.
Conclusion
The continuing US support for the IAEA’s role in Iran
indicates that the Bush administration may be willing to let
international efforts lead the way on Iranian policy, at least
for now. Or, it may indicate that the Bush administration has
not yet formulated a clear policy, especially as its military is
currently so widely dispersed. Simultaneously, the EU has
seemingly accepted the possibility of using force against a
potential ‘rogue’ nuclear state.
It is therefore possible that the United States and the
EU may arrive at a common policy regarding Iran.
The
EU policy document can be seen as a positive development.
The proliferation of WMD has become a divisive issue and
it is important that the EU has a stated and coherent policy.
It is vital that viable policy alternatives are developed
and pursued before military options become necessary.
The EU’s proactive response provides tools for conflict
prevention and may decrease the potential of unilateral US
action.
Russia has been intrinsically involved in the Iranian
nuclear programme but has cooperated in diplomatic efforts to
encourage Iran to declare its nuclear intentions. Russia’s
collaboration with the United States and the EU has become part
of a cohesive international endeavour to resolve the ambiguous
situation in Iran.
The
unfolding situation in Iran should be distinguished from the
recent conflict in Iraq and the nuclear ambitions of North
Korea.
It is essential that the EU and US establish and analyse
the situation before taking authoritative action.
The IAEA will play a vital role in evaluating the Iranian
nuclear programme and determining the intentions of the Iranian
government.
At the moment, administrations on both sides of the
Atlantic are awaiting a definitive statement from the IAEA,
which is likely to precede any further transatlantic upping of
the ante in Iran.
[i] Full statement available at
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n011.shtml
16 June 2003
[ii] ibid.
[iii] ibid.
[iv] ibid.
[v] Tett, Gillian, Dempsey, J. and Bozorgmehr,
Najmeh, ‘US seeks more cash for nuclear watchdog’
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1054966154745&p=1012571727102
16 June 2003
[vi]
Council of the European Union, Basic
Principles for an EU Strategy against
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
10352/03, Brussels, 10 June 2003; and Council of the
European Union, Action
Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles for an
EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, 10354/1/03, Brussels, 13 June 2003.
[vii] ‘What Should the
West done about Iran?’, The
Today Programme http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/listenagain/
17 June 2003.
[viii] Anton
La Guardia ‘UK seeks EU ultimatum on Iran arms’, Daily
Telegraph, 18 June 2003.