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BASIC NOTES 28 April 2003 Senate
Hearings on NATO Expansion: Key Issues of Concern
Thank you to
Martin Butcher at Physicians
for Social Responsibility for assistance on questions related to
nuclear issues. Introduction
As the
global debate over the principles of preemption and unilateral
action continues, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is
under great pressure as it faces both internal dissention and doubts
about its usefulness. Disputes among allies over involvement in Iraq, the
protection of Turkey, and debates about a peacekeeping role outside
the North Atlantic region all have overshadowed the alliance’s
enlargement process, which hit a climax last November when seven
Eastern European countries were invited to join the organization.
The Expansion Process
At the
Prague Summit in November 2002, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were extended invitations
to begin accession talks. These
accession talks were held from December 2002 to March 2003 between
NATO experts and representatives of the invited nations.
They discussed the obligations and commitments of alliance
membership, as well as issues in need of further reform to meet
these obligations. The
outcome of these talks is the submission to NATO of letters of
intent by individual invitees attesting to their intended reforms to
meet obligations and the establishment of a timeframe for these
reforms.[1]
Following the receipt by NATO of these letters of intent in
March 2003, the individual Protocols of Accession for each of the
invitees were signed on behalf of NATO members on March 26, 2003 to
serve as amendments to the North Atlantic Treaty and currently await
approval by the governments of NATO countries.
Once all Protocols of Accession are accepted, the invited
countries must deposit their instruments of accession with the
United States in order to become full parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty. The entire
process of accession should be completed in time for the next NATO
summit in May 2004. NATO has
traditionally maintained an open door policy of accepting into the
alliance any European state that may contribute to the security of
the North Atlantic area. Hungary,
Poland and the Czech Republic were the most recent additions to the
alliance in March 1999. The
latest round of expansion has been characterized by the
implementation of a Membership Action Plan (MAP) in April of 1999,
designed to give greater structure and guidance to the preparations
of nations moving toward accession to the North Atlantic Treaty.
These preparations included the submission of national
programs toward preparation, such as political, defense, economic,
resource, security and legal status and provides for the feedback of
NATO countries to the aspirant countries on these programs and their
ability to meet NATO standards.
The MAP also suggests the examination of military and defense
assistance by NATO countries toward these aspirant countries.
Ratification by the United
States
The
ratification by the United States of these Protocols of Accession
will take place in the Senate according to the guidelines for treaty
ratification. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee initiated hearings on
NATO expansion in the weeks following the signing of these Protocols
to consider the implications and strategic advantages and
disadvantages of ratification of the Protocols as well as the future
of NATO in general. These hearings are intended to provide the Senate with
insight into these issues from high-ranking government officials and
non-governmental NATO experts prior to final consideration of the
Protocols for ratification by the Senate.
These hearings should provide the opportunity to raise
concerns and gain insight into many of the unanswered issues
surrounding the accession of the seven invited countries as well as
the future of NATO more broadly.
BASIC has raised several questions for consideration during
these hearings in five main areas of concern:
NATO, after
September 11, 2001, conducted lower-level missions, such as
deploying AWACS to the United States to help monitor its skies in
support of the war against terrorism. NATO is now headed toward an
era where it may be conducting more intense missions outside of the
European theater. Where
is NATO likely to be used within the next decade? ·
So far,
every country that had led the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has been a member of NATO.
Will NATO eventually take over the ISAF?
·
The EU is
replacing NATO’s peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, which may
indicate a larger trend. With
the EU ramping up its military capabilities, does the United States
want to have NATO move out of the Balkans completely over the coming
years and have the EU take over?
Does the Administration envision a time frame for this? ·
Some of the
Prague invitees, such as Estonia and Lithuania, have offered
peacekeeping support for future operations in Iraq.
Despite recent and severe diplomatic problems within the
alliance over policy toward Iraq, is there any chance that NATO
might be used to help train a peacekeeping force for that country? v
For more
information, see: o
“The
Results of the Prague Summit and the Challenges Ahead,” BASIC
E-mail Series article - http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/fall2002ResultPrague.htm o
“Changing
the Guard in Afghanistan and Macedonia,” BASIC Reports
article - http://www.basicint.org/pubs/BReports/BR83.htm NATO’s
Response Force
Much has
been said about the “niche” capabilities of new and aspiring
countries to help develop a NATO Response Force (NRF).
For example, the Czech Republic maintains chemical and biological
defense capabilities that could be useful to the NRF. Nevertheless,
one would expect that newer and even some seasoned allies will need
financial assistance for NATO to create the force.
·
How costly will it be for the
United States to help an enlarged NATO develop the NRF? Before U.S. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld proposed that NATO develop the NRF, the
European Union was working toward the creation of an all-European
Rapid Reaction Force. While
the EU’s RRF is intended to conduct lower-level peace operations
and the NRF will be designed to participate in high-intensity
combat, some concern persists that NATO and the EU might duplicate
their capabilities, resulting in unnecessary military expenditures.
·
To what extent have personnel
at the State and Defense Departments analyzed the problem of excess
defense expenditures that could result from a possible duplication
of EU and NATO assets? ·
How might the U.S. policy of
preemptive intervention influence decisions to use the NATO Response
Force? ·
How could European skepticism
over the United States’ preemption policy impact NATO relations? v
For more information, see: o
“Rapid Reaction Forces: More
Questions Than Answers,” BASIC Note - http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2003EU-NATOforcesfin.htm o
“NATO’s Defense Gap: More
Than Just Capabilities,” BASIC E-mail Series article - http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/fall2002defcapgap.htm NATO
and the Conventional Arms Trade
According to
an Iraqi defector interviewed by the British newspaper, The
Guardian, Iraq may have obtained anti-aircraft
rockets and missiles from a
source in the Czech Republic as recently as 2002.
·
Are there
any plans for NATO to play a role in end-use monitoring of weapons
within alliance countries? NATO
and Russian Relations
Much has been made of NATO’s
emerging new relationship with Russia and the opportunity to build
upon the progress of the NATO-Russia Council established this past
spring in Rome, but tensions over Iraq may threaten to derail
substantial progress.
v
For more information, see
“As NATO Gets Bigger, Can It Downsize Nuclear Risks,” BASIC
E-mail Series article, http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/fall2002tacticalnuke.htm NATO
and Nuclear Policy
Despite
a much-touted “transformed” NATO, it is clear that nuclear
weapons—paired with distinctly Cold War–reminiscent
strategies—remain very much a core part of the alliance. Lord
Robertson has said that the concept of deterrence is at the heart of
NATO’s philosophy and nuclear posture, “and so long as there are
nuclear weapons in the world there is a role for NATO’s nuclear
posture.” In the past, NATO nuclear policy has followed in line
with U.S. policies. Recent changes in U.S. strategy will undoubtedly
result in NATO discussions and shifts in policy.
Nuclear
Cooperation Agreements
For background on Nuclear Sharing, see: “Questions of Command and Control: NATO, Nuclear
Sharing and the NPT,” BASIC Research Report at http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2000nuclearsharing1.htm
Within the NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO stated
that the alliance “has no intention, no plan, and no reason to
establish nuclear weapons storage sites on the territory of those
members (nations joining in last NATO enlargement), whether through
construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of
old nuclear storage facilities.” During Senate hearings on ratification of the last
round of NATO enlargement, Secretary of State Albright and Secretary
of Defense William Cohen added some additional “no’s” to these
first three. Both officials confirmed that there are no plans to: Ø
Train new
members states’ pilots in nuclear missions during peacetime, Ø
Nuclear
certify these countries’ aircraft, or Ø
Transfer
equipment or infrastructure to support these countries’
dual-capable aircraft in a nuclear role.
For more
information, please contact: Chris
Lindborg, Analyst – Transatlantic Security Issues Kathryn
Crandall, Analyst – Nuclear Weapons Issues [1] There is no requirement that these reforms be carried out prior to official accession to the North Atlantic Treaty, simply that they be scheduled for reform prior to accession.
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