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BASIC NOTES
7 March 2002
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PrepCom
2002: Avoiding More
Missed Steps
By Christine Kucia
BASIC
The upcoming meeting
of States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will
be another opportunity for the world to focus on the strength of
international security agreements in the wake of heightened concern
over the availability of weapons of mass destruction.
Why Are We Having
A PrepCom?
The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting, which will begin paving
the path toward the 2005 Review Conference (RevCon) of the NPT, will
meet April 8-19, 2002 in New York.
PrepCom meetings
convene in the three years preceding the five-yearly NPT reviews to
start procedural and substantive discussions.
According to Strengthening the Review Process for the
Treaty (Decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference),
“The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to
consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the
full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and
to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference.” Creating procedural recommendations are also a task for
PrepComs.
During the 2002
PrepCom, the 189 NPT States Parties will discuss ways to move
forward with the NPT’s objectives, especially in light of the
decisions made at the May 2000 RevCon.
What Are the
Issues Being Carried Forward from the 2000 Review Conference?
The May 2000 RevCon broke new ground for global
non-proliferation efforts. In
the final document, all states agreed to an historic “13 steps”
toward the goal of accomplishing the elimination of the world’s
nuclear arsenals. Steps
agreed by both nuclear-weapon states and their non-nuclear allies
and neighbors include:
-
Achieve
early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT).
-
Continue
the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions until CTBT
enactment.
-
Move
forward on negotiations for a verifiable treaty banning fissile
material production.
-
Establish
a body within the U.N. Conference on Disarmament to start
discussions on nuclear disarmament.
-
Apply
the principle of irreversibility to arms control and disarmament
negotiations.
-
Develop
verification capabilities that will be required to provide
assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements.
-
Implement
START II and conclude START III negotiations as soon as
possible, while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a
cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further
reductions of strategic offensive weapons.
-
Nuclear-weapon
States will take the following steps leading to nuclear
disarmament in a way that promotes international stability:
o
Efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;
o
Increased transparency on nuclear weapons capabilities
and implementing agreements;
o
Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,
both unilaterally and as a part of the arms reduction and
disarmament process;
o
Concrete measures to further reduce the operational
status of nuclear weapons;
o
A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security
policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to
facilitate the process of their total elimination;
o
Engagement of all the nuclear-weapon States in the
process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
-
Reaffirm
that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the
disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under
effective international control.
-
An
unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to
accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals
leading to nuclear disarmament.
What
Are the Expected Outcomes or Anticipated Glitches?
When the countries convene in New York next month, evaluating the
level of progress on this list of commitments will be a critical
component guiding the discussions.
However, several changes in the international security
climate since May 2000 have resulted in significant setback in the
implementation of these measures.
– U.S. Withdrawal From the ABM
Treaty
Recent actions and
statements by the Bush administration in the United States are
likely to have the greatest impact on the steps listed above.
The decision in December 2001 to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty, cited in May 2000 as “a cornerstone of strategic stability
and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive
weapons” represents the most high profile action by Washington.
With the cornerstone removed, and discussions on the START
process stalled due to impasses between the legislatures in the
United States and Russia, the stability of the non-proliferation
regime has been significantly weakened.
The example set by Washington in withdrawing from an
international treaty also sets an unfortunate precedent that may be
exploited by other countries in the future.
– Lack of
Progress in Transparency, Irreversibility, and Verification
The issues of
transparency, irreversibility, and verification have seen some
setbacks since the May 2000 RevCon.
The United States announced proposed reductions in its
arsenal from 6,000 to 1,700-2,200 deployed strategic nuclear
warheads over the next ten years.
While those reductions are welcome, they were initially
suggested by President Bush outside of a treaty framework, which
would hinder international efforts to verify the reductions, and
make sure that the warheads would be destroyed.
Upon closer inspection, the “cuts” offered by Bush were
redefined in his administration’s Nuclear Posture Review in
January 2002. The
warheads would instead be moved to active or inactive storage, and
no announcements of warhead destruction have been made yet by the
administration. Finally, transparency remains problematic among all of the
nuclear weapon states. For
example, China’s nuclear arsenal modernization and buildup remains
a largely obscure process to other states and independent experts
seeking a clearer idea of China’s holdings, development, and
potential proliferation risk.
– Failure
to Implement the CTBT
Another challenge
confronting States Parties involves the not-yet-implemented CTBT. While
all countries still abide by the voluntary moratorium pending the
treaty’s entry into force, discussions on enacting the CTBT last
November were not conclusive. The
United States, a required ratifier to implement the CTBT, refused to
attend the meeting; while India, Israel, and Pakistan, also required
ratifiers, have yet to even sign the treaty.
Progress has not been significant on banning nuclear testing,
a key action for furthering global nuclear disarmament.
– Stalled
Action on Fissban
Progress on banning
fissile material production and establishing a nuclear disarmament
sub-body in the U.N. Conference on Disarmament has been stalled as
well. The consensus
negotiating body has failed to establish a program for its work for
six years, without which negotiations may not proceed.
–
Non-Compliance, Universality, and Other Concerns
Other issues beyond
the “13 steps” will also challenge countries at the upcoming
PrepCom. The
alleged nuclear activities of Iraq and North Korea, States Parties
to the NPT, bring up concerns about compliance with their
international obligations to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The heightened conflict in the Middle East will also drive a
wedge between states during the discussions, as some countries aim
to address Israel as a nuclear-weapon state, while Israel remains
outside of the treaty. And
increased tension between India and Pakistan, also outside of the
NPT regime, will bring forth more deliberations about how to make
the NPT a universal treaty.
Avoiding More
Missed ‘Steps’
The forthcoming PrepCom in New York will be an opportunity for
States Parties to begin discussing these concerns in the context of
their commitment to and compliance with non-proliferation and
disarmament measures outlined in the NPT process.
While the PrepCom is tasked only to make recommendations for
future negotiations, and will not produce a binding document out of
its own discussions, countries should start toward the 2005 RevCon
with measures to build upon the May 2000 steps.
Changes in international priorities, and particularly in U.S.
government policy, will force some of the commitments made in 2000
to be extensively reevaluated.
The challenge will be to ensure that the remaining steps
listed above stay intact and are strengthened and implemented as
much as possible.
The current
international climate, while still troubling and unsettled in the
wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, increased tension in South Asia, and
heightened violence in the Middle East, must not override States
Parties’ existing commitment to ensuring “nuclear disarmament in
a way that promotes international stability, based on the principle
of undiminished security for all.”
FOR
MORE INFORMATION:
Full text of the 13
steps, see the Final
Document of the Review Conference
BASIC’s
NPT Home Page
UN
Dept. for Disarmament Affairs, NPT Web pages
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