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BASIC NOTES 5 September 2002 The EU and the OSCE in the War on Terrorism By David Norris In response to the attacks of 11 September 2001, both the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have altered their priorities and have sought internal reform to better suit the new security landscape. As intergovernmental organisations, both are dependent upon the level of support of their members, particularly those with the most power. This creates an onus on, and an opportunity for, the United States to influence the scope and direction of anti-terrorism policy in both organisations – directly as a member of the OSCE, and indirectly in relation to the EU. Overall, the EU and the OSCE’s efforts since 11 September share a basic common approach grounded in their traditional outlook on security. The recent focus on terrorism has reinforced and validated their judgment that efforts should target the underlying causes, as opposed to merely acts, of terrorism. This has led European leaders to advocate even more after 11 September a “comprehensive security” strategy, founded on multilateral legitimacy. Kirsten Biering of the OSCE, for example, argues that, “ … fostering human rights, civil society and institution building can deprive terrorists of fertile breeding ground and undermine their recruitment potential.”[1] In practical terms, the European gaze has shifted away from the continent itself and on to the Central Asian region. OSCE Later that month, the then Chairman-in-Office, Romanian foreign minister Mircea Geoana, outlined the broad areas for future OSCE activity for combating terrorism as promoting joint action among international actors and focusing upon the root causes of terrorism.[3] These themes were taken up in early December at the Bucharest Conference, which concluded with the Action Plan suggested by Geoana. The Plan sets out to establish a framework for action based on three main categories of activities: 1. International
legal and political commitments
2. Preventive Action, including:
3.
Platform for Cooperative Security
Just ten days after the Bucharest Conference, the OSCE reassembled, this time in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The Bishkek Conference, co-sponsored by the United Nations, included representatives of 60 states and 20 international organisations. The choice of location had already been decided as a follow-up to the OSCE’s work in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in October 2000, but the 11 September attacks radically upgraded its significance. The Conference set out to address what OSCE High Commissioner Rolf Ekéus described as “the new terrorism … low-tech but high concept.”[4] The intention of the Bishkek Conference was to transform the Action Plan into a more definite collection of activities. Its net effect, though, was merely to restate the need for national efforts, along with a further pledge to address the financial elements of terrorism.[5] The added value of Bishkek was mostly to draw attention to the need for greater investment in the security of Central Asia. In his closing remarks, Geoana noted that the focus of the OSCE and other actors had shifted from the Western Balkans towards Central Asia, and even went so far as to advocate the OSCE going out-of-area by establishing a dialogue with countries outside its borders, such as Afghanistan. Likewise, Adrian Severin, President Emeritus of the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly, has suggested creating a TransAsian Parliamentary Forum and extending the OSCE’s Partnership for Cooperation to China.[6] In 2002, the OSCE continued its counter-terrorism efforts. In February, Danish foreign Minister Jan Troejborg assumed the new part-time post of CiO Personal Representative for Combating Terrorism with the task of better coordinating states’ actions. The OSCE Secretariat has since gained a Counter-Terrorism Unit, designed to focus on day-to-day implementation of the Programme of Action, and Russia and the United States have proposed a database where states or OSCE agencies can request funding for particular anti-terrorism activities. These moves have consolidated the struggle against terrorism as the OSCE’s new priority in the post-11 September world.[7] In mid-June, the OSCE convened a third anti-terrorism meeting, this time in Lisbon, with the aim of improving cohesion among international agencies in implementing the Programme of Action. In Lisbon, as earlier in Bucharest and Bishkek, the role of the OSCE was limited to constructing a political framework for action, encouraging cooperation and coordination between actors, and urging states to adopt national legislation in support of OSCE goals. In terms of using one of its greatest strengths – its field missions – the OSCE has so far been relatively inactive. In Lisbon, the organisation promised that “special meetings … will soon be scheduled” to implement the Programme of Action.[8] The fact that such a promise was needed six months after the OSCE had asked its agencies to prepare “roadmaps” with definite timetables for implementing the original Action Plan appears to indicate inadequate resources and substantial work ahead. EU The EU has been more active than the OSCE in crafting and, crucially, moving to implement anti-terrorism policy. The first of the EU’s practical efforts came just two days after the 11 September attacks. Within two weeks, it had an Action Plan, which it proceeded not only to implement but also to revise on a monthly basis. Also unlike the OSCE, the EU has been able to meet the United States as an approximate equal in some issue areas, particularly finance and justice. The EU has pursued its counter-terrorism policy within each of its three “pillars” by generating new tools as well as exercising those already extant. First, in terms of economic affairs, the European Commission participated in the OECD’s Financial Action Task Force, including its October 2001 meeting in Washington in which new goals were set to improve detection of terrorists’ transactions. This was followed in November by a Council of Ministers’ decision to upgrade the EU’s money-laundering directive along similar lines.[11] Although the Council reached agreement on this binding measure, its implementation is dependent on action by its member states, which may take up to eighteen months. In December, the EU published a list of terrorist organisations and individuals whose assets were to be targeted. This list contained names not included even by the United States at the time. Furthermore, accused by some observers of funding Palestinian terrorism, the European Parliament blocked a 18.7m euro ($18.3m)[12] grant to the Palestinian Authority until the Palestinian leadership offered the EU a budget to show where the money would be allocated. In contrast to the United States, the EU prefers to follow the United Nations’ lead on labelling an organisation as terrorist,[13] though their respective “blacklists” have grown more similar since the EU expanded its own list in 2002. Wide disparities remain within the EU, however, because it is dependent upon its member states to actually take action. Whilst EU countries have frozen around $35m of terrorist assets[14] – slightly more than the United States[15] – $10m of that is accounted for by the United Kingdom alone. Second, in terms of justice and home affairs, the EU has made considerable progress. Perhaps most significant was the adoption of an EU-wide arrest warrant and common definition of terrorism in mid-December 2001.[16] Not only was this a rapid response to American and OSCE calls for greater cooperation on this issue, but it brought European integration into another area that had long been widely considered to be the preserve of the nation-state. In February, the EU reached another agreement on the execution of orders freezing property or evidence of terrorists. Moreover, taking advantage of this agreement, justice ministers have proposed to the United States a transatlantic treaty on extradition, and police and judicial cooperation, on which negotiations continue.[17] A similar EU-US agreement was signed on 6 December 2001 to improve cooperation between American authorities and Europol, Europe’s coordinating body for law enforcement. Noteworthy too is the establishment in December 2001 of Eurojust, which is designed to improve cooperation between EU member states over police, customs and legal systems, although this institution was already planned before the war on terrorism. Third, in terms of foreign and security affairs, the EU has stepped up its commitment in some areas, albeit in a much more limited way that has not included new powers or institutions. The EU has been particularly active through its external assistance programmes. In direct support of the campaign against terrorism, the EU has become a key player in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, budgeting for over 1 billion euros ($977m, 2001-06) as part of the Bonn Agreement, which it hosted. A proportion of this funding derived from the EU’s new Rapid Reaction Mechanism.[18] Associated with post-11 September events, the EU has also rewarded Pakistan’s changed policy towards the Taliban by increasing its foreign aid, first with a new Cooperation Agreement in November 2001, followed in May 2002 by a 50m euro ($48.84m) award intended specifically for Pakistan’s financial sector. More recently, the EU has signed an agreement to increase counter-terrorism efforts with Lebanon as part of a new Association Agreement.[19] Apart from using its financial and economic strengths, the EU has attempted to improve its civil protection capabilities. Its Action Plan of September 2001 had called for a new monitoring and information centre, pooling of expertise on nuclear, bacteriological and chemical issues, and an inventory and development of serums and vaccines. To that end, the EU is establishing an early warning and rapid response system, and in May 2002 created a Task Force on Bio-terrorism to coordinate research activities.[20] Although the EU’s reaction to 11 September has been substantial, the EU quickly reverted to an all-too-familiar internal discord as it became clear that the United States would adopt a military response to the attacks. The early façade of unity soon dissipated as Commission President Prodi and smaller states were sidelined[21] by the more powerful clique of Germany, France and, particularly, the United Kingdom.[22] Months later, when war-making turned to peace-keeping, the EU was again unable to present a coherent and effective option. Lamenting the lack of progress over the previous two years, foreign policy chief Javier Solana complained, “These are exactly the problems we had during the Kosovo war. September 11 shows why the Europeans must be ready to contribute to peacekeeping and crisis management.”[23] In December 2001, Belgian Foreign and then-EU representative Minister Louis Michel, hailed a proposed Rapid Reaction Force mission in Afghanistan as “a turning point in the history of the European Union”,[24] a remark that had unfortunate echoes of Jacques Poos’ famous empty “hour of Europe” boast as Yugoslavia collapsed. Conclusion The EU itself has implemented credible anti-terrorism policies across its territory, and these measures will become increasingly important as the EU enlarges eastward. Despite much-publicised European criticism of America, the EU has shown a willingness to support a number of key American anti-terrorist policies, as in targeting specific terrorist groups, and has proposed expanding cooperation further, such as in judicial action. To some extent, the full potential of the OSCE and the EU in the war on terrorism will be subject to the degree of American commitment to both organisations and the predominantly non-military solutions that they champion. *Note: This paper was completed just before the OSCE’s meeting on terrorism that took place on 6 September 2002. For more information about the anti-terrorist activities of the EU and the OSCE, see BASIC’s Web page on Transatlantic Responses to Terrorism. Endnotes [1] OSCE, OSCE Bishkek Conference Report, 13-14 December 2001, URL http://www.osce.org/events/bishkek2001/documents/Bishkekreport.pdf, p. 68 [2] Johnson, David T., Statement on Terrorism, delivered to Informal Working Group on Terrorism, Vienna, 17 September 2001, United States Mission to the OSCE, URL http://www.usosce.rpo.at/archive/2001/10/17terrorism.htm [3] OSCE, Reports to the OSCE 9th Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Bucharest, Chairman-in-Office’s Activity Report for 2001, 3-4 December 2001, URL http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/mcs/9buch01e.htm [4] OSCE Bishkek Conference Report, p. 62 [5] U.S. State Department, US Official Says OSCE Cooperation Helps Fight Terrorism, 8 May 2002, URL http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02050902.htm [6] OSCE Bishkek Conference Report, p. 200 [7] As declared by new CiO and Portuguese Foreign Minister Antonio da Cruz (“Portuguese Foreign Minister on Future of OSCE, EU,” Die Presse, Vienna, 6 May 2002, translated, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 May 2002). [8] Da Cruz, Antonio, “High Level Meeting on the Prevention and Combat of Terrorism,” speech delivered 12 June 2002, URL http://www.osce.org/cio/documents/speeches/files/speech-12-06-2002-e.pdf [9] EU, “The Diplomatic Front,” 11 September Attacks: The European Union's Broad Response, 3 June 2002, URL http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/110901/index.htm [10] Freeland, Jonathan, “Breaking the Silence,” Guardian, 9 February 2002, URL http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1284,647516,00.html. [11] EU, “Economic and Financial Measures,” 11 September Attacks: the European Union’s Broad Response, n.d., URL http://www.europa.eu.int/news/110901/emu.htm [12] All currency conversions current at date of article. [13] “Europe Freezes Terrorist Assets worth Dollars 35m,” Financial Times, 8 April 2002. [14] “International Response: US and Europe Disagree Over Terrorist Funds,” NTI, 11 April 2002, URL http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2002/4/11/2p.html [15]
Remarks
of Under Secretary Jimmy Gurulé, Treasury Under Secretary for
Enforcement,
at [16] EU, “The Diplomatic Front,” September 11: the European Union’s Broad Response. [17] Drago, Tito, “EU-US: Cooperation Must Also Focus on Roots of Terrorism,” Inter Press Service, 15 February 2002. [18] EU, Conflict Prevention, n.d., URL http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp/casea.htm [19] See the respective countries’ fact sheets on the EU’s website, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/search/countries.htm [20] EU, Bio-terrorism, n.d., URL http://europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph/programmes/bio-terrorism/index_en.html [21] Morris, Chris, “Analysis: Europe’s Second Class States?” BBC News, 5 November 2001, URL http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1639192.stm [22] Blitz, James, Judy Dempsey and Robert Shrimsley, “Blair Diplomacy Effort Angers EU Leaders London Meeting,” Financial Times, 5 November 2001. [23] Dempsey, Judy and David White, “Not Rapid Enough,” Financial Times, 18 November 2001, http://specials.ft.com/theresponse/FT3LK8J77UC.html [24] “EU Pledges Troops for Afghanistan,” BBC News, 14 December 2001, URL http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/1709888.stm David Norris was a European Security intern with BASIC. He now works at the Woodrow Wilson Center.
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