BASIC NOTES

July 1997

NATO Expansion and the Excluded Countries:
A New Division of Europe

By Alistair Millar
with Tasos Kokkinides

The selected expansion of NATO into central Europe will marginalize excluded countries and create a new dividing line in Europe. Despite assurances that the first group of states will not be the last and that NATO will remain open to future enlargement, the Alliance has failed to assess the impact of this policy on excluded countries, as the Defense Minister of Bulgaria recalled at the Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council on 13 June, excluded countries might be exposed "to the effects of anti-integration processes with unpredictable consequences".¹

US President Bill Clinton's stance to back only the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for NATO membership has irritated European allies, especially France and Italy, who strongly support Romania and Slovenia's accession to NATO at Madrid. Others, including the Scandinavian countries - some of whom are not even NATO members - and Senate Republicans in the United States, support the candidacy of the Baltic States. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have been told by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that it is not a question of "if", but "when" they will be NATO candidates. These states have snubbed offers of a charter-style relationship that NATO and Russia now have, favoring nothing less than full NATO membership. Inclusion of the Baltic Republics, however, will further isolate Russia. The Russian Ambassador to Brussels recently noted that "Russia is also interested in having access to the Baltic sea and the admittance of the Baltic states (to NATO) would mean to be separated from the sea by an alliance to which we do not belong."²

For the excluded countries, NATO is assembling a package of measures aimed at reassuring them. NATO announced the establishment of yet another new body, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which aims to strengthen political consultations and military cooperation. However, having raised expectations, consoling excluded nations, at this late stage, may prove insufficient. Alternatively, rather than expanding NATO at all, enhancing the role of Partnership for Peace (PfP) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), would provide a solution to the problems NATO is creating.

Interstate Tensions
Hungary has concluded bilateral treaties with Slovakia and Romania, which are unlikely to be invited to join NATO. These treaties normalize relations between the three countries and in particular commit all to respect ethnic minorities. In Slovakia and Romania there is a sizable Hungarian minority (10.8% and 8.9% respectively)³ whose status has been hotly disputed. Clearly, the prospect of NATO membership has helped to forge the conclusion of the treaties. Exclusion from NATO, however, could unravel the positive developments in relations between those countries.

These treaties will be under threat from the nationalist forces that will be strengthened in the excluded countries. A recently released "White Book" by the Romanian Foreign Office provides a chilling picture of the future and warns that:

"If only one of them [Hungary, Romania] is able to see her aspirations fulfilled, there is no doubt that the other would feel frustrated, with a negative impact on the domestic political scene. If this happens, the process of rapprochement and partnership-building between Romania and Hungary could be slowed down, if not compromised altogether. The impact on all the political leaders who worked hard to accomplish a major breakthrough in the Romanian-Hungarian relations could be serious, even devastating. Thus, the ground would be prepared for those nationalistic and extremist politicians who opposed all along the development of normal partnership relations between Romania and Hungary".⁴

Arms Race in central and eastern Europe
As currently devised, NATO expansion is divisive and exclusionary and could cause an arms race in central and eastern Europe. Countries in the region are increasing their military spending and are planning major weapon acquisitions from the US. Fighter aircraft and attack helicopters are on top of the shopping list. A senior Romanian defense ministry official recently said that Romania would go ahead with a $1.5 billion deal to buy NATO-compatible helicopters in a joint venture with the US firm Bell Helicopter Textron.⁵ Furthermore, a letter to the US Defense Department states Romanian intentions to purchase 12 F-16 or F-18 fighter jets and 9 Hercules C-130 transport aircraft.⁶ Romanian officials have been warning for some time that the cost of such acquisitions "would deepen the bane of poverty" in their country, noting that, "failure to be admitted to NATO would force Romania to revert to a national rather than a cooperative defence strategy. This means diverting much more resources into building national Armed Forces and away from where they are badly needed: the welfare of the people."⁷

In addition, Russia arms dealers are wooing excluded countries. For example, Slovakia has purchased six attack helicopters and increased cooperation on defense technology as part of a recently concluded military accord. Also, Hungary and Slovakia have taken MiG-29 fighter aircraft in exchange for debt owed to them by Russia, and Bulgaria is being pressured by Moscow to follow suit.⁸

Slovakia, and especially Romania, are actively campaigning for inclusion into NATO. For both countries, integration into Western structures has been their number one post Cold War foreign policy for as long as they have been able to conduct such policy independently. Furthermore, both countries fear that their contributions to peacekeeping forces in the Balkans has been overlooked by NATO. It is not unreasonable to expect a backlash in Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia when the news of their exclusion from NATO becomes official in Madrid next month. NATO's policy of expansion could backfire. Future Partnership for Peace operations may suffer from a lack of the cohesion. PfP has been applauded as a force for stability in the former Yugoslavia, but after Madrid, central and eastern European countries that are excluded from NATO will be less enthusiastic about PfP operations with partners that make promises and deliver disappointment.

____________________

Endnotes

1. Bulgarian Defense Minister Gueorgi Aanie, address to the Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Defense Minister's Session. 13 June 1997.

2. Vitali Churkin, Russian Ambassador to Brussels, statements from the International NATO workshop on political-military decision making, Prague 14 June 1997, quoted by CTK - Czech News Agency, 25 June 1997.

3. CIA World Fact Book

4. Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Book on Romania and NATO, 1997.

5. "The Romanian defense ministry plans to buy 96 AH-1RO Dracula helicopters to be co-produced by a venture between Romania's Intreprinderea Aeronautica Romana (IAR) aircraft maker and US firm Bell Helicopter Textron. (Reuters)." 

6. "Romania Eyes Purchase of Used U.S. Fighter Planes," 18 April 1997. For further background on NATO expansion and CEE arms transfers see: Kirsten Ruecker "Military Buildup in Central and Eastern Europe: NATO Membership for Sale", BASIC Paper # 22, June 1997.

7. Romania Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Book on Romania and NATO, 1997 p. 20.

8. "Slovakia Acquires 6 Ka-50 Attack Helicopters", Krasnaya Zvezda, in fbis 1 May and 7 February 1997; On MiG 29s see: http://www.businessweek.com:80/1997/22/b3529171.htm, p. 3.

.

Back to BASIC Publications