BASIC REPORTS
NEWSLETTER ON INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY
OCTOBER 2003 . NUMBER 84 . ISSN
0966-9175
STRENGTHENING THE IAEA'S
SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM
By the IAEA Office of External Relations and
Policy Co-ordination
Fifty years ago, the President of the United States
of America, Dwight D. Eisenhower, proposed at the General Assembly
of the United Nations the creation of an organization to promote
the peaceful use of nuclear energy and ensure that nuclear energy
would not serve any military purpose. This new organization would
be the centrepiece of President Eisenhower's vision, "Atoms for
Peace": on the one hand, the prevention of nuclear weapons
proliferation, with the aim of their eventual elimination - and on
the other, the sharing of safe and secure nuclear technologies in
peaceful applications that benefit humankind.
Nearly a half century after its creation in 1957,
the International Atomic Energy Agency is facing new sets of
challenges and opportunities. In the last few months in particular,
the international community has been in the midst of responding to
compliance issues that bring special challenges to the regime
charged with verifying non-proliferation undertakings in the
nuclear field. According to Director General ElBaradei: "The past
year has been a time of significant challenges and achievements for
the Agency."
To this day, Agency inspectors are not in a
position to complete their work to verify the absence of prohibited
nuclear activities in Iraq, despite a Security Council mandate that
still stands. There have also been no IAEA verification activities
on the ground in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
since December 2002, following unilateral actions of the DPRK to
interfere with or remove the Agency containment and surveillance
equipment at its nuclear facilities and to expel Agency inspectors.
More recently, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been at the centre
of attention for having failed to meet some of its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of
nuclear material.
These three cases vividly illustrate the importance
of effective verification - as an essential prerequisite for
providing credible assurance to the international community
relevant to compliance with non-proliferation obligations, and as a
powerful tool for detection and deterrence of violations. One of
the most urgent challenges facing the IAEA is to strengthen and
fully implement its verification system in order to increase the
likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme
in breach of international obligations. The Agency should thus be
able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear
material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared
material and activities.
The role of IAEA safeguards
Ever since the Agency was founded in 1957, its
safeguards system has provided an indispensable instrument for
nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear co-operation. In
recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States
(NNWS) parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with
the IAEA, and thus put all their nuclear material under safeguards.
Article III of the NPT provides that all NNWS must "accept
safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and
concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification
of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under [the
NPT]…". With 189 States party to it, the NPT represents the
cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament. In the context of the NPT, the IAEA is charged with
providing the international community with credible assurance that
any nuclear material in peaceful use is not being diverted to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This task can
only be realised in States that have concluded comprehensive
safeguards agreements (CSAs).
CSAs have been applied since the 1970s. A steady
rise in the amount of nuclear material and the number of facilities
to be safeguarded has led to a substantial increase in the workload
of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In 1982, Significant
Quantities[1] (SQs) of
material under safeguards corresponded to 18,578; twenty years
later, in 2002, this figure reached 123,320. This increase in the
workload of safeguards staff was partly met by an increase in the
number of inspectors. In 1982, the Department of Safeguards had a
total of 358 staff members; today, there are 542 staff members
working with safeguards. New methods and techniques are constantly
being developed to assist IAEA inspectors in their tasks and ensure
that the safeguards system evolves as new challenges arise in the
field of non-proliferation.
In this regard, an important and positive
experience was gained in South Africa. Following that country's
announcement that it had abandoned its nuclear weapons programme
before joining the NPT in 1991, the IAEA examined the relevant
facilities and their associated historical data to verify that the
programme had indeed been terminated and to ensure that all the
nuclear material had been accounted for and placed under IAEA
safeguards. Many IAEA teams visited South Africa to examine the
records of all nuclear-related facilities, and a large number of
measurements were made of various types of nuclear material. The
Agency found no evidence that the list of facilities and locations
outside facilities provided by South Africa in its initial report
was incomplete. With full co-operation of the South African
Government, the IAEA was able to confirm the dismantlement of South
Africa's nuclear programme and provide assurances of the now
peaceful nature of its nuclear activities, in compliance with the
country's commitments pursuant to the NPT.
In addition to its NPT related verification
activities, the Agency, through its safeguards system, also
verifies compliance in the context of the different regional
nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties. Such treaties exist in
Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South
Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (Treaty of Bangkok)
and Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba). By establishing areas free of
nuclear weapons, these accords constitute additional legally
binding instruments through which States express their commitment
to nuclear non-proliferation. Moreover, these NWFZ treaties are
complemented by protocols to be signed by the nuclear-weapon States
and by States possessing de jure or de facto
territories under their responsibility in the Treaty application
zone.
A number of other bilateral or multilateral
arrangements rely on IAEA safeguards, particularly in the regional
sphere. Since the Quadripartite Agreement between Brazil,
Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and
Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA entered into
effect in March 1994, safeguards covering nuclear materials and
activities have been carried out within the territory of both
countries. As parties to the Quadripartite Agreement, the IAEA and
ABACC are requested to coordinate their verification activities and
draw independent conclusions on the countries' compliance with
their non-proliferation commitments.
The agreement signed between the IAEA and Euratom
in 1973 for the implementation of safeguards provisions under the
NPT is a further example of a regional safeguards approach.
Another interesting example of a safeguards
arrangement - demonstrating this time how arms control,
non-proliferation and disarmament move in a common direction - was
the launch in 1996 of the Trilateral Initiative, involving the USA,
the Russian Federation and the IAEA. The Initiative was undertaken
to investigate the technical, legal and financial issues associated
with IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material in the
Russian Federation and the U.S. Work under the initial task was
concluded in September 2002, and the Agency now stands ready to
consider assuming a new charge in the trilateral format if and when
it is requested to do so, including work related to IAEA
verification as foreseen under the existing bilateral Russian
Federation- USA Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement.
Facing the challenges
The events of 11 September 2001 focused States'
attention on the importance of preventing terrorist or other
criminal misuse of nuclear material or other radioactive material,
as used in hospitals, research facilities or industry. The system
of IAEA safeguards and related domestic measures constitutes a
firewall against such threats. Of course, IAEA safeguards alone
cannot ensure the physical protection nuclear and other radioactive
material, or of nuclear facilities, from terrorists. It is the
responsibility of States to undertake all the necessary safety and
security measures, and to ensure adequate control of such material
and facilities. But there is no doubt that bringing into force a
comprehensive safeguards agreement with an additional protocol is a
fundamental measure in this regard.
Although safeguards have developed progressively
since their inception, until recently the IAEA system focused
mainly on nuclear material and activities that States have
declared. However, the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear
weapon's programme after the 1991 Gulf War - despite an existing
comprehensive safeguards agreement between Iraq and the IAEA -
demonstrated that an effective verification regime must also focus
on possible undeclared material and activities.
Beginning in the 1980s, Iraq undertook an extensive
programme to develop the capability to produce weapons-usable
nuclear materials. Although its major effort was in the production
of enriched uranium, Iraq also separated several grams of plutonium
from declared irradiated nuclear material. Iraq's declared holdings
of enriched uranium were under IAEA safeguards, and it was only at
a late stage that Iraq decided to undertake a crash programme to
divert some of the safeguarded uranium. This programme was
unsuccessful. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Agency had
destroyed much of the nuclear infrastructure in Iraq pursuant to
United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 and the Agency has
not found any indication of the resumption of a nuclear weapons
programme in Iraq. While the case of Iraq can be characterized as
late detection of undeclared activities in the context of military
action by the international community, the case of the DPRK was one
of prompt detection of possible undeclared activities followed by a
measured international diplomatic response.
Indeed, by the end of 1992, the Agency was able to
alert the international community to the possibility of undeclared
plutonium in the DPRK. In reaching that conclusion, the Agency made
use of all the tools available to it: enhanced analysis of data,
including information provided from a third party; a request for a
special inspection of additional sites and additional information;
and interaction and dialogue with the Security Council. The DPRK
subsequently accepted some verification activities, including IAEA
containment and surveillance measures to verify the freeze of key
nuclear facilities such as its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors;
but limited verification powers prevented the Agency from using a
number of techniques - mainly environmental sampling and specific
measurements - that would have helped it to verify the correctness
and completeness of the DPRK's initial safeguards declaration.
Following demand by the DPRK, IAEA inspectors were withdrawn in
December 2002 and the Agency remains still today unable to conclude
that nuclear material in the DPRK has not been diverted.
Following these events in Iraq and the DPRK, the
realization that the IAEA verification system needed to be
strengthened prompted the international community to envisage an
expansion of the IAEA's verification rights. For some, a number of
measures to strengthen the safeguards system could be applied
within the framework of existing comprehensive safeguards
agreements. For others, the IAEA required additional legal
authority. In essence, as Dr ElBaradei said, "it is essential that
the international community continues to work towards the universal
application of the Agency's safeguards system. This is the key to
the long term viability of the non-proliferation regime."
Strengthening the Safeguards System
In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved
the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements, which
contains a number of provisions conferring upon the Agency the
legal authority to implement further strengthening measures. The
additional protocol is integral to the strengthened system, and its
principal aim is to enable the system to provide assurance about
both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Model
Additional Protocol, States are required to provide the Agency with
an expanded declaration that contains information covering all
aspects of their nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle activities. The
States must also grant the Agency broader rights of access and
enable it to use the most advanced technologies.
Previously, routine access was generally limited to
specific "strategic points" in declared facilities. An additional
protocol requires a State to provide access to any place on a
nuclear site and to other locations where nuclear material is, or
could be, engaged in activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle
and, in cases where such access may not be possible, to make every
reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements without delay
through other means. The Model Additional Protocol also provides
for certain improved administrative procedures including
streamlined procedures for designating inspectors and providing
them with visas; and improved means by which inspectors may
communicate with Agency Headquarters.
The current issue concerning Iran's nuclear
programme has highlighted the importance of concluding additional
protocols in all States with safeguards agreements. By allowing
tighter inspections and greater access to facilities - in
particular for the collection of environmental samples in specific
locations - States would put the IAEA in a position to confirm the
peaceful nature of their nuclear programme and provide the
necessary assurances. Moreover, adherence to the additional
protocol in regions of tension would function as a significant
confidence- building measure (CBM).
The strengthened system is thus based on a
political commitment to support an "intelligent" verification
system - one where qualitative assessment takes place alongside
quantitative accounting measures. Calls for wider adherence to
safeguards agreements and additional protocols have been made in
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, by States
parties to the NPT in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review
Conference, and by Member States of the Agency in resolutions of
the IAEA General Conference. Dr ElBaradei himself onto the 1982
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), for fear it would
interfere with certain U.S. sovereign prerogatives, the U.S. has
signed the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI
of the Convention. The LOS grants several freedoms, including the
right to navigation on the high seas and rights to transit
(restricted to innocent passage) through international straits,
exclusive economic zones (EEZ), and the territorial and
archipelagic waters of another state. The regime does bar a select
number of illegal activities including piracy, slave trade, illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances and
unauthorized broadcasting. It grants states the right to intervene
in such activities. There is nothing in the LOS regime that
explicitly prohibits transit of weapons of mass destruction or
gives states rights to interdict such transit. On the contrary, a
number of states, including the United States, have actively
opposed the development of such prohibitive norms or
interpretations of international law that would inhibit the transit
of weapons of mass destruction by the seas or air, and cite the
rights and privileges established in the LOS to affirm their
unhindered military use of the oceans. Nuclear weapon states such
as the United States, United Kingdom and France have continuously
worked to ensure that their ability to transit nuclear weapons is
not hindered by regional nuclear weapons free zones or U.N. efforts
to create a Nuclear Weapon Free Southern Hemisphere. These three
states, along with Japan, have also asserted their rights to
transit nuclear materials - in particular reprocessed plutonium -
through the high seas and through the EEZ's of coastal states. In
addition, a number of states including the United States, France,
Israel, China, Russia and Italy export missile technology,
transiting through the oceans to do so. In contrast to this general
assertion of rights to transit nuclear weapons, missile technology,
fissile materials and other materials related to weapons of mass
destruction, the United States is currently advocating for the
selected interdiction of such materials to and from certain "states
of concern" as a means to stem proliferation. Ten countries have
now joined the U.S. in what is known as the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), which met in Madrid (June), Brisbane (July),
Paris (September) and London (October) in 2003. Members of the PSI
include: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, "urge[d] all States
that have not done so to conclude and bring into force the required
safeguards agreements and additional protocols at an early
date."
It is important to stress that safeguards do not
prevent States from acquiring nuclear material, facilities or
technology. In fact, adhering to the Agency's safeguards system is
a responsibility to be assumed by all States wishing to benefit
from applications of nuclear techniques and technology for such
diverse purposes as treating cancer, optimising the use of scarce
water resources, developing high yield varieties of crops,
eradicating insect pests and boosting industrial performance.
Conclusion
Today, 46 years after the Agency's founding, its
verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by
the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in
Iraq, in the past decade, and in the DPRK. Moreover, the horrifying
events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent
need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other
radioactive material.
While we have not reached the alarming prediction
of the 1960s - of an eventual 15 to 20 nuclear-weapon States - the
unfortunate reality 40 years later is that at least eight countries
are believed to possess nuclear weapons, and the goal of a
nuclear-weapon-free world remains elusive.
Since its establishment - and today more than ever
- the Agency has been dedicated to the achievement and promotion of
President Eisenhower's vision, "Atoms For Peace". Pursuant to its
mandate, the IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts
to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and
respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. In
this regard, strengthening the Agency's safeguards system
represents a fundamental contribution to the IAEA's ability to
provide assurances that States comply with their non-proliferation
undertakings. ¨
[1] "Significant Quantities" (SQs) are defined by the
IAEA as the amount of a particular material (e.g. plutonium or
highly enriched uranium) needed to make a nuclear explosive
device.
FREEDOM OR FORCE ON THE
HIGH SEAS?
Arms Interdiction and International Law
By Devon Chaffee
The international community is pursuing a number of
strategies to reverse and contain the effects of North Korea's
withdrawal from the nuclear nonproliferation regime and
announcement of its nuclear weapons program. Some officials are,
however, advocating for a controversial policy of interdiction that
threatens to undermine the freedoms established in the
International Law of the Sea (LOS).
The LOS is one of the most comprehensive and
well-established bodies of international regulatory norms in
existence. It is buttressed by longstanding international norms,
and formal legal agreements, critical to creating a more secure
international environment. Such formal agreements include the four
1958 Conventions that resulted from the Geneva Conference on the
law of the sea, to which the United States is a party. Though
President Ronald Reagan decided not to sign onto the 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), for fear it would
interfere with certain U.S. sovereign prerogatives, the U.S. has
signed the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI
of the Convention.
The LOS grants several freedoms, including the
right to navigation on the high seas and rights to transit
(restricted to innocent passage) through international straits,
exclusive economic zones (EEZ), and the territorial and
archipelagic waters of another state. The regime does bar a select
number of illegal activities including piracy, slave trade, illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances and
unauthorized broadcasting. It grants states the right to intervene
in such activities.
There is nothing in the LOS regime that explicitly
prohibits transit of weapons of mass destruction or gives states
rights to interdict such transit. On the contrary, a number of
states, including the United States, have actively opposed the
development of such prohibitive norms or interpretations of
international law that would inhibit the transit of weapons of mass
destruction by the seas or air, and cite the rights and privileges
established in the LOS to affirm their unhindered military use of
the oceans.
Nuclear weapon states such as the United States,
United Kingdom and France have continuously worked to ensure that
their ability to transit nuclear weapons is not hindered by
regional nuclear weapons free zones or U.N. efforts to create a
Nuclear Weapon Free Southern Hemisphere. These three states, along
with Japan, have also asserted their rights to transit nuclear
materials - in particular reprocessed plutonium - through the high
seas and through the EEZ's of coastal states. In addition, a number
of states including the United States, France, Israel, China,
Russia and Italy export missile technology, transiting through the
oceans to do so.
In contrast to this general assertion of rights to
transit nuclear weapons, missile technology, fissile materials and
other materials related to weapons of mass destruction, the United
States is currently advocating for the selected interdiction of
such materials to and from certain "states of concern" as a means
to stem proliferation. Ten countries have now joined the U.S. in
what is known as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which
met in Madrid (June), Brisbane (July), Paris (September) and London
(October) in 2003. Members of the PSI include: Australia, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
the United Kingdom and the United States. At the September meeting
in Paris, the PSI countries agreed to a set of "Interdiction
Principles" which included specific commitments to, "Undertake
effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states,
for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery
systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state
actors of proliferation concern." The PSI countries also began
cooperative interdiction military exercises in September.
However, there are limitations to the transit that
countries can legally inhibit in their territorial waters and EEZs,
and even stricter limitations on what can be intercepted on the
high seas.
The legal implications of arms interdictions on the
oceans depend greatly on the nature of interdictions and the way
the interdictions are undertaken. Some states have agreed to export
controls amongst themselves, such as those laid out in the Missile
Technology Control Regime. However, the "states of concern" to the
United States, such as North Korea, China, Pakistan and Iran, are
not members and so are not bound by these controls. In territorial
waters it might be possible for the coastal state to determine the
transit of missiles or WMD to be a threat to its security and thus
prohibit such transit deeming it to be non-innocent passage.
Such is the strategy urged in PSI's recently issued
"Interdiction Principles," and that is already being implemented in
Japan with respect to North Korean shipments deemed suspect by the
Japanese government. It might also be legal to interdict shipments
on the high seas that have been deemed by the U.N. Security Council
or the Law of the Sea Tribunal to violate the Law of the Sea and to
constitute a threat to the peace. This option is pursued in a
strategy issued by the Council of the European Union on April 14,
2003, calling on the EU to support a Security Council Resolution
that would authorize arms interdictions "when appropriate."
Any interdictions outside those explicitly allowed
in the existing LOS regime would clearly violate the freedom of
navigation on the high seas and the right of innocent passage
through territorial waters.
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer
recognized that there is a, "very real difficulty in terms of
vessels that might be going through the high seas because
international law requires that those ships should not be
intercepted," and that there might therefore, "need to be some
change to international law to facilitate these types of
interdictions, to stop illicit trade." However, changing the LOS
would be a long process requiring extensive negotiations and would
unlikely yield the discriminatory approach desired by the PSI of
prohibiting transit by certain "actors of proliferation concern"
while allowing others.
The likelihood that the United States and PSI will
thus develop an interdiction strategy outside international law is
reinforced by the current trend in U.S. policy towards dismantling
norms that prevent the United States from exercising its military
superiority. The United States has moved away from multilateral
nonproliferation solutions (i.e.: withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, abandoned START II, failed to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and stalled efforts to improve the
Biological Weapons Convention regime). The controversy over the
U.K. and U.S. use of intelligence in Iraq will also bring into
question the legitimacy of intelligence information used to justify
interdictions regarding the existence of arms and material
shipments and their intended destination and/or use. Such
uncertainty around the use of intelligence breeds fear that PSI
interdiction policies will be misused for geopolitical or economic
purposes unrelated to proliferation. Leaders in China are already
voicing concerns that PSI interdictions could aggravate military
tensions and interfere with legitimate shipping in East Asia.
Restricting the transit of weapons of mass
destruction might help to further arms control and stem
proliferation, if such norms were carefully developed by the
international community and applied uniformly. It is, however,
unclear how the integrity of international law can be maintained if
applied whimsically or discriminately, or if defined by a small
"coalition of the willing." If leaders of the states participating
in the PSI attempt to exchange LOS norms for selective
nonproliferation measures, they should realize that such a
trade-off could eventually restrict their own country's access to
international waters, and it is unlikely that such concessions
could be easily reversed.
This article is a modified summary of a longer
piece pending publication in Science for Democratic Action, the
newsletter of the Institute for Energy and Environmental
Research.
* Devon Chaffee is the Washington, D.C.
Representative of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.
CURTAILING MISSILE
PROLIFERATION
By Mark Smith
Subscribing states to the Hague Code of Conduct
Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) held their first
plenary meeting in New York recently, almost a year after the
launch of the initiative in the European city which gave its name
to the initiative. The meeting was timed to coincide with the
opening of the First Committee of the United Nation's 58th General
Assembly.
The HCoC was developed between 1999 and 2001 within
the framework of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), as
Regime members became increasingly conscious of the lack of any
demand-side norms to fit alongside their supply-side controls.
Aware that a Code of Conduct could not contain any measures that
MTCR members would not be prepared to sign up to, the drafters
settled for a cautious approach based on confidence- building
measures (CBMs), in which policy declarations and notification of
forthcoming missile test launches were the principal policy
measures in the text. The information in the CBMs is submitted to
an Immediate Central Contact office in Vienna, which then
circulates it to subscribing states.
Widening the HCoC's membership has been a priority
since shortly before the 2002 launch, as it became clear that not
enough 'missile active' states were prepared to join. China, India
and Pakistan all announced shortly before the launch conference
that they would not be subscribing, and in addition the DPRK,
Egypt, Iran and Israel all declined to join. The only signatory of
note outside the MTCR membership was Libya, which has been the
subject of recurrent rumours about Nodong missile imports from the
DPRK. Paradoxically, therefore, the HCoC now has 109 subscriber
states but still can be considered to have a narrow membership.
The implementation of the CBMs contained in the
text was discussed at an intersessional meeting held in Vienna
earlier this year.[1] The
two CBMs required under the HCoC are a declaration of missile
policy and pre-launch notification (PLN) on test launches. Of
these, the former is only vaguely defined in the text, which
contains a number of suggestions about content, but no actual
stipulations. This was deliberate, in view of the sensitivity of
such information, and the intersessional meeting decided that no
prescriptive format was required for the declarations. It should,
of course, also be noted that in many, if not most cases, the
subscriber states to the HCoC do not have any missiles on which to
make a policy declaration.
Specifications on PLNs are more explicit, but still
leave a good deal of the format and content to the discretion of
the submitting state. Again, this is deliberate and probably
necessary, since not all states regard transparency on such matters
as a 'Good Thing'. In fact, Israel referred to this in 2001, when
it pointed out that some states regarded strategic ambiguity as an
integral part of their deterrent strategy. The HCoC intersessional
debated the potential format of PLNs in some depth, and the Dutch
Chair has prepared a nonprescriptive draft.
In between the intercessional and the New York
plenary, three more states (Eritrea, Liechtenstein and Tonga)
decided to sign the HCoC, but it is no reflection on those states
to say that the list of non-subscribers is of more concern. The
problem of how to widen participation in the HCoC formed one of the
key issues at the plenary, along with the implementation of its
CBMs.
Faced with the difficult choice between widening
and deepening, it seems most sensible to opt for widening. Those
states that have declined to join through unease at the concept of
transparency (such as China) or distrust of the HCoC's motives and
provenance (such as India and Pakistan) are not going to become
more inclined to join if the Code is deepened before it is widened.
Overcoming reservations about transparency will be no simple task,
but the lingering mistrust about the Code may be more amenable to
action.
One way to do this is to move the HCoC closer to
the United Nations, which would simultaneously move it closer to
global multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament discussions
and also help to break ties with the MTCR. The first of these
explains why the HCoC's first plenary was held back-to-back with
the UN First Committee, where it was hoped to obtain perhaps some
recognition of the HCoC in the debates. The second helps to explain
the choice of Chile as the HCoC Chair for 2003-4. Several officials
who participated in the meeting applauded the choice: a US State
Department official noted the importance of, "the public face of
the Code not being an MTCR face." The Chilean Chair is Ambassador
Luis Winter.
One reason for holding back on deepening the
initiative before developing the HCoC measures further is the need
to attract more states with active missile programmes. Another may
well be that some current signatories, in particular the United
States, will currently be unwilling to countenance further
measures, and a third is that the current requirements of the HCoC
are experiencing teething problems. Only 20 states have so far
submitted the policy declarations to the Immediate Central Contact,
and some difficulties have been experienced with PLNs.
Although the low rate of policy declaration is seen
as disappointing, it must be borne in mind that many subscriber
states to the HCoC do not possess any significant missiles, and
only a handful (for example France, Russia, Ukraine, the United
Kingdom, the United States) have any kind of long-range capability
or development programme. Many subscriber states will therefore be
going through the 'Nothing to Declare' door, so to speak.
Ambassador Winter said that several members had
delayed their declaration because they were "watching what to do"
and waiting to take their cue from other subscribing states. This
does suggest that the text of the Code, which leaves most of the
content of declarations to the discretion of the submitting state,
and the decision at the intercessional to allow multiple formats,
may also have had some unintended consequences. Some of the 20
submitted declarations have now been circulated in order to give a
clearer idea of what is required, which ought to speed up the
process. The deadline for submission has now been extended to 31
January 2004.
Submission of PLNs is not subject to the same
uncertainty, since it only applies to states with active missile
development programmes, and five states have submitted such
notifications. However, this is not to say that PLNs are without
problems of their own. The June intercessional discussed the
practicalities of PLNs in some detail, but format and content were
left flexible. The most sophisticated and established PLN system is
that developed over the last thirty years between Russia and the
United States, and both states have indicated that they prefer to
channel test launch notifications through that medium first before
putting it through the HCoC. Other states may have queries still to
be answered, particularly on the technical information to be made
available on what is after all a highly sensitive area of
policy.
To summarise, the HCoC currently has three
priorities:
- Developing its links with the United Nations;
- Expanding its membership in ways that give credibility to its
status as a missile non-proliferation regime, and;
- Working out the practicalities of its provisions.
The first of these should be achieved in the first place through
a UN General Assembly resolution, which is likely to be provisional
in the first instance (such as a recognition that the HCoC is now
an operative multinational policy instrument). It is unclear
whether this will be achieved immediately. The second may in some
ways be a corollary of the first, bearing in mind that several
non-subscribers still bear suspicions about the HCoC's provenance
in the MTCR. The European Union, the Dutch 2002-3 HCoC Chair, and
the HCoC Immediate Central Contact have all worked hard during the
last twelve months to persuade such states to over come these
suspicions.
Speaking on behalf of the European Union, Ambassador Carlo
Trezza (of current EU Chair Italy) recalled the EU statement form
the founding meeting in The Hague that established, "fundamental
principles" and a multilateral framework where none had previously
existed. The EU, he stated, "considers that the Code has already
become an asset in the multilateral field of non-proliferation" and
"continues to support the universalisation of the Code."
* Mark Smith spoke at an HCoC outreach seminar
in New York organised by the Netherlands. He is a Research Fellow
at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of
Southampton.
[1] I have discussed the HCoC intersessional in
'Preparing the Ground for Modest Steps: A Progress Report on the
Hague Code of Conduct', Disarmament
Diplomacy,
August/September 2003, pp. 30-6.
THE FRENCH NUCLEAR
'DISUADER'
By Jean- Marie Collin
Details of French military strategy are contained
in a Defense Ministry document entitled the "White Book"
(le Livre Blanc). The most recent White Book dates
from 1994. It states, "France has no declared adversary" and
emphasizes, "the importance of the modernization of conventional
and nuclear forces." It elaborates, very discreetly: "With
the nuclear option, the autonomy of Europe in defense matters is
possible. Without it, autonomy is excluded." Recently, the
defense ministry published a document entitled "French Defense
Strategy" which completes the strategy set forth in the
White Book.
This document states that, "France assigns
itself a demanding ambition, in Europe but also in the world to
respond to different international threats." Its defense policy
is inscribed "in a perspective of the choices fashioned by its
history and its rank as a major power. It must assume its role as a
member of the security council and a nuclear power." The action
of France on the international scene is thus going to be guided not
only by principals of action, but also by its military
capabilities.
The principal actions of France can be grouped
under the notion of defense diplomacy. This notion covers in
particular, "the promotion of a strong policy of mastery of
weapons all over the world," measures of confidence, and the
battle against weapons of mass destruction. Globally "the vision
of France in terms of international security rests on the respect
of law" and the "refusal to see every concept of legitimate
preventive defense or of reprisals applied in a universal
manner."
French defense policy is essentially based on its
nuclear arsenal (stockpile of 348 operational nuclear warheads,
delivery by four strategic submarines, carrier-based strike
aircraft and land-based bombers). At the same time, France
denounces the risk tied "to arms of massive destruction and the
pursuit of cooperation between nations in regard to ballistics and
nuclear technology." French nuclear strategy and its
operational capacities are little discussed, like the idea of an
extension of French nuclear "dissuasion" to the European Union.
The earlier controversy over the possible extension
of the French nuclear "umbrella" to European partners is advanced
discreetly as "nuclear dissuasion should potentially be able to
contribute to the security of Europe in taking account of the
growing solidarity among the countries in the Union."
However, despite this seeming prudence on the part
of the Defense Ministry, this subject has been commented on
frequently in the past by the highest authorities in the French
State:
- Declaration of President Francois Mitterrand during the
French-British summit of Chartres (18 November 1994). "Nuclear
dissuasion is the basis of a policy of European security. A policy
of European security without nuclear dissuasion would be a major
weakness."
- Speech given at the Ecole militaire 23 February 1996 by Prime
Minister Alain Juppé: "Our dissuasion, which already
contributes to the general dissuasion of the Atlantic Alliance, is
called to take on an increased European dimension. The overlapping
of vital interests between European nations, the common character
of many threats to which they could be exposed have led France to
launch the idea of concerted dissuasion."
The defense strategy of France appears to be based on an
ambiguity: France states it wants to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction in order to reach stable international
security; and at the same time it wants to preserve and develop a
modern nuclear arsenal (the M51 SLBM with a new nuclear warheads,
ASPM-A cruise missile and Rafale nuclear-capable strike aircraft)
to protect its territory and the European Union.
* Jean-Marie Collin is a researcher and journalist of the
Centre de Documentation et de Recherche sur la Paix et les Conflits
(Research and Documentation Center on Peace and Conflicts) at Lyon
in France (http://www.obsarm.org).
BASIC Reports is a bulletin on international security
politics published by the British American Security Information
Council, an independent research organization that analyzes
government policies.
Back to the BASIC Publications home
page.
|
