ISSUE AREAS:

A Citizens' Inquiry Into the Legality of Trident

Military and political aspects of British Nuclear Forces and Defence Policy

Presentation by Nicola Butler, 6 November 2004

Is the UK nuclear policy and doctrine in compliance with Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?

Article VI of the NPT states,

"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

Does Article VI require nuclear disarmament by the UK?

The UK government argues that, "under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), five states-the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Russia and China-are legally entitled to possess nuclear weapons,"[1] but the NPT does not explicitly confer this right, rather it gives responsibilities to the nuclear-weapon states to pursue nuclear disarmament.

For many years, following signing of the NPT, the UK government privately argued that Article VI did not require it to disarm, except for in the context of a treaty on general and complete disarmament - an objective that was regarded as a distant and utopian. Lord Chalfont, who was a British Minister, during the NPT negotiations in the 1960s continues to make the case that "there is no international agreement which calls upon anyone to promote the elimination of nuclear weapons except in the context of general and complete disarmament".[2]

In 1996, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice severed the possible linkage in Article VI between nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Court unanimously agreed that, "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control." [3]

Following the ICJ opinion, the 2000 NPT Review Conference essentially confirmed this interpretation of Article VI. At the 2000 Review Conference all five nuclear-weapon made an "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals", and committed themselves to a programme of "practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI". The NPT Final Document therefore provides a benchmark by which to measure implementation of Article VI. (See Appendix 1 below.)

UK Nuclear Capability

Trident is the most advanced and capable nuclear weapon system that the UK has deployed to date. The UK has procured four Trident submarines, each capable of deploying with up to 16 Trident II D5 missiles. With a range of over 7,000 km, Trident is capable of quickly reaching a much broader range of targets than its predecessor Polaris. Each Trident submarine is capable of deploying at least 128 Trident warheads. Unlike Polaris, the Trident warheads are independently targettable, allowing Trident to cover many more targets.

 

Table 1: British nuclear-armed submarine deployment since the 1970s
	1970s, Polaris	1980s-1990s, Polaris Chevaline	1994-1997, Trident, Conservative Policy	1998 onwards, Trident, Labour Policy
Submarines	4	4	4	4
Submarines on patrol	1	1	1	1
Missiles per submarine	16	16	12-16	12-16
Warheads per submarine	48	32	60	48
Submarine targeting capability	16	16	60	48

The UK describes Trident as "the ultimate guarantor of the UK's national security". The 2003 Defence White Paper states that the UK's nuclear deterrent capability is "likely to remain a necessary element of our security," and has announced plans to consider whether to replace Trident in the next parliament.[4]

How does this affect the UK's record on Nuclear Disarmament?

The UK argues that it has an "excellent record" in fulfilling its legal commitment under Article VI of the NPT. Government Ministers point highlight the following points:

"First, we have withdrawn and dismantled the RAF's freefall nuclear bomb, so that Trident is now our only nuclear weapons system. We dismantled the last Chevaline warhead in 2002, demonstrating our commitment to irreversibility in the reduction of the UK's nuclear weapons. We have reduced our operationally available stockpile to fewer than 200 warheads. That is a reduction of more than 70 per cent. in the potential explosive power of our nuclear forces since the end of the cold war-a significant development, in my view."

"We have also rightly reduced the readiness of our nuclear forces. A single Trident submarine is now on deterrent patrol, carrying 48 warheads. The submarine on patrol is normally on several days' "notice to fire, and its missiles are de-targeted. That, too, is a significant de-escalatory move. We have rightly signed and ratified the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. As I said, we continue to promote its early entry into force."[5]

Despite the figures, the UK's record on nuclear disarmament is very weak. It cites the dismantlement of weapons such as the WE177 free fall bomb and the Chevaline warhead, but these are weapons that had reached the end of their service life and were in fact replaced by the more capable Trident system.

Although the UK Government highlights a reduction in the "potential explosive power" of its warheads, qualitative improvements make this comparison somewhat misleading. Trident's greater speed, accuracy, and independently targetable warheads enable it to reach more targets than Polaris Chevaline, as Table 1 above demonstrates. As the Defence Select Committee noted in 1994, "Trident's accuracy and sophistication in other respects does - and was always intended to - represent a significant enhancement of the UK's nuclear capability. We have invested a great deal of money to make it possible to attack more targets with greater effectiveness using nominally equivalent explosive power".[6]

Far from effecting nuclear disarmament, the replacement of WE-177 and Polaris with Trident, represents an enhancement in the UK's nuclear capability.

Since the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the UK has made little or no progress in implementing the commitments entered into. Although the 2000 NPT Final Document was meant to provide a forward looking agreement, the UK's official statements on implementation of Article VI refer only to commitments made either in or prior to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and demonstrate no progress since then.

UK Nuclear Doctrine

Trident is intended to provide the UK with an independent nuclear deterrent. Trident was originally designed as a strategic nuclear system aimed at deterring the Soviet Union. However, in 1993 following the end of the Cold War Conservative Secretary of State for Defence Malcolm Rifkind announced that in future Trident's role would be to deter "potential aggressors" from threatening UK "vital interests".

To do this, Trident was assigned an additional "sub-strategic" role. Rifkind argued that:

"The ability to undertake a massive strike with strategic systems is not enough to ensure deterrence. An aggressor might, in certain circumstances, gamble on a lack of will ultimately to resort to such dire action. It is therefore important for the credibility of our deterrent that the United Kingdom also possesses the capability to undertake a more limited nuclear strike in order to induce a political decision to halt aggression by delivering an unmistakable message of our willingness to defend our vital interests to the utmost".[7]

Trident's strategic and sub-strategic roles are intended to demonstrate that the UK's deterrence posture is credible in a wide range of scenarios - that the UK is willing to use or threaten to use its nuclear weapons, if necessary. As Rifkind described it:

"Our analysis of deterrence, and the contribution of nuclear weapons to it, now has to relate to a new context. The basic ideas do not change. Deterrence is about sustaining in the mind of the potential aggressor a belief that our use of the weapons could not prudently be altogether discounted".[8]

Shortly after the 1997 General Election, the new Labour government reaffirmed the UK's commitment to retain a nuclear deterrent in the Strategic Defence Review. The Review stated:

[I]n present conditions nuclear deterrence still has an important contribution to make in insuring against the re-emergence of major strategic military threats, in preventing nuclear coercion, and in preserving peace and stability in Europe. [9]

It also noted that the Government needed "to ensure that [Trident] can remain an effective deterrent for up to 30 years".[10]

As part of the agreement under which the UK procures Trident missiles from the United State, UK Trident forces are assigned to NATO to be used for the defence of the Alliance "except where the UK government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake".[11] The UK is therefore committed to NATO's nuclear policy, which since the mid-1960s has been based on a doctrine of "flexible response".[12] One of the key elements of NATO's nuclear doctrine is that the Alliance refuses to rule out first use of NATO nuclear weapons, thereby allowing its nuclear planners to prepare for that option.

Similarly, the UK has always refused to rule out the first use of its nuclear weapons, in particular in cases where biological or chemical weapons may have been used. For example shortly after the 1997 election, then Minister of State Dr John Reid stated:

"The role of deterrence... must not be overlooked. Even if a potential aggressor has developed missiles with the range to strike at the United Kingdom, and nuclear, biological or chemical warheads to be delivered by those means, he would have to consider - he would do well to consider - the possible consequences of such an attack... It seems unlikely that a dictator who was willing to strike another country with weapons of mass destruction would be so trusting as to feel entirely sure that that country would not respond with the power at its disposal."[13]

An MoD report in July 1999 asserted:

"To date [1999] neither arms control nor export controls have been sufficient to prevent the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. We must therefore also seek to deter the use of biological and chemical weapons by assuring a potential aggressor of three related outcomes, namely that: their use will not be allowed to secure political or military advantage; it will, on the contrary, invite a proportionately serious response; and that those, at every level, responsible for any breach of international law relating to the use of such weapons, will be held personally accountable."[14]

It is highly questionable whether the use of nuclear weapons would be a proportionate response to use of biological and in particular chemical weapons.

And, following the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001, a new chapter to the Strategic Defence Review extended the role of nuclear weapons further to include deterring terrorist organisations:

"The UK's nuclear weapons have a continuing use as a means of deterring major strategic military threats, and they have a continuing role in guaranteeing the ultimate security of the UK. But we also want it to be clear, particularly to the leaders of states of concern and terrorist organisations, that all our forces play a part in deterrence, and that we have a broad range of responses available."[15]

The implication is that the UK is willing, if necessary, to use its nuclear weapons against states of concern and terrorist organisations, raising the question of how this could be done without also killing large numbers of civilians.

NATO and the UK's nuclear doctrine of refusing to rule out the first use of its nuclear weapons has been a major obstacle to progress on Negative Security Assurances - a long standing issue linked with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The 1995 NPT Review Conference agreed that "further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument."[16] However, since 1995 there has been no significant change in NATO or UK nuclear posture and consequently no further steps on negative security assurances.

The UK's policy on nuclear disarmament negotiations

The UK has always refused to enter the Trident system (or its predecessors) into nuclear disarmament negotiations despite requests to do so, arguing that such a move would be unnecessary, irrelevant or premature. I believe that this is not in compliance with the UK's commitment to pursue disarmament negotiations in good faith under Article VI.

During the 1970s and 80s, the UK repeatedly refused to enter its nuclear weapon systems into the disarmament negotiations of that time.

During the SALT I and SALT II talks in the 1970s, the UK's refusal to allow Polaris to be considered caused problems during negotiations. The Soviet Union repeatedly called for the ballistic missile submarines of US allies in NATO to be taken into consideration and argued that if "U.S. allies in NATO should increase the number of their modern submarines... the Soviet Union will have the right to a corresponding increase in the number of its submarines".[17]

When the UK first announced its decision to procure the Trident I C4 nuclear weapon system in 1980, the UK Government argued that Trident was compatible with its arms control obligations on the grounds that it was: "fully consistent with the terms of the SALT II Treaty"; that "the scale of our new capability will in no way disturb existing and prospective East/West relativities"; and that "Britain's strategic SLBM force lies outside the category of those United States and Soviet long-range land-based theatre nuclear forces about whose limitation the United States... invited the Soviet Union to negotiate".[18]

Similarly, when the UK announced that it was changing to procure the Trident II D5 system in 1982, it argued that Trident was not relevant to the then current INF and START negotiations. The Government argued that Trident was not relevant because these negotiations were "bilateral", aimed at achieving a "level of strategic parity" between the US and the Soviet Union. The UK argued that the "British strategic force will account for no more than a very small fraction of the total size of the strategic nuclear forces maintained by the United States and the Soviet Union". However, it added:

"If these circumstances were to change significantly, eg if Soviet military capabilities and the threat they pose to the United Kingdom were to be reduced substantially, we would of course be prepared to review our position in relation to arms control. But this point would appear to be a long way off."[19]

During the 1980s the end of the Cold War resulted in massive cuts to Soviet/Russian military capabilities, in particular reductions in nuclear weapons. However, the UK's response to these reductions has not been to review its position on nuclear weapons or to allow British nuclear weapons to be entered into disarmament negotiations.

In 1987, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed by Reagan and Gorbachev. The Soviet Union had tried to involve UK nuclear weapons in the INF negotiations, but the UK, backed by its NATO allies, opposed this. UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's response to INF was that she believed that nuclear arms cuts in Europe had gone far enough. "I will never give up Britain's independent nuclear deterrent", she told the media.[20]

As US and Soviet nuclear reductions gathered pace, rather than pursuing disarmament negotiations in good faith, according to the Defence Select Committee Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher "sought and received assurances from the United States that the supply of Trident missiles to the UK will in no way be affected by any future arms control agreement."[21]

In 1997 Labour was elected with an explicit manifest comment to press for "multilateral negotiations towards mutual, balanced and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons." The manifesto continues, "When satisfied with verified progress towards our goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons, we will ensure that British nuclear weapons are included in multilateral negotiations."[22]

Shortly after the election, the Government's Strategic Defence Review stated that, "The Government wishes to see a safer world in which there is no place for nuclear weapons. Progress on arms control is therefore an important objective of foreign and defence policy."

However, the UK continued to make negotiations on nuclear disarmament a long-term aspiration, rather than an immediate policy objective. The SDR states: "while large nuclear arsenals and risks of proliferation remain, our minimum deterrent remains a necessary element of our security,"[23] and it essentially rules out any further reductions in UK nuclear weapons until further reductions have been made by the US and Russia:

"Our own arsenal, following the further reductions described above, is the minimum necessary to provide for our security for the foreseeable future and very much smaller than those of the major nuclear powers. Considerable further reductions in the latter would be needed before further British reductions could become feasible."[24]

In the Labour Party manifesto for 2002, the commitment to nuclear disarmament had been toned down and rephrased to read, "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commits us to work for the global elimination of nuclear weapons," but gives no specific policy steps to achieve this goal.

Despite the reductions made by the US and Russia in the SORT Treaty of 2002, the UK continues to argue that the time is still not right for it to be able to enter nuclear disarmament negotiations. In his speech to the 2004 NPT PrepCom UK Ambassador David Broucher argued,

"We have consistently stated that when we are satisfied that sufficient progress has been made - for example in further deep cuts in their nuclear forces by the US and Russia - to allow us to include the UK's nuclear weapons in any multilateral negotiations, without endangering our security interests, we will do so."[25]

The implication is that 35 years after signing the NPT, the UK is still not ready and willing to pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament. Far from adopting a position in preparation of willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations, the UK has made it clear that it intends to maintain Trident for up to 30 years and is considering options to replace it. This is not consistent with the UK's commitment to negotiate in good faith on nuclear disarmament.

Appendix 1: Nuclear Disarmament Plan of Action, NPT Review Conference 2000

15. The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament': 1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 2. A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty. 3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years. 4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body. 5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures. 6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States Parties are committed under Article VI. 7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions. 8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency. 9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all: Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally. Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon states with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament. The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process. Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems. A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon states in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. 10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon states to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes. 11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. 12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament', and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996. 13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Endnotes

[1] House of Commons, Official Report, September 1, 2004, column 689W.

[2] House of Commons, Official Report, January 26, 1998, column 8.

[3] 'International Court of Justice issues advisory opinion on legality of threat or use of nuclear weapons', International Court of Justice Press Release, ICJ/546, July 8, 1996.

[4] 'Delivering Security in a Changing World', Defence White Paper, Ministry of Defence, Cm 6041-I, December 2003.

[5] Foreign Office Minister Bill Rammell, House of Commons, Official Report, March 24, 2004, Column 301 WH.

[6] HC 297 of Session 1993-94, p.xiv.

[7] Malcolm Rifkind, UK Defence Strategy; A Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons?.

[8] ibid..

[9] Strategic Defence Review, "Supporting Essay Five: Deterrence, Arms Control, and Proliferation", para. 5, The Stationery Office, July 1998. Also available on the web at: http://www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/essay05.htm.

[10] The Strategic Defence Review, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, July 1998, Cmnd 3999, The Stationery Office. Also available on the web at http://www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/index.htm.

[11] The British Strategic Nuclear Force: Text of Letters exchanged between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States and between the Secretary of State for Defence and the US Secretary of Defense.

[12] 'The Alliance's Strategic Concept', NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65, April 24, 1999.

[13] Official Report, House of Commons, 4 December 1997, column 577.

[14] Defending Against the Threat: Chemical and Biological Weapons, Ministry of Defence, July 1999, Chapter 3.

[15] 'THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW: A NEW CHAPTER', Ministry of Defence, Cm 5566 Vol I, July 2002.

[16] Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, NPT Review Conference 1995.

[17] ' INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS', Unilateral Statement by Minister Semenov, May 17, 1972.

[18] The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force', Defence Open Government Document 80/23, Ministry of Defence, July 1980.

[19] ' The United Kingdom Trident Programme', Defence Open Government Document 82/1, Ministry of Defence, Cmnd 8517, March 1982.

[20] Nicholas Ashford and Alexander Chancellor, "Arms reduction accord 'threatens UK deterrent", The Independent, 22 September 1987.

[21] 'Progress of the Trident Programme', 422 of 1987-88, HMSO, May 11, 1988.

[22] Labour Party Manifesto, 'New Labour: Because Britain deserves better', 1997

[23] Strategic Defence Review, Ministry of Defence, Cm 3999, July 1988.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Statement by Ambassador David Broucher, NPT Preparatory Committee 2004, Cluster I, May 3, 2004.